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SUMMARY 
The thesis operates upon the premise that there has been, in the 
course of the last two centuries, a radical transformation in narrative 
presentations of exceptional states of consciousness. It sets out to 
identify the main characteristics of the fictional transformation, and to 
situate them in the context of wider cultural shifts. I decided to rest 
my approach upon the relatively conservative sense that, roughly speaking, 
the structural and linguistic analysis of a narrative topos - that is to 
say the protagonist's madness - can elicit a clearer understanding of the 
changing, underlying dynamics and thematics of fictional works as they 
emerge over a given historical period. 
The thesis is set out in two parts; Part I explores nineteenth 
century uses of madness, and Part II compares and contrasts more recent 
treatments. The study of the different presentations of madness in 
fiction is organized diachronically for heuristic purposes, although the 
typological emphasis of the thesis must eventually take precedence over 
the imposition of a rigid historical framework. 
In the nineteenth century it is predominantly an intellectually 
marginalized kind of fiction (often termed 'gothic') which deals with 
exceptional psychic experience. It does so in a way which engages with 
the treacherous 'otherness' of mad experience, which is often aligned with 
the supernatural. In these texts the position of the narrator in relation 
to such phenomenon is of paramount importance. More recent treatments of 
'madness' display a tendency to undermine its 'otherness' and to move 
towards narrative identification with such states. 
The method of investigation functions upon several levels. In order 
to provide a constructive counter-perspective upon fictional treatments of 
madness and to forge the link with contemporary methodologies, the study 
commences with the narratological analysis of a work written by a 
(clinically diagnosed) psychotic author which has achieved the status of a 
classic within psychiatric, psychoanalytical and even recent cultural 
theory. The narrative structure of D. P. Schreber's Memoirs finds its 
equivalent in a kind of fiction identified in this thesis as 'paranoid'. 
Twentieth century clinical discourse increasingly has recourse to the 
very broad term 'schizophrenia' as a synonym for the outmoded term 
'madness'. The current emphasis upon linguistic concerns in the definition 
and location of psychosis allows the critical grouping of certain kinds of 
texts under the heading of 'schizoid', due to the discovery of analogous 
characteristics at work within their (anti)narrative strategy. Again, these 
terms are heuristically intended and cannot be scientifically precise. The 
thesis concludes with a discussion of the current centrality of a 
terminology of psychopathology to the ways in which fictionists, critics 
and theorists describe, prescribe and understand the 'postmodern' self and 
world. 
This project offers an overview of attitudes to madness as they are 
transformed in fiction in the course of a historical period. The way in 
which madness functions in these texts is, first of all, not only as the 
instrument of literary exploration but also as a means of transgressing 
boundaries between sanity and insanity. The period is crucial, further, in 
its radical transitional nature with regard to concepts of fundamental 
import for the novel form: most particularly, ideas of the 'self' and ideas 
of 'reality', as objectively stable or as sub. iective and illusory. For the 
fictional articulation of these, the topos of 'madness' serves as the 
ultimate measure. 
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This thesis originated in the observation that, in the course of the last 
two centuries, narrative presentations of madness have changed. On 
looking through the literature on the subject, it became apparent that 
there has been no specifically diachronic study of alterations in narrative 
technique in the fiction concerned. I therefore set out to identify the 
main characteristics of this transformation. In the course of my effort to 
build such a study certain paradigms or models emerged for the reading of 
narrative discourse in texts that deal with madness. The congruence of 
these models with more generalised shifts in literary practice suggested 
that the structural and linguistic analysis of a recurring narrative topos 
in the fiction of madness (the disturbed perception of a main protagonist) 
might contribute to a clearer understanding of the changing, underlying 
dynamics and thematics of fictional works as they emerge over a given 
historical period. 
The critic who wishes to examine literary works from the perspective 
of their treatment of madness may, however, negotiate an array of methods 
now available for this kind of study. These methods have already given 
rise to a variety of critical studies, the substance of which can be only 
briefly suggested here. In outlining these established modes of analysis I 
will attempt to indicate to what extent they have been influential in the 
development of the narratological approach undertaken in this thesis. 
The major critical stratagems for analysing madness in fiction tend 
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to belong to these main categories: socio-cultural criticism, psychological 
and psychoanalytical criticism, biographical criticism, philosophical 
criticism, or eclectic and productive combinations of these. Perhaps the 
most significant single text on the sub. iect is Michel Foucault's 
controversial Madness and Civllizetiom A History of Insanity in the Age of 
Reason (1961, translated in 1967) which eludes easy categorization, but 
which must now be taken into account by any critic attempting an extended 
study of literary interest in psychopathology. Foucault's attempt to 
reveal the ways in which an authentic, original and irrational level of 
awareness has been silenced or obscured by the functions of social 
institutions enlists madness in a cultural critique. He posits ways in 
which structures of power operating in Western society since the 
Enlightenment, founded as they are upon the 'progressive' discourses of 
science and reason, have subjected madness and the mad to mediation, 
distortion and suppression. This need to confine and control, Foucault 
suggests, is manifest in historical events such as the birth of the asylum 
and the gradual increase in power of the figure of the doctor and 
psychiatrist. 
This thesis is not, in the first instance, a general critique of 
modern culture and does not, therefore, take such thought as central to 
its methodology. The thesis does, however, engage with this mode of 
cultural critique where it has a bearing upon texts that may be construed, 
in their use of madness, as in some way founded in the anti-psychiatric 
tradition. Socio-cultural criticism which uses madness in its critique may 
also be seen partly as the legacy of R. D. Laing's popular hypothesis that 
schizophrenia is not an illness but the adaption of an individual's psyche 
to a dysfunctional society. This Laingian view has been widely influential 
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with regard both to later fiction and critical readings of texts which 
represent mental trauma. The investigation of madness as a form of 
cultural critique is, as a result, mainly treated in this study in relation 
to mid- to late twentieth-century literature. 
Within the domain of specifically literary criticism, Lillian Feder's 
broad-ranging study of the history of madness from ancient Greece through 
to the twentieth century (Madness in Literature) perhaps best exemplifies 
the combinative, eclectic approach mentioned above as one of the major 
methodologies used in the analysis of madness in fiction. Feder sets out 
to demonstrate that literary interpretations of madness, 
both reflect and question medical, cultural, political, religious, and 
psychological assumptions of their time, that they explore the very 
processes of symbolic transformation of these influences and disclose 
their psychic consequences in the minds of individual characters or 
personae (Feder 1980,4). 
Feder's subject, like Foucault's and Laing's, is, fundamentally, the nature 
of madness as a social product. Neither the very wide historical ambition 
nor the primarily sociological impetus of Feder's work provide a model for 
the following study, which neverthless belongs to a literary critical 
tradition which takes an interest in the range and extent of states of 
consciousness which a text can represent. 
On the other hand, criticism that starts from the psychological 
analysis of characters (the tacit basis of much traditional criticism), 
rather than from its own diagnosis of madness as social disorder, often 
contributes more to the elaboration of a richly textured and constant 
'human nature' rather than to the pro. iect of understanding the 'literary' or 
textual processes involved in the presentation of psychological disruption. 
This kind of criticism is not entirely appropriate for the analysis of 
'modernist' or 'post-modernist' works which set out to challenge precisely 
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such literary constructs as 'character', and to question the integrity of 
the conventional human sub. iect. For these reasons, again, such a method 
was not wholly suitable for this study. 
Another critical tactic, based on interest in authors known to have 
undergone psychotic experience and the 'resulting' psychotic qualities of 
their literary creations, draws upon the biographical dimension available 
to psychological criticism. A good example of this strategy at work is 
that of Gordon Claridge's Sounds from the Bell Tarr Ten Psychotic Authors 
(1990). Claridge seeks to equate the recorded psychic experience of the 
authors who are his subjects with elements of their published literary 
work, speculating as to the links between the individual psychosis and the 
roots of creativity. This seemed, for my purposes, to move analysis too 
far in the direction of conjecture as to the mental state of the author. 
Such a strategy makes tenuously substantiated claims, on the basis of its 
findings, as to the direct connections between the recorded mental state 
of the author and the form taken by their work. Sight is lost, in the 
process of such analysis, of the status of narrative productions as 
governed equally by textual convention as by individual control. 
Psychoanalytic literary criticism (which must include the work of 
Freud himself, the classic example of which is perhaps Ernest Jones's 
Freudian analysis of Hamlet, 1954) may set out to appropriate either the 
fictional character or the author as 'patient', the screen upon which to 
reinscribe the complex findings and constructions of this kind of clinical 
discourse. More recently, and with more sophistication, such criticism has 
sought to explore the links between 'madness' and 'literature' as they are 
forged in the relationship between 'psyche' and 'text'. Evelyne Keitel's 
Reading Psychosis: Readers, Texts and Psychoanalysis (1989) suggests that a 
-5- 
new genre may be identified in contemporary literature, definable as 
'psychopathography'. Combining aspects of psychoanalytical thought with 
reader-response criticism (specifically that developed by Wolfgang Iser) 
Keitel works toward an understanding of the psychic processes which 
emerge in the act of reading the psychopathography and argues that these 
recreate the psychotic emotional state presented in the text. Although 
this thesis does consider texts as constructs that involve the process of 
reception (a recognition which is not typical of early psychoanalytic 
criticism), its methodology remains rooted not in psychoanalytical but in 
narrative theory. 
Approaching the subject of madness from a different angle again, 
drawing upon both recent philosophy and psychoanalysis, Shoshana Felman in 
writing and Madness sets out to formulate the question that literature, 
'from its unique position, invites us to ask and that, from its unique 
position, it addresses to psychiatry, psychoanalysis, biology and 
linguistics' (1985,254). Felman takes as her sublects both fictionists and 
post-structuralist theoreticians, constructing a dialogue between them 
which reveals ways in which fiction and theory are engaged in deploying 
mutually informative uses of madness as a performative utterance rather 
than as a stable signifier. Through this pioneering endeavour certain 
literary texts become junctures for connecting specialized but divergent 
theoretical discourses, in order to generate another discourse which is 
concerned with the process of meaning production as it transcends the 
isolated literary text. 
The paradigms for the study of the literature of madness mentioned 
above are all, of course, important as antecedents to this study. However, 
I will neither be founding my discussion upon biographical evidence of the 
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'madness' of an author, nor starting from the language, logic and 
objectives of any discipline (the subject of which would only incidentally 
be literature) which would shift the focus of this thesis away from its 
emphasis on narrative. Nevertheless, the ground broken and the 
perspectives opened by several of the above writers, and related works, 
have been of enormous value in the writing of this study. 
I am interested in charting historically the narrative strategies that 
are used in fictional texts which 'give an account of' madness, and in the 
ways in which writing about abnormal psychological states enacts a process 
of transcribing the elusive and complex notion of madness. I wish to do 
this in a manner which does not begin by accounting for madness itself. 
My central proposition in this thesis is the idea that there are 
connections between certain kinds of narrative technique and the kinds of 
psychological disturbance presented in fiction. In order to gain sufficient 
latitude within which to differentiate efficiently between texts I am 
undertaking the investigation of texts across a historical period which 
allows clear distinctions to be made in terms of the changing modes of 
narration. Such works will, in turn, be viewed in the context of 
contemporary attitudes to, and conceptions of 'madness'. 
Using 'Madness' 
Any discussion of madness in literature which situates itself outside of a 
semi-biographical, a specific philosophical or a psychoanalytical 
perspective (each itself embedded in a particular social and historical 
context) must contend with the historical relativity of the term, its 
existence within a diachronic mode. Although readers have some idea as to 
what we understand by it, 'madness' turns out to be a cipher, a signifier, 
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the signified of which shifts as the word is itself shifted from one 
(linguistic, clinical, social, ideological, cultural, historical) context to 
another. There are some commonly held threads in this maze. Most current 
dictionaries. for example, will supply a variety of meanings for the word. 
These often emphasise its romantic connotations, ranging from the loss of 
reason, through manifestations of 'wild recklessness' to 'extravagant 
passion'. Unless used in the latter, somewhat metaphorical manner, the 
word 'madness' has become rather archaic. due perhaps to the fact that it 
has been abandoned by clinical vocabulary. The fact that formally it is 
generally acceptable to call a person 'insane' (literally - unhealthy) or 
'mentally ill'. but unacceptable to call such a person 'mad', is indicative 
of this shift in the nature of the term. The OED points out that 'the 
word has always had some tinge of contempt or disgust'; it ignores the 
romantic attraction of the term, but adds that the word madness 'would now 
be quite inappropriate in medical use, or in referring sympathetically to 
an insane person as the subject of an affliction'. 
However, within a literary context, madness of a sort that does not 
necessarily denote illness, but a kind of visionary or 'higher 
consciousness'. has traditionally proved productive as an idea or metaphor 
for writers engaged in exploring and interrogating their culture's 
imaginational borderlands. This has been the case at least since Dante's 
journey from darkness to enlightenment in The Divine Comedy. Shakespeare's 
representations of psychic extremity in Hamlet and King Lear raise the 
main protagonists' level of awareness beyond that of the other characters 
in the drama. Exceptional or visionary states of consciousness are central 
to Romantic ideology, to which Wordsworth's Prelude (1799), for example, 
bears witness ('Some call'd it madness - such indeed it was... If prophesy 
-8- 
be madness; if things viewed/ By poets of old time-May in these tutored 
days no more be seen/ With undisorder'd sight'. III, 147-155). The poetry 
of Blake. Coleridge, Keats and Shelley is similarly impatient of what they 
saw as the general acceptance of a psychological range of experience which 
was far too limited and limiting. A related use of madness is still 
present in much twentieth century literature (of a kind which is the sub- 
ject of this study). The links between madness and genius, psychological 
disorder and creativity, are among the folkloric foundations upon which, 
historically, literary movements (Romanticism', Surrealism2) and theoretical 
approaches (psychoanalytical and cultural criticism) have been constructed. 
From the middle of the eighteenth century, a focus upon madness and 
the irrational became a preoccupation in certain kinds of fiction, and this 
development is widely interpreted as a reaction against Enlightenment 
rationalism. Where Romantic poetry manifests a preoccupation with 
recognising and unleashing the most potent and enigmatic capacities of the 
imagination, the early Gothic novel (works, for example, by Ann Radcliffe, 
Clara Reeve, Horace Walpole, M. G. Lewis and C. R. Maturin) took this 
reaction deep into the realm of nightmare. moral outrage and perversity. 
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein (1818), a notable later example of this 
literary concerns may be seen as a critique of rationalist hubris, 
presenting the obsessed scientist justly pursued by his monstrous nemesis. 
However, the project will not start with a generalized analysis of 
types of literary uses of madness, whether as revelation, imaginational 
release or illness, but from the treatment of madness with regard to the 
integrity of the perceiving self as it is presented in a particular 
narrative discourse. For example, in The Divine Comedy (to cite a text 
which historically precedes the scope of this study), Dante may be said to 
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have been working within a world where exceptional psychic experience was 
still widely regarded as a mystical condition in which human consciousness 
potentially partakes of the divine, a state productive of truth and, 
paradoxically, reason. Though extraordinary, such experience does not 
threaten the constancy of the self within a God-centred world-view. 
Combining figuratively in his own person the usually distinctive roles of 
author, narrator and protagonist, Dante spoke from the late Medieval 
position not of a madman but of a prophet. His visionary experience is 
not presented as the occasion of a displacement of self, his narrative 
identity remains intact, bridging the abyss between the 'real' world and 
the 'other' world. The nature and significance of Hamlet's madness, on the 
other hand (whether 'real' or 'pretended'), registers a new conceptual 
complexity, turning upon the Renaissance questioning of the boundaries of 
'the self'. Within this paradigm madness is less likely to be disclosure 
than invasion. Hamlet plays upon the uncertainty as to where those 
boundaries should be drawn: 
... What I have done 
That might your nature, honour, and exception, 
Roughly awake, I here proclaim was madness. 
Was't Hamlet wrong'd Laertes? Never Hamlet 
If Hamlet from himself be ta'en away, 
And when he's not himself does wrong Laertes, 
Then Hamlet does it not, Hamlet denies it. 
Who does it then? His madness. If It be so, 
Hamlet is of the faction that is wrong'd; 
His madness is poor Hamlet's enemy. 
(Act V, scene ii, 1.176-185) 
This argument about accountability, rooted in the question of the subject's 
identity with his irrational or criminal behaviour, was still of the utmost 
social importance as the nineteenth-century began3. It remains so today 
in the domain of legal proceedings, though the reliance of this argument 
upon a possible clear distinction between sanity and insanity has, since 
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its inception, been questionable". The question of the constancy of the 
self when subject to psychic disturbance seems to present interesting 
difficulties for the writer of nineteenth-century fiction, who may exploit 
this uncertainty in experimenting with the relation between narrative 
perspective and the presentation of character and event. The problematic 
relation between the integral self and madness is raised and explored in 
the texts examined in this study: James Hogg's Private Memoirs and 
Confessions of a Justified Sinner (1824), Edgar Allan Poe's Narrative of 
Arthur Gordon Pvm (1838), Robert Louis Stevenson's 'The Strange Case of Dr. 
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde' (1886). 
These texts are viewed in the light of the emergent study of the 
mind as a substantial intellectual discipline. In the course of the 
nineteenth century, madness, whilst retaining its poetic fascination, 
apparently undergoes a process of alteration with regard to its treatment 
in literature. Recurrent narrative configurations demonstrate the extent 
to which it represents a challenge to the ability of rational discourse to 
account for it. The work of Sigmund Freud is often taken to mark a 
modern weakening of the general sense of the 'otherness' of madness, and 
its incorporation within the normal psychic mechanics of the self (however 
relative the term 'normal' may be). An index of the extent of Freud's 
influence in this normalization of madness arises in the fact that it has 
become difficult to think of Hamlet without being influenced by Ernest 
Jones's mediation of the reading of the play through the Oedipus complex. 
Freud's theory of the 'civilized' individual's traumatic psychological growth 
to maturity defeats Hamlet's politic defence, playing as this does upon the 
fundamental separateness of madness from a rational and inviolate self. 
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Significantly, madness Is not a term that is used frequently in 
Freud's vocabulary. The words that replace it (neurosis, psychosis, 
hysteria) point to particular forms of dysfunction which can be located 
within 'normal' psychic mechanisms. From this perspective, the accepted 
view of insanity may be thought of as moving from something of 
supernatural, or unnatural origin (and therefore alien to the self, the 
body and society) into something that has, by stages, been assimilated as a 
natural object within the discourses of knowledge which seek to define and 
interpret that self and that body. Clinically, madness has been, to some 
extent, relieved of its 'otherness'. Features of this conceptual change 
which moves madness from an enigmatic to a more 'domesticated' status are 
significant for this thesis. Narrative presentations of madness in the 
twentieth century must be examined in the context of this substantive 
shift in the account given of the self in relation to madness. 
In this era madness may still be used 'poetically' in fictional texts 
to denote the extraordinary or exceptional, but it has lost some part of 
its potency as a sign of that which exceeds knowledge or reason and 
threatens the maintenance of order. 'Madness' will be employed here, in 
its most general modern sense, to indicate states involving a loss of 
psychic equilibrium, as they are found to be represented in fiction. The 
'use' made of madness by the writers in question, as examined in this 
thesis, will depend upon the discursive presentation of such experience in 
the text, and the extent to which this effects narrative procedure, or 
indeed becomes an effect of narrative procedure. 
It is the concern of this thesis, as I have said, to examine the 
narrative techniques of fictional texts within a diachronic framework. In 
the nineteenth century, exceptional psychic experience is the subject of an 
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intellectually marginalized fictional genre often referred to as 'gothic' 
(in opposition to 'realist', which avoids the unfamiliar in the quest for 
verisimilitude). The texts chosen as a focus for analysis in part I may be 
termed 'gothic' and deal with such experience in ways, connected to the 
conceptual schema outined above. In these works madness is often 
apparently aligned with the supernatural, but not in any straightforward 
way. A profound ambiguity about locating the internal or the external 
origin of troubling phenomena gives rise to characteristic narrative 
structures and dynamics. In this study I will explore the elements and 
implications of the oblique procedures of these texts, which mark a 
historical boundary between the treatment of madness as perilously and 
challengingly 'other' and less diacritical post-Freudian explorations of 
aberrant psychological states. 
Later treatments of exceptional psychic experience examined here 
include Woolf's Mrs. Dalloway (1925), Beckett's Watt (1953) and The 
Unnamable (1953, translated in 1959) and Jeanne Hyvrard's Mother Death 
(1976. translated in 1988). These texts do not display either the 
ambivalence or the peculiar textual dynamics intrinsic to the earlier 
works. While a firmer location of madness in the exceptional mind of a 
central protagonist is in some sense achieved, transformations in narrative 
technique effect a distinct representation of madness which is ultimately 
antithetical to earlier treatments of the topos. 
Madness and Narrative 
To look now at the issue of narrative representation, an etymological 
. juncture at the root of the verb 'to narrate' (derived from the Latin 
'gnarus', knowing) links the experience or perception of phenomena to 
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knowing how to account for it. This link involves not merely the linear 
process of mind working upon matter, or subject upon object that is 
implied by the definition but also a hermeneutic circuit or psycho-textual 
economy constitutive of the capacity to generate homeostasis (which may be 
thought to require hypothetically constant forms of self and world). The 
literary convention of 'narrator' can be viewed as the embodiment of such 
a regulatory and interpretive psychic mechanism. Narrative is, in a sense, 
the expression of a fundamental ordering principle. Narration can be seen 
to function as a representation of an essentially cognitive activity. It 
does not only give an account of, but recognises or represents it, and is, 
in a profound sense, constitutive of experience. In the same way, perhaps, 
as the Cartesian narrative - ego cogita ergo sum - does not just give an 
account of consciousness but 'knows' it in the sense of 'creates' it for 
itself - represents it to the mind without it being necessary for it to 
refer to an a priori truth. 
However, traditional 'realist' narratives, and those narratives 
examined in part I which mimic - perhaps even ultimately parody - basic 
realist conventions, rely for their effect upon the temporary collusion of 
the reader with the supposition that narration involves an observing mind 
(personal or impersonal) giving an account of experience and events which 
have an existence beyond and independent of the means of representation. 
The internal coherence of the narrative appears to confirm its 
epistemological status as the representation of 'real events in the real 
world', which obey agreed laws of cause and effect. It also attests to the 
shared ability of narrator and narratees, and by extension writer and 
reader - the observing mind - to comprehend and organize ('read') 
phenomena. 
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One of the distinctive aspects of the nineteenth-century texts 
examined in part I is that they may involve more than one narrator. 
Several narrators may produce several more or less discontinuous accounts 
of the same events. This causes different kinds of disturbance; for 
example, the restoration of internal coherence of the plot may be become 
the precondition for the renewal of narrator/narratee as reliable cognitive 
categories. This destabilization seems to generate compensatory meta- 
narrative processes (both intradiegetic and extradiegetic, see note 5). 
Making connections and 'discovering' the plot take on an extraordinary 
importance on different textual levels. This process may be dramatized 
and exacerbated on the level of narration, for example, in terms of a 
narrator's con. iecture as to the origin of an 'unknowable' (supernatural or 
psychopathic) experience. In turn, this kind of conjecture becomes a main 
function of the narratee. 
This study argues in part I that the exceptional emphasis upon 
working to achieve a coherent plot bears similarity to mechanisms in force 
in the paranoid state of mind. These mechanisms are explored in chapter 
1, where Todorov's narratological theorization of the gothic text supplies 
an initial point of reference. He argues that it is the resolution of a 
profound hesitation as to the reality status of events in a text that 
constitutes the moment at which a text 'becomes' gothic. This hypothesis 
frames the analysis of a text that has been accepted and discussed as the 
locus classicus of paranoiac writing (I will say more about this below). 
The argument builds toward the identification of a kind of textuality 
that may be designated 'paranoid'. In a reworking of Todorov's idea it is 
suggested that the damage done in the process of narration to the 
operation of the cognitive function might elicit one of two responses in 
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the reader: the acceptance of what amounts to a 'negative capability', or 
the development of a 'hyper-positive' or 'paranoid' capability. The former 
is rendered problematic because it runs counter to the signalled processes 
of the texts to be examined. The latter, an essentially reparational 
activity, characteristically relies upon the heightened operation of binary 
logic, which is comparable again to paranoid thought mechanisms. 
The peculiar salience of this logic is posited as integral to the 
narrative process in these texts. Postmodern theory emphasizes the idea 
that dualism is the basis upon which Enlightenment epistemology and 
positivism is constructed (Foucault, for example, has argued that madness 
was positioned as the 'other' of reason in the eighteenth century, and 
therefore was that upon which the Enlightment pro. iect of rationality was 
founded). The challenge that both madness and the supernatural present to 
rational ideals and modes of thought may be seen to be demonstrated and 
enacted in these texts. Paranoid texts involve a variously impaired 
narrational or 'knowing' process which provokes a distinctive mode of 
thinking. The deployment of a cognitively destabilized (if not explicitly 
'mad') narrator is a significant feature of this type of writing. It may be 
said to contribute, under otherwise conventional narrative conditions, to 
the release of paranoid reading processes into the text. 
Part II proposes that, under different narrative conditions, the 
effect of such instability will alter. Some modernist texts, for example, 
may be said to inherit in a more radical form the processes that are 
problematized in the earlier texts. The reconstructive imperative notable 
in the texts discussed in part I is, it seems, replaced (or displaced) in 
the works under consideration in part II by gradations of a 'discursively' 
disordered or interrogative narrative process. Since these texts refuse to 
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establish unquestioningly the grounds signalled in the earlier narratives 
(the agreement that there is a stable external reality to be recorded, and 
this record governed by a stable narrator-function; the sub. iect/ob. lect 
dichotomy), the exposure of the more or less chaotic and productive 
processes of the mind - and consequently of language - provokes no 
reciprocal synthesizing activity from the narratee. In a sense, it is the 
disruption of the discours rather than the recit which characterizes these 
texts. With this in mind, I will examine these fictions under the heading 
of 'schizoid' texts, by analogy to schizoid mental states. Such states can 
be diagnosed via the identification of disordered discourses, and analysis 
of the texts will be preceded by a discussion of fundamental ideas in this 
field. 
In line with the early twentieth-century preoccupation with the 
limitations of sublective experience (which occludes the coherence of an 
external reality), textual disruption is more emphatically focused in the 
means of representation rather than in that which is to be represented or 
'known'. This may involve the employment of a narrator (or narrative view- 
point) manifestly unable to function adequately as such, a narrator whose 
experience is so disjunctive as to disable its own representation. The 
ideas of writers engaged in research into schizophrenic discourse and the 
mechanics of language (for example, those of Emile Benveniste) will be 
drawn upon here in order to open a perspective upon the discursive 
procedures of these narratives. 
Part II moves on from the analysis of early 'modernist' presentations 
of madness, to texts which engage in a more radical fashion with the 
precarious interface between language, subjectivity and representation. 
Theoretical points of reference include the work of Jean Jacques Lecercle 
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on language, Raymond Federman's proposals with regard to avant-garde 
writing, the ideas of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (their theorization 
of 'minor literatures') and theories of feminine writing. At this stage the 
thesis is interested in demonstrating the manner in which the fiction 
under discussion allegorizes or exhibits schizoid mechanisms and motifs. 
Further, it suggests ways in which this situates the works in the context 
of. wider theoretical concerns. Ihab Hassan noted, for example, the 
precedential nature of Beckett's work, saying, in The Dismemberment of 
Orpheus, that Beckett was 'a supreme example of the postmodern artist, 
turning the malice of language against itself' (1982,210). The discursive 
proximity of theoretical representations of postmodernist procedures to 
psychiatric representations of psychosis will be further pursued in the 
conclusion of the thesis. 
Before the focus widens in this way, however, the study goes on to 
examine how the presentation of madness In fiction may be used 
politically, by going beyond challenging conventional modes of narration, 
perception and representation. The final chapter of part II involves the 
close comparative analysis of two schizoid texts (Beckett's Unnamable and 
Hyvrard's Mother Death) which may be seen to deploy disrupted discourse 
and motifs of madness in the interests of achieving different, and 
arguably opposed, ends. Mother Leath introduces a specifically political 
deployment of the topos of madness. It is argued that the schizoid 
condition has become a metaphor accommodating critical and theoretical 
thought from very different domains, and with potentially conflicting 
agendas. The issue of whether politically motivated writing is finally 
undermined in the deployment of this metaphor is addressed. 
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Summary of Method and Structure 
The schematic deployment of particular texts in relation to spatialized 
distinctions that describe specific narrative procedures is viewed as 
requisite for the construction of an operable theoretical framework. In 
effect, the texts discussed as 'paranoid' or 'schizoid' should be understood 
to partake of elements of both paranoid and schizoid textuality, operating 
as they do at the limits of narrative endeavour. These terms ultimately 
describe functions of integration and of disruptive procedures which may 
be identified at work within the narrative economy of any literary text. 
They can also be seen as simultaneously opposed and inseparable modes of 
narrative procedure. The diachronic organization of the study is also for 
heuristic purposes, and will not be insisted upon. The typological 
emphasis of the thesis must eventually take precedence over the imposition 
of a rigid historical framework. The unique, avant-garde or retrograde 
elements within a text are preserved alongside its status as a 
historically confined discursive product. Nineteenth-century modes of 
thought and narration cannot be thought to have ceased during the 
twentieth century; likewise, the experimental techniques and intellectual 
concerns of the twentieth century cannot be thought to have had no earlier 
precedents. The inclusion of the study of a mid nineteenth-century text 
by Melville at the beginning of part. II ('Bartleby the Scrivener', 1856), 
followed by Charlotte Perkins Gilman's The Yellow Wallpaper (1892), derives 
from my intention to avoid a structure that is overly schematic, 
foreshadowing as these texts do much later treatments of madness. 
The formal method of inquiry is cumulative, and functions upon 
several levels. In order to provide a constructive analogue or 'control' in 
this investigation of fictional treatments of madness, part I commences 
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with the narratological analysis of a work written by a (clinically 
diagnosed) psychotic author which has achieved the status of a classic 
within psychiatric, psychoanalytical and even recent cultural theory; this 
work is D. P. Schreber's Memoirs of my Nervous Illness (1903)'. 
Schreber's Memoirs is treated, as far as possible, as a text which is 
open to investigation for its narrative procedures (rather than in terms 
of extant psychoanalytical readings). To my knowledge, there is no 
precedent for this kind of approach to the work. There are, of course, 
some difficulties involved in transforming what has hitherto properly been 
the subject of clinical analysis into the subject of literary analysis. The 
text moves into the literary domain encumbered and written over by a 
discourse which situates the text as object, as available for scrutiny but 
as having nothing to say to 'the sane' on our own terms. When viewed as 
the dysfunctional noises of madness, the product of a patient, the emphasis 
is necessarily upon the atypical and deviant in Schreber's writing, rather 
than upon those aspects which derive from conventional communicational and 
conceptual procedures. In a clinical context the onus would be upon the 
reader to discover what characterises the patient's discourse as 
psychologically impaired, and what features might function as an index to 
the nature and origin of that impairment. At the risk of placing 
insufficient emphasis upon the eccentricity of Schreber's text, however, I 
will be exploring it for what it reveals with regard to its deployment of 
narrative conventions. 
Analysis of the fictional texts in part I will refer back to this 
first chapter. In part II, fictional narratives will be investigated with 
regard to patterns and issues which emerge out of this discussion, and 
also with regard to their contemporary conceptual context°. Parts I and II 
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will be prefaced by a fuller introduction to the terminology and premises 
behind the detailed examination of the selected works. 
Finally, the project will be situated in relation to current critical 
practice. Discussion will take up the issue of recent literary trends 
involving the use of ideas about madness, which suggest its current 
centrality to the ways in which writers describe, prescribe and understand 
the 'modern' and 'post-modern' self and world. My interest at this point is 
not only in fiction, but also in the increasing critical fascination with 
psychological terminology. Critics ranging from Lionel Trilling,, Frederick 
Jameson1°, to Christine Brooke-Rose", have all identified what Georg 
Lukdcs once called an 'obsession' with psychopathology in modern 
literature's. There appears to have been a growing consensus regarding the 
significance of aspects of psychopathology across fiction and related 
writings, the progress of which seems nevertheless to have remained 
uncharted to date. References in criticism to links between extraordinary 
psychic states and particular kinds of writing sometimes appear to be made 
in passing. Beyond the frequent intimation of psychopathology's 
importance, any concurrence seems to dissolve. What, for example, might 
Terry Eagleton mean when he speaks of a consensus that the typical post- 
modern artefact is 'schizoid'? '2. What are the precise evidence and 
thinking that lead to the observation made by Shoshana Felman that 
'madness has currently become a common discursive place'4? 
Fictional interest in 'madness' since the nineteenth century seems to 
have been situated at the frontiers of an ongoing literary preoccupation 
with the exploration of the psyche'=. Those texts forming the basis for 
analysis in this thesis demonstrate a fascination with the obscure, 
subterranean realms within the self, and also with the power of language 
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to evoke states which offer access to these. Further, the way in which 
textual madness functions is, first of all, not only as the instrument of 
the literary exploration of extreme emotional states or the tapping of the 
springs of creativity, but also as a means of transgressing the boundaries 
between sanity and insanity. This correlates with a deeper cultural shift 
regarding the apprehension of madness. The period which limits the scope 
of this study is crucial in its radical transitional nature with regard to 
concepts of fundamental import for the novel form: most particularly, 
ideas of the 'self' and ideas of 'reality', as objectively stable or as 
subjective, illusory, even fictive. For the fictional articulation of these, 
the topos of 'madness' serves as the ultimate measure. 
PART I: PARANOID FICTION 
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INTRODUCTION: MADNESS AND GOTHIC TEXTS 
Views differ as to what constitutes a gothic text. And more 
hypotheses have developed around the enigma of 'madness'. Yet it is in 
the juxtaposition of these, in the unsettling effect engendered in reading 
by the evocation of exceptional states of consciousness in works that have 
been called 'gothic', that the peculiar textual force of the latter lies. 
Those texts to which I shall be referring have in common not only 
the presentation of apparently 'supernatural' phenomena - not perhaps 
sufficient in itself for designating a text as gothic - but the 
supernatural as the focus of interrogation, as the site of 'dis'ease or 
radical uncertainty. Manifestations of the supernatural, whether or not 
explicable as psychotic delusion, place both the integrity of 'self' and the 
world inhabited by that self in . ieopardy. 
The gothic quality of these 
texts may be understood to reside in a particular form of anxiety'. 
Vital contributions to the gothic debate are those launched by 
Tzvetan Todorov and David Punter. Todorov sees the gothic text partly as 
a temporal construct arising out of the reading process. He suggests that 
traditional gothic literature often adheres to his definition of 'the 
fantastic' only until it is resolved in one of two possible ways, at which 
point it actually becomes gothic: 
The fantastic... lasts only as long as a certain hesitation: a 
hesitation common to reader and character, who must decide whether 
or not what they perceive derives from 'reality' as it exists in the 
common opinion. At the story's end, the reader makes a decision even 
if the character does not; he opts for one solution or the other, and 
thereby emerges from the fantastic. If he decides that the laws of 
reality remain intact and permit an explanation of the phenomenon 
described, we say that the work belongs to another genre: the 
uncanny. If, on the contrary, he decides that new laws of nature 
must be entertained to account for the phenomena, we enter the genre 
-23- 
of the marvellous (1975,41). 
He proposes that we are generally able to 'distinguish, within the literary 
gothic, two tendencies: that of the supernatural explained-and that of the 
supernatural accepted' (ibid., 43). Punter stands in opposition to Todorov 
in that he understands the peculiar nature of gothic literature to be 
rooted in its fascination with, and psychological expression of, ongoing 
and unresolved conflicts predominant in the social context of such writing. 
Punter sees, it seems, Todorov's moment of hesitation indefinitely extended 
due to the interrelation between text and context. Todorov finds the 
gothic to be limited, generically and historically; Punter recognizes 
transformations of the form in much later literature. I would follow 
Punter's example both in locating the moment of gothic anxiety in the 
point of conflict or hesitation rather than resolution, and in pushing back 
the definitive boundaries of the genre. It seems to me that since its 
insurgence, though themes and motifs may have undergone a superficial 
transformation, gothic narrative has been sustained by the continued 
presence of 'taboo' in the Western psyche - those things which as Punter 
points out are both 'sacred' and 'unclean', which 'resist conventional 
explication', and arouse fear and fascination (1980,410). Madness must 
occupy a prominent place in that category. 
Although Todorov also notes that 'the sentiment of the uncanny 
originates... in certain themes linked to more or less ancient taboos' (1975, 
48), he is dismissive of the critical association of gothic fiction with 
fear. There are several conditions upon which a text may be considered 
fantastic. The first, the idea that 'the fantastic produces a particular 
effect on the reader - fear, or horror, or simply curiosity - which the 
other genres or literary forms cannot provoke' (ibid., 92), he argues 
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against, saying 'we shall not concern ourselves here with the first 
function of the fantastic, for it derives from a psychology of reading 
quite alien to the strictly literary analysis we are undertaking'. If we 
take such criticism seriously, he concludes, 'a work's genre depends on the 
sang-froid of its reader' (1975,35). What then if, as he seems to say, it 
depends upon the reader's peculiar need to bring about a resolution of 
contradictory elements by discovering /constructing a system of thought 
which will accommodate them? This suggests that a work's genre rests 
equally upon the reader's desire for tidiness. Conversely, David Punter 
proposes that 'exploring Gothic is also exploring fear' (1980,21); 'Gothic 
fiction has, above all, to do with terror'. He concludes that it is founded 
upon perplexity of the kind that Todorov feels must be resolved - evoking 
responses akin to paranoia: 
It seems to me impossible to make much sense out of Gothic fiction 
without continual recourse to the concept of paranoia. Many 
writers... can appropriately be seen as contributors to what we might 
call 'paranoiac fiction', fiction in which the reader is placed in a 
situation of ambiguity with regard to fears within the text (1980, 
101). 
There is, then, an apparent discrepancy here with regard to the place of 
fear, and the function of ambiguity in gothic fiction. We have two 
contrasting theories of the gothic; one which dismisses the presence and 
arousal of fear on critical grounds and enlists the idea of resolution (a 
text becomes gothic rather than fantastic only through the participation 
of the reader in its 're/writing'), and one which engages with the idea of 
fear and focusses upon unresolved ambiguity. Todorov believes that gothic 
literature becomes such when the reader formulates an opinion as to the 
extent of a narrative's conformity with the laws of reality; Punter 
suggests that the gothic writer insists that 'realism' is not 'the whole 
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story: the world, at least in some aspects, is very much more inexplicable 
- or mysterious, or terrifying, or violent than that' (1980,407). 
Both, however, concede that an element of perplexity as to the 
reality status of events on the part of the reader as well as the central 
protagonist is involved. Todorov points out that this perplexity is most 
successfully created when the narrator is also a character or witness of 
events (1975,86). As narrator, the speaker is invested by the reader with 
a certain amount of authority; as character witnessing supernatural or 
irrational events the speaker may be suspected of madness in the interest 
of the reader's desire to 'rationalise' such problematic phenomena. What 
he calls 'the psychology of reading' is not, I would suggest, a factor that 
can be considered separately from an analysis of the texts concerned here. 
Todorov does in fact rely heavily upon a different kind of effect that 
narratives must have upon the reader in order to fulfill their function as 
'fantastic' when he says that 'the fantastic is based essentially on a 
hesitation of the reader -a reader who identifies with the chief 
character - as to the nature of an uncanny event' (1975.157). There is a 
contradiction apparent in differentiating between the two kinds of 
reading-effect; I would suggest that they are connected and that both may 
be inscribed within the content and structure of a text. 
The term 'diagnosis' might be used to describe my approach here, 
though rather than offering a clinical analysis of a character or of the 
'reader' I am attempting to locate common characteristics symptomatic of 
something that differentiates these works from other works - their having 
a noticeably more 'disturbing' quality. However, one of the texts I shall 
be looking at has before been 'diagnosed', in the orthodox sense of the 
word - the Memoirs of Daniel Paul Schreber. This is a work that has 
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achieved the status of a classic within psychiatric disciplines. I propose 
that there are ways in which the Memoirs may be considered a paradigm of 
a species of text which might, to an extent, demonstrate a reconciliation 
of both Todorov's and Punter's suggestions. 
Schreber's story was understood by Sigmund Freud to furnish proof 
that its author conformed to his idea of a paranoiac. Schreber's Memoirs 
has since been the focus of analysis from both a clinical and a literary 
theoretical perspective 2. Its literary status could be considered that of 
'autobiography', or of a unique kind of gothic fiction, if the author's 
sanity were not in question; historically it is more than in question, and 
thus perhaps the text has no 'literary' status. Yet Schreber's narrative 
technique derives from, or possesses elements in common with those of the 
fictionalists I have mentioned. Freud, who was convinced of Schreber's 
psychosis, had only the text and not the man (contrary to the accustomed 
situation of psychoanalysis) for the purposes of his diagnosis3. The 
grounds for his diagnosis of a text, rather than of a person, are relevant 
to this discussion, in that the paranoiac's psychosis is structured, 
according to Freud, in a way that permits of no intervention or 
manipulation by an analyst. The paranoiac will 'only say what they choose 
to say, and it follows that this is precisely a disorder in which a written 
report or printed case history can take the place of personal acquaintance' 
(1979,138). The paranoiac individual inhabits his own complex and pre- 
established narrative so thoroughly that the analyst is left disabled. 
Schreber's text partakes of the characteristics of Todorov's fantastic 
fiction; it is riven with perplexity. It also meets Punter's description of 
a kind of text which presents and evokes terror, and might be called 
'paranoiac fiction'. It is a narrative of which the narrator is also a 
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character and whose authority/insanity is an issue foregrounded by the 
narrator himself. The kind of fear evoked is partly Schreber's own fear of 
insanity, and simultaneously of persecution by agents of unknown 
ontological status. The supernatural is thrown into doubt by Schreber's own 
insistence upon its 'naturalness'. This is founded upon his production of a 
fictional 'reality' which will accommodate his experience as natural, or at 
least undermines those mechanisms essential to the decision-making process 
whereby something comes to be considered 'supernatural', or somebody 
'insane'. Schreber appears to be addressing and challenging a reader who 
would not normally separate insanity from the perception of supernatural 
phenomena. 
Frequently loosely enlisted in the interpretation of the kind of texts 
that are called 'gothic', the concept of paranoia is not unequivocal; 
signification shifts between contexts. Strictly this word applies now to a 
form of psychosis (since the Schreber case was found by Freud to be its 
prototype). It is also associated with a peculiar operation of reason or 
logic. This study builds upon the collapsing of such contexts inferred by 
criticism, in order to identify and to some extent validate a possible 
point of contiguity. Todorov's critical resolution essentially involves the 
reader's spontaneous re-construction of the narrative's plot. Both Punter 
and Todorov emphasise the peculiar operation of the 'plotting' mechanism in 
gothic literature. Punter believes that for gothic writers 'complexity of 
plotting was necessary, because it was only for them that the process of 
suspense and release was an essential fictional mechanism' (1980,16). 
Todorov cites (in support of his own observations) Poe's emphasis upon 
composition and 'pre-established design' as exemplary of his 'theory of 
plot' in fantastic narrative (1975,86-88). The creation of plot also, as I 
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will attempt to demonstrate, is an essential constituent of Schreber's 
paranoia. Schreber's Memoirs will be treated as a prototypical example of 
the way in which fantastic or mad experience may be transmuted into 
narrative form. 
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SCHREBER'S MEMOIRS OF MY NERVOUS ILLNESS. ' A MODEL 
Schreber's Narrative 
The Memoirs were published in 1903, after Schreber had spent eight 
years in an insane asylum. In his introduction to the work he explains 
why he began to write. He had decided to apply for release from the 
asylum, and felt it necessary that people he would have to encounter in 
the outside world should have some understanding of the beliefs that 
caused him to think and act in a certain way. He is of the opinion that a 
full understanding of his experience will enlighten them, that an essential 
lack in people's knowledge of the universe will be filled. He is not only 
concerned that they should not embarrass him by treating him as mad, he is 
trying to endow his exceptional experience with a status correspondent 
with his reader's sense of reality. 
This is the purpose of this manuscript; in it I shall try to give an 
at least partly comprehensible exposition of supernatural matters, 
knowledge of which has been revealed to me for almost six years (1)'. 
These memoirs are not, therefore, simply a history, an autobiographical 
account. They have a double subject, they record both Schreber's 
experience and the nature and progress of his 'illness'. They combine an 
attempt at a linear narrative with a speculative commentary that is (from 
a sceptical or psychiatric perspective) formative in his illness and a 
'symptom' of his madness. Schreber's account draws upon both scientific 
and religious 'images and similes' (2) for the communication of what he 
believes happened to him, and in what terms it may be understood. In 
order to convince himself and other people that his experience is 'real' 
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(not the deluded imaginings of a diseased mind) Schreber decides that he 
must first change the conventional parameters of reality so that they 
encompass things that are otherwise considered unreal, or as real only 
within the domain of religious belief. 
He precedes the exposition of his experience (in Chapters I to IV) 
with an account of how he now understands the universe to function, and 
describes this in terms of the 'Order of the World'. He outlines 'God's' 
relationship to human souls (alive and dead) and the human body when 
things are operating in accordance with the Order of the World. 'God's and 
all created things material or immaterial are to be regarded as consisting 
in the stuff of 'rays' (strahlen), or 'nerves' (nerven) (Schreber 1972). 
'Nerves' are an instance of a kind of conceptual thinking which breaks down 
dualisms such as real/unreal, mind/matter, inside/outside. They are both 
material and immaterial, they constitute both the human soul in its 
individuality and its continuity with the external world through the 
registering of 'vibrations'. The human soul is 'contained in the nerves of 
the body' (45) and they are the medium through which everything is sensed. 
When the body dies these go to heaven. Heaven is structured 
hierarchically, Schreber explains, and goes on to relate the history of the 
soul as it undergoes forms of purification and stratification. 
God's interference in affairs outside of his heavenly jurisdiction is 
rare; after He had created everything, according to Schreber, God largely 
left the world 'to its own devices' (10) and merely provided sunlight to 
enable the continuation of life. However this 'miraculous structure' 
(wundervollen Aufbau) we are told has 'recently suffered a rent' (22). 
Somebody has committed 'soul murder' (Seelenmora). It is not at first 
clear who the murderer is, and Schreber professes himself unable to 
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'enlarge on the nature of soul murder' (58) (and the passage which follows 
this statement was omitted as unfit for publication). This attack on the 
nerves of (probably) his soul has occasioned a radical disturbance in the 
Order of the World. The nerve matter of God has become irrevocably 
attracted to the nerves of his body because of this damage and has thus 
been torn from heaven and his proper, central, overseeing and organizing 
place in the universe. Thus, Schreber reasons, the survival of the world 
has come to depend upon his own fate, God is neglecting His appropriate 
position by attaching Himself to one human being. Supernatural forces 
have intervened where they should not, the order of things has been upset. 
What would normally be considered out of this world' has become 
intimately involved in his own history. 
Schreber then relates what happened to him (visions, the hearing of 
voices, 'compulsive' thinking, somatic disturbance, spatial and temporal 
disorientation, the fear that he is losing his reason) in terms of 'divine 
miracles' (göttliche Wunder). 'Divine miracles' fit into the narrative 
schema in that they arise at different stages of his struggle with God. 
In trying to get free of Schreber, God attacks his physical and mental 
well-being. God is involved in a conspiracy to bring about his 'unmanning' 
(Entmannung, which, as Samuel Weber points out in his introduction to the 
text, implies 'the removal from the category of men', as well as 
emasculation; Schreber 1988,361). 'Unmanning' involves Schreber's 
transformation into the 'other', each the subject of taboo: physically he 
will be transformed into a woman, mentally, into a madman. God does not 
realize that by so doing, as Schreber says, he is making it more difficult 
for himself to escape the entanglement. Schreber, being actually more 
reasonable than God in this dis-ordered condition, sees that the survival 
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of the human race on the contrary now depends upon him becoming a woman 
and embracing God. Thus order has been disrupted on a cosmic scale. This 
elaborate imaginative construction has been understood, and still is, as a 
manifestation of Schreber's madness. 
Schreber's Narrative Strategy 
Schreber does not want to think he is mad, he does not think he is 
narrating madness, telling a story about madness or a mad story - and he 
does not want the reader of his text to think this either. 
My aim is to show the reader that he is not only dealing with the 
empty figments of a poor mental patient's fantasy... but with results 
which are the fruit of many years' hard thinking and based on 
experiences of a very special kind not known to other human beings 
(241). 
While he is writing he must therefore undertake various strategies that he 
believes will both destabilize the criteria for reading him as simply 
insane (produce a kind of aporia) and create different conditions, a new 
frame of reference, whereby his text is taken as a serious challenge to 
conventional patterns of thought. Schreber undertakes to problematize the 
difference between reason and madness, between what is objectively real 
and what the product of delusion, whilst proving himself capable of making 
such a differentiation; that is to say, sane. 
One of these strategies involves speaking from different positions. 
Different Schrebers may be located as the source of the narrative voice in 
the Memoirs the author (who is authoritative, socially respectable, 
educated, philosophical, sane) and the madman (who is 'nervously ill', tied 
to God, turning into a woman, and undergoing a Dantesque trial of 
supernatural experience which it is the duty of the other - Schreber as 
author - to reveal to the world). He relates, at one point, having felt 
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that he was two people; 
I retain some recollections which I can only describe in a general 
way, to the effect that I felt as if I myself existed for some time 
also in a second, mentally inferior form... In this second inferior 
shape, in which I myself retain the conscious awareness of having had 
lesser intellectual powers, I was told that another Daniel Paul 
Schreber had existed before me (72-3). 
Schreber isolates this experience as a confused memory, but this division, 
which is a precondition of the production of his text, is experienced in 
terms of problems in its exposition'. 
To deal first then with the ('mentally superior') controlling voice: 
objectivity is accentuated in his text because apart from being 
autobiographical, his 'memoir' also constitutes a social defence (of his 
sanity) - it is 'accountable' for its own veracity°. This creates a tension 
around his 'authorial' position. The narrative 'I' needs to be established 
before it does anything else as an 'authority'. Schreber issues a direct 
challenge to his reader to accept that, contrary to expectation, he is 
entirely capable of a reasoned explanation of his experience, perhaps more 
so than his most exacting audience. He asserts: 
If psychiatry is not flatly to deny everything supernatural and thus 
tumble with both feet into the camp of naked materialism, it will 
have to recognize the possibility that occasionally the phenomena 
under discussion may be connected with real happenings, which simply 
cannot be brushed aside with the catchword 'hallucination' (80) 
He has a theory which attempts to forestall conventional objection and 
explains: 
We are used to thinking all impressions we receive from the outer 
world are mediated through the five senses, particularly that all 
light and sound sensations are mediated through eye and ear... I 
receive light and sound sensations which are projected direct onto my 
inner nervous system (124, n61). 
This constitutes an attempt by Schreber to control or 'frame' his text 
within the context of a thoroughgoing scientific treatise, though he admits 
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that it is not scientific according to contemporary thought. He proposes 
an alternative 'truth' or reality that may be rationally communicated. 
Schreber devotes considerable attention to proving his scientific 
adequacy as the basis for establishing his respectability as narrator. In 
default of convincing his audience, he offers himself, his body, his 
madness, his text as an object intended for scientific observation and 
investigation, and initiates this process himself in his approach. The 
objective physicality of his body and his work will provide an 
unconventional kind of proof of the truth of his history: 
I believe that expert examination of my body and observation of my 
personal fate during my lifetime would be of value both for science 
and the knowledge of religious truths. In the face of such 
considerations all personal issues must recede... (iii). 
He attempts to use his body to conceal the fissure between natural and 
supernatural. 
Respectability for him as a narrator also involves his dissociating 
himself from any idea that he may be a poet or his experience 'fictional' 
(the work of creative imagination and as such entirely subjective)'-. 
Professor Flechsig (who treated him, and whom he believed to have 'secret 
designs' against him, 44), he tells us, must soon have realized that 'in me 
he was dealing with a human being of high intellect, of uncommon keenness 
of understanding and acute powers of observation' (35). At the beginning 
of Chapter 4 he asserts: 
Whoever knew me intimately in my earlier life will bear witness that 
I had been a person of calm nature, without passion, clear-thinking 
and sober, whose individual gift lay more in the direction of cool 
intellectual criticism than in the creative activity of the unbounded 
imagination. 
He also wishes to distance himself from the credulity of the religious 
believer, 
I occupied myself too much with the natural sciences, particularly 
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with works based on the so-called modern doctrine of evolution, not 
to have begun to doubt, to say the least, the literal truth of all 
Christian teachings... (63-64). 
In applying rational thought processes to delusion (science tends to have 
to consider religion as such) he already has a model. Contemporary 
thought had set up a conflict between the two which, if not resolved one 
way or another, could be thought of as resulting in a profound hesitation. 
As J. Hillis Miller has said of nineteenth century fiction, 'the battle 
amongst various forms of belief and unbelief was fought within each 
individual mind, or more precisely, within each individual text' (1963,281). 
Schreber, however, sets about subsuming them into a third term - the 
cosmic order of his text; 'man must reconcile himself to the fact that 
things exist which are true although he cannot understand them' (2). 
He is attempting to problematize the unreality of what he perceives. 
His text also undermines the sanity of the perceiver. However, the fact 
that he is able to be objective even about this contingency is disarming. 
Schreber institutes what may be seen as a 'splitting' mechanism in the 
production of his text. As a reader of his own experience he assumes a 
critical stance in relation to his 'insanity'. He speaks from a position 
that he recognizes is officially regarded as mad -a term which carries 
with it the inference that he should not be able to distinguish the real 
from the unreal, or the rational from the irrational. Yet he contrives to 
speak from outside of this mad self, in order to prove that he can make 
such a distinction. He gets 'out of his mind' (pare/noid). The conditions 
of his writing are linked to the paradox of his madness. 
However, the split is problematic from the moment of the inception of 
his narrative. He may be defeating his own cause by communicating subject 
matter of such an incredible nature that even he cannot be certain of its 
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veracity. His narrating 'I' already feels menaced by the disruptive 
potential of the other, which is a threat to the satisfactory completion of 
his plan. Schreber writes; 
The difficulties are in part external and in part of an inner nature. 
In the first place in such an attempt I have to rely totally on 
memory, because at the time in question it was impossible to make 
notes; I had no writing material at my disposal, nor could I feel 
inclined to make written notes... Furthermore the impressions which 
rushed in upon me were such a wonderful mixture of natural events 
and happenings of a supernatural nature, that it is extremely 
difficult to distinguish mere dream visions from experiences in a 
waking state, that is to say to be certain how far all that I thought 
I had experienced was in fact historical reality... (65). 
The 'I' is also split in terms of its location in time and space. The 
authorial narrator imposes temporal and spatial coordinates upon events 
that subjectively lacked this orientation. He does this in order to 
emphasize his present position of sanity. However, despite his attempt the 
narration of the onset and intensification of Schreber's illness is 
accompanied by a gradual loss of touch with temporal coordinates. 
Schreber wishes to give a faithful record of his experience but also to 
maintain his objectivity at the moment of writing (which is a prerequisite 
for enabling the former) and an odd conjunction occurs. 
He begins with great attention to accuracy to establish the temporal 
framework of the progression of his illness; 
The first of the two illnesses commenced in the autumn of 1884 and 
was fully cured at the end of 1885, so that I was able to resume 
work as Chairman of the County Court at Leipzig to which I had in 
the meantime been transferred on let January 1886. The second 
nervous illness began in October 1893 and still continues... (34). 
From a position 'beyond' madness he speaks of a time when, though becoming 
deranged, his experience was still contingent upon the 'real' world and 
appropriates its measurements. As the story of his degeneration continues 
time is measured in days, nights, hours. By Chapter 6 time goes wild, 
The period I have been trying to describe in the previous chapter - 
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from about the middle of March to the end of may 1894 - assuming 
always that it was really a matter of a few earthly months only and 
not of centuries... (63). 
From here, time becomes slippery, confusing and irrelevant. Precision is 
used in a seemingly arbitrary way to pin down the duration of some 
particular hallucination to 'real' time and thus to reality. Spatially the 
'nervously ill" Schreber is radically polarized between knowing that he is 
in an asylum of which he provides detailed ground plans, violently 
'earthing' his narrative, and believing that he may not inhabit Earth at 
all, 
I lived for years in doubt as to whether I was still on earth or 
whether on some other celestial body. Even in the year 1895 I still 
considered the possibility of being on Phobos, a satellite of the 
planet mars... (76). 
A further complication is contingent upon the difficulty of being truthful 
and believed to be so when he is working from recollection. Schreber 
recognizes that he is creating, despite his efforts, a supremely unreliable 
narrator, 'infected' by the vicissitudes of memory and time. 
Conventionally, narration is a mode of writing which operates in the past 
tense and this kind of uncertainity need not be an issue. Present and 
past self must be split. However, Schreber's narrator is also split into 
'sane' and 'insane' self in this way; unable to 'take notes' (mentally or 
literally) when undergoing 'supernatural' experience, he relates how a large 
part of his 'nervous illness' manifests itself in the constant disruption of 
thought and speech processes by supernatural means. It is in the nature 
of nerves that they 'must speak', they are defined through language, but 
they also, for Schreber, cause language to get out of control. It is 
difficult for his 'mad' self to write anything other than nonsense. It 
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follows that if his speech is orderly he is not mad, but if he cannot 
represent these verbal hallucinations in a scientific fashion then it is 
possible that he has not been sane all along and that one part of him 
is/was mad; unless - and this he constantly falls back upon - the 
knowledge gained from such experience is ineffable in the traditional 
sense of the visionary (this, for example, is Dante's position in the 
Paradiso). Thus, by the appeal to ineffability, one mode of distinguishing 
reason from unreason is undermined, rewritten by Schreber in the same 
moment as he recognizes the division. 
The forefronting of the problem of representing abnormal experience 
in a normal and accessible manner disorientates by indicating that the 
experience referred to is potentially 'real' because potentially narratable. 
The experience is no less true because it is not yet fully representable 
in writing. Yet, as Jacques Derrida has said of the act of writing, 
By its essence the sentence is normal. It carries normality within 
it, that is, sense, in every sense of the word... It carries normality 
and sense within it and does so whatever the state, whatever the 
health or madness of him who propounds it, or who it passes through, 
on whom it is articulated. In its most impoverished syntax, logos is 
reason (1978,54). 
Schreber's instincts this far are sound - the act of writing immediately 
redeems madness from 'non-significant' chaos. In order to achieve its 
unsettling psychological effect the 'gothic' fictional treatment of madness, 
if it employs a deranged narrator, would need somehow to foreclose the 
awareness that normality of narrative form makes the sublect's state of 
mind appear less than abnormal. For Schreber writing is also a mode of 
salvation. Schreber's preoccupation with language - uncontrolled in his 
illness and controlled in his narrative - is an index to the functioning'of 
his psychosis; that language should 'pass through him', that he should 
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reconstruct himself in language is also part of reinstituting normality - 
reordering the world. As Freud says of the kind of activity that Schreber 
is involved in, building the memories of his hallucinations into a schema 
and a narrative, 'the delusional formation, which we take to be the 
pathological product, is really an attempt at recovery, a process of 
reconstruction' (1979,209-210). 
Schreber's Paranoid Logic 
Connected to the difficulties Schreber encounters in his effort to 
create the appropriate conditions for narration, a critical splitting 
mechanism also works on an ideological level. Splitting or doubling of 
identity occurs in the form of an insistent dualism. Schreber's delusions 
are centred upon the oppositions rational/demented, God/man, and most 
importantly for him, man/woman. Critical thought commonly posits the 
hierarchical binary opposition as the very root of making sense ('its 
methodological primacy would alone indicate its place as a fundamental 
operation of human thought and thus of human semiotic systems', says 
Jonathan Culler, 1975,15). The delusional content of Schreber's memoirs 
revolves increasingly around his relationship to God and God's desire to 
change him from a man into a woman in the cause of the salvation of the 
human races. To Schreber, being 'unmanned' is a condition synonymous with 
the loss of reason. The subversion of the 'normal' hierarchy of 
oppositions plays an important part in the way in which Schreber presents 
and understands his derangement as the product of a disrupted world-order 
and the abnormal machinations of 'God', which it is up to Schreber alone to 
redress, to be 'reasonable' where God is irrational. 
Normally God in His Sublimity retains priority over man, partly 
-40- 
Schreber suggests, by virtue of His elevated distance. However, in 
Schreber's case God has become 'tied to his person', brought down to, and 
below the level of humanity. Prior to this he has stated his view that 
the opposition mantwoman, according to the orderly state of things, is 
hierarchical ('the male state of blessedness was superior to the female 
state', 18)7. 
I feel I must protect the reader from possible misunderstanding. 
religiously minded people who are filled with the concept of God's 
omnipotence, omniscience and loving kindness must find it 
incomprehensible that God should here be depicted so lowly a Being 
that He can be surpassed both morally amd mentally by one single 
being. However, I must emphasize that my superiority in both 
respects is to be understood in the most relative sense. I maintain 
such superiority only as it concerns the condition contrary to the 
Order-of-the-world... in this respect I am both more reasonable and the 
better part (155). 
God's strange wish that Schreber become a woman at first seems to further 
upset the balance; it appears immoral and 'unclean' to Schreber. However, 
Schreber discovers that in order to reinstitute some form of balance he 
must submit - at least in part - to God's desire that he be changed into 
a woman. 
Now I could see beyond doubt that the Order of the World imperiously 
demanded my unmanning, whether I personally liked it or not, and that 
therefore it was common sense that nothing was left but to reconcile 
myself to the thought of being transformed into a woman (177). 
It is possible to see a rationale in Schreber's own'terms for this 
transformation in that the sacrifice of his masculinity is a gesture 
toward the reinstatement of order through hierarchy. To become female is 
to solve the problem of God's reprioritization. If God has been reduced to 
the level of Schreber the man, then Schreber as woman reinstates Him as 
superior, and realigns himself as the subject of patriarchal ideology and a 
theology which places Eve in relation to Adam as Adam to God; or as 
Milton's Paradise Lost persuasively states, they were 
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Not equal, as their sex not equal seem'd 
For contemplation he and valour formd, 
For softness shee and sweet attractive grace, 
Hee for God onely, she for God in him: 
His fair large front declar'd absolute rule 
(IV, 1.296-299,1980,222). 
These hierarchically arranged attributes are very much part of Schreber's 
vision, where intellect characterizes masculinity, and 'voluptuousness' 
(Wollust) femininity. To become partly female ('I could always be playing 
the woman's part in sexual embrace with myself', 285) paradoxically also 
reasserts the stability of his own identity. 
Schreber first recognizes the impulse toward transformation in terms 
of submission; he has the feeling that 'it must be really rather pleasant 
to be a woman submitting to intercourse' (36). The 'taboo' nature of his 
wish is in fact remembered by Schreber as a precursor to his breakdown. 
He begins to consider 'absolute passivity almost a religious duty' (127). 
Women achieve only an inferior level in Schreber's heaven because they are 
essentially sexual creatures, endowed with the 'soul-voluptuousness' 
(Seelenwollust) that God is now imposing on Schreber (who as a man 
possesses rather more intellectual nerves). 
Culler's investigation of how psychoanalytic discourse echoes this 
man/woman relationship, helps to disclose how the forefronting of this 
opposition is implicated in Schreber's attempt at self-cure; 
A deconstructive reading reveals that woman is not marginal but 
central and that the account of her 'incomplete sexuality' is an 
attempt to construct a male plenitude by setting aside a complexity 
that proves to be a condition of sexuality in general. The 
hierarchical opposition implies the identity of each term, and 
particularly the coherent self-identity of the male (1983,171). 
Paradoxically, the presence of God, the origin of this struggle, guarantees 
his sanity and his masculinity. God's presence also begins to demand the 
presence of His 'other' to accommodate him: that is, that Schreber become 
-42- 
feminine, develop 'voluptuousness'. Schreber then creates another self 
which is endowed with all the attributes that he understands to be 
feminine. This is a double self, a self which is conceived of as 'low' 
enough to place God high above him and separate, or simply 'other' in that 
he becomes his sexual others. Femininity as a term within the hierarchical 
opposition is the deviant other. For a man to be feminine in his desire is 
doubly deviant (in the cultural climate in which Schreber existed). 
However it is possible that Schreber's assertion of femininity within 
himself is actually the most reasonable and efficient solution to the 
problem of re-asserting the plenitude, unity, priority of masculinity in his 
system, and thereby partially restabilizing what he remembers as his 
former full, stable, rational identity. 
The idea of this doubling and concern with the 'other' is linked to a 
mirroring activity. Mirroring or doubling as a motif appears in many 
Gothic texts, and literary criticism has dealt amply with it elsewhere. In 
need only be said that it is fundamental to the structure and desired 
effect of Schreber's text, where he is representing himself as object (and 
not subject, see for example his discussion 'Concerning Hallucinations', 
306). Schreber uses it as a measure of reality", of the reality of his 
self and his experience as he understands it. He sees himself layed out 
in language as an object of his own gaze, and of others' V everything that 
happens is in reference to me. Writing this sentence, I am fully aware 
that other people may be tempted to think that I am pathologically 
conceited... ', 262). His Memoirs are a mirror, he sees himself therein 
objectified by science, possessing an integral body ('I consider that the 
transformations observable on my body may possibly lead to new scientific 
insights in this field', 205). He sees himself as other, as a woman, as 
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having a female Gestalt, as an object among other objects ('always rest my 
gaze on female beings, always look at female pictures, etc., '). As an 
object among other objects his reflection is at the centre of a 'real' 
world and a network of relations and connections. This, he finds, opens 
the door to endless 'speculation'. His writing is reflexive; the scientific, 
objective truth of his body represents the veracity of the text, and in the 
text he constructs his reality, and 'proves' the reality of God, 'All that is 
recorded in my book has led me to the certain knowledge of the existence 
of a living God. ' This entitles me to examine the relation between God and 
His created world from an entirely new point of view in the light of the 
supernatural impressions I received' (192). The necessity and implications 
of objective self-presentation and dualistic splitting are intimately linked 
to the 'paranoid' characteristics of Schreber's narrative. 
Narration and Paranoia 
Schreber has been called paranoiac. He is partially demented; he is 
able to reason with great intellectual acumen around matter that by 
somebody 'sane' would be considered mad. This split into a rational self 
that develops a critical standpoint upon a mad self takes place (his 
reasoning suggests) in the cause of wholeness, health, whole-someness. It 
is this logical self which is able to accumulate data from the experience 
of the self subjected to hallucination, and construct from it a rationale 
on a cosmic scale. Schreber thus aspires to being able to cure on his own 
terms (though not perhaps those of society) the symptoms of his 'other's' 
insanity. If a system is so constructed that hallucinatory experience has 
meaning within it, may be explained with logical coherence, then (his 
reasoning suggests) this experience is no longer irrational but rational. 
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By standing outside of himself, beside himself, parallel to himself, 
Schreber is able to build a frame, to develop a relation to reality. That 
which had threatened him with loss of reason, loss of manhood, loss of 
identity is now contained within this framework. Daniel Paul Schreber is 
at the centre of the universe, the focus of God's attention, at the centre 
of his new system, at the centre of his text, framed. Schreber's split 
enables him to control the irrational, and to re-define and delimit the 
self. Schreber frames himself, he signs his text, his 'memoirs'. The 
'delusional formation' re-establishes a sense of unity; 'the frame is what 
gives us an object that can have an intrinsic content or structure' 
(Culler 1983,195). His body is part of the frame. Mentally he positions 
himself outside of the body that suffers from persecution or hallucination, 
and posits these as enigmas yet to be explained by analysis within the 
con/text of a new system. 
Schreber's self-doubling then may be considered an attempt at the 
reinforcement of unity. It may also be seen as a response to the paranoid 
condition of being subject to the threat of sliding into the other. It is 
an exercise in differentiation, in finding unity in discreteness. Schreber 
feared that it was 'God's' Intention to transform him into a madman and a 
'harlot' (neither possesses an inviolate integrity, both are - in his mind 
- subject to penetration by external forces). Schreber the paranoid victim 
of persecution feels he must be 'unmanned'. However, a parallel Schreber, 
the author, the narrator, observer, the analyst finds that he can re- 
arrange the initial significance of such language by constructing an 
'integrative principle" 0. The split is not passive, a symptom (of the 
split-personality kind usually thought of as schizophrenic) but manifests 
itself as a strategy, a mode of thought and speech. It is active, caught 
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up in an urgent desire to mean, understand, classify and re-stabilize. It 
is a critical split where an objectified 'self' campaigns for hegemony over 
another chaotically experiencing self undergoing a loss of sense of 
identity. 
There is intrinsic to the structure of Schreber's text a delirium of 
interpretation. Reading/writing the text of his own madness he discovers 
a series of signs which he takes up as roads out of the domain of 'the 
fantastic' in which he finds himself and integrates them into a more 
stable conceptual network. 
Plot. Speculation and The Integrative Principle 
Schreber is confronted with an enigma which, unsolved, threatens the 
foundations of his very existence, 
I lived in the belief - and it Jr. still my conviction that this is the 
truth - that I had to solve one of the most intricate problems ever 
set for man and that I had to fight a sacred battle for the greatest 
good of mankind (146>. 
Trapped in uncertainty, he nevertheless cannot afford to hesitate. If he 
cannot resolve the conflict within the ordinary parameters of reality, he 
must undertake no less than to rewrite that reality. He needs to be able 
to understand what is happening to his mind and body", the only 
alternative is to die in despair, 'I could think of nothing else but that 
any manner of death, however frightful, was preferable to so degrading an 
end... ' (76). Madness threatens his life and its reverberations are cosmic 
in scale. He suggests that all created life is involved in a cosmic order 
and that his illness results from its being damaged C'This 'miraculous 
structure' has recently suffered a rent, intimately connected with my 
personal fate'). He needs to be able to explain why, as he believes, 'God, 
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whose power by rays is essentially constructive in its nature, and 
creative, came into conflict with Himself when he attempted the irregular 
policy against me, aimed solely at destroying my bodily integrity and my 
reason' (63, n. 35). 
His body, the frame of his self, his identity, his soul has broken 
through by means of nerves. Soul-murder has been committed upon a living 
body, he has not become insane. 'Nerves' may be seen as Schreber's 
rationalization for the breakdown of an opposition basic to his 'madness' - 
inside/outside. Death in life, what is outside penetrates within, what is 
inside escapes (into the 'heavens', in an activity known by Schreber as 
'tying-to-celestial-bodies', 173). God (and other agents) act upon his 
nerves from outside of him to produce miracles inside him - visual and 
verbal hallucinations C'In contra-distinction to these inner voices I hear 
outer voices. -However in both cases my nerves cannot avoid the sound of 
spoken words; the stimulation of my nerves follows automatically... ', 220) 
and disturbances in his normal bodily functions along with different forms 
of exquisite physical torture; 'since my nervous illness took the... critical 
turn, my nerves have been set in motion from without incessantly and 
without respite' (47). By constructing the 'normal' state of things, the 
Order-of-the-world, around the idea of 'rays' or 'nerves', he is able to 
posit his illness as the occasion of an abnormal state brought about by 
the wrong use of nerves. He thus fabricates and preserves intact a 
conceptual framework which gives his illness meaning. 
As he believes, 'everything that happens is in relation to me', he is 
'simply the human being around whom everything turns, to whom everything 
that happens is related and who therefore, from his own point of view, 
must also relate all things to himself' (197). Differentiation between 
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what is self and originates inside, and what is other and belongs outside, 
has broken down. His relationship to language and meaning is dependent 
for its efficiency upon this opposition as is his integrity. Re-centring 
his self, and in particular his body, by the creation and application of an 
integrative principle is a mode of regaining control over the production of 
meaning and thereby over his reason. His reading and writing the text of 
his experience in-corporates him. Schreber is speculating. He speculates 
in the sense that he is gambling his survival upon his intellectual 
capabilities, he risks having found a solution but not the right one, not 
the truth, he risks delusion. He is also speculating in the sense of 
looking in a mirror. The mirror is his text, the story of creation, his 
creation, his re-creation, the re-creation of the world - with a totality, a 
unity, an integrity which is the text's raison-d'etre. 
Schreber feels that he is a victim of 'compulsive thinking' which 
consists in 'throwing into [his] nerves unconnected conjunctions expressing 
causal or other relations' and it has forced him 'to ponder many things 
passed over by human beings' (228), to 'trace the causal relation of every 
happening, every feeling, and every idea' (229). Schreber's over-active 
intellectual faculties insist upon his fitting these 'unconnected 
conjunctions' into an explanatory conceptual framework - in the cause of 
homeostasis and the fear of dementia. His delusional exegesis is, though 
deviant in many ways, never far from a relation to widely recognized 
integrative principles, and he admits that such thought was attractive to 
him before his illness (230). To Schreber, to ask a question is to set a 
stone rolling down a hill and to cause an avalanche, 'an extremely simple 
observation under the pressure of compulsive thinking becomes the starting 
point of a very considerable mental task' (231). It is in the apparently 
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unorthodox, unbound and excessive rationalization of the most trivial, 
outrageous, fantastic or 'supernatural' (hallucinatory) of phenomena that 
pathology becomes manifest in this text. 
The subject of Schreber's text, his 'mad' experience, is treated in the 
narration in a manner concordant with 'fantastic' fiction in that he 
indicates that it is of supernatural origin and manipulates it into 
narrative form. The text as Freud interpreted it involves the exposition 
of a paranoid 'delusional system' (1979,209). Its schematic presentation 
means that although it was written by somebody certified as insane it is 
not mere gibberish and is susceptible to interpretation. The organization 
is part of the insanity, indicating that Schreber suffered from a 
paradoxically rational kind of madness. 
Effectively, however, simultaneously with recording his history, 
Schreber is transmuting his experience from the fantastic -a condition of 
complete disorientation - into 'the marvellous'; he has made the decision 
that 'new laws of nature must be entertained to account for the phenomena' 
(Todorov 1975,41). This brand of 'the marvellous' is in accord with what 
Christine Brook-Rose refers to as 'dogmatic' or 'speculative fabulation' 
(1981,81). (She notes that another work which deals with setting out a 
cosmic vision, Dante's Divine Comedy, fits this description). As Schreber 
reads his experience, however, to complicate Todorov's categorization, it 
enters the domain of the 'uncanny'. These new laws, operating as they 
appear to him to do in accordance with reason, mean that through the 
creation of his own conceptual framework he has found a rational (even, he 
believes, scientific) explanation for the events he relates. The new laws 
must be understood to apply to the 'real' world as a revised version of 
previous knowledge, and not simply as the 'supernatural accepted' in 
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Todorov's sense. This highlights a problem with Todorov's 'common sense' 
decision in that it assumes natural and supernatural to be signs with 
referents rather than signifiers whose signified shifts according to the 
signifying system to which they belong. 
Freud may also be considered to have read the text as uncanny (in 
Todorov's sense), because he himself has a new 'scientific' system of 
thought that explains the supernatural phenomena described by Schreber; 
the text is a product of paranoid psychosis's. On the other hand, as 
Freud admits, it may also be productive of paranoid psychotic thought 
processes in that his own explanatory system may be as delusional as 
Schreber's, or in other words, he returns us through his explanation not to 
a state of normality but to an order of the world which is, in its nature 
as constructed or fictionalized narrative, generically marvellous. Either 
way, Freud appears to respond to Schreber's narrative as Todorov implies a 
reader should to a fantastic or ultimately gothic text'. 
Schreber attempts, through the elaboration of a cosmic system, to 
encode a reading of his text as both 'marvellous' and 'uncanny'. Todorov's 
'genres' collapse into each other with Schreber's rampant reorganization of 
the lineaments of reality. His psychosis is manifest partly in a perpetual 
effort to inscribe closure and meaning into text and experience, driven by 
the fear of an annihilation of self in insanity. Schreber's treatment of 
his madness is most fundamentally storytelling. He is compulsively 
elaborating a tremendous plot, subduing everything he perceives to 
narrative form, to cause and effect, to the story of Schreber, God, and the 
fate of creation. 
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PLOTTING DAMNATION: JAMES HOGG'S PRIVATE MEMOIRS AND CONFESSIONS OF A 
JUSTIFIED SINNER 
Narrative Structure: The Double Account 
This is a work which has been called a 'masterpeice' of nineteenth 
century Gothic (Wilt, 1980). Punter observes that the primary object of 
the work is to investigate the 'extremes of terror', as he draws attention 
to Hogg's concern with setting up an experimental structure which is 
peculiarly effective - 'the audience is led, gradually, and sometimes 
hesitantly, into new territories where terror can have full rein, 
independent of the constraints of the real world' (1980,133-4). In other 
words, the work is not remarkable simply for the events it describes but 
for the narrative technique employed in achieving its disturbing effects. 
It has been selected for analysis because the 'memoirs' of the 'Justified 
sinner' prove to be an account of experience identifiable as psychotic, and 
because the mode of narration sustains, on several different levels, 
comparison with Schreber's. Punter has recommended that perhaps this work 
should be termed a paranoiac text, since it is very difficult to know 
'where the reader is situated in an encounter with a story of persecution 
told by the persecuted', and this forces us to react 'ambivalently' (1980, 
158). This section investigates the implications of such a suggestion, 
holding within view Schreber's strategies in the Memoirs. 
These 'private memoirs' do not constitute the text in its totality. 
The narrative of Robert Wringhim (the 'justified sinner') is central to the 
text, but is framed by an objective account of the events in which he 
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appears to be involved ('The Editor's Narrative'). Wringhim's narrative is 
preceded by a relation of what is known popularly about the course of 
Wringhim's life. Wringhim's mother (Lady Dalcastle) is a strict Calvinist 
and his (official) father a dissipated lord. His spiritual father (who, it 
is implied - and suspected by the Lord Dalcastle - may be his biological 
father) is also a strict Calvinist minister and Robert takes his name from 
him, following his mother's abandonment of the lord, and 'spiritual' union 
with the minister. Robert has a brother, George, who is staunch, upright, 
legitimate and aristocratic. Robert takes to dogging his brother's every 
footstep and publicly embarassing him. On attempting to avoid further 
persecution by his brother, George sets out for 'Arthur's Seat', a 'rocky 
precipice' (Hogg 1969,41). He is here confronted with what appears to be 
an oversized, demonic apparition of his brother's face, and then by his 
brother himself, and is 'confounded between the shadow and the substance' 
(48). Both accuse each other of being in league with the Devil, and fight. 
George spares Wringhim but is later found murdered in mysterious 
circumstances. Two women (the lord's mistress and a prostitute) then 
decide to look for the culprit where the law has failed to bring him to 
justice, suspecting Wringhim. The mystery is not cleared up however and 
it appears that more is happening than meets the eye, or more than the 
eye may comprehend. In the course of their attempt to uncover Wringhim's 
guilt they see him with a mysterious companion, who on the first occasion 
appears to be his dead brother George, and later somebody else whom 
Wringhim names Gil Martin - and who mysteriously vanishes from the scene 
as Wringhim attacks the two women who have had him under there 
surveillance. Lord Dalcastle has died following the news of the death of 
his son, and his property falls to Lady Dalcastle, who herself then 
I 
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disappears. Just as it seems Wringhim is about to be caught he too 
disappears. 
Wringhim's own narrative gives special emphasis to what he presents 
as moments of spiritual significance in his life. He relates the mental 
anguish he suffered before he had the assurance from his Calvinist 'father' 
that he was one of 'the elect', his elation afterward, and his encounter 
with a strange person - who seems to be spiritually and physically the 
mirror image of himself. His friend takes on an ambiguously satanic 
quality. It is not clear whether this person is real but oddly perceived 
by Wringhim, or supernaturally 'real', or only psychologically real - an 
hallucination. He persuades Wringhim that nothing can alter the fact that 
he (Wringhim) is elect and that he must commit horrible crimes in the name 
of God. This being names himself Gil-Martin, and incites Wringhim to 
murder his brother. Wringhim gives an account of the murder, which he 
then admits to be that of Gil-Martin, because he could not trust his own 
memory of the event. Wringhim comes to believe he has a double who takes 
over his life and body. He is later accused of having murdered his mother, 
but has no memory of having done so. He takes to wandering, still haunted 
by Gil-Martin. Having attempted to have his memoir printed in order to 
enlighten humanity, gain 'religious' fame and revolutionize. doctrine, 
Wringhim ends his narrative and apparently his life in a scene of intense 
psychological anguish and terrible phantasmagoria. 
His guilt has not been publicly established, and it is, in any case 
possible to feel, as David Punter says, that he has not been to blame for 
his 'misfortunes' (though what these consist in must remain uncertain) 
since Hogg has 'taken pains to demonstrate that he is, in any reasonable 
definition of the term, insane' (Punter 1980,156). However, it is, 
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perhaps, not quite this straightforward. 
Following the conclusion of Wringhim's memoirs, the reader is 
returned to 'The Editor's Narrative', which recounts the discovery of the 
manuscript of the memoirs when the grave is found and the body exhumed. 
This text exhibits a radically conceived version of the mechanism observed 
in Schreber's Memoirs. Schreber's narrative openly acknowledges its public 
purpose (his ambition to communicate his experience to people for the 
purpose of scientific or religious enlightenment). His problems lay in how 
to present to the public experience of an incredible, irrational subjective 
nature in a persuasive manner. These problems are 'solved', in a more or 
less subtle fashion, by the narrator's substitution of a private for a 
public language (he attempts to render such experience accessible by using 
religious, discourse). Wringhim's 'memoirs' on the other hand are presented 
as intensely 'private' ('there being a curse pronounced by the writer on 
him that should dare to alter or amend', 253). Perhaps the religious 
nature of its contents, untempered by an appeal to science, determine that 
they should be so. Wringhim's personal narrative is offered in terms of 
the history of his soul (when taking his manuscript to the press he 
suggests that it is a kind of Pilgrim's Progress). As is the case with 
Schreber, the plot seems to centre on a 'mission'; in Wringhim's view, the 
steps toward his salvation and the activity demanded of him once he is 
saved. A large portion of the text as a whole, however, does not however 
belong to the 'memoirs' but forms a public commentary upon them, or is 
designed to mediate their public reception. The expectation is encouraged 
that the first narration will constitute a detailed and coherent account 
that will substantiate or refute the claims of Wringhim's narration 'as 
written by himself' (title page of Wringhim's narrative). 
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The Editor presents himself as carrying out the task of repeating, 
reporting or 'recording' (1) an extraordinary history already known to a 
few people and to be made public by his efforts. The Editor is not 
representing the material as fiction but as fact. It is partly the product 
of public consensus, of 'history, justiciary records, and tradition' (92). 
On the other hand the documentary authority of the editor's narrative is 
not complete. The difficulties that Schreber noted of relating material 
that is likely to meet with an incredulous and condemnatory reception are 
present here as the editor comments that it has become the stuff of 
legend and folktale, and makes no great claims for it containing more 
truth than rumour ('to tradition I must appeal for the remainder of the 
motley adventures of the house', 1). 
In this text it is possible to see the objective/subjective strategic 
manoeuvres of Schreber's Memoirs crystallized out into two entirely 
separate accounts. Neither purports to be 'scientific' in nature, though 
the Editor assumes some of the authority of the historian. The split 'I' 
noted in Schreber's narrative (the 'I' that undergoes psychotic experience 
and the 'I' that takes on its objective, retrospective representation) here 
becomes two different narrators. Hogg's Editor says that he presumes to 
'offer no remarks', no commentary upon Wringhim's narration beyond calling 
it a 'document of a most singular nature' (93). He is merely providing an 
account of the events as they happened, and rendering it dramatic by the 
inclusion of large sections of dialogue as he has heard it reported The 
Editor's narrative persona does however provide some kind of discours, a 
public discourse, in the language that he uses. Though not without an 
undercutting humour, he is very much aware of tradition, custom, social and 
literary etiquette ('Sorry am I, that the shackles of modern decorum 
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restrain me from penning this famous rebuke... ', 15) and the 'gentleman's' 
code of behaviour. Wringhim's madness, or stories of satanic possession, 
are not easily freed from the 'shackles of modern decorum' (sixty years 
after the publication of this book Schreber was encountering problems with 
getting material in his memoirs published that was not considered 
'aesthetic"). The critical distinction here springs first from questions 
of legitimacy and illegitimacy rather than the distinction between the 
scientific and the fictional or poetic, or the sane and the insane. The 
issue of madness is here obscured by concerns of illegitimacy, with being 
outside of, and subversive of, the law. The Editor demonstrates a concern 
similar to Schreber's that the reader should ', fudge for himself' of the 
status and authenticity of the 'memoirs' (93). He speaks from within an 
articulate, educated register fully conversant with, and observant of the 
limitations imposed on man by society'. He is himself a 'legitimate' 
author; he subscribes to that realm of meaning structured by legal, 
political and class concerns. As might be expected his narrative focusses 
largely upon the unorthodox marriage between Lord and Lady Dalcastle, upon 
George, their 'legitimate' son and brother to the subject of the 'memoirs', 
and questions of property, inheritance, and criminal motivation. Robert 
Wringhim's narrative from the beginning emphasises that he was 'born an 
outcast in the world' (98). This nameless, unspecified Editor establishes a 
'commonsense' perspective on a text that he determines to be the work of a 
religious 'fanatic' rather than a madman. 
However, on the completion of Wringhim's memoir, the Editor questions 
the nature of the preceding narrative, and introduces a new sequence of 
events which he regards as yet more incredible: 
What can this work be? Sure, you will say, it must be an allegory; or 
(as the writer calls it) a religious parable, showing the dreadful 
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danger of self-righteousness? I cannot tell. Attend to the sequel: 
which is a thing so extraordinary, so unprecedented, and so far out 
of the common course of human events, that if there were not 
hundreds of living witnesses to attest the truth of it, I would not 
bid any rational being believe it (240 ). 
His expression of doubt and scepticism about the previous narration 
establishes him as a reliable witness to something even more extraordinary 
- which, however, like Wringhim's experiences, may or may not have taken 
place. In this sequel the Editor refers to a story in the Blackwood's 
Magazine of August, 1823 - written by James Hogg. The author uses his 
own name, a journal, a date to pin down his tale to coordinates of reality. 
However, the Editor questions the authenticity of 'Hogg's' account of the 
circumstances of Wringhim's death (gathered orally from local people who 
report somebody having been seen with Wringhim before he was found 
hanged) and of the discovery of his body a century later in an undecayed 
state. The Editor then sets out to prove its truth. Hogg's 'Hogg' may be 
seen, in sense, a ploy to 'defamiliarize' the fictional illusion, drawing 
attention 'illegitimately' to the reader's suspension of disbelief. On 
another level, though this 'Hogg' figure is related to neither the Editor or 
Wringhim in any way except as the discoverer of Wringhim's grave, the 
author is by sleight of hand supposedly real enough, as is Blackwood's 
Magazine (though the Editor refers to the magazine which contained the 
letter as being untrustworthy); this simultaneously endows the story with 
a new reality status. Having been to visit the grave himself the Editor 
then establishes 'Hogg's' authenticity, but in doing so he has placed the 
frame of the whole text (that agreement by which it is divided from 
'reality') under tension; it has been damaged. Instead of merely provoking 
uncertainty as to which version of events is the right one, Hogg assaults 
the implied reader's ability psychologically to engage with the work in the 
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customary manner. The text confronts us with two distinct versions of the 
'actual' writer; one whose historical reality we accept, and one whose 
fictional status we accept. Yet they cannot exist simultaneously, one 
counteracts the other. Neither is connected to the Editor, and it is the 
Editor who relates the events which lead up to the discovery of the text 
that has just been read. Objectification is again employed on a concrete 
textual level to re-endow the story with a three-dimensional reality. The 
text unearthed by the Editor is Wringhim's and this is 'proven' because the 
title page of Robert's account as it appears in the novel is reprinted, 
reinscribed within the Editor's narrative. 
The Editor also confronts us with two distinct versions of the 
central protagonist, and sets up a deluded/rational opposition which is 
nevertheless inadequate to a categorization of Wringhim's text. His 
concluding narrative ends with the comment that though the story does not 
appear to be 'consistent with reason' it could be considered 'authentic'; if, 
that is, the rational approach were taken that accepts Wringhim's narrative 
to be correspondent with 'traditionary facts' (254). Hogg appeals to the 
establishment of a consensus, and represents Wringhim (despite his 
irrationality) as a trustworthy witness to the events related in his 
account. On the other hand, Wringhim's subjective narrative, as it stands, 
may be the creation of a 'deluded creature' at the 'height of madness'. 
The 'reasonable' Editor desires not to be too closely associated with him; 
'I confess that I do not comprehend the writer's drift. It is certainly 
impossible that these scenes could ever have occurred, that he describes 
as having himself transacted' (254). The Editor's ordering principle in 
reading Wringhim's text has proved inadequate, things do not correlate, he 
cannot master it in a rational manner. 
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Narrative Technique- The Double Narrative and Cognitive Uncertainty 
The ordering principle operating behind Wringhim's narrative is 
dualistic and symbolic. Wringhim refers everything back to a black and 
white spiritual condition relative to salvation or damnation. The 
narrative eventually brings about the hierarchical inversion of this 
opposition. By the conclusion of the book the man who believes implicitly 
in the literalness of the Word has (if one is saved by absolute decree, 
one can never be 'unsaved'), precisely through the completeness of this 
belief, apparently been irrevocably damned. Those who are represented by 
him as profligate, ignorant or licentious then necessarily assume the 
status of the 'saved'. The text also renders the sense behind the Editor's 
irrational/rational opposition dependent upon the status of the 
supernatural, which remains ambiguous. 
Events prove to be equally focussed upon the idea of inversion or 
subversion of oppositions usually held in place by 'legitimacy' (social 
order, supplemented by the law of God). Hogg's Editor first reports an 
oppositional relationship between a pious woman and a profligate lord 
(Robert Wringhim's parents). The relationship gives rise to a series of 
deviant incidents and situations. The wife lives alone, mainly in the 
company however of her 'spiritual guide' - the Reverend Mr. Wringhim. 
Both suffer from a severe condition of Calvinist hubris ('How delightful to 
think that a Justified person can do no wrong! Who would not envy the 
liberty where-with we are made free? ', 13). The lord meanwhile takes a 
mistress into his house and lives openly with her. One son is born to the 
wife and acknowledged as lawful, 'another is born to her in far more 
dubious circumstances. Eventually the lawful son dies in a mysterious 
manner, and the other inherits the lord's estate, becomes legitimate, 
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though he is suspected of murder (a crime in both religious and social 
terms). 
The reinstatement of order and meaning in both narratives depends 
upon the solving of a series of enigmas. Each narration sets up a process 
of 'compulsive thinking', a kind of 'detective' approach to the problems of 
whether Robert's narrative is mad, whether Gil-Martin is the devil, whether 
Robert is a murderer, whether Robert is saved (from Robert's point of 
view), whether Robert is Robert. The mystery surrounding George 
Dalcastle's death is the focus of the second half of the Editor's narration 
(until still more suspected murders are added). The Editor posits God as 
the foremost key to the resolution of any enigma, any crime, any 
subversion of the natural order of things - He is the ultimate agent of 
the law; 
It is the controller of Nature alone, that can bring light out of the 
darkness, and order out of confusion. Who is he that causeth the 
mole, from his secret path of darkness, to throw up the gem, the 
gold, and the precious ore? The same, that from the mouths of babes 
and sucklings can extract the perfection of praise, and who can make 
the most abject of his creatures instrumental in bringing the most 
hidden truths to light (56). 
The late lord's mistress, Arabella Logan, becomes the instrument whereby - 
it is expected - the murderer of the inheritor of the old lord's estate 
will be brought to light. She feels that upon receiving the news of the 
death of his legitimate son, Lord Dalcastle has suspected the foulest play, 
She perceived that some strange conviction, too horrible for 
expression, preyed on his mind from the moment that the fatal news 
reached him, to the last of his existence; and in his last ravings, he 
uttered some incoherent words about justification by faith alone, and 
absolute and eternal predestination having been the ruin of his 
house (56). 
Miss Logan decides, 'I will spend my days, and my little patrimony, in 
endeavours to rake up and expose the unnatural deed' (57). She takes upon 
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herself the unravelling of the mystery of George's death. All is 'wrapped 
in darkness' but 'by dint of a thousand sly and secret inquiries' Arabella 
puts together a hypothesis concerning Lady Dalcastle, the deceased's 
mother; 'she had hopes of having discovered a clue, which, if she could 
keep hold of the thread, would lead her through darkness to the light of 
truth' (57). Through association with another woman she is able to 
reconstruct (as the Editor has done with the whole of the strange story) 
the events of the night of the murder. Where 'the law' has proved useless, 
Miss Logan expects to solve the mystery. She develops a theory that does 
appear to produce significant connections for the facts involved in the 
case so far; "'the murderer of the accomplished George Colwan has been his 
own brother, set on, there is little doubt, by her who bare them both, and 
her directing angel, the self-justified bigot. Aye, and yonder they sit, 
enjoying the luxuries so dearly purchased, with perfect impunity! "' (78). 
However all her efforts at deduction, all her surmises are shattered. The 
man who was killed, for whose murder she is seeking retribution, seems to 
be alive again. She, and Bell Calvert the prostitute, see him walking down 
a street with Robert Wringhim. 
At this point any ambiguity surrounding the physical reality of Gil- 
Martin becomes ill-founded, for Robert talks about walking with Gil-Martin 
in his own narrative, and there is the possibility that the two women 
mistook him for George. The women are not represented as entirely 
reliable witnesses by the Editor; they are emotionally and imaginatively 
extremely reactive (Mrs. Logan 'uttered a loud cry between a groan and a 
shriek, and fell down on the floor', 'she had scarcely ever well recovered 
out of one fit before she fell into another... ', 81-2). As objective 
witnesses, two women (who are operating outside of the law, and are 
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unlawful - mistress and prostitute) may be supposed to be considered 
unreliable (and associated with the rumour and folktale dimension of the 
tale mentioned by the Editor). On the other hand, Gil-Martin's 
supernatural quality is substantiated. The devil is traditionally thought 
to assume different forms, and Robert has related how Gil-Martin admits to 
this ability. The 'detective' nature of the narrative shifts - with the 
women's version - from a social, realist, legal basis to the a more 
epistemologically uncertain ground: What is naturally lawful? What mistaken 
perception? What hallucination? The two women are left once more in 
confusion; 'their conversation was wholly about the dead, who seemed to be 
alive, and their minds were wandering and groping in a chaos of mystery' 
(84). 
The Editor's introduction to Wringhim's narrative, then, offers not 
only one unsolved mystery where it has promised resolution, but two; who 
committed the murder and who/what is young Wringhim's friend who looks so 
uncannily like the murdered man? ('my thoughts are less about him than the 
extraordinary being who accompanies him' Arabella says of the suspected 
murderer, 90). If what they have seen is unnatural then that must be 
consequent upon the original nature of the crime; in the case of certain 
crimes God takes a perverse attitude to discovery and retribution; "If 
there is an earthly crime", said Mrs. Calvert, "for the due punishment of 
which the Almighty may be supposed to subvert the order of nature, it is 
fratricide"' (90). 
The objective narration, in the voice of Miss Logan, questions the 
criteria presumably held in common between the 'realist' editor and the 
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reader he addresses. Insufficient empirical evidence and explanation is 
abandoned in favour of an implied understanding of the mysterious ways of 
God in achieving victory over evil. Instead of representing reason, the 
Logos, stability, God himself brings into the text the unnatural (and 
'legitimizes' the reality of the supernatural). When her habitual cognitive 
methodology breaks down she shifts to a mythological and hypothetical 
conceptual framework within which her intuitions can operate. She 
abandons the rational, deductive, process. If, she reasons, we subjectively, 
empirically perceive something of an unnatural or irrational character it 
is nevertheless so; "'we have nothing but our senses to depend upon, and 
you and I believe that we see a person, why, we do see him. Whose word 
or whose reasoning can convince us against our own senses"' (85). Here 
she begins to sound like Schreber claiming reality status for his 
hallucinations. By her affirmation Miss Logan nevertheless institutes 
Cartesian doubt. The appearance of the supernatural means that God is no 
longer benevolently rational but is suspected of subverting his own order. 
The normal process of reasoning through accumulation of fact and 
hypothetical connection is perverted; 
I shall suppose, therefore, that there is, not a true God, who is the 
sovereign source of all truth, but some evil demon, no less cunning 
and deceiving than powerful, who has used all his artifice to deceive 
me. I will suppose that the heavens, the air, the earth, colours, 
shapes, sounds and all external things that we see, are only illusions 
and deceptions which he uses to take me in (Descartes 1968,100). 
This demon might be Gil-Martin. He is the third factor which throws the 
enigma/solution process into confusion. The investigative activity is 
turned back upon itself, a new process is initiated whereby the elements 
and principles for the elaboration of the detective riddle must first be 
solved. The murderer's own account follows, and the condition for the 
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solution to the original mystery becomes the problem of discovering the 
laws of its solution. The text is apparently abnegating its 
responsibilties to the reader whose activity has been invoked by presence 
of the 'Editor'. 
The pattern of connections with which we have so far been provided 
by the Editor for the formation of the correct hypothesis are of a dubious 
nature, and not sufficient support for the encounter with a tale told by a 
potential 'fanatic', or hallucinating madman. Neither is it helpful for the 
inquiry to discover Miss Logan's valorization of the subjective over the 
rational and objective. For a solution, and retribution, to be achieved 
satisfactorily there must be a consensus. Retribution according to the law 
is not a private but a social event, dependent upon consensus and 
objectivity, but the possibility and security of these has been undermined. 
Clive Bloom has said of 'detective' writing that 
the tale is not the tale of the teller but of the reader (reading 
itself abolished by becoming a form of 'listening' to a narrator 
guide). Detective writing in the nineteenth century is therefore a 
continuing tale of what it means to be read: a constant search for 
meaning among a jumble of signs and signals patterned as if random 
yet always concentric, a concentricism guided by and organised within 
the mind of the detective (the eccentric outsider) upon whom the 
responsibility or organisation and revelation rests (1986,81). 
The mind of the detective works in symbiosis with the mind of 'the reader'. 
Bloom goes on to say that once the crime has been solved the original 
orderliness of the world is restored, 'society is rendered safe only when 
the detective also is rendered impotent, his analytic rage spent, (for the 
detective is obsessive and professionally paranoid)' (ibid., 89). In the 
case of Hogg's Sinner, however, the opposite occurs. The Editor's narrative 
solves nothing and adds a further 'crime' (against natural, as well as 
legal law). 'Society' is not safe, the detective 'rage' is doubled. 
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Wringhim's Paranoid Logic 
Wringhim's narrative, the core of the text, might be expected to provide 
the means of allaying this rage, but the terms have been altered. Where 
Mrs. Logan's account has damaged any objective perspective upon events, 
Wringhim's subjective narrative is invested with a new legitimacy. From 
the common-sense angle it has been suggested that God has taken the 
subversion of his laws into his own hands. Wringhim then launches into an 
account of his obsessive hypothesizing about the problem of the operation 
of God's laws. Boundaries between Wringhim's fanaticism or delusion, and 
normality seem to be breaking down. He needs to believe in a universal 
plot, a comprehensive system to which all the 'individual processes of life' 
(as Schreber says) must be referred, and he finds this in Calvinist belief. 
Christianity offers an archetypal detective story that provides a framework 
for Robert's experience: as'the Editor has already said, God is the agent 
by which all crimes will be brought to light. The criminal here is man, he 
must receive retribution for his sins, must atone for them, in the name of 
divine order. At the end of his account Robert describes how he was 'hung 
by the locks over a yawning chasm, to which I could perceive no bottom' 
(239). Psychologically, perhaps, the state of being elect, as in the case 
of Schreber becoming the object of God's attentions ('I became in a way 
for God the only human being', Schreber 1988,262; but God's newest plan 
involves destroying his reason) is actually something like this. The 
condition of knowing one exists in a (particularly Calvinist) Christian 
universe demands suspension above eternal damnation. Life is given 
meaning by obsession with death, salvation by damnation, God by the devil. 
Calvinism represents an enigma to Wringhim. Either every action is a 
sin, or it is mapped out and preordained by God in his eternal plan. His 
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story from then on may be interpreted as a search for the solution to this 
problem. Beyond the questions of who committed murder, whether delusion, 
God or the supernatural is at the heart of the crime, further fuel for the 
analytic 'rage' is being added to the text: it is a philosophical problem 
that Descartes engaged with: What is the normal order of the operation of 
God's laws? What is the relation of the individual to the rest of creation? 
Is the individual God-like? To be elect is to assume a central role in His 
plot, to find meaning and stability in existence. An outcast of social 
meaning structures, Robert searches for identity in an abstract system of 
a paranoid nature. Robert's reading and writing of his experience in terms 
of Calvinist doctrine is all-embracing and begins - he believes - before 
his birth. His identity depends upon it. Before his election he is a void, 
a hole, a chaos, a non-being, an entity marginalized from existence. He is 
not born until he is saved and named in the 'book of life' (115). His 
birth depends upon his entering and becoming central to a system that 
generates its own significance; 
I come now to the most important period of my existence, - the period 
that has modelled my character, and influenced every action of my 
life, - without which, this detail of my actions would have been as a 
tale that hath been told -a monotonous farrago - an uninteresting 
harangue-in short, a thing of nothing. Whereas, lol it must now be a 
relation of great and terrible actions, done in the might, and by the 
commission of heaven. Amen (114). 
He reconstructs a world and an identity along Schreberesque lines. He 
places himself at the centre of a cosmic plot. Wringhim needs to believe 
that he is 'saved', one of God's elect, perfect and complete, that nothing 
he can ever do will threaten this completeness. At first he knows himself 
to be a sinner, an outcast from God's elect - liable to end a nothing, 
unnamed, in hell; 'I lived in a hopeless and deplorable state of mind; for I 
said to myself, "if my name is not written in the book of life from all 
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eternity, it is vain for me to presume that either vows or prayers of 
mine, or those of all mankind combined, can ever procure its insertion 
now"' (100). Robert is 'utterly confounded at the multitude of [his] 
transgressions' and informs us 'I was sensible that there were great 
numbers of sins of which I had never been able to repent, and these 
momentary ones, by a moderate calculation, had, I saw, long ago, amounted 
to a hundred and fifty thousand in the minute' (107)2. 
The narrative of Robert Wringhim, the 'justified sinner' is the 
history of a sub. lectivity which cannot be convinced of its wholeness until 
it has produced an 'other'. As an 'illegitimate' person (unacknowledged by 
his father) Wringhim discovers in the Calvinist notion of election a 
legitimacy that transcends that of his socially legitimate brother George. 
He becomes obsessed with antagonism toward George as his profligate, 
dissolute, 'unsaved' counterpart. Where George excels socially Robert 
behaves in the most anti-social manner imaginable to him. He attempts to 
provoke George into the 'wicked' behaviour of attacking his own brother, an 
account of which is provided by the Editor's narrative ('he seemed courting 
persecution', 24) and thus establishing publicly and privately his own 
righteousness and authenticity. In Wringhim's narrative, however, a second 
double plays a larger role, Gil-Martin. 
Gil-Martin at first poses an enigma to Robert, being nameless, 
homeless, and obscurely powerful. When Robert is told by his Calvinist 
surrogate father that he has finally entered the number of God's elect he 
is triumphant, 'I wept for Joy to be thus assured of my freedom from all 
sin, and of the impossibility of my ever falling away from my new 
state... my whole frame seemed to be renewed' (115-6). All his sins he 
counts as 'blotted out' now that he is an 'accepted person' (108). At this 
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point he encounters what has the appearance of his own imago, an entity 
that is to exist side by side with him, and partakes of his own identity; 
'What was my astonishment on perceiving that he was the same being as 
myself' (116). Robert develops a problematic relation to his external 
appearance that suggests that Gil-Martin could be a delusional double, a 
subjective delusion. When Gil-Martin first appears Robert reports that 
those people who see him (Robert) claim no longer to recognize him. He 
appears transformed, no longer recognizable, 'my mother and reverend father 
kept insisting that I was an altered youth, changed in my appearance, my 
manners, and my whole conduct' (127). Later Robert displays a radical fear 
and alienation from his own mirror image. At the height of his 
persecution by demonic phenomena he fears to see there the reflection of 
the schism that he senses within himself. 
I not only looked around me with terror at every one that approached, 
but I was become a terror to myself; or rather, my body and soul 
were terrors to each other; and, had it been possible, I felt as if 
they would have gone to war. I dared not look at my face in a glass, 
for I shuddered at my own image and likeness (227). 
However, interpretative doubt is again introduced when George, Robert's 
legitimate brother, is found petrified between Robert and his dreadful 
mirror image. He sees the apparition in a mist, 'the face was the face of 
his brother, but dilated to twenty times the natural size... ' (41). On 
turning to encounter his brother in the flesh, George confuses the imago 
with the reality, 'being confounded between the shadow and the substance, 
he new not what he was doing or what he had done' (42). Robert reports 
that on their first aquaintance Gil-Martin informs him; 
You think I am your brother... or that I am your second self. I am 
indeed your brother, not according to the flesh, but in my belief of 
the same truths, and my assurance in the same mode of redemption, 
than which, I hold nothing so great or so glorious on earth (117). 
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Anxiety is created in Robert and the reader as to the nature of this 
apparition. Though at first it looks as if it were the reflection of 
Robert's wholeness and perfection, it is actually amorphous. Robert is 
told that the stranger can assume the likeness of anybody he thinks about 
(125). He prefers to remain nameless, but as Robert cannot converse with 
a nameless person he calls himself Gil-Martin (129). Robert produces the 
hypothesis that he is the Czar Peter of Russia, 'having heard that he had 
been travelling through Europe in disguise'. From the moment of this 
revelation Gil-Martin's existence is totally coherent with Robert's 
megalomaniacal and beseiged world view. Gil-Martin as a national ruler 
takes on the characteristics of a crusader, justifying murder in the fight 
against the forces of evil. Robert has 'thence-forward great and mighty 
hopes of high preferment, as a defender and avenger of the oppressed 
Christian Church, under the influence of this great potentate' (130). His 
conviction of this fiction grows until it forms the parameters of his 
understanding of his life, 'I had now no doubt that he was Peter of Russia. 
Every thing combined to warrant the supposition, and, of course, I had 
resolved to act in conformity with the discovery I had made' (133). 
Robert spends all his time in the company of this being discussing 
Calvinist doctrine. Then he becomes ill, 
I generally conceived myself as two people-this occasioned a 
confusion in all my words and ideas that utterly astounded my 
friends, who all declared, that instead of being deranged in my 
intellect, they had never heard my conversation manifest so much 
energy or sublimity of conception; but for all that, over the singular 
delusion that I was two persons, my reasoning faculties had no power 
(154). 
He falls increasingly under the influence of the mysterious and sinister 
Gil-Martin. Urging doctrine to its wildest extremes Gil-Martin convinces 
Robert that it is his duty to murder in the name of God, and Robert then 
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murders his brother. Eventually Robert believes that his body is 
periodically usurped by his strange partner for the purpose of committing 
atrocities. His companion turns into a persecutory phenomenon. Gil-Martin 
informs him; 
Sooner shall you make the mother abandon the child of her bosom; nay, 
sooner cause the shadow to relinquish the substance, than separate 
me from your side. Our beings are amalgamated, as it were, and 
consociated in one (189). 
Robert feels himself to be completely overpowered by a being whose 
objective existence is doubtful. 
I can in no-wise describe the effect this appalling speech had on me. 
It was like the announcement of death to one who had of late deemed 
himself free, if not of something worse than death, and of longer 
continuance. There was I doomed to remain in misery, subjugated, 
soul and body, to one whose presence was become more intolerable to 
me than ought on earth could compensate' (189). 
Eventually Robert is hounded to suicide by his other. Robert's desire 
for completeness, for absolute certainty has been expressed in the form 
and discourse of his demonic counterpart. At first Gil-Martin appears to 
be an ideal member of the inviolable elect, the purveyor of perfect 
doctrine. He answers all questions, in the style of Schreber's paranoid 
logical voice. He provides an account of the elect Robert and all that he 
believes in, giving him a sense of solidity and truth. He then proceeds to 
test this language to its limits. With the supposed intention of teaching 
and convincing Robert of its rock-like (Czar 'Peter') veracity, he empties 
it of meaning. 
Avoidance of the question that never ceases to unravel would have 
preserved Robert in a state of complacent ignorance. Gil-Martin practices 
a form of meticulous inversion. Whilst affirming Robert's identity to be 
of superior significance he is also suggesting that he may as well be non- 
existent. Robert is replaced in the same position of ineffectuality as he 
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had been when he had despairingly watched his sins multiply before his 
eyes. The only way to convince himself of being in control of his 
existence had been to be, actively, a sinner. Gil-Martin 'deconstructs' the 
semantic network that sustains his new state as a 'justified' sinner and 
reveals to him his state of non-being, of existential damnation; 
Now, when you know, as you do, (and as every one of the elect may 
know of himself) that this Saviour died for you, namely and 
particularly, dare you say that there is not enough of merit in his 
great atonement to annihilate all your sins, let them be as heinous 
and atrocious as they may? And, moreover, do you not acknowledge 
that God hath preordained and decreed whatsoever comes to pass? 
Then, how is it you should deem it in your power to eschew one 
action of your life, whether good or evil? (126). 
Robert's double becomes persecutory, undermining the system within which 
Robert has interpreted his experience and seen himself created as subject. 
Whereas Schreber's paranoid activity involved the splitting into an 
analytical self which ordered the delusions of the other into a logical 
'reality', Robert's obsessional self relates to an other which analyses his 
faith into psychopathy, who 'overthrows all religion and revelation 
together; ..., jumbles them into a chaos, out of which human capacity can 
never select what is good' (132). Though posing as his saviour it is clear 
to Robert that Gil-Martin is inflicting punishment upon him, for his state 
of confusion and indecision with regard to complete submission to Gil- 
Martin himself. It is never clear, the further Robert sinks into this 
infernal, nightmarish world, how much is fanatical delusion and how much 
to be taken as 'objective truth'. 
It is possible to compare the persecution of Robert with that of 
Schreber. David Punter proposes that, 'Wringhim is clearly progressively 
subject to a religious mania with close affinities to recognizable forms of 
schizophrenia' (1980,153). (Presumably Wringhim is not identified as 
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paranoiac here since paranoia is often clinically viewed as a form of 
schizophrenia, itself used more or less interchangeably with 'insanity' 
generally. ) Internal destruction effected from outside seems to signal a 
complete loss of control within the subjective self. Self-destruction, and 
death at the hands of his double, blur into the same thing, and it is not 
certain whether the impulse originates from inside or outside. Gil-Martin 
says to Wringhim, 
I have attached myself to your wayward fortune... and it has been my 
ruin as well as thine. Ungrateful as you are I cannot give you up to 
be devoured; but this is a life that it is impossible to brook longer. 
Since our hopes are blasted in this world, and all our schemes of 
grandeur overthrown; and since our everlasting destiny is settled by 
decree which no act of ours can invalidate, let us fall by our own 
hands, or by the hands of each other; die like heroes.. throwing off 
this frame of dross (234). 
'God's' persecution of Schreber also involves the endangering of his own 
existence ('What is to become of God - if I may so express myself - 
should I die. I am certain that the whole relation into which God brought 
Himself to our earth and to other human beings rests at present upon the 
particular relationship that exists between Him and me', Schreber 1988, 
291). Robert's tortured 'frame' coincides with the collapse of his 
Calvinist belief that he is elect, the former architectonics supporting his 
identity. There is a moment of struggle when (as happens in the case of 
Hyde over the body of Jekyll to be discussed later) his double strives for 
the attainment of power over his self; 
I have been buffeted as never living creature was. My vitals have 
all been torn, and every faculty and feeling of my soul racked, and 
tormented into callous insensibility. I was even hung by the locks 
over a yawning chasm... (239) 
In this state of torture Robert repeats a prayer told to him by the 
demonic Gil-Martin and is 'instantly at liberty' (239). Thus he Is no 
longer suspended but damned; that is if we are to believe Gil-Martin to be 
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the Devil, or the devilish other of this paranoiac's God. It is interesting 
to compare this language to Schreber's; 
I may say that hardly a single limb or organ in my body escaped 
being temporarily damaged by miracles, nor a single muscle being 
pulled by miracles, either moving or paralysing it according to the 
respective purpose... (Schreber 1988,148). 
Curiously this splitting and persecution, and what looks like dis- 
integration, keels over into a renewal of of a perverse kind of order and 
unity. 
I am wedded to you so closely, that I feel as if I were the same 
person. Our essences are one, our bodies and spirits being united, 
so, that I am drawn towards you as by magnetism, and wherever you 
are, there must my presence be with you (Hogg 1969,229). 
Instead of being eternally elect Robert recognizes himself to be 
irrevocably damned. He becomes 'solemnly pledged' to Gil-Martin. His 
'faith' in his paranoid delusional system remains intact, but Robert has 
assumed another sublect position within it. Schreber also recognizes that 
out of the persecution and suffering will come a new status for his 
identity, he assumes a different position in relation to God and God 
regains something of his traditional detachment and superiority; 
There must be an equalizing justice and it can never be that a 
morally unblemished human being with feet firmly planted in the Order 
of the World should have to perish... the reward of my victory could 
only be something very extraordinary for my loyal perseverance in the 
struggle for my reason and for the purification of God.. (Schreber 
1988,292-294). 
Schreber is more fortunate than Robert in his relationship to a 
supernatural double; however, each delusional integrative principle is 
preserved through this rationalization of the experience of internal 
disintegration. 
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Plotting Damnation: The Text 
Wringhim's narrative in Hogg's Confessions concludes with the approach of 
the Devil (presumably, in the form of Gil-Martin, 'his stern face blackened 
with horrid despair', 240) and with Robert's intended suicide. In Robert's 
own mind there is no mystery and no doubt left. The text does not, 
however, end here. The Editor first appears again with a display of 
scepticism. Further mystery is indicated and further attempts made to 
solve it. Robert's suicide has become legendary locally for the 
particularly difficult manner in which it was carried out, 'every one said, 
that if the devil had not assisted him it was impossible the thing could 
have been done' (242). The grave of the suicide is then repeatedly broken 
into as a result of curiosity. More witnesses are accumulated. The Editor 
is the last to see the body before it disintegrates on contact with the 
air. Beyond Robert's testimony, the veracity of the story has yet to be 
proved with evidence of his 'natural' death in order to bring about 
closure. 
The clue is supposed to lie in his grave as to whether he really was 
the victim of supernatural persecution or a madman. The opening of the 
grave discloses two new enigmas. Over a century later Robert's body has 
not disintegrated, 'this man's corpse has been miraculously preserved frae 
decay, a hundred times langer (sic) than any other body's' (252). Finally 
it is Robert's narrative that becomes the greatest mystery into which we 
must search for the truth, 'But now I could wager a guinea, it has been 
for the preservation o'that little book. And Lord kens what may be in't! It 
will maybe reveal some mystery that mankind disna ken naething about yet' 
(253). The cycle of disruption of the normal, designation of mystery and 
spiraling interpretation begins all over again. 
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Robert's version did not come to light until the opening of his grave 
and the discovery of his manuscript because when he took his memoirs to 
the printer for publication the text was destroyed. It was destroyed, 
Robert says, because the Devil was seen in the printing house ("Surely you 
are not such a fool', said I, 'as to believe that the devil really was in 
the printing office? ", Robert is told, 223). Robert deduces who it 'really' 
was, and that Gil-Martin 'had visited the printing house in order to 
furthur the progress of my work'. That work is now an object in his 
reader's hands. Whether it is the Editor, or actually a malignant demon 
that has enabled it to be there is a mystery. In order not to succumb to 
the madness of the latter belief the text must be reread to prove that 
Robert is mad. The 'analytic rage' is perpetuated. 
The Editor, as reader of Robert's text, proposes the theory that the 
writer 'wrote and wrote about a deluded creature, till he arrived at that 
height of madness, that he believed himself the very object whom he had 
been all along describing' (254). The text exploits the basic criteria for 
discriminating truth from delusion (objectivity/subjectivity), and is 
structured in a way that determines the reader will read and read about a 
deluded creature until all possibility of objectivity is undermined. I 
would suggest that the text is, in fact, so designed as to make it 
difficult for its reader not to become 'the very object' whom he or she has 
'all along been reading about'. Bloom has said that the 'responsibility of 
organization and revelation' rests in the mind of the 'detective'. However, 
the 'signs and signals' within this text promise only the revelation of 
another mystery 'that mankind disna ken naething about'. In a sense, the 
situation of the reader is itself not sufficiently distinguishable from 
that of the persecuted; the mode of narration prevents the resolution of 
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questions left unanswered by the text, but that state of irresolution 
(rooted as it is, in the false choice between a story of the supernatural 
and paranoid delusion) was what initiated the writing of Schreber's 
Memoirs. This perpetuation of perplexity, the 'continual suspension which 
keeps us engaged' (Punter 1980,158), is an effect of 'paranoid textuality'; 
a fprm of writing about madness that releases the mechanisms of that 
madness4 not only from the confines of character and into the mode of 
narration, but beyond this, into its reading - where differentiation 
between 'writer' and 'reader' has been undermined, and equally implicated in 
the provocation to account for the unaccountable. 
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PLOTTING THE UNEARTHLY: EDGAR ALLAN POE'S THE NARRATIVE OF ARTHUR GORDON 
PYM OF NANTUCKET 
The Narrative Structure: Internal Disiunction 
In his analysis of some of Poe's shorter tales George E. Haggerty proposes 
that Poe 'is perhaps the first tale-writer to demonstrate the affective 
power of paranoia... Even though we realize that the narrators are mad, we 
are incapable of resisting the horrifying force of what in their madness 
they relate' (1989,105). The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket 
is, perhaps, one of the least criticized of Poe's works. Poe is most well- 
known for his short stories, and for his belief in the 'unity of effect'. 
The extended nature of this text might suggest that Haggerty's description 
should no longer apply, that the 'affective power' of the text would be 
diminished. Whilst sustaining a parity with Schreber's Memoirs, this 
chapter will investigate the possibility that other aspects of Poe's text 
nevertheless generate such an effect. 
In contrast to Hogg's The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a 
Justified Sinner, Gordon Pym does not offer so explicit an account of a 
'madman's' experience, in that the character of 'Pym' is never objectively 
treated as insane. In fact, no external perspective is made available. A 
disturbed psychic state is 'made present' in a more oblique and complex 
manner than is the case in the former; the analysis of its nature is 
shifted back and forth between the protagonist's occasional retrospective 
claims to 'temporary insanity' and certain characteristics of the account in 
its entirety. 
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Though this text and Schreber's Memoirs might appear to have little 
in common, they share a basic structural feature. Their narrators draw 
attention to their advance into a reality that not is shared by the reader 
they address. Gordon Pym tells a story of the speaker's journey into 
unexplored regions of the globe. Schreber's narrative gives an account of 
his unique experience of phenomena of which the rest of humanity is 
ignorant. Both texts show themselves as encountering the difficulty of 
representing that which is beyond the conventional universe of 
signification. 
Poe's Gordon Pym is not constructed on the basis of plot; progress is 
sequential rather than operating within a process of cause and effect. As 
the original title paper runs, Gordon Pym 'comprises' 
the details of a mutiny and atrocious butchery on board the American 
brig Grampus, on her way to the South Seas, in the month of June, 
1827. With an account of the recapture of the vessel by the 
survivors; their shipwreck and subsequent horrible sufferings from 
famine; their deliverance by means of the British schooner Jane Guy; 
the brief cruise of this latter vessel in the Antartic ocean; her 
capture, and the massacre of her crew among a group of islands in 
the eighty-fourth parallel of southern latitude; together with the 
incredible adventures and discoveries still farther south to which 
that distressing calamity gave rise'. 
Gordon Pym aligns itself with a mode of writing that assumes a structural 
and imaginative licence, that is based upon series rather than development, 
and finds its unity in reference to the substantive self. It gives an 
account of a sea voyage, and the tradition can be traced through Homer 
(The Odyssey), Anglo-Saxon literature2, Defoe (Robinson Crusoe), Swift 
(Gulliver's Travels) and Melville (Moby Dick). It draws upon the style of 
contemporary 'documentary' accounts and geographical speculation3. Yet it 
is an adventure story with a difference; encounters with strange external 
phenomena are compounded in their strangeness by the focus upon their 
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effects within the mind of the traveller. 
The voyage to the South Pole is preceded by a short account of 
another adventure, which functions as a prelude to the main journey. Pym 
relates how, at sixteen, he had stolen a boat with his friend Augustus and 
suffered a terrifying ordeal at sea, which nevertheless fuels Pym's desire 
to' put to sea again. The first part of the second voyage takes place with 
Pym concealed (with his dog Tiger) in the hold of a ship captained by 
Augustus's father. Pym is imprisoned in the hold for far longer than he 
had foreseen, and suffers suffocation and starvation. The dog attacks him, 
but Pym manages to save his life. Meanwhile the ship's crew have 
mutinied, having murdered the sailors who resisted. Pym and Augustus 
plot, with the aid of another sailor (Dirk Peters) to overcome them. They 
do so, but a storm blows up and destroys the ship, leaving the three and 
another man (Parker) to die of thirst and starvation, stranded on the 
upturned hulk. They are rescued (except Parker, who they have eaten 
following the drawing of lots) by a ship originally bound for the South 
Pacific which changes its course for the Antartic. Landing on a strange 
island, Pym and others are attacked by its inhabitants. Most of the crew 
are killed. Pym and Peters escape in a canoe and sail on Southward. The 
phenomena they encounter take on an increasingly unearthly character, until 
finally they sail toward a huge white veil or cataract, where a large 
white figure stands sentinel, and here the narrative ends. 
The uncharted nature of a voyage into unknown regions is part of the 
attraction of such texts; the psychical stress undergone and survived by 
the speaker reaffirms the security of the self. Similarly in the case of 
the 'memoir', a peculiarly artificial narratorial control is to be imposed 
upon the chaotic, unconnected and unpredictable nature of lived events. 
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The focus is upon the story-teller, who is both the subject of the 
represented experience, its retrospective chronicler (in this case the sole 
remaining witness) and the guarantor of the safety of the self caught up 
in the 'moving viewpoint" constituted by the text. Belief in the integrity 
of the narrator (his psychic 'intactness', his identity with the 'I' of the 
recorded experience, his non-mediated 'presence') underwrites the 
completeness of his testimony and establishes the level of credibility 
necessary for the reader's unproblematic access to the fictional world. 
The 'presence' of the protagonist as narrator invests the writing with a 
singularly inductive power. 
There are, however, intrinsic to both Pym's and Schreber's efforts to 
record their experience, elements which render the narratives less than 
reassuring. Not least of these is that the integrity of speaking subject 
is problematized. Poe's narrator continually renders his account unreliable 
by paying as much attention to recording his unstable mental states as to 
the events that unfold around him, to the extent that they become 
indistinguishable. Schreber, on the other hand, felt that enough attention 
had been already drawn to his psychic instability and preferred to find 
ways of rejecting this attitude (which had nevertheless to be raised in 
order to be refuted) in favour of investing his experiences with objective 
reality. The result, however, is similar; they are caught up in -a twilight 
zone where the boundaries between mindscape and landscape are taut and 
rent. 
Pym's presentation of his experience throughout is that of a person 
in conditions of psychological and physical extremity. His survival and 
sanity constantly depend upon the successful deciphering of the cause, 
origins or logic operating behind threatening phenomena and events. The 
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narrative begins by launching into the oldest symbolic enigma of all, the 
sea. The incidents to be narrated are said to be of a 'positively 
marvellous nature', and most interesting in 'that portion which relate[s] to 
the Antartic Ocean' (43). Yet the first abortive escapade with Augustus 
functions, on several levels, as an informative paradigm for the narrative 
of the voyage toward the South Pole which follows. Augustus is a 
storyteller and often fires Pym's imagination with fantasy adventures. 
This time he decides, with Pym, to have a 'real' adventure. Once out to 
sea Pym asks Augustus about the expectations he should entertain toward 
the journey they are undertaking, to find that Augustus suddenly appears a 
menacing helmsman; 
I now asked my companion what course he intended to steer, and what 
time he thought it probable we should get back. He whistled for a 
few minutes, and then said crustily, 'I am going to sea - you may go 
home if you think proper'... I found that something had gone wrong, and 
became seriously alarmed (49). 
Pym is filled with an 'indescribable feeling of dread', until it flashes 
upon him that Augustus is drunk. Augustus is in a 'highly concentrated 
state of intoxication -a state which like madness, frequently enables the 
victim to imitate the outward demeanour of one in perfect possession of 
his senses' (50). This state of consciousness is reproduced, to varying 
degrees, in Pym. When the occasion eventually arises for Pym to venture 
into the heart of this unknown territory his comment is curiously 
reminiscent of Schreber's; 
So tempting an opportunity of solving the great problem in regard to 
an Antartic continent had never yet been afforded to man... I must 
still be allowed to feel some degree of gratification at having been 
instrumental, however remotely, in opening to the eye of science to 
one of the most intensely exciting secrets which has ever engrossed 
its attention' (186-7). 
The search for an answer, the desire to fill in a cognitive gap first 
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suggested here in terms of the gulf between the rational and the 
irrationalr- self glimpsed in Augustus, has been mapped onto geographical 
coordinates. In the course of Pym's . 
journey an internal discontinuity or 
rupture may be said, through this structural association, to have been 
projected onto a world both contiguous with the 'real' world but also (as 
Schreber admits to suspecting) somehow alien. Like Schreber, Pym 
transforms his own sufferings, and the transcription of that experience, 
into a mission to serve the world. 
Narrative Techniques Impaired Testimony 
Long before Schreber or Poe, Dante wrote an account combining the 'memoir' 
form and the idea of a journey both physical and psychical (undertaken at 
considerable risk to the pilgrim) where the 'unknown' factor is presented 
as supernatural, but of the foremost importance for the survival of 
humanity. Like Schreber and Pym, Dante - as both narrator and protagonist 
- styles himself the purveyor of cosmic truth. Dante's 'Dante' is firmly 
established as a go-between, journeying forth from a historical Italy to 
eternal realms - still 'unexplored' - but which were held in contemporary 
religious doctrine to have a 'spiritual' reality. These terms, in this 
historical context, are not mutually contradictory, since the earthly realm 
was held to supplement the reality of the spiritual. In Schreber's Memoirs 
the reliability of the speaking subject, and the plenitude of the account, 
are threatened as he writes (he acknowledges) by unease founded in his 
inability to offer sufficient material referential to the familiar 'real' 
world, and by the fact that mention of an unseen world is already more 
than suspect. In Poe's text the inverse is the case; the familiarity of 
the invoked reality is progressively undermined by the intimated 
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unreliability of the speaking subject. 
Poe's text begins with Arthur Gordon Pym raising questions about the 
status of his own narrative. In his 'preface' to the account of his 
journey Pym writes of his reluctance to begin the 'true' story of his 
adventures on paper. He finds that the reception of his text as a 
rational, credible account will be jeopardized should he decide to attempt 
a subjective narration of his story; 
I feared I should not be able to write, from mere memory, a statement 
so minute and connected as to have the appearance of that truth it 
would really possess, barring only the natural and unavoidable 
exaggeration to which all of us are prone when detailing events 
which have had powerful influence in exciting the imaginative 
faculties (43). 
He doubts his ability to organize his experience into narrative form. He 
questions the truth status of any story that recounts an experience which 
has had a powerful affect upon its narrator. Untrained in the rigours of 
poetic decorum, subject to a potentially over-reactive imagination and a 
lack of objectivity, Pym fears the transformation of his truth into what 
would be seen as an over-blown sensationalism. Another reason for his 
reluctance to begin is that, 
the incidents to be related were of a nature so positively marvellous 
that, unsupported as my assertions must necessarily be... the public at 
large would regard what I should put forth as merely impudent and 
ingenious fiction' (43). 
He is at a loss as to how to augment his insufficient authority. Pym 
makes appeal (like Schreber) to a framing discourse, to the power of 
science to authenticate his story, and potentially to invest it with 
extraordinary significance. In its latter portions his narrative he says 
will be found to include incidents of a nature so entirely out of the 
range of human experience, and for this reason so far beyond the 
limits of human credulity, that I proceed in utter hopelessness of 
obtaining credence for all I shall tell, yet confidently trusting in 
time and progressing science to verify some of the most important 
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and most improbable of my statements (85). 
In that instant, however, Pym is constrained by a more convenient method 
of authentication. Pym's subjective 'I' hands over the task to another 
narrator. Pym resolves his predicament by placing his story in the hands 
of the 'Poe' persona who, as a fictionalist, could be relied upon to 
communicate his tale in a more convincing manner. Having seen a portion 
of his tale presented by 'Poe' to the public as fiction, but received as 
fact, he decides to reconstruct the rest for publication himself. Pym 
tells us that where his speech ends and 'Poe's' begins will be immediately 
obvious, but this turns out not to be the case. The consistency of 
subjective testimony is of paramount importance for the reception of such 
a tale, yet Pyrn has put his story into the hands of a 'real' fabricator -a 
professional deceiver - in order to have it seem more 'real'. The device 
of drawing attention to the difficulty of writing and communicating his 
experience, and then having it related by an author who was not a witness 
to the events concerned, is disruptive of the status of the text in the 
manner that Hogg's 'Hogg' proved to be. There is the same collision 
between the real and the unreal, fantasy and actuality. Instead of evoking 
an investment of belief it foregrounds the state of 'delusion' evoked by 
the fictionalist, and suspends the narration in a limbo of authorial 
uncertainty. Pym's assertions that 'Poe's' work was carried out 'without 
altering or distorting a single fact', and that 'no fact is misrepresented 
in the first few pages which were written by Mr. Poe' (44) alert the 
reader to the possibility of misrepresentation. By drawing attention to 
the importance of the secure status of the 'I' behind the utterance, and 
then exposing its slipperiness, Poe evokes anxiety within and around the 
text. Suspicion is generated about who and where the narrative voice is 
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coming from. The strategies are similar; Schreber wanted to emphasise 
coherence, Pym - ostensibly attempting the same thing - achieves the 
opposite effect. 
In both Schreber's and Poe's narrations the insistence of the 'I' on 
giving precise co-ordinates in space and time, self-consciously 'for the 
reader' is also counteracted by the impression of a self subject to a 
fundamental dislocation at the moment of experience. Pym's 'prefatory' 
nightmarish tale of shipwreck, and near-death by drowning, is reassuringly 
introduced with convincing geographical coordinates. He puts out from 
where he was born - Nantucket, He was educated in New Bedford. He meets 
Augustus and hears of sea voyages in New Bedford. Yet once launched out 
to sea this certainty is disrupted. This kind of disturbance fascinates 
Pym, he dreams of 'a lifetime dragged out in sorrow and tears, upon some 
gray and desolate rock, in an ocean unapproachable and unknown' (57). The 
adventure is initiated by Augustus's drunkeness, and the tale reels from 
loss of control to disaster. Events become increasingly horrific and 
hallucinatory. As the boat is battered in the darkness by a violent sea, 
Pym hears 'a loud and long scream or yell, as if from the throats of a 
thousand demons' which seemed to pervade the whole atmosphere around and 
above the boat' (51). Through extreme terror, the protagonists experience 
peculiar psychic states, which include dissociation from their bodies, and 
loss of the ability to reason. This prelude, then, frames the main text in 
the sense that it defines its status for his audience. It predicts 
psychological disturbance at the core of a tale of geographical 
exploration. 
As we move into the main narrative itself we witness a process by 
which the stability of the speaking 'I', the bearer and 'authenticator' of 
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the tale, is further 
. 
jeopardized. Pym finds his- mental condition to be 
precarious; 
I have before stated more than once that my intellect, for some 
period prior to this, had been in a condition nearly bordering on 
idiocy. There were, to be sure, momentary intervals of perfect 
sanity, and, now and then, even of energy, but these were few... (74). 
The narrative spins into confusion, with Pym entombed in the dark hold of 
the ship dream is confused with waking, connections between ideas 
disintegrate, a reliance upon memory is the only available method of 
establishing the reality of his condition. The demarcation of time is 
demonstrably impossible: 
Getting hold of the watch, I found, upon applying it to my ear, that 
it had run down; but at this I was not at all surprised, being 
convinced, from the peculiar state of my feelings, that I had slept, 
as before, for a very long period of time; how long it was of course 
impossible to say (67). 
Yet the narrative continues to operate as if the subject were in 'perfect 
possession of his senses'. Incredible and terrifying events are 'pinned' 
together with the 'outward demeanour' of a seaman's journal. Details of 
latitude and longitude create the assurance of events taking place in 
reference to 'real' locations; 'On the twenty-sixth, at noon, we were in 
latitude 63' 23' S., longitude 41' 25' W. We now saw several ice islands... ' 
(182). Via the coordinates of a 'hyper-objective' reality, the narrative 
has been pushed out to the abstracted limits, the margins of the 'real' 
world. 'Many unusual phenomena now indicated that we were entering upon 
a region of novelty and wonder' (236); 'March 9th. The white ashy material 
fell now continually around us... ' (238). However, even the precision of 
these measurements is radically undermined. An annotation to his March 
Ist entry reads, 'For obvious reasons I cannot pretend to strict accuracy 
in these dates. They are given principally with a view to perspicuity of 
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narration' (236). Pym speaks of the falsity of his referring to day and 
night when no such alternation any longer occurred. 
From early on in his narration Pym has operated in the vigilant (but 
frequently unsuccessful) 'detective' mode of a disorientated mind proposing 
and discovering connections. Pyrn is enclosed, metaphorically and literally, 
in darkness, urgently trying to discover a way out. Stowed away in the 
hold, condemned to remain there concealed until (as was initially decided) 
enough time has passed for the ship to have gained the open seas, he 
himself gradually becomes more cut off from 'reality'. He becomes 
convinced that far more time has passed than should have been the case. 
On attempting to get out he finds the trap door is immovable. He believes 
he has been abandoned, his survival is threatened; 
My sensations were of extreme horror and dismay. In vain I 
attempted to reason on the probable cause of my being thus entombed. 
I could summon up no connected chain of reflection, and sinking on 
the floor, gave way, unresistingly, to the most gloomy imaginings, in 
which the dreadful deaths of thirst, famine, suffocation, and 
premature internment, crowded upon me as the prominant disasters to 
be encountered (70). 
Eventually there returns to him 'some portion of presence of mind' and he 
begins to explore his situation in a more logical manner. By accident he 
discovers a piece of paper tied to his dog, 
the thought instantly occurred to me that the paper was a note from 
Augustus, and that some unaccountable accident having happened to 
prevent his relieving me from my dungeon, he had devised this method 
of acquainting me with the true state of affairs (72). 
He laboriously deduces a method by which he can procure sufficient light 
to read the note. Examining only one side he finds no message and tears 
the paper to pieces. It then occurs to him that something may 
nevertheless have been written on the other side and endeavours to piece 
the paper together. He discovers a message, but has only sufficient 
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light left to read one part of it. This institutes more desperate 
hypothesizing, 
Augustus had, undoubtedly, good reasons for wishing me to remain 
concealed, and I formed a thousand surmises as to what they could be 
- but I could think of nothing affording a satisfactory solution of 
the mystery (76). 
He resigns himself to 'all the misery of his fate'. Later on, when they 
find themselves shipwrecked, a ship passes which the survivors imagine 
gratefully will be their salvation. The ship sails on past, strewn with 
grinning corpses. Pym offers the retrospective information that he has, 
'since this period, vainly endeavoured to obtain some clew to the hideous 
uncertainty which enveloped the fate of the stranger' but concludes that 
'it is utterly useless to form conjectures where all is involved, and will 
no doubt, remain forever involved, in the most appalling and unfathomable 
mystery' (134). As they sail deeper into the heart of the unknown, 
mysterious things seem increasingly likely to remain so. Simultaneously 
Pym's encyclopaedic approach to his experience is exaggerated. He exhibits 
what Barthes might have termed, 'an excess of precision, a kind of maniacal 
exactitude of language, a descriptive madness' (1975,26). He provides, for 
example, a minute description of the wildlife to be found upon 'Desolation 
Island' (166-169). He relates the discoveries and fates of all the (failed) 
expeditions there had so far been to the South Pole. Detailed notation of 
flora and fauna, and of alien human behaviour patterns run throughout. 
Subjective disorientation is belied by this inordinately precise approach 
to environment and what happens around him. He builds up the expectation 
that the world of the text still functions in accord with the world being 
mapped by contemporary explorers and that, as a detective novel may 
demand, there will eventually be found a rational explanation for 
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everything that occurs in the narrative. 
Pym's precarious mental state finds its correlative in the irrational 
and phantasmagoric quality of the regions into which he voyages. E. H. 
Davidson (1976,169) has suggested that The Narrative of Arthur Gordon 
Pym is 
a symbolic parable of how the mind moves from an assumed coherence 
and reality of things to a recognition that everything, even the most 
logically substantial, is an illusion; the mind makes its own reality. 
Pym, however, never articulates this recognition. He continues to search 
for coherence in a manner which imparts an apparent objective status to 
external phenomena. The kind of philosophical awareness imparted to Poe's 
narration here is precisely what his narrative technique precludes 
(whether or not, on reflection, the reader may master it in this fashion). 
Instead of the activity of explicitly attempting to write cognitive 
irresolution, and entrapment in psychotic delusion, out of the text (this 
is Schreber's main concern), Poe is implicitly, from the beginning, writing 
it in. 
Pym's Paranoid Logic 
Pym suspects a profound significance behind events as they take place. 
The narrative logic evokes the feeling that however marvellous, savage, or 
supernatural, the substance of Pym's tale is neither characterizable as 
'ingenious fiction', nor delusion, but means something on a global and even 
cosmic scale. 
It is the ending of the book that has most concerned recent readings 
of Pym. This voyage of exploration to the pole ends as Pym's goal is 
obscured by a tremendous white cataract spread across the sea, and a vast 
white figure barring the way through. All that Pym can see is a 
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phantasmagoria of black and white. Reaching the pole, reaching the end 
and reaching a meaning are expected to happen simultaneously. 
This expectation is provoked throughout the text by Pym's emphatic 
use of dualistic thinking operating in a similar manner to Schreber's. The 
first tale introduces a recurring psychological manoeuvre of Pym's7, which 
involves attributing psychological disturbance, inadequate reasoning 
powers, and persecutory intentions to an 'other'. These oppositional or 
'doubling' formations have been identified both in Schreber's Memoirs and 
Hogg's Sinner (Schreber's narrative, for example, proposes the existence of 
another Schreber of 'lesser intellect' and the threatening figure of 'God', 
Robert Wringham is obsessed with his brother's damnation and hounded by 
Gil Martin). Pym recognizes fear, delusion, madness, vulnerability and 
destruction in this 'other' in moments of the greatest stress, preserving 
an odd kind of detachment for himself. In contrast to Schreber's process 
this 'other' may be the means by which he recognizes himself as disturbed. 
It mirrors what Pym fears will happen to him, and may destroy him. There 
is an overt and repetitive conceptual patterning operating within Pym's 
narration based upon an oscillation between life and death, destruction and 
survival, 'self' and 'other', clarity and obscurity, sense and non-sense. 
The first threat to his sanity, and his life, is the companion to his 
imprisonment in the hold, his dog Tiger. Tiger is introduced at the end of 
a dream, as 'some huge and real monster' (66). On rising from his mattress 
Pym's conceptions are 'in a state of' the greatest indistinctness and 
confusion', he cannot account for the presence of the dog. Tiger then 
becomes his solace and counterpart, but suddenly (like Augustus in the 
former escapade) turns into a menace, a thoroughly irrational and 
dangerous entity. Soon after being attacked by Tiger, Pym is 'redeemed 
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from the jaws of the tomb' (80). On another occasion, Pym is stranded on 
a wrecked ship far out in the ocean without food or water. It is his 
companions and not he, he concludes, who have lost their minds. Pym 
retains his 'powers of mind in a surprising degree, while the rest were 
completely prostrated in intellect' (139). Yet having enabled this 
distinction to be made, anxiety is renewed as to the condition of this 
helmsman/narrator; 
It is possible, however, that my companions may have entertained the 
same opinion of their own condition as I of mine... this is a matter 
which cannot be determined (139). 
Their 'intellects were so entirely disordered by the long course of 
privation and terror to which we had been subjected that we could not 
justly be considered, in that period, in the light of rational beings' (158). 
If Pym's 'other' is differentiated as mad in place of him (like 
Schreber's double) he, as narrator, establishes his own reliability. 
However, the text retains the paranoid characteristic on the subjective 
level of Pym's experience, undermining ventured modes of distinguishing 
between them, because ultimately his ability to distinguish between 
madness and sanity, reality and delusion is not secure. 
Pym also encounters his reflection in a mirror. On one occasion he 
finds that it is necessary to dress as a dead crewman (in order to 
frighten the mutineers). He decides to give the impression of a ghostly 
visitation, in order to gain control over the ship through the arousal of 
terror (in his own experience this has disabled his intellectual faculties). 
Before emerging on deck Pym catches sight of himself in a mirror and is 
shocked at what he sees. He experiences (as Wringham does) complete 
alienation from his reflection. He is alive, but this image he has created 
suggests that he is not; 
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As I viewed myself in a fragment of looking glass which hung up in 
the cabin, and by the dim light of a kind of battle lantern, I was so 
impressed with a vague sense of awe at my appearance, and at the 
recollection of the terrific reality which I was thus representing, 
that I was seized with a violent tremor, and could scarcely summon 
resolution to go on with my part. It was necessary, however, to act 
with decision... (113). 
On this occasion Pym is masquerading as a man risen from the dead. This 
odd syncretism of life and death is accompanied by the splitting of the 
self into object and subject, and this phenomenon itself mirrors an earlier 
sensation of Pym's in the prefatory tale when he observes a body being 
rescued by crewmen from drowning, and oddly adds 'the body proved to be 
my own' (53). On another occasion Pym looks on with avid interest as a 
savage (also, clearly, an opposite and an 'other') from the island of Tsalal 
encounters his own mirror image. He fully expects the savage's reaction 
to be one of extreme irrational fear and astonishment, rather than 
curiosity; 
Upon raising his eyes and seeing his reflected self in the glass, I 
thought the savage would go mad; but, upon turning short round to 
make a retreat, and beholding himself a second time in the opposite 
direction, I was afraid he would expire on the spot. No persuasions 
could prevail upon him to take another look; but throwing himself on 
the floor, with his face buried in his hands, he remained thus until 
we were obliged to drag him upon deck (191). 
There is a sense in which this configuration is representative of the 
mechanism of Pym's narration. This evidence of the characteristic 
reversals of Pym's perceptions and logic suggest that his narration might 
be comprised of responses to something that has existence only within the 
space of Pym's tortured psyche but is then accounted for as alien, 
external, and threatening. The 'terrific reality' he is physically 
representing might also refer, psychically, to the story he is telling, its 
dramatic and disruptive effect depending upon a confusion between 
mindscape and landscape. Whilst Pym reads his experience and plots his 
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narrative, he is, like Schreber, speculating; looking into the mirror of his 
madness, recognizing himself as 'other'. In the above passage his response 
to his mirror image almost brings about a total lack of self control, his 
survival, however, depends upon the success of his masquerade, the solidity 
and coherence of his pretence. 
Toward the close of the narrative, the narrative logic involves the 
reduction of experience into differentiation between black and white. The 
narrative opens in darkness, with a lack of light for any temporal, 
geographical or visual orientation. The night of the first adventure is 
replaced by the gloom of the ship's hold, 'the most loathsome and horrible 
of dungeons' (79). Whilst imprisoned in the hold Pym has a dream of dark 
water (a potent symbol of the unconscious). He sees trees whose 'roots 
were concealed in wide-spreading morasses, whose dreary water lay 
intensely black... ' (65). The black and mysterious gathers significance, and 
appears to offer the key to further patterns of meaning in the text'. 
The conclusion of his tale then makes a statement about the 
discovery of whiteness, 'from out of the milky depths of the ocean a 
luminous glare arose... ' (238). Pym, Peters (and a captured islander, Nu-Nu) 
in their small boat are 'nearly overwhelmed by [a] white ashy shower'. 
Black and white meet at the pole, the presence of one militating against 
the ubiquity of the other, 
The darkness increased relieved only by the glare of the water 
thrown back from the white curtain before us. Many gigantic and 
pallidly white birds flew continuously now from behind the 
veil... (238-9). 
Finally their way is barred by a white apparition, 
there arose in our pathway a huge human figure, very far larger in 
its proportions than any dweller among men. And the hue of the 
figure was of the perfect whiteness of snow (239). 
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Poe sets up the conditions of meaning, and then defies the reader to find 
it. Black does not mean 'bad' to begin with, in the case of the natives, 
but simply 'other'. When they manifest signs of evil they are not so much 
barbaric and uncivilized as 'treacherous', highly intelligent (rather than 
'savage') and deceptive. On the island of Tsalal, Pym finds himself in a 
situation analogous to that of being endlessly interred in the 'dungeon' of 
the ship's hold. He and several companions find themselves in a chasm 
buried beneath a massive earth fall. At this point the perceived 
oppositional organization of external phenomena gives rise to a similar 
process of reasoning in extremis (confronted by death and for the 
preservation of life). By a process of deduction Pym decides that the 
treachery of the natives, who had put together a 'deeply laid plan' (205) 
has brought this about. He goes into the minutae of how (but not why) 
they must have effected this murderous act (211-2). 'Calculation' becomes 
a key word. Whilst in hiding as the only survivors of this disaster Pym, 
with his strange half-caste (not black, not white) friend Dirk Peters, 
discovers another chasm. The windings of this chasm and 'indentures' in 
the rock appear to Pym to be of some profound significance, resembling as 
they do a pattern of hieroglyphic characters. They remain unable to make 
sense of them however, and unable to find a way out. White, on the other 
hand, though conventionally associated with 'good' arouses fear in the 
natives of Tsalal. Where these signifiers appear their expected signified 
is either missing or transformed. Poe's polar journey is a journey into 
polarization, but although one thing may stand opposed to another, 
significance is deceptive, distorted or unattainable. 
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Plotting the Unearthly: The Text 
It has been proposed that the enigmatic non-closure of Pym's narrative 
indicates an artistic failure on Poe's part. I would suggest the 'framing' 
of the text demonstrates Poe's control over its 'treacherous' signifying 
mechanism. The note of the anonymous editor at the end, attempting 
explanation, trying to construct a coherent reading, finally invests the 
text with a focus upon 'plotting' rather than upon 'plot'. This editor 
discovers the 'meaning' of the shapes in the chasms that appeared to Pym. 
He believes they are in the form of hieroglyphics; 
Mr. Pym has given us the figures of the chasms without comment, and 
speaks decidedly of the indentures found at the extremity of the 
most easterly as having but a fanciful appearance to alphabetical 
characters, and, in short, as being positively not such (241). 
He goes on to explain that according to Arabic and Ethiopian writing the 
figures could mean 'to be white', 'to be shady', and 'the region of the 
south' (241). His interpretation does no more than return, tautologically, 
to the meaning structures intrinsic to the text, although the editor offers 
this additional information as a valuable discovery without which the text 
is incomprehensible and incomplete. The editor's contribution is a parody 
of critical endeavour, and this ploy of Poe's has been the focus of much 
literary critical attention, which discovers in it possibilities for the 
contribution it makes to the theoretical analysis of critical discourse 
itself'. It is sufficient to notice here that this is the second model 
that Poe provides for the reading of Pym's main narrative. In the 
prefatory tale Pym's reader is implicitly manipulated into responding to a 
certain kind of emphasis (horrific and psychological) in the narrative 
which is to follow. This works to implicate the reader within the 
threatened subjectivity of the narrator. The appendix spoken by the figure 
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of the editor, however, provokes a withdrawing into an objective relation 
to the text as a problem to be solved, instituting a split. 
This model invites the retrospective analysis of the text. The 
editor affirms that information about the outcome of Pym's journey is 
missing. There is a large and perhaps decisive gap in the reader's 
knowledge. The narrative ends with Pym sailing towards a mysterious white 
veil of cosmic proportions and encountering an inexplicable huge white 
figure. The last few chapters which might explain this are lacking. The 
objective dissociation from his irrational experience has involved Pym in 
adopting a speculative tone comparable to Schreber's, speaking in terms of 
things being absolutely certain, or probable, or conceivable. Poe's text 
also provokes and demands hypothesis. Mystery is continually perpetuated 
and Pym's narration ends with this renewal of mystery, a symbol of lost 
significance. The huge white figure seems to mean everything but is 
finally inexplicable. Pym could be mad and hallucinating - or the 'figure' 
may simply be an iceberg. It may be supernatural but still its presence 
is not satisfactorily ratified by the accumulation of sign and symbol in 
the narrative. The text now represents an enigma, and the editor has a 
theory; he believes that an understanding of what the hieroglyphs mean may 
help to fill any gaps in our understanding, that upon the application of 
'minute philological scrutiny' connections must develop (242). He says, 
conclusions such as these open a wide field for speculation and 
exciting conjecture. They should be regarded, perhaps, in connection 
with some of the most faintly detailed incidents of the narrative; 
although in no visible manner is this chain of connection complete 
(242). 
The 'loss' of the last chapters means that the 'intensely exciting secret' 
which Pym professes to actuate the trajectory of the narrative remains 
concealed - its crucial significance proclaimed, its message lost. 
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Ultimately it designates a vacuum; abandoned by the (already hollowed-out) 
narrating self upon which so much has been staked (leaving cognitive dry 
land has demanded an unusual act of faith in the speaking subject) the 
implied reader is left suspended within the text to fill this vacuum. Upon 
this replenishment depends the integrity of the self. 
" Unlike Schreber's Memoirs, Poe's text as an 'authorized' fictional text 
is assumed not to be the writing of a possible candidate for the insane 
asylum. The text is whole, complete, in the sense that it is framed by the 
author's signature. However, the fact that Pym himself draws attention to 
this ('in order that it might be certainly regarded as fiction, the name of 
Mr. Poe was affixed,.. ') removes this guarantee. The narrator has already 
been 'split', and testimony betrayed. Poe creates a state whereby the 
frame is turned inside out, invalidated. Meaning is disrupted by 'Poe' 
appearing as Pym's 'writing hand', by illusion masquerading as reality 
becoming illusion again - in order to make it more convincing. The point 
here is not that the author may be considered psychologically disturbed, 
but that he introduces paranoid conditions for the reading of his text. 
Anxiety is invoked by the assault upon the identity, integrity, the trust 
in the presence of the speaker. Pym is a paranoid text in that it plays 
upon the fear of madness, where madness is understood as the state of 
being caught deciphering in an abysmal spiral of non-meaning. Gordon Pym 
might be considered a fine example of the state analogous to 'psychosis' 
that Shoshanna Felman attributes to the activity of interpreting any 
fictional text; 'madness is nothing other than an intoxicating reading: a 
madman is one who is drawn into the dizzying whirl of his own reading. 
Dementia is, above all, the madness of books; delirium an adventure of the 
text' (1985,64). Gordon Pym takes this one step further, disclosing to 
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the reader his colonization by the madness of the text, and invoking 
(through the editor) Schreber's Sisyphean task of recuperation and 
recovery. 
Neither reader (and Pym is the primary reader of his own experience) 
nor 'writer' (which is what the reader becomes) can distinguish the 'real' 
from the non-real, the internal from the external. The narrator has been 
said to journey 'through the mundane world of multiple deception toward an 
apocalyptic vision of arabesque reality' (Ketterer 1979,125), but this 
movement is also synchronic, occurring from moment to moment; it is as 
difficult to see where the mundane world ends and the unearthly begins, as 
to distinguish between the narratives of Pym and 'Poe', between reader and 
writer, between reason and madness. The paranoid mechanism involves the 
imperative to discover truth in delusion. Poe's text enacts this process 
on several levels. Freud observed that the paranoiac 'perceives the 
external world and takes into account any alterations that may happen in 
it, and the effect it makes upon him stimulates him to invent explanatory 
theories' (1979,214). Schreber recalls a time when he found it hard to 
accept that the changes in external phenomena had not been connected with 
his experience: 
Having resumed some contact with the outside world... I can now no 
longer refuse to acknowledge that viewed merely from outside 
everything has remained as of old. But whether a very profound inner 
change has taken place neverthless will be discussed (1988,85). 
Fym's experience, too, is construable in terms of his interrogative rapport 
with experience. Those textual strategies that are similar to Schreber's 
(and often enlisted in his narration in order to allay suspicion) function 
equivocally or inversely and exploit the affective properties of psychic 
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disorientation. The refusal of closure, is, in a sense, a refusal to close 
down 'madness'; the text is actually releasing it. 
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PLOTTING THE DIABOLICAL: ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON'S 'THE STRANGE CASE OF 
DR. JEKYLL AND MR. HYDE' 
Narrative Structure: A Composite Account 
Stevenson's tale has become so well-known since its publication in 1886 
that it hardly needs an introduction. The title is proverbial, and is 
probably used as frequently as the terms 'schizophrenic' and 'paranoid' to 
describe contradictory, obsessive or weird personality traits. This text is 
distinct from the previous works in that explicitly psychotic states of 
consciousness are not the focus of narrative attention. Though this is 
commonly approached as a story of split personality or 'doubling', it is 
with more difficulty that these manifestations are assigned to 'madness'. 
The 'division' of Jekyll is, on one level, more closely related to science 
fiction, than to fictional investigations of insanity. However, though 
Jekyll's transformations into Hyde are presented as the result of 
scientific experiment, the text has been included in this study for the 
similarity it bears in other respects to narrative features of the works 
by Hogg and Poe. Moreover, as I hope to show, that 'scientific' dimension 
of the tale is closer in essence to their representations of psychic 
disruption than may be supposed. 
The text is split into three main narratives. The first is a third 
person narration in the conventional 'realist' mode, but largely limited to 
the point-view of one character. Mr. Utterson Dr. Jekyll's close friend 
and lawyer) creates the perspective, from which the incidents connected 
with Jekyll are initially recorded. This narrative accounts for around 
two-thirds of the text. Utterson's experience is divided into episodes 
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designating a series of experiences that he regards as extraordinary and 
inexplicable. 
The first ('The Story of the Door') involves a discussion between 
Utterson and Mr. Enfield (an acquaintance) of the fact that a back door to 
Jekyll's very respectable establishment is being used by a grotesque and 
repugnant character called Hyde, who unflinchingly tramples a small child 
in the street, and offers to pay for the offence with a cheque signed by 
Dr. Jekyll. The second ('The Search for Mr. Hyde') details an exchange 
between Dr. Lanyon (a colleague of Dr. Jekyll's) and Utterson, concerning 
Jekyll's Will, which endows Hyde with all his wealth on his death. Lanyon 
is of the opinion that Jekyll has been, for some time, 'wrong in mind' 
(Stevenson 1979,36). Utterson 'thought it was madness', but decides that 
it is 'disgrace' (36). He fears for his friend's security and becomes 
obsessed with the figure of Hyde, deciding to discover more about him. 
Following this a short passage ('Dr. Jekyll was Quite at Ease') thwarts 
both Lanyon's and Utterson's hypotheses, as Jekyll appears to be completely 
sane, and offers a charitable excuse for being Hyde's benefactor. 'The 
Carew Murder' case gives an account of Hyde's apparently motiveless murder 
of an old man, witnessed by a maid-servant. Hyde, however, is nowhere to 
be found; he leaves behind him only 'the haunting sense of unexpressed 
deformity' (50). 'The Incident of the Letter' records Dr. Jekyll's seeking 
of Utterson's advice about a letter he has received from Hyde, which 
informs Jekyll of Hyde's safe escape from justice. It is noted by several 
people that the hand-writing, though somewhat distorted, is very similar to 
Jekyll's; Utterson decides that Jekyll has been 'forging for a murderer' 
(55). 'The Remarkable Incident of Dr. Lanyon' describes a sudden and 
terrible depression which takes hold of Lanyon; it is somehow connected to 
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Jekyll. Lanyon subsequently dies. A further brief section ('Incident at 
the Window') describes Enfield and Utterson's shocked reaction to catching 
a glimpse of Jekyll's face at a window as it suddenly, and unaccountably, 
takes on an expression of 'abject terror and despair' (61). Finally, 'The 
Last Night' gives an account of Utterson's experience at the scene of 
Hyde's suicide. Jekyll, though thought to have been present, has 
mysteriously vanished. 
Utterson then gains access to a series of documents, and the second 
narration (from among these) is Lanyon's record of his final encounters 
with Jekyll, his fears for Jekyll's sanity and finally his witnessing of the 
doctor's transformation into Hyde. The text concludes with 'Henry Jekyll's 
Full Statement of the Case'. 
The first narrative begins with no preliminary attention to the 
nature of the tale to be told; no mediation, no preparation, no passage 
forged between the extraordinary and the ordinary (as is the case in the 
Sinner and Gordon Pym). It is a vehicle for reporting others' versions of 
the story, for dramatic representation. It is an authoritative voice 
(drawing, as it can, upon 'its effacement of its own status as discourse' 
(Belsey 1980,72). Stevenson, in contrast to Hogg and Poe, has chosen a 
method of narration which simply posits the events transcribed as fact 
(there are no negotiations with subjective testimony, hearsay, memory, 
conjecture). The impersonal narration offers a stable, objective reality 
and narratorial reliability. It is rooted in an ordered, recognizable world, 
which operates according to recognized laws. The point-of-view is 
emphatically that of a mind conversant with the social laws regulating 
people's behaviour and, to an extent, with the metaphysical laws that 
underwrite those laws. The first words are, 'Mr. Utterson the lawyer... '. 
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Utterson's perspective upon the case has the appearance, in its brevity and 
precision, of a legal file. He focusses only upon 'incidents' that he 
judges to be of significance in the efficient reconstruction of Jekyll's 
history, and for the eventual solution to the mystery that surrounds the 
initiating 'story of the door'. 
Mr. Utterson's point-of-view, in his professional capacity, depends 
upon a particular kind of logic, upon the ability to assess a situation 
correctly in terms of the law. He represents authority. He maintains a 
system that encompasses codes of honour and morality, and expresses 
constant and entrenched modes of thinking and believing. He is a 'lover of 
the sane and customary sides of life, to whom the fanciful is immodest' 
(36). To begin with, the growing mystery around his friend Mr. Jekyll 
'touched him on the intellectual side alone' (37). This is the comfortable 
and commonsense point-of-view that was also provided by the editor in 
Hogg's Sinner. He is on the outside, looking in on some arcane failure of 
order, a rent in the carefully woven fabric of this world, and it is his 
concern to knit it together with scraps of report and conjecture based 
upon 'incidents'. 
With regard to the narrative framing of Dr. Jekyll's personal record, 
Utterson's approach functions in a similar way to that of Hogg's Editor; 
the mystery with which he deals is approached in terms of a social crime, 
a transgression of mundane laws. The law is enlisted in the unravelling 
of the mystery (an officer investigates the murder of Carew). Gestures 
are made toward the solution of the crime according to traditional 
methods, in the public domain. Unlike Hogg's Editor, however, Utterson is 
himself a lawyer, his narration is invested with a new tension, it is not 
merely reportage but pursuit. All that Utterson represents is measured 
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against the enigma he confronts. He is an agent in the unfolding of the 
plot. 
Whilst investing the narration with urgency, Utterson's personal 
affinity with Jekyll also challenges his legal objectivity. Glimpses into 
his mind reveal this lack of distance. He recognizes the tortured 
subjectivity of his friend. He thinks not only in terms of the law of the 
state, but also of the law of God. When the insane and uncustomary sides 
of life begin to emerge around him (as, for example, when Hyde 'mows down' 
a small girl, and when Jekyll wills all his worldly goods to Hyde) his 
'imagination was also engaged, or rather enslaved' (37). He subscribes to 
a spiritual code of belief (similar, in its preoccupation with guilt and 
transgression, to that of the 'justified sinner'). He has recourse to this 
to explain the predicament of Dr. Jekyll: 
"Ah, it must be that, the ghost of some old sin, the cancer of some 
concealed disgrace; punishment coming, pede claudo, years after the 
memory has forgotten and self-love condoned the fault". And the 
lawyer, scared by the thought, brooded awhile on his past, groping in 
all the corners of memory lest by chance some Jack-in-the-Box of an 
old iniquity should leap to light there. His past was fairly 
blameless; few men could read the rolls of their life with less 
apprehension; yet he was humbled to dust by the many ill things he 
had done, and raised up into sober and fearful gratitude by the many 
he had come so near to doing, yet avoided (42). 
Either Jekyll has offended God, or he has been the victim of another's 
social deviance, though the two are not incompatible in Utterson's 
estimation. His view-point enlists two interpretative codes as *the 
narrative progresses toward the 'solution' of the mystery, and toward Dr. 
Jekyll's final statement: God's plot - divine retribution - is already 
perhaps in motion (the subject of which is Jekyll's soul), Jekyll also 
appears to be engaged in criminal activity (the subject of which is his 
body, or social being). 
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Narrative Technique: The Failure of Syncretism 
Utterson's narrative opens with a series of oppositions. 'The Story of the 
Door' sets up a contrast between the door used by Jekyll (of the elegant 
main street facade) and the door used by Hyde in a 'certain sinister block 
of building' bearing marks of 'prolonged and sordid negligence' (30). This 
block has no window, and 'neither bell nor knocker'. It conceals, rather 
then admits access. Hyde, Enfield says, 'was a fellow that nobody could 
have to do with, a really damnable man' whilst Jekyll 'is the very pink of 
proprieties... one of your fellows who do what they call good' (33). Already 
the bad Mr. Hyde and the good Mr. Jekyll have been seen by Utterson as 
linked in a mysterious relationship Utterson is perplexed by the apparent 
and inexplicable connection between 'good' and 'evil'. He is aroused by the 
spirit of inquiry; '"If he be Mr. Hyde", he had thought, "I shall be Mr. 
Seek" (38). 
Dualistic thinking marks the site of subversion and the initiation of 
hypothesis. Like Poe in the hold of the ship, Utterson presents an 
inside/outside interest in relation to the sinister building. It is not 
simply an interest in revealing the hidden, finding out what is on the 
other side of the door, that awakens Utterson's curiosity; what grips his 
imagination is the gap - the logical connection that is lacking and has to 
be made between what is usually to be found completely separate and 
opposed, Utterson's friend Enfield is curious about the windowless 
building, but is unwilling to inquire further. His attitude is that there 
can be no simple answer. An infinite line of questions building one upon 
the other develops its own disastrous momentum; 
'You never asked about - the place with the door? " said Mr. Utterson. 
"No sir: I had a delicacy'. was the reply. "I feel strongly about 
putting questions; it partakes too much of the style of the day of 
. judgement. You start a question, and it's like starting a stone. You 
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sit quietly on top of the hill; and away the stone goes, starting 
others" (33). 
The sinister building proves to be connected to Jekyll's property. 
Poole (Jekyll's loyal servant) makes clear to Utterson to which part of the 
house Mr. Hyde belongs; 
I saw Mr. Hyde go in by the old dissecting-room door... We see very 
little of him on this side of the house: he mostly comes and goes by 
the laboratory (41). 
Following the murder of Carew information about Hyde's habitual haunts 
enforces the polarity between the two in social terms. Jekyll lives in a 
respectable quarter of London and Hyde in Soho. London's dream-world. 'a 
district of some city in a nightmare' (48). 
Utterson is alerted to the depth of the relationship between Jekyll 
and Hyde because he is in possession of Jekyll's 'mad will', which promises 
his estate to Hyde should he die or disappear. He is able to formulate a 
theory in terms of authorship, examining a series of written 'documents'. 
The cignature on the cheque procured by Jekyll from Hyde is the first 
clue. Mr. Hyde apparently draws money on Dr. Jekyll's account. The 
connection is considered to be blackmail. Utterson compares the letter 
written by Hyde after the murder of Carew with a letter written by Jekyll 
asking for chemicals. The handwriting is similar. 'What matters hand of 
write? ' Poole asks Utterson (66). Hand of right matters to the lawyer. 
Jekyll's money and estate is at stake. More is also at stake. Besides 
suggesting the possibility of an illegal exchange, the signature is also 
enlisted in determining whether another opposition is appropriate to the 
symbolic Jekvll/Hvde pattern: Is Hyde a madman? How would a madman sign 
his name? Of what significance is a madman's signature? Utterson's friend 
Guest is convinced. 
1; "The man of course, was mad". 
1i 
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"I should like to hear your views on that", replied Mr. Utterson. "I 
have a document here in his handwriting; it is between ourselves, for 
I scarce know what to do about it; it is an ugly business at the 
best. But there it is; quite in your way: a murderer's autograph". 
Guest's eyes brightened, and he sat down at once and studied it with 
passion. "No, sir" he said; "not mad; but it is an odd hand" (54). 
The opposition remains one of criminal/victim, and therefore still within 
the public domain and objectively accessible. Madness denotes lack of 
authority, lack of identity and lack of responsibility. It would break down 
the constellation of oppositions already in place to allow madness into the 
equation, and is not amenable to either of Utterson's investigative 
premises (that Jekyll is the subject of spiritual or social guilt). At the 
moment they add up to Hyde being an independent agent, a parallel identity 
who is, in a calculated manner, a positive threat to the person they know 
as Dr. Jekyll. The possibility that it is Jekyll who is mad must be ruled 
out. Dr. Lanyon's behaviour, following his momentous encounter with Jekyll, 
convinces Utterson that Lanyon has encountered something so extreme that 
it holds for him more terror than death. This is the first explicit 
indication that Utterson will deduce nothing from aligning oppositions 
within the normal 'order of things'. Meaning is to be found beyond this. 
In Jekyll, he decides, 'so great and unprepared a change pointed to 
madness; but in view of Lanyon's manner and words, there must lie for it 
some deeper ground' (58). The line of opposition has shifted from 
sane/insane to insane/? Something is involved which invites more terror 
than madness or death. 
Poole has seen Hyde in possession of Jekyll's rooms. He makes no 
deductions on the basis of handwriting. It is no longer just the authority 
of the signature that appears to have been usurped but Jekyll's space, the 
concrete rather than the abstract co-ordinates of his existence. He 
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appeals to Utterson for assistance, believing that Hyde has killed Jekyll. 
However, the fact that Hyde is still apparently locked in Tekyll's 
laboratory and has not escaped the scene of the crime raises difficulties, 
'it doesn't commend itself to reason' (65). The shift of focus brought 
about by Miss Logan in Hogg's Sinner is here re-enacted. Attention moves 
away from the murder, from who did it and why, to what it is that has 
taken his place. Instead of eliminating mystery, Utterson's inquiries lead 
mystery (as Enfield feared) to multiply, and demand an ever greater 
resource of rationalization. Poole announces; 
Master's made away with; he was made away with eight days ago, when 
we heard him cry out upon the name of God; and who's in there 
instead of him, and why it stays there, is a thing that cries to 
Heaven, Mr. Utterson! (65). 
The scene of the discovery of the body of Hyde at the end of this 
objective narration also involves the discovery of a mirror. This 
represents a further mystery to Poole and Utterson. It is enigmatic 
because it has 'seen' the events that have led up to 'Hyde's' suicide and is 
therefore the impenetrable repository of the truth about what has passed 
between Jekyll and Hyde ('"This glass has seen some strange things, sir", 
whispered Poole', 71). It is also provocative because its presence at the 
scene cannot be explained ('"And surely none stranger than itself" echoed 
the lawyer'). It was not only an observer but also, it is suggested, a 
protagonist in the preceding drama. Jekyll, Hyde and the mirror become a 
triad and the significance of what has happened lies in the uncovering of 
the relationship between them, a factor which remains opaque to the 
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conjecture of the two investigators, just as the mirror at first reflects 
only an obfuscating play of light and colour; 
Next, in the course of their review of the chamber, the searchers 
came to the cheval-glass, into whose depth they looked with an 
involuntary horror. But it was so turned as to show them nothing 
but the rosy glow playing on the roof, the fire sparkling in a 
hundred repetitions along the glazed front of the presses, and their 
own pale and fearful countenances stooping to look in (71). 
Utterson and Poole look into the glass apparently in the hope that what 
they see there will reveal to them some clue. The fact that it shows them 
only their own faces suggests both that they will never find anything but 
their own unsatisfied curiosity when looking into the 'strange case', and 
also that somehow the answer may actually lie in the reflection of 'their 
own pale and fearful countenances'. 
Everything suggestive of the presence of Jekyll remains undisturbed 
in the laboratory; his writing, his signature, the environment 
demonstrating evidence only of Jekyll's habitual civilized way of life and 
not that associated with Hyde. Jekyll's body however is not there. 
Resolution is again deferred. Concealed within the documents found with 
the body (as was the case in Hogg's Sinner) lies, perhaps, the answer to 
the mystery. 
Dr. Lanyon's narrative (one of these) does not provide a perspective 
entirely different from that of Mr. Utterson, but represents an 
intensification of the opposition between public and private (objective and 
subjective, the intellect and the imagination, science and superstition). 
Dr. Jekyll had become 'too fanciful' for his taste, indulging in a lot of 
'unscientific balderdash' (36). He is increasingly convinced that Dr. Jekyll 
is insane, a victim of 'cerebral disease' (77). When he encounters Hyde he 
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wants to know 'his origin, his life, his fortune and status in the world'. 
When called upon to carry out a mysterious errand for Dr. Jekyll (of 
collecting the drug for Hyde) he wonders how the powder could effect the 
honour, the sanity, or the life of [his] flighty colleague' (76). His more 
radical scepticism, however, is challenged by an encounter with a 'prodigy 
to stagger the unbelief of Satan' (79). Lanyon's horror hints at the 
diabolical, surpassing the terrors of madness and death. 
Lanyon's narrative is also the locus of the dismantling of these 
oppositions. He feels an affinity with the strange Mr. Hyde, experiencing 
a 'subjective disturbance' in his proximity (77). Through his 
transformation into Hyde, Jekyll assaults Lanyon's faith in orthodox science 
('you who have denied the virtue of transcendental medecine... ', 80>. 
Lanyon's account brings the mystery to the brink of solution, of the 
completion of the 'plot', but he finds he cannot finally commit the esoteric 
explanation of the metamorphosis, imparted to him by Jekyll, to paper. He 
can no longer write, externalize and objectify his terrifying experience.. 
Dr. Lanyon's life is 'shaken to its roots' (80). The coordinates whereby he 
had previously orientated his identity have been cast asunder, and Lanyon 
plummets into dread and confusion, and ultimately death. The certainty 
offered by social morality, scientific knowledge, religious faith, belief in 
the consistency of the self and in the determinate limits of sanity that 
are upheld by Utterson's logic (and sustained in opposition to the 
phenomenon of Mr. Hyde) has disintegrated. Dr. Lanyon's narrative ensures 
that the continuity of this ideological framework, relative to that which 
he has witnessed and the truth he is unable to communicate, is impossible. 
This truth, somehow linked to the impossible incorporation of the 
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scientific (the natural) and the transcendental (the supernatural) is what 
'Henry Jekyll's Full Statement of the Case' is bound to divulge. 
Dr. Jekyll's Paranoid Logic 
As is the case with Robert Wringham's narrative, the text creates the 
expectation that what has so far proved elusive will finally be brought to 
light by Dr. Jekyll. Jekyll's subjective testimony has been framed by a 
discourse which generates a mode of interrogation characteristic of the 
paranoid text. The initial problems of what connection Hyde can have with 
Jekyll, and the possible motivation for blackmail and murder, have shifted 
frames from a mundane criminal investigation to metaphysical speculation. 
The operative dilernma is now rooted in the rationalization of what appears 
to be an unnatural occurrence; a subversion of 'God's law' has been brought 
about. 
Jekyll's discourse is characterized by an exceptional clarity of 
thought. He is regarded by his colleagues as quite brilliant, but 
eccentric (his 'scientific studies... led wholly towards the mystic and 
transcendental', 81). He becomes obsessed with the realization that he is 
constituted of contradictory psychological elements; 'those provinces of 
good and ill which divide and compound man's dual nature' (81). This 
condition is equivalent to that of Robert Wringhim in the Hogg's Sinner. 
Jekyll has a problem, he wishes to be respected by the 'wise and good', 
'wear a more than commonly grave countenance' (81) and finds that there is 
a side to himself which is not consistent with this image. He senses a 
frivolous or mildly sinful element that threatens to undermine his drive 
toward perfection. He can only wear one face at a time, and that means 
that a part of him must go faceless. This lack of continuity upsets him, 
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he finds he is - when functioning under one identity - 'committed to a 
profound duplicity of life' (81). He is disturbed by the idea that in the 
agonized womb of consciousness these polar twins should be continuously 
struggling' (82). 
Though 'The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde' is often 
discussed as a splitting of personality, it is important to note that 
Jekyll feels himself 'always already' to be internally schismatic, and that 
this awareness of doubleness is ideologically determined; his identity is 
under stress before the introduction of the wonder-drug. He is subject 
(like Robert Wringham) to the conflict between the purity promoted by an 
idealist system of thought, and its counterpart - conceived in terms 
either of original sin or the innate bestiality of the physical self (being 
rewritten by Darwinism). He is very aware, on an intellectual level, of the 
possibility not of being, but of becoming two people (a characteristic of 
many split-personality cases is that one identity is not, and has never 
been, aware of another, and also that such cases are rarely divisible into 
only two such clear-cut identities). He says that the medicine 'potently 
controlled and shook the very fortress of identity' (83), it 'shook the 
prisonhouse of [his] disposition' (85). This 'fortress of identity' is 
already menaced by the coexistence of 'good' with 'bad', 
I saw that, of the two natures that contended in the field of my 
consciousness, even if I could rightly be said to be either, it was 
only because I was radically both; and from an early date, even 
before the course of my scientific discoveries had begun to suggest 
the most naked possibility fo such a miracle, I had learned to dwell 
with pleasure, as a beloved daydream, on the thought of the 
separation of these elements (82). 
He therefore sets about devising a 'scientific' method of separating 
them out, so that each should be free of the other. He discovers a drug 
which enables the transition between states, or between identities. He has 
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solved the riddle of how to achieve wholeness, and purge the conflicting 
factors in his identity, through a method as efficient and purificatory as 
the Calvinist doctrine of election. Science (instead of God) provides him 
with the means of separating the good from bad and, apparently, with a 
separate receptacle into which to disgard the irritant factor. The 
internal dichotomy is represented by Jekyll to be as explicit as Schreber's 
assumption of a female self to exist alongside his masculinity, 
[I] managed to compound a drug by which these powers should be 
dethroned from their supremacy, and a second form and countenance 
substituted, none the less natural to me because they were the 
expression, and bore the stamp, of lower elements in my soul (83). 
Dr. Jekyll/Mr. Hyde's triumphant statement to Lanyon as he swallows the 
drug C'you who have so long been bound to the most narrow and material 
views... - behold! ', 81> bears a resemblance to Schreber's obsession with, 
offering his body - dead or alive - to science, so that his transformation 
into a woman (via the external manipulation of his 'nerves') may be 
objectively witnessed. The drug, like Schreber's 'nerves', is the product 
(it produces and was produced by) of a massive theoretical tour de force. 
It is the 'unnatural' mediatory material by which that which was perceived 
as an unnatural contradiction is rationalized. Jekyll is obsessed with the 
enigma of his internal disunity and, over many years, develops a scientific 
and transcendental system of thought to overcome this. The drug is his 
solution to an existential enigma2. 
It proves to be not a solution however, but an indication of an even 
more profound enigma. Despite Jekyll's careful admission of seeing both 
sides within himself, we are left with the impression that it is Dr. Jekyll 
who is the 'whole', the controller, the scientist and author, and Hyde the 
noisome appendage. Hyde however begins to grow, to campaign for hegemony, 
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to fight for time and space within 'Jekvll's' body. As Hyde's presence and 
influence increase, Jekyll's perception of his cohabitant takes on aspects 
now familiar from Robert Wringham's attitude to the diabolical Gil-Martin 
in Hogg's Sinner (when he discovers, for example, that his 'elect' body has 
been usurped for the execution of heinous actions); Jekyll confesses that; 
He had now seen the full deformity of that creature that shared with 
him some of the phenomena of consciousness, and was co-heir with him 
to death: and beyond these links of community, which in themselves 
made the most poignant part of his distress, he thought of Hyde, for 
all his energy of life, as of something not only hellish but 
inorganic. This was the shocking thing; that the slime of the pit 
seemed to utter cries and voices; that the amorphous dust 
gesticulated and sinned; that what was dead, and had no shape, should 
usurp the offices of life (95). 
Fear of a discontinuous self led him to attempt self-division in order to 
achieve control. Jekvll develops a paranoid consciousness. He begins here 
to refer not only to Hyde but to 'Jekyll' objectively. The split is 
incomplete, the narrative 'I' dissociates itself from both the good and the 
bad identity. The division is unsuccessful because it is impossible and 
paradoxical, because it represents a crystallizing-out of his original 
dread. 
Jekyll's account informs us that he had the mirror moved into his room 
for some specific purpose. A suggestion of what this may be is found in 
the occasion of his first glimpse of himself after taking the drug. He 
examines the change that has taken place in him. The recognition of 
himself in the mirror evokes a satisfied reaction similar to that induced 
following the first internally experienced transformation into Hyde. After 
the drug he feels 'younger, lighter, happier in body... an unknown but not an 
innocent freedom of the soul'. Again on perceiving his reflection there is 
a similar dissolution of anxiety; 
And yet when I looked upon that ugly idol in the glass, I was 
conscious of no repugnance, rather a leap of welcome. This too, was 
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myself. It seemed natural and human. In my eyes it bore a livelier 
image of the spirit, it seemed more express and single, than the 
imperfect and divided countenance, I had hitherto accustomed to call 
mine (84-5). 
At first the vision of himself/his shadow in the glass produces a 
beneficial effect. He believes that he is completely insulated from the 
repercussions of Hyde's behaviour, 'whatever he had done, Edward Hyde would 
pass away like the stain of breath upon a mirror' (86). However, when 
Jekyll loses control over the existence of Hyde, realizing that Hyde has an 
independent reality such that he is no longer subject to Jekyll's will, the 
reflection begins to create terror in the observer; 
I rushed to the mirror. At the sight that met my eyes, my blood was 
changed into something exquisitely thin and icy. Yes, I had gone to 
bed Jekyll, I had awakened Edward Hyde... (88). 
From then on Jekyll regards Hyde with fear and aggression. He develops a 
paranoid relationship to his mirror image, his own body; Hyde changes from 
sinner to devil. Jekyll's narrative concludes with what he fears to be 
Hyde's claim to complete dominion over his body, and his own consequent 
suicide. Splitting as a mode of control comes full circle. Complete unity 
is dependent upon the elimination, the absolute negation of both. 
Plotting the Diabolical: The Text 
The text of Jekyll's 'memoirs', to an extent, creates the paranoid 
writing/reading conditions developed in Foe's Fym. There is, attendant 
upon the usurpation of the body, anxiety as to whom the 'hand of write' 
belongs. Madness, delusion, delirium (the 'anti-Jekyll', the other, the 
'trace') threaten to break in upon the authority of the text. In each of 
these texts an authorial split has enabled the writing of the text. The 
text frames, gives body, unity to the subject of the 'memoir'. The bible, 
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representative of the ultimate author(ity) is ritually defaced by both Gil- 
Martin in Hogg's Confessions and Hyde ('Utterson was amazed to find... a 
copy of a pious work for which Jekyll had several times expressed a great 
esteem, annotated, in his own hand, with startling blasphemies'; 'Hence the 
ape-like tricks that he would play me, scrawling in my own hand 
blasphemies on the pages of my books', 71 and 96). Wringhim had wanted to 
be inscribed in the eternal book, he is shown its lack of permanence and 
inviolability. Hyde threatens to break through into Jekyll's text, 'Should 
the throes of change take me in the act of writing it, Hyde will tear it in 
pieces' (97). 
Dr. 7ekyll's narrative hardly goes furthur than Lanyon's in achieving 
an approximation to the ineffable truth about Jekyll's de(con)struction. As 
Jekyll tells us, he can only supply us with a limited amount of information 
'My narrative will make, alas' too evident, ray discoveries were incomplete' 
(83). The 'version book' discovered by Lanyon in Jekyll's laboratory seems 
to foreshadow the pattern of his narrative; this contained only 'a series 
of dates'. These covered 'a period of many years', but he observed that 
'the entries ceased nearly a year ago and quite abruptly'. 
Here and there a brief remark was appended to a date, usually no 
more than a single word: 'double' occurring perhaps six times in a 
total of seven hundred entries; and once very early in the list and 
followed by several marks of exclamation, 'total failure!! '. All this, 
though it whetted my curiosity, told me little that was 
definite... (76). 
Although the terrible truth proves to be finally incommunicable and 
incomplete, the text signals various interpretative strategies that might 
render it accessible or offer a solution. Both Mr. Utterson and Dr. Lanyon 
operate under the seal of their professions, law and science. These 
professions are founded apparently upon logical and objective principles. 
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Dr. Jekyll's experience (in fact, who he is, has come to be, the denotation 
of his 'I') becomes accessible to these discourses on condition that it 
remain 'sealed' within either of them. Utterson reads the narratives of 
Lanyon and Jekyll in his capacity as Jekyll's lawyer. Jekyll allows Lanyon 
to witness his transformation 'under the seal of your profession' (80). 
Jekyll calls his narrative a confession (72). A confession may be of 
social crime or religious sin. He addresses his confession to Utterson, 
but it is unclear in what capacity Utterson is required to respond. Their 
discourse cannot 'seal' or contain Jekyll's subjective narrative. It is a 
thing apart, split off, beyond their scope. The narratives of Utterson and 
Lanyon are as 'other' to Jekyll's demoniacal confession as Jekyll is to 
Hyde. 
The tale operates in reference to a further metatextual framework - 
the theory introduced by Darwin that man is descended from the ape. Hyde 
is repeatedly represented as a monkey-like figure given to animal desire 
and ferocity. Darwinism has been considered a parallel to the paranoiac's 
system, as a cultural delusional theory; 
the Darwinian integrative principle itself is viewed as important 
because it is integrative, and we do not mind too much the obvious 
fact that it is itself not empirically testable (Fried and Agassi 
1976,41). 
Jekyll's drug achieves the validation of this 'truth'. Jekyll fears that he 
has a dual personality, one part of which is inhuman and amoral. 
Darwinism provides a rationale for this belief, the other appearing as an 
ape (man's primeval core) instead of the devil (as the Christian framework 
might suggest). Within the spreading paranoid network of Jekyll's thinking, 
the drug, like Schreber's 'nerves' theory, is the key to stabilization. 
Jekyll needs to connect a historical theory with a psychological one. The 
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one thing that he and Hyde have in common is memory (89). The ape lives 
on in the 'unconscious' mind, in the soul of man. Jekyll, as if he were the 
first psychoanalyst, combines the metaphysical with the scientific, the 
situation was apart from ordinary laws' (87). The drug represents a 
paralogical attempt to subdue the other, the supernatural and irrational. 
It is the tool of a delusional operation fighting to integrate subjective 
disorder into the wholeness of scientific 'truth'; 
And it chanced that the direction of my scientific studies, which led 
wholly towards the mystic and the transcendental, reacted and shed a 
strong light on this consciousness of the perennial war among my 
members. With every day, and from both sides of my intelligence, the 
moral and the intellectual, I thus drew steadily nearer to the truth 
by whose partial discovery I have been doomed to such a dreadful 
shipwreck... ' (84) 
Jekyll sees his inner contradictions mirrored in the development of his 
scientific studies, and resolved within its framework into separate and 
discrete parts. It is (in contrast to the occasion of Wringham's 
possession) beyond doubt that the transformation of Jekyll into Hyde is a 
physical actuality (Lanyon witnesses the change Jekyll describes as taking 
place before him in a mirror), and is therefore supposedly scientifically 
or empirically determined. John Herdinan, in The Double in Nineteenth 
Century Fiction, decides that this rationale for Jekyll's doubling is the 
main weakness of the tale; 
The trouble is... that the story's crude scientism no longer gives it 
any such hold, that it appears to the modern reader to be indeed 
nothing more than a 'mystic spell', and in that respect the device 
renders the story very dated. The problem for a late nineteenth 
century writer such as Stevenson was that the loss of confident 
belief in any spiritual reality outside the human psyche had robbed 
him of a concrete figure through which to articulate the 
psychological-spiritual nuances to which he aspired to give form 
(1990,132). 
Conversely, it might also be seen, on a textual level, as its most 
effective device. It is not clear why the 'modern reader' should be 
-118- 
distinguishable from the late nineteenth century reader as regards the 
measure of discomfort elicited by a story which turns upon the hub of a 
'mystic spell'. Indeed, Herdman fails in this way to account for its 
abiding fascination. There is, perhaps, a difficulty in seeing the 
empirical and the metaphysical combined in this manner. The reader, as the 
writer, is left 'robbed'. This kind of dualism reenacts, in a sense, that 
within the text expressed by Jekyll's attempt to separate off his grosser 
material self from his finer spiritual self. A rationale must be found, on 
the level of allegory, or the renewal of signification through 
reconstructing the text (as Jekyll attempts to integrate his radically 
divided self) in terms of an undisclosed metatextual symbolic system. 
Hypothesis (whether religious, evolutionist, psychoanalytical) inhabits the 
rift, is evoked to conjure the tale into profound significance, to freight 
the cipher of the drug. As the transformation (in contrast to the nature 
of Jekyll's initial sensation of discontinuity) is represented as physical 
rather than psychological it remains conceptually opaque and functions in 
a manner equivalent to the cheval glass into which Poole and Utterson gaze 
at the scene of the 'crime', as an irritant and provocation. 
Like the editor's interpretation of Pym's tale, Jekyll's confession 
simply returns to the oppositions at play throughout the text; good/bad, 
black/white. Between the close of Jekyll's narrative ('I bring the life of 
that unhappy Jekyll to an end'), and Utterson's discovery of Hyde's body, 
Hyde has inexplicably reappeared and Jekyll has vanished. This 
transformation has taken place simultaneously with the transition from 
life to death of the body, and at this point the natural and the 
supernatural become contiguous. Where Jekyll's drug has by narrative 
sleight of hand achieved the collapsing of boundaries between the physical 
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and the moral or psychological, bringing the latter under the control of 
the former, this conclusion secures a reversal, a reinstatement of the 
original 'order' (denied by Lanyon, whose view-point Jekyll describes as 
narrow and material). The supernatural dimension of the tale remains 
unarticulated or only hinted at by Utterson, Lanyon and Jekyll, but is 
nevertheless fully present and cannot be excised. On Jekyll's suicide the 
relations between good and evil, self and other, life and death once more 
transcend the domain of science and knowledge; the epistemological aporia 
that provoked Jekyll (the conflict between the physical and the spiritual 
dimensions) is reinstituted. The glass returns only the reflections of the 
gazers' faces, instead of the resolution of the mystery of his fate. 
Jekyll's narrative offers the investigators (the lawyer, the police officer, 
the detective, the author, the reader, the psychoanalytical critic) no 
answer but the reflection of their own conflicted subjectivities, the 
always unsolved enigma of the self. The text releases Jekyll's 
spiritual/scientific hypothesizing, with no possibility of allaying the 
malignant demon that has brought about an inquiry into 'God's' laws or the 
order of things. 
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CONCLUSION: PROVOCATIVE NARRATIVES AND THE PARANOID TEXT 
Perhaps the most well-known paranoid text would be Henry James's 'The 
Turn of the Screw'. Its acclaim and notoriety are such that the work 
needs no introduction; the amount of ink spilt puzzling over its piquant 
prevarications leaves little room for further speculation. It offers, in 
view of its reception, a powerful example of the paranoid dynamic. The 
predicament created in the text is of a familiarly perilous kind; either 
the narratee (of which several mediatory forms are generated) has been 
erroneously negotiating the headlong meanderings of insanity in the 
expectation that events would finally be secured in a customary 'reality', 
or he or she must succumb to an endless reconstruction of the sequence of 
events on a basis that both incorporates the supernatural and elaborates 
the precise nature of the perceived evil. Remarking upon the network of 
critical responses which have accumulated around this text, Christine 
Brooke-Rose notes that 'the hesitation of the reader' is encoded in the 
ambiguity of the text 'so efficiently that it has continued for three 
quarters of a century, building itself up into a literary 'case" (1981, 
128). The frequency of those treatments has, in its turn, become an object 
of interrrogation; many have, already, been comprehensively. charted both by 
Brooke-Rose and by Shoshanna Felman in Writing and Madness. 'The Turn of 
the Screw' displays perhaps the most complex and sophisticated (and 
playful) deployment of those strategies so far identified in the earlier 
texts; on this level it has proved enticingly accessible to approaches that 
attempt to apply psychoanalytical thought systems to its byzantine 
procedure. Felman points out that, 
the hypothesis of madness, or 'pathology' which is indeed brought up 
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by the governess herself, is not nearly so easy to eliminate as one 
may think, since, expelled from the text, it seems to fall back on the 
text's interpreter, and thus ironically becomes, through the very 
critical attempt at its elimination, ineradicable from the critical 
vocabulary, be it that of the 'Freudians' or that of the 
'metaphysicians' (1985,147). 
The presentation of madness in James's work ensures that, as Brooke-Rose 
says, 'the state of the governess is contagious' (1981,132). 
This kind of text seems to function as a mirror (recalling a 
recurrent motif of these Gothic presentations of madness) in relation to 
the invoked reader, who confronts in its elliptical surface both the mind's 
inherent resources for engaging in compulsive speculation, and the 
proximity of thes-3 resources to (and conversely their operation as modes 
of defense against) that state of delusion known as 'madness'. 
George E. Haggerty has said of 'The Turn of the Screw' that it 
confronts us with, 
our own inability to explain, or explain away, the Gothic experience. 
The degree to which we push for a resolution to this confusion, the 
very degree to which we desire that resolution still, is the degree 
to which we are part of the horror of the tale ... all the details of 
our experience of the tale are but the bait for the epistemological 
crisis that we experience as the ultimate horror of this tale (1989, 
157) 
The study of the nineteenth century works in Part I has worked toward 
uncovering the narrative strategies that create this kind of Jeopardy or 
'critical' participation. These strategies have been examined for the ways 
in which they compel an osmosis from presented psychotic experience 
through a membrane of the narrative framing of that material and the text, 
into the process of reading. Each of these works, in some way, exhibits 
what appear to be three essential components: the text presents 
extraordinary psychic experience displaying features analogous to paranoid 
thought processes; this is associated both with madness and the 
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supernatural giving rise to a process of investigation of this phenomenon 
which is simultaneously located within conflicting conceptual frames, and 
which itself mimics these processes; resolution is both continuously 
offered and indefinitely deferred - characteristically the text not only 
resists closure but propels the reader back into the text promoting a 
compulsive re-reading the nature of which shifts ever closer to that of 
the primary fictional presentation of paranoid logic. This pervasive, 
circuitous paranoid logic is distinctive for the binary, polarized 
discursive configurations that generates it/it generates. On the level of 
subjective experience (that of a central protagonist) this can result in 
the splitting of the self into self and 'other', the parts of which develop 
continuity with such dualisms as become generally operational in the text; 
sane/insane, damned/saved, real/unreal, natural/supernatural, or good/evil. 
The operation of this kind of logic is usually precipitated by a rift, an 
enigma of some sort, an irresolvable mystery or 'disturbance of the order- 
of the-world' which requires an exaggerated realignment of these 
fundamental meaning-making oppositions in order to achieve resolution. 
Once the mechanism has been provoked, however, its inductive dynamic may 
carry the subject who identifies the need to reconcile untractable 
experience within the limits of the positive term over into the realms of 
the opposite term; the insane, the unreal, the supernatural. 
The narratives operate in a manner which stresses the expectation of 
solution and completion. Nevertheless, each of the works ends with a 
renewal of mystery. There is an approach to revelation and solution and 
then enigma reinhabits the closure of the text. This denial of closure is 
the characteristic of these texts that has recently attracted most critical 
interest. They are treated as examples of post-structuralist theory. They 
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encourage such descriptions as a 'graphic illustration of the Derridean 
gospel". Magdelene Redekop notes that 'closure is emerging as perhaps the 
single most important problem for critics of A Justified Sinner' (1985, 
160), that 'inconclusive conclusions have become a prominent feature of 
contemporary reading of this book' (1985,162) and clinches the point with 
a neat chiasmus 'Hogg has created an important new expectation: that all 
our expectations for rational order will be frustrated' (ibid., 178). Pym 
is often viewed (as are other of Poe's works) as a self-conscious comment 
upon the impossibility of meaning and presence in a deconstructive context. 
It is narrative which talks about itself. Paul Rosenzweig discusses the 
'dust of disintegrating meaning' and explains that 'Nothing is certain in 
the world of the Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pyrn, not even the certainty 
that nothing is' (Rosenweig 1984,149). The uncertainty within the text 
becomes an uncertainty of the text. Yet the texts do not 'end' with non- 
closure, with an (avant-garde) subversive statement, turning our 
unreasonable (irrational, deluded) demands for signification back upon 
ourselves. At least this is not the whole story. They do not just bring 
about a disintegration of meaning and a sense of the indeterminacy of the 
literary text - should it be searched ad infinitum for clues. It is not 
the denial, but the denial of denial that is the salient feature. 
Hogg sends the reader back into the text and to the grave of the 
suicide (with some urgency, for soon there will be nothing left of the 
body), in the hope that the significance of Wringhim's narrative (the 
reason for its preservation) will be unearthed. Where Wringhim's text had 
failed to supply the 'Editor' with any peace of mind concerning what 
'actually' happened, he went beyond it to the evidence contained in the 
grave of a dead man whose flesh was unaccountably undecayed. Death has 
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not happened, closure has not happened, the body is somehow unnaturally 
still living, and equally unnaturally, the text continues to be written. 
Part of Pym's narrative is missing but may still be found 
It is feared that the few remaining chapters which were to have 
completed his narrative, and which were retained by him, while the 
above were in type, for the purpose of revision, have been 
irrecoverably lost through the accident by which he perished himself. 
This however, may not prove to be the case, and the papers, if 
ultimately found, will be given to the public (Poe 1975,240). 
Again, further investigation is suggested: 
The loss of the two or three final chapters (for there were but two 
or three) is the more deeply to be regretted, as, it cannot be 
doubted, they contained matter relative to the Pole itself, or at 
least to regions in its very near proximity; and as, too, the 
statements of the author in relation to these regions may shortly be 
verified or contradicted by means of the governmental expedition now 
preparing for the Southern Ocean' (ibid., 240). 
The key to the tale is missing, but it is not so much lost as concealed. 
It is, perhaps, significant that Poe was himself interested not so much in 
expressing what amounts to the perpetual play of signification in 
language, and the way in the sign itself is empty of presence and meaning, 
but in eliciting the intellectual process which insists upon its 
significance'. Hence his fascination for hieroglyphs and cryptography as 
evidenced in his essays entitled 'Secret Writing", where he explores the 
'peculiar mental action' that is 'called into play in the solution of 
cryptographical problems' (Harrison 1965,123); 
Cryptography,... pure, properly embraces those modes of writing which 
are rendered legible only by means of some explanatory key which 
makes known the real signification of the ciphers employed to its 
possessor... Nonsensical phrases and unmeaning combinations of words, 
as the learned lexicographer would have confessed himself, when 
hidden under cryptographic ciphers, serve to perplex the curious 
enquirer, and baffle penetration more completely than would the most 
profound apothegms of learned philosophers (Harrison 1965,126-127). 
Poe's text itself stimulated the writing of several elaborate responses, 
from authors4 who attempted to complete and explain the story in rational 
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terms, to decipher the text. 
These texts are 'not finished', but they are incomplete not only in 
the sense that completion is impossible, but in the sense that 
hypothesizing and interpretation is invited to continue beyond the scope of 
the text, beyond the ceasing of the narrative. Their deconstructive 
quality leads immediately into a reconstructive mode (but not necessarily 
of the kind that Todorov proposes, that is to say the resolution either in 
terms of the 'uncanny' or the 'marvellous'). 
The plot of each of these works involves the unravelling of where 
madness ends and the supernatural begins, where the parameters of reality 
in the fictional world coincide with those of the actual 'known' world. 
The supernatural, the inexplicable, is an irritant; it is un-whole-some, it 
points to the breach where God used to be, the subject and his world are 
not whole, boundaries are trangressed and broken. These works' initial 
appeal to their audience is made on a rational and empiric level. As 
Hogg's editor challengingly remarks of the appearance of the supernatural 
(having asserted the coherence of the justified sinner's narrative with 
that of popular tradition) 'it could scarcely have missed to have been 
received as authentic; but in this day, and with the present generation, it 
will not go down... ' (1969,254). The objectivity displayed in the texts is 
betrayed. Their reception may elicit one of two equally destabilizing 
responses; either a subjection to a code which will encompass the 
operation of the supernatural (belief in the devil, belief in a threatening, 
concealed and monstrous part of ourselves, belief in the eradication of the 
boundaries between the known world and the esoteric at the ends of the 
earth - therefore not 'the marvellous' resolution of Todorov) despite the 
appeal to a wholesome rationality; or the recognition that the process of 
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unpacking the text the reader has also been exposed to and infected by a 
paranoid hypothesizing around a delusional centre: 'reading about psychosis 
becomes a reading psychosis's. The rational, empirical subject is hung by 
the locks (like Robert Wringhim, in his hallucinatory experience) over the 
perilous, yawning chasm of madness, the supernatural, the incognizable, and 
is forced to account for what happens, is 'hoist with his own petard'. 
The urgency evoked to discover a pattern in the texts is of a 
paranoid nature. Criticism that discovers the pattern of the texts to be 
one of an allegory of the process of writing, of signification are 
nevertheless in a sense succumbing to this factor. In the same way the 
'editor' of Pym's narrative offers the 'explanation' of the hieroglyphs. The 
texts operate upon the reader in a manner that produces results similar to 
Schreber's compulsion to complete partial sentences that form in his mind. 
In Schreber's writing (for the purposes of this discussion at least) his 
pathology may be seen to reside in a persistent attempt to make sense 
where sense is missing. There is a predominant interpretative activity 
operating where interpretation is impossible. Madness is found where 
reason is forced to rationalize that which is suspected of being beyond 
the conventional universe of discourse, 
The splitting and antithesis that takes place in these texts, 
including Schreber's, and manifested in what may be considered a 
pathological mode in the form of doubles and delusions, appears 
fundamentally to be an attempt to create meaning and whole-someness 
through objectification. This is triggered when some subversion of the 
normal order of things, experienced subjectively as an enigma, occurs. The 
dissociation in the case of Schreber, however, functions finally in a 
mariner distinguishable from the fictional modes. Through the construction 
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of his comprehensive and elaborate cosmic system Schreber begins to regain 
some kind of stability, the psychological disruption he has been 
experiencing becomes more harmless, 'the scales of victory are coming down 
on my side more and more, the struggle against me continues to lose its 
previous hostile character... ' (Schreber 1988,214). His logical self has 
created a framework within which his irrational experience becomes 
rational and explicable, and he is therefore (despite God's plan) able to 
fend off total dementia and suicide. Each of the fictional texts, however, 
end with death; or rather, deferred deaths, that precede and undercut the 
final destruction of the central protagonist, the circumstances of which 
merely create more mystery. Poe's ratiocination works on the surface to 
expunge the presence of mystery with regard to Pym's consciousness rather 
than to integrate it into his reality. The overall effect is, however, 
vertiginous. Objectivizing, rational hyper-activity very often leads into 
frustration. 
Purposive ambiguity and lack of clarity in Hogg infuriated a 
contemporary reviewer; 
If an author will introduce supernatural beings, he is at least bound 
to invent plausible motives for their interference in human 
concerns ... Me phantoms of that superstition must either have a real, 
external being; or they must exist solely in the diseased imagination 
of the supposed writer... (1969,257, appendix). 
This is exactly the differentiation that Schreber works so hard -to make. 
These texts cultivate ontological anxiety, and thereby induce a paranoid 
reading-effect, Through their continous emphasis upon tracing a thread 
through the labyrinth of cause and effect, upon the mechanisms of meaning 
production, upon the construction of plot and through their ambiguous 
presentation of madness and the supernatural they challenge, in effect, the 
're-plotting' of a world within which such texts may be accomodated and 
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resolved; the moment of hesitation identified by Todorov is constitutive 
and indefinite. The provocation to resolve is there, and for reasons which 
would seem in fact to refute his suggestion that they have little to do 
with the 'psychology of reading'. Paranoia, within the context of the 
Gothic fictional mode, would appear to be identifiable as a 'malady of 
reading', and is brought into play at that point at which the distinction 
between fiction as depiction of the 'unreal' and as engulfment in delusion 
is most strenously plied'6. 
PART II: SCHIZOID FICTION 
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I 
INTRODUCTION: MADNESS AND MODERN FICTION 
This section will deal with texts bearing some similarity to those 
discussed in relation to the 'paranoid', but which develop aspects that 
seem to require a different approach. The designation of these texts as 
'modern' does not necessarily imply that they were written within a 
specific historical period. The term is used to indicate a type of text 
that displays an approach to 'madness' that ceases to function in accord 
with what are now generally considered outmoded ideas; that is to say, it 
is treated in a way which does not invoke superstitious responses, does 
not align insanity with - or play it off against - the supernatural, and 
which does not demonstrate an overt interrogative narrative concern with 
metaphysical oppositions. 
%I 
will be looking at works that deal with what appears to be, and has 
frequently been approached as, the breakdown of the mentality of a central 
character into a form of psychosis. Manifestations of derangement may or 
may not be discussed as such within the text by the narrator. The process 
of increasing psychic destabilization itself (rather than conjecture as to 
the status of 'mad' experience) provides the texts with a kind of unifying 
structural dynamic. In contrast to the 'paranoid' texts discussed, the 
experience of the 'mad' self in these texts remains unmediated by any 
determined rational interpretative and controlling mechanism or voice: or 
rather. if it appears, this voice may become demonstrably defeated or 
obsolete. The narrative may swing from a 'control' position to one of 
passive endorsement of the position taken up by (or imposed upon) the 
psychotic self. 
The ambivalence created in the texts previously examined in terms of 
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Todorov's ideas (which gave them a paranoid character) no longer appears 
to be an important element of the narrative. They do not belong to the 
genre of the 'fantastic'. The texts to be dealt with here unambiguously 
present as their subject a form of insanity. Neither are they strictly 
conformable to Todorov's idea of the literary Gothic (as the others may 
be)'. Little doubt is allowed to remain in these texts as to whether any 
event is brought about by the operation of the supernatural. A 
disturbance is never finally locatable in the 'outside' objective world, its 
source lies on the 'inside', within the individual concerned. Its 
'naturalness' (the possibility of its coming about within the laws of 
nature as they are generally understood) is not the focus of interrogation 
by narrator or reader. 
The stories do coincide to a certain extent, however, with Todorov's 
general idea of the genre of the 'uncanny' in its 'pure state': 
In works that belong to this genre, events are related which may be 
readily accounted for by the laws of reason, but which are, in one 
way or another, incredible, extraordinary, shocking, singular, 
disturbing or unexpected (1975,46). 
In so far as madness may be accounted for by the laws of reason (and 
moving into the twentieth century there are available to author and reader 
proliferating methods for doing so - springing from the growth of 
psychiatry and psychoanalysis) these texts may be considered uncanny. 
However, they may also be found to question the adequacy of an appeal to 
'the laws of reason' and nature to account for the events; not because 
reason cannot account for something supernatural, but because reason 
paradoxically is what stands between the psychotic experience and an 
understanding of it. Reason is that which preserves the 'uncanniness' of 
such experience through a form of distancing. The disturbing effects of 
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these works may depend upon the breaking down of those distancing 
mechanisms. 
The narratives do not finally work toward, or conclude with, an 
inducement to paranoid interpretative strategies (with regard to the 
presence of the irrational within it) - although such expectations may be 
aröused at the outset. Instead, what can only be described in each case 
as a statement of negation or refusal of such interpretation occurs. The 
irrational forfeits its status as 'other' through the lack of 
differentiation on the level of narrative logic. There is little incitement 
to identify and defeat a disruption of 'order' - the process which would 
engender narrative activity. Disorder finds its own validation as a facet 
of human experience and becomes integral to the narrative voice. 
Approached as the structurally significant component of a literary 
text rather than as a clinically conceived exposition, this refusal may be 
concerned with protest against or protection from various forms of 
negatively experienced management; a character may be understood to be 
reacting against reduction, against understanding or being understood, or 
against being open to a repressive circumscription of the self within a 
(socially, discursively) prescribed and defined existence. The stories may 
be interpreted as structured around the presentation of the individual 
encountering conflict between the self and a world which it experiences as 
repressive. Any textual resolution which allows dismissal of this 
experience to occur through the application of the critical adjective 'mad' 
is in this regard a false restabilization, a concealment of the original 
state of conflict. The presentation of a psychotic state of mind is in 
each case of a kind liable to undermine paranoid, exegetical activity. It 
represents a partial dissociation or dislocation from a dominant discursive 
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reality as represented by an objective interpretative narrative 
consciousness. 
Essentially the point I wish to make in juxtaposing readings of these 
with the other more 'fantastic' texts is that instead of enacting and 
instituting a search for meaning (in a manner which becomes psychotic by 
virtue of its being applied to that which insistently eludes satisfactory 
rationalization), they seem to enlist 'madness' in a gesture against such a 
process. Instead of any persistent movement toward a (manifestly 
unattainable) restabilization of self and meaning these texts focus upon 
the instability of the self and begin to question the constructed nature 
of meaning. The activity of decision and explanation is precluded by 
attention being focussed in a subjective experience of madness - of an 
'anti-logical' as opposed to a paralogical3 kind). A position of objective 
judgement ('is this in accord with rational or natural laws and if not how 
can I make it so? ') becomes less tenable. 
Before examining these aspects of the transformation in presentation 
of disturbed states of consciousness in fiction, the fact that this shift 
does not take place within a conceptual vacuum should be addressed. It 
has often been remarked that much twentieth century narrative fiction 
seems to have been increasingly preoccupied with such states. Bernard 
McElroy, for example, takes note of 'the technique of a conspicuous number 
of twentieth century writers by which the reins of a novel are delivered 
into the hands of a first person narrator who is insane or quite possibly 
insane, thereby making the world of the novel the world as he experiences 
it' (1989,95). The proliferation of discourses around the phenomenon of 
'insanity' since the pioneering work of Freud has led to a universally 
heightened awareness of its manifestations and of the ways in which they 
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may be described. Some texts previously examined predate, and yet 
prefigure concerns which become the focus of later twentieth century 
theoretical and scientific debate (see appendix for further general 
discussion concerning relevant developments). I do not assume any direct 
connection between particular fictional and clinical approaches to madness, 
beyond the recognition that there exists an interface where both are 
reliant upon the limited power of contemporary discursive structures to 
communicate the states of consciousness. Characteristic similarities are 
typologically noted. 
Madness, understood as psychological disturbance whether the cause is 
traced to mental or biological dysfunction, may now be known by many 
names and explained in as many different contexts. Common to most is the 
idea that it is dysfunction, that it is an illness consequently capable of 
cure by science. There is an inherent paradox however, that arises out of 
the discourses created to secure this perspective upon madness, which 
posits insanity as both ultimately natural and controllable. Once madness 
is made to render up its threatening, enigmatic status and to submit to 
the clinical gaze, it also gives up its position as 'other', as linked to the 
supernatural, as always beyond and external to the 'rational' self and, in 
its naturalness enters into that self - it is no longer alien to the norm 
but instrinsic to the norm. As an illness it is perhaps unhealthy but not 
unnatural or even irrational. 
In the gothic text, madness maintains sufficient of its enigmatic 
status to perform as a challenge to rational or scientific discourse, to 
the coherence of the text. Where the scientific or rational approach 
fails, God and the metaphysical returns in daemonized form, eliciting the 
compulsion to contain this return within the protagonist's mind. Much of 
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the textual power of madness lies in the never wholly excluded possibility 
that its origin is supernatural rather than psychological. Daemonic 
persecution, the wrath of God or the evil of the Devil may be located in 
the fevered imaginings of the mad protagonist, or may signal the eruption 
of a forgotten other world into the world of the text, which masquerades 
as a reflection of contemporary reality. Though there is uncertainty as to 
whether it is inside or outside, that opposition is still very much 
operative. In twentieth century clinical thought it begins to be broken 
down. Rather than residing between the natural and the supernatural, the 
origin of the disturbance has been located (leaving aside biological and 
neurological theories) in several primary conceptual sites: the faulty 
progression of the individual from infancy to sexual maturity (the 
narrative of sexual orientation), the critical relation of the subject to 
language and of the individual to society. In each case insanity may find 
its roots embedded, at the same moment as within the individual, in that 
space that we are challenged to preserve inviolate in earlier texts - the 
'real' world, the environment in which the protagonist functions and which 
we share. These are unavoidably interconnected, but the degree of 
interrelation is dependent upon the emphasis of the theorist. Since Freud 
the self precariously inhabits, and has become inhabited by disorder and 
irrationality. 
Beyond any consensus suggested here as emergent from a constituent 
modern 'demystification' of madness, any designation of psychosis remains 
inherently unstable due to the plurality of available categories and the 
resistent fluidity of manifestations of psychic disturbance. The concept 
of 'schizophrenia' functions as an index to this seminal (but medically 
frustrating) permutability. It performs the transmutation of 'madness' into 
-135- 
something that may be subsumed within current diagnostic and descriptive 
discourses. These share with recent philosophical and literary theoretical 
debate the common focus of the operation of language (see also appendix, 
under 'Jacques Lacan and Language' and 'Further Linguistic Approaches' for 
further relevant discussion in this regard). In the domain of psychiatry 
the term can serve, fundamentally, to situate madness within a linguistic 
context, to make of it an object identifiable through its modes of 
expression whilst releasing it both from a redundant metaphysics and an 
uncertain physicality. Though it is so widely used, the term remains 
arguably only loosely descriptive, both within clinical usage and popular 
vocabulary. As is pointed out in Schizophrenia: An Integrated Approach to 
Research and Treatment (Birchwood 1988,16), from its inception a century 
ago as a hypothetical concept 'schizophrenia was imbued with a sense of 
certainty, of a spurious foundation in a secure knowledge base' but has 
really become merely 'shortened for 'insanity". There are 'no universally 
accepted criteria for the classification of schizophrenia' (ibid., 12). The 
International Encyclopaedia of Psychiatry reiterates this, 'schizophrenia is 
not a clinical entity but a group of distinct clinical patterns put 
together on the basis of a loose communality of symptoms' (ibid., 47). 
These 'patterns' seem to inform general critical use of the term. They are 
taken up in this study in so far as they are founded in, or may be related 
to the narrative use of language. 
As is the case with paranoia, schizophrenia is a term that has passed 
into common parlance. It is frequently used to indicate inexplicably 
conflicting facets of personality or modes of behaviour evinced by an 
individual. This particular deployment of the adjective 'schizoid', implying 
as it does manifestations of multiple personality, is of limited benefit in 
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this case, where attention is paid to modes of narration (and not simply 
to the doubling or splitting of character). More appropriate, but 
disparate, are descriptions of 'schizoid thought processes' as manifest In 
speech or writing; they may be expected to be, for example, 'peculiarly 
fragmentary, disjointed, and discontinuous', according to the International 
Encyclopaedia of Psychiatry. They are commonly acknowledged to include an 
attendant sensation of 'loss of self' or of any 'psychical boundary'. 
Eugene Bleuler, providing one of the earliest and most influential accounts 
of schizophrenia, is still referred to for his classification, which 
stresses associative disturbances and affective incongruity as significant 
to the condition: 
In associative disturbances the patient's thinking appears 
incomprehensible. He is no longer capable of linking his thought 
according to logical relationships, so thoughts are disconnected or 
unusually connected and lacking in rational structure (Balis 1978, 
134). 
In affective incongruity, he explains 'a feeling of indifference or an 
emotional bluntness may coexist' (ibid., 134). Bleuler posits here a state 
of normality where thought, feeling and speech operate logically and 
rationally in relation to each other - the disruption of which marks the 
schizophrenic subject. That recognition or establishment of difference and 
reversal C'no longer') allows for the identification of psychosis. Though 
specific interpretations differ, ultimately a consensus is apparent to the 
effect that schizoid states must reside in the disrupted relation of the 
self both to language and to reality. 
That assumption of a babelish deterioration is the necessary basis 
here for the discrimination of sanity from insanity (necessary for those 
whose job it is to make such a decision). The fictionist, however, is able 
to elude the narrative logic of the fallen state, the 'no longer', the 
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movement into difference through time. C. G. Jung's listing of the 
potentially psychotic characteristics of modern art in 'Ulysses A 
Monologue' (1934, in Jung 1967) both further demonstrates the original 
breadth of significance attributable to the concept of schizophrenia, and 
shows a psychiatrist wrestling with the problematic illusoriness of art for 
the diagnostician who is nevertheless provoked by the insights it seems to 
offer. He speaks of the incidence in Joyce's Ulysses of 'interminable 
ramblings', 'a sensory curiosity directed inwards as well as outwards', 'a 
delirious confusion of the subjective and psychic with objective reality', 
'a method of presentation that takes no account of the reader but indulges 
in neologisms, fragmentary quotations, sound- and speech-associations, 
abrupt transitions and hiatuses of thought', 'an atrophy of feeling that 
does not shrink from any depth of absurdity or cynicism', and 'the tendency 
to treat reality as if it were strange'. The psychiatrist may find himself 
'startled' by the suspicion that the book is 'schizophrenic', since trenchant 
analogies may be drawn (ibid., 116). He finds, however, that he is in a 
domain where he can identify no 'norm' from which the composition deviates 
(e. g Joyce's style of writing when 'sane'?; Jung counters - 'It would never 
occur to me to class Ulysses as a product of schizophrenia', ibid. 117). He 
concludes that the text simply represents a facet of the norm, 'a 
collective manifestation of our time' (ibid., 117). We would not then be 
dealing with 'schizophrenic' as diagnosis ('knowing between', evaluative 
differentiation between past self and present, or the condition of one 
individual as opposed to that of the majority) but as a description: this 
would not necessarily imply any lapse, since it is not clear from what 
there has been a fall, and to whom/what this has happened. Jung's analysis 
infers that a schizoid configuration may be the property of the text, and 
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not of the writer's mind. It also indicates the extent to which diagnostic 
method, from the inception of 'schizophrenia' as a category, could be 
characterized by and lend itself to a textual, or narrative mode of 
comprehension. 
The analysis of the modern texts will work toward evolving a 
perspective upon the possible usefulness of such a polysemous, over- 
determined but richly suggestive term for the activity of literary 
criticism (adapted here to 'schizoid' to free the term from its association 
with the mind of the 'patient'). It is possible that there can be no true 
schizoid 'text' in the sense of the writings of a schizophrenic; such 
experience would be unwritable because the linguistic and conceptual 
ordering principle is damaged. Schreber's system centred and 're-created' 
his subjectivity; the self is repaired as it becomes narratable. Schizoid 
states involve a 'non-'sense of self from which the act of writing affords 
no sustainable redemption, or may even be considered disruptive in itself. 
It may be said, however, that an analogous perplexity has in different 
ways become characteristic of many modern and 'post-modern' literary texts. 
Beckett's The Unnamable, for example, demonstrates an anarchic oscillation 
between liberation and entrapment contiguous with the radical ephemerality 
of the dis-articulated (unnameable, uncreated) schizoid self: 
I'm all these words, all these strangers, this dust of words, with no 
ground for their settling, no sky for their dispersing, coming 
together to say, fleeing one another to say, that I am they, all of 
them, those that merge, those that part, those that never meet, and 
nothing else, yes, something else, that I'm quite different, a quite 
different thing, a wordless thing in an empty place, a hard shut dry 
cold black place, where nothing stirs, nothing speaks, and that I 
listen, and that I seek, like a caged beast born of caged beasts born 
of caged beasts... blind from birth (1979,356). 
Is the 'I' misrepresented or negated by language ('I'm quite different'), or 
nothing other than - fall-out from - language ('this dust of words'? ). 
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Julia Kristeva has suggested that some recent works are, in a sense 
'unreadable' (Kristeva 1986,42) (if not, manifestly, unwritable), and there 
is much to be said on this level. However, this discussion will confine 
itself to texts that refer specifically to psychic disturbance4. The wider 
relevance of the arguments put forward may be inferred from the treatment 
here of writers that are considered to be representative of modern and 
'post-'modern literature. 
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DE-COMPOSITION IN MELVILLE'S 'BARTLEBY THE SCRIVENER: A STORY 
OF WALL-STREET' 
Narrative Structure: Story-Telling Against the Grain 
Whilst manifesting similarities in its treatment of disturbed states of 
consciousness with the works formerly under discussion, this story also 
marks a departure and prefigures many of the concerns to be developed in 
later fictional treatments of madness. In particular, it demonstrates a 
move toward representing psychosis in a way which more plainly addresses 
the individual's modes of psychic defence against the alienation or 
'falsification' of the self within modern social structures; although it was 
published first in 1853, this is an approach which aligns it with mid- 
twentieth century rather than contemporary attitudes. 
The arrival of Bartleby in the narrator's law office, apparently in 
answer to an advertisement for a scrivener, initiates the account. The 
text follows the progress of the relationship between the two men. It is 
a history of the increasingly irrational behaviour of one man, and of the 
other's reasonable (he believes) response to this behaviour. The fact that 
it becomes, ultimately, not a simple matter to discern whose behaviour is 
to be considered the more rational indicates some of the complexity of 
this narrative. 
Bartleby seems, at first, to be the ideal copyist, working 
obsessively for long hours. However, the narrator begins to express his 
perplexity as the scrivener refuses to carry out aspects of his work, and 
finally refuses to do anything at all. Having allowed him to remain 
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motionless in this way, day and night for some time (Bartleby has taken up 
lodgings in his office), the narrator decides that his new scrivener should 
go. Bartleby, however, unexpectedly refuses to go. By this time the 
narrator begins to find Bartleby's presence insupportable and decides to 
move out himself. Following this Bartleby is sent to prison by-the new 
landlord of the previous premises, and eventually dies incarcerated. 
The text bears some compositional resemblance to Hogg's Sinner. Like 
the Editor, the narrator in this story begins by establishing his authority, 
an authority that derives from an acceptable and accessible social 
position. He describes himself as a 'safe man'. This is a term which has 
significance within the context of his professional occupation on Wall 
Street, and also suggests that as a narrator he is reliable, operating with 
reason and discretion. From his position of security he sets out to to 
narrate the history of the scrivener, a character that he has come to 
regard as in some manner insane. 
The world of the text is limited to a specific and unified space. 
The narrator proposes that, by initiating his tale with a description of 
the environment, and of the way people function and behave within it, a 
complete understanding of Bartleby might be achieved: 
Ere introducing the scrivener, as he first appeared to me, it is fit I 
make some mention of myself, my employes, my business, my chambers, 
and general surroundings; because some such description is 
indespensible to an adequate understanding of the chief character 
about to be presented (Melville 1967,59). 
The implied author is a typical inhabitant of this environment. He is a 
lawyer of an unexceptional kind ('I am one of those unambitious lawyers... '. 
60). Within such offices, according to the narrator's experience, there 
exist two kinds of men; lawyers, and law-copyists, or 'scriveners'. This 
story is then comprised in the experience of two people, lawyer and law- 
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copyist, one who writes and one who copies, one who commands and one who 
obeys; one who has a voice, and one who does not. The narrator speaks for 
both; he feels that his own experience must also be able to account for 
Bartleby's, since they share a common circumstance. 
However, the lawyer is really attempting to tell the story of a man 
he perceives to be suffering from an 'innate and incurable disorder' (79), 
which institutes difference. At first this disorder takes the form of 
exaggerated conformity: 
Bartleby did an extraordinary quantity of writing. As if long 
famishing for something to copy, he seemed to gorge himself on my 
documents. There was no pause for digestion. He ran a day and 
night line, copying by sunlight and candlelight (67). 
Initially, this is perceived as merely eccentric. The narrator describes 
the erratic personality traits of his other employees, which seem to be 
expressions of frustration with their occupation (for example he says of 
'Nippers', who is continually frustrated with his equipment, 'if he wanted 
anything it was to be rid of a scrivener's table altogether' 64). Their 
peculiar and regulated outbursts appear to have developed as a kind of 
safety-valve. The lawyer talks about their aberrations coolly, with amused 
detachment (he is not eccentric), and congratulates himself upon how, 
despite these problems, he has still managed to find the men useful, and 
has been able to manipulate them into the schedule of his normal working 
day. 
All that Bartleby does, however, is write, manifesting no intractable 
behavioural quirks. Yet it is in his excessive industry that his 
derangement first becomes apparent. The lawyer is anxious: 
I should have been quite delighted with his application, had he been 
cheerfully industrious. But he wrote on silently, palely, mechanically 
(67). 
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His 'madness' manifests itself as a kind of 'scrivener's madness', a 
maniacal perversion of what is expected of him. Amidst this display of 
tangential human behaviour, the narrator presents himself as oddly self- 
contained. He is complacent in his acceptance of his way of life as 
natural and desirable, as a reasonable sort of existence. A precarious 
steite of mind, he mentions, is a frequent occurrence in his profession, but 
he maintains himself as an exception to the rule; 
Though I belong to a profession proverbially energetic and nervous, 
even to turbulence, at times, yet nothing of that sort have I ever 
suffered to invade my peace (59-60). 
Bartleby, however, increasingly affects his peace of mind. Suddenly, 
instead of carrying out his tasks with quiet acumen and a defensive 
equanimity, he unaccountably refuses to carry them out at all. Having 
been asked by the lawyer to examine a paper, Bartleby, in a 'singularly 
mild, firm voice' replies, 'I would prefer not to'. The narrator confesses 
his panic: 
I sat awhile in perfect silence. rallying my stunned faculties. 
Immediately it occurred to me that my ears had deceived me, or 
Bartleby had entirely misunderstood my meaning. I repeated my 
request in the clearest tone I could assume; but in quite as clear a 
voice came the previous reply, "I would prefer not to". 
"Prefer not to", echoed I, rising in high excitement. and crossing the 
room with a stride. "What do you mean? Are you moon-struck? " (68). 
His incredulous fury arises from the perceived breach of a contract 
established between them. There is a sense in which his response is 
appropriate. Bartleby's reasonable tone suggests that the lawyer's request 
is itself unreasonable, and challenges the conventions of this existence. 
The narrator feels he must draw in other employees to witness Bartleby's 
odd behaviour; 
It is not seldom the case that. when a man is browbeaten in some 
unprecedented and violently unreasonable way, he begins to stagger in 
his own plainest faith. He begins, as it were, vaguely to surmise 
that, wonderful as it may be, all the justice and all the reason is on 
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the other side. Accordingly, if any disinterested persons are 
present, he turns to them for some reinforcement of his own faltering 
mind (70). 
It is from this moment that the narrator's stance of complete equilibrium 
becomes questionable. He is not as 'safe' as he imagines. It is possible 
to discern beneath the lawyer's veneer of compos mentis conduct a subtext 
of -growing disorientation and increasingly paranoid behaviour'. Despite 
the fact that he regards Bartleby as a 'demented man' the lawyer prefers 
to retain him in the office; that is, until his presence becomes so 
embarrassing for his practice that he asks him to leave. He assumes that 
Bartleby will depart, and this he hopes (the conviction that he, as a 
reasonable being inhabits a reasonable world, is dependent upon Bartleby's 
compliance) should be enough to actually bring about his departure. The 
scrivener does not leave. and the lawyer conceives of a plan that might 
prove effective; 
I might enter my office in a great hurry, and pretending not to see 
Bartleby at all, walk straight against him as if he were air. Such a 
proceeding would have the appearance of a home-thrust. It was 
hardly possible that Bartleby could withstand such an application of 
the doctrine of assumptions (86). 
The 'doctrine of assumptions' turns out to be predictably ill-founded. 
Eventually, deciding paralogically that if his scrivener will not leave, his 
office will leave the scrivener, he moves his rooms to another part of 
Wall Street. The narrator, in relating the story of his encounter with 
Bartleby, explains but never comments upon the singularity of his own 
thought processes and behaviour. Yet he trembles to think that his 
'contact with the scrivener had already and seriously affected (him] in a 
mental wav' (81). He suspects that he is losing touch with his habitual 
modes of functioning in this society (the nodes of 'reality' which it is 
his role to maintain). 
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The narrator's rational tone and style, the manner in which he 
suggests he is telling the story of one of his scriveners and objectifies 
Bartleby's gradual psychic disintegration, overlays the more personal story 
of his own experience. In Melville's text there is another 'voice' 
operating below the superficial narration of events which suggests there 
is a different story being told. On this level the appearance of Bartleby 
is also the catalyst to the narrator's experience of an increasing 
subjective proximity to a state of insanity. Their confrontation is one 
which threatens to bring about a destabilization of the lawyer's 
psychological condition. The course of events which leads to Bartleby's 
removal from his presence is also that which ensures that the developing 
insecurity of narrative view-point does not finally result in a disruption 
of the text, and allows the story to be told objectively - in retrospect. 
The narrator then, is not so 'safe' as first appears. His responses 
to Bartleby's behaviour are illogical and not entirely consistent with the 
reasonable tone that he adopts to tell his story. Bartleby's psychological 
state, and also that of the narrator, have been critically recognized as 
conforming to (diverse) clinically identified conditions. The relationship, 
on the narrative level, between the lawyer and his scrivener develops a 
complexity belied by the tone of the lawyer's introduction of the story. 
The objective presentation of another's psychological deterioration is 
undermined, the boundaries between them - from the narrator's perspective 
- are indistinct. As the narrative develops it becomes clear that this 
lack of an authentic perspective has influenced, conversely, the narrative 
presentation. The impact of Bartleby upon the narrator can be understood 
when it is considered to what extent the scrivener becomes a subversive 
factor in his life. Bartleby represents a threat to his personal vision of 
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the 'order of the world'. Order, in his offices, is his priority to the 
extent that the violent emotional outbursts of his most valuable copyists 
are viewed in the light of how he can integrate such irregularities into 
the smooth running of his practice. His existence is derived from, and 
consists in, the orderly transcription of legal language. He is by 
definition 'a conveyancer and title hunter, and drawer-up of recondite 
documents of all sorts' (66). He deals in the creation of order, of 
financial agreements and contracts. Bartleby's arrival shakes the 
foundations of this world, since he prefers not to adopt its internal logic 
and behavioural requirements, not to be 'automatized', to lose his self in 
this manner (nor to exhibit a suppressed resistance in the inconsistent 
manner of Turkey and Nippers). This kind of reasoning negates that upon 
which the narrator sustains his own 'safety'; anything other than working 
in an orderly fashion (worshipping 'prudence' and 'method') in a well- 
organized world denotes derangement. The narrator is caught in a 
difficult position. To dismiss Bartleby would be to admit the defeat of 
his methods of reasoning. To let him remain means that he is allowing, or 
inviting, the undermining of his authority and of the conventions of his 
way of life. Bartleby's rebellion is a threat to the lawyer's social 
identity. When the narrator discovers that Bartleby has come to 
continuously inhabit his office, and is even able to exclude the lawyer 
from the place in which he is 'safe', it is experienced by the narrator as 
'unmanning' (76); 
I consider that one, for the time, is sort of unmanned when he 
tranquilly permits his hired clerk to order him away from his own 
premises3. 
At first the lawyer sees Bartleby's behaviour as the result of faulty 
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logic, and 'begins to reason with him' (70). The lawyer is then convinced 
that Bartleby must see reason behind his argument ('every copyist is bound 
to examine his copy', 70), and that if he appears not to, it must be 
because he has good reason, within the terms of this contract, to disagree; 
It seemed to me that, while I had been addressing him, he carefully 
revolved every statement that I made; fully comprehended the meaning; 
could not gainsay the irresistable conclusion; but at the same time, 
some paramount consideration prevailed with him as he did (70). 
When it becomes clear that no 'paramount consideration' is forthcoming the 
lawyer's faith in Bartleby's powers of comprehension fails and he considers 
him deranged. Bartleby has however already undermined the balance of his 
own thoughts. He cannot explain his response to Bartleby - his failure to 
dismiss him, his inability to cope with him, his own aggression and acute 
helplessness when confronted with Bartleby's misery and passivity. All 
attempts at dealing rationally with Bartleby as an employee have failed. 
The lawyer's narrative (as an ordering process, a composition of 
cause and effect) displays paranoid characteristics4 in its treatment of 
Bartleby's 'madness'. As author of the story of Wall Street, of 'Bartleby', 
the narrator is in part defusing the threat of losing his own sense of 
self. He attempts to assume Bartleby into his narrative (by adopting him 
as his protege, 'billeted upon him by providence', and by attempting to 
control Bartleby with his 'doctrine of assumptions'); he tries to take him 
up into his description of events, into his own account of Bartleby's 
personality. Bartleby 'interested' him most because he was 'one of those 
beings of whom nothing is ascertainable' (59). It has become essential to 
ascertain something about him, in order to right the subverted order of 
the lawyer's world and to preserve his own sanity. The writing of 
Bartleby may be seen as a paranoid mechanism enlisted to reconstruct his 
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world. He sees the lack of information about Bartleby as an 'irreparable 
loss to literature' (59); fictionalizing Bartleby prevents further rupture 
in the texture of his existence. As narrator he sets out to repair this 
loss of coherence, and the task is a challenging one. He asserts that he 
could write the complete biography of other men, but Bartleby apparently 
has none. Bartleby both undermines the ascendancy of an objective view- 
point, and offers the opportunity for total mastery. When his life history 
is demanded of him by the lawyer, as a final test of his ability to be 
'reasonable', he will submit nothing; 
"Will you tell me, Bartleby, where you were born? " 
"I would prefer not to. " 
"Will you tell me anything about yourself? " 
"I would prefer not to" (80). 
The narrator, by nevertheless endowing himself with the legitimacy of the 
authorial voice, has discovered (he hopes) a way of assuring that the 'I' 
that assumes is safe, victorious in 'assuming' the former into his 
narrative. He draws up the document; but his safety is not assured, 
Bartleby's silence forever threatens and witholds confirmation of that 
reality. This 'virtual' control over the subject of his narrative is 
important with regard to the way in which this text's treatment of 
disturbed states of consciousness differs from the type of text previously 
discussed. Here the emphasis is not so much upon challenging logical and 
objective modes of reading the world, as it is concerned with the 
difficulty of locating a fixed and unassailable subject position as the 
locus of thought and action. The narrator decides that the relation of 
conflict that arises between himself and Bartleby rests essentially in 
their different use of words. It becomes apparent that what is at stake 
is not simply the opposition of perversity to reason, of deviance to the 
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norm, but a struggle enacted on a linguistic level for sovereignity of the 
sign; for the preservation of psychic stability through the right to 
exercise self-expression in language. 
Truth is, in this context, not transcendent but recognized to be 
constituted in the process of negotiating consensus. The lawyer assumes 
that his truth has priority because it is underwritten by social 
structures. The tool he uses for the creation of order, legal discourse, 
is one of pedantic linguistic precision. In his encounter with Bartleby it 
becomes clear that once the social contract is challenged all that remains 
of his logic is assumption; though it is usually coercive because 
effectively disguised by the hierarchical configurations which situate the 
individual either as employer or employee, as legislator or subject, 
Bartleby has exposed that system as a fiction. If Bartleby does not agree 
that he is 'bound' to examine his copy, he goes not against reason but 
against assumption. 
The manner in which Bartleby engages in the use of language is both 
alienated and alienating. His utterances are ineffectual. He lacks an 'I' 
that describes himself. His existence, circumscribed by Wall Street, by the 
lawyer's chambers, is an existence without a self. The lawyer writes up 
documents, agreements, statements and verbally orchestrates the activities 
in his office; he exercises language. Bartleby's function is to copy these 
documents, to wordlessly respond. Drawing on the ideas of Benveniste, 
Bartelby's ultimate breakdown may be understood as a crisis in subjectivity 
brought about by his relation to language: 
It is in and through language that man constitutes himself as 
subject, because language alone establishes the concept of 'ego' in 
reality... 'Ego' is he who says 'ego'. 
The lawyer's environment operates according to his precepts of law and 
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order, sustains its logic, its reality, at the price of Bartleby's 'ego'; 
Consciousness is only possible if it is experienced by contrast. I 
use I only when I am speaking to someone who will be a you in my 
address. It is the condition of dialogue that is constitutive of 
person, for it implies that reciprocally I becomes you in the address 
of the one who in turn designates himself as 1 (1971,84). 
Bartleby's refusal is a method of survival, since the lawyer seeks to draw 
him into a discourse founded upon his negation. This discourse is a 
hierarchical one in which Bartleby can only be 'you' (the narrator has the 
room arranged so that he cannot see Bartleby, but Bartleby can hear him). 
When Bartleby takes up residence in the office, the narrator notes, he is 
without a mirror (77); not only does Bartleby unaccountably exist without 
the customary objects of everyday life, he is without an awareness of his 
self as object among other objects, as seen. This lack gains significance 
in relation to the lost quality of reciprocity in language which Bartleby 
experiences. 
The only information the lawyer professes to have about Bartleby's 
previous existence is that he worked in a 'Dead Letter' office. The 
inevitable depression arising from this circumstance serves to explain 
Bartleby's behaviour to the lawyer; he apparently refuses to realize that 
Bartleby's every utterance continued to be no more than dead letters. 
Bartleby's I prefer not to suggests that he is preferring not to witness 
the demise of his identity, the constitution of such a paper selfhood under 
these circumstances. However, for him there is no alternative, he can only 
mutely enact his drama of denial, and play out the destruction of his self 
through suicide. 
Melville's choice of a legal context for this story of personal 
disintegration is not confined in its exposition to the specific, it implies 
the paradigmatic. Law is the site of the inscription and rationalisation 
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of the structure and beliefs of a society. The narrator had originally 
chosen what he considered to be a 'safe' practice -a lucrative practice in 
'rich men's bonds, and mortgages and title deeds' (60). He thereby largely 
avoids involvement with the wider application of law, law which in the 
general sense is founded upon moral, ethical, philosophical and personal 
premises. His law is of a kind that 'never addresses a jury, or in any way 
draws down public applause' (60). Just before the arrival of Bartleby the 
narrator has been promoted to the office of a 'Master of Chancery'. Courts 
of Chancery deal in equity, 'a legal system... which supplements statute or 
common law and corrects, if necessary, its failure to accord with what is 
morally just and fair's. The narrator betrays his dubious suitability for 
the post when he states that he never indulges 'in dangerous indignation 
at wrongs and outrages' and considers the job merely a 'pleasantly 
remunerative' occupation (60). The Wall Street brand of legal practice 
indicates how far the law, as a socially determined integrative system, may 
drift from such an axiomatic basis. The law in this instance seems to be 
an inscription of the beliefs of this modern, capitalist 'Wall Street' 
society, a machine to ensure the subjection of the individual to the 
system, of the 'singular set of men' (59) like Bartleby, to the production 
of wealth. Equitable remedies may consist in either of two actions 
against the person; injunctions against some form of legally classifiable 
behaviour, or an order for a specific performance or act. The narrator, in 
his dealings with Bartleby, attempts both (he is bound to copy, he is later 
told that he is forbidden the lawyer's premises) and succeeds in neither. 
Equity supplements the law. The lawyer is equitable in his dealings with 
Bartleby to the extent that he allows him to respond as he chooses to his 
dictates and suggestions, within the context of this system. Yet Bartleby 
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is not 'particular' (94), prefers not to acknowledge this context. 
Law, as an instance of the systematic use of language, becomes the 
site of a disintegration of meaning, of the decentering of the self. To 
draw, for analogy, upon recent thought; 
Once the conscious subject is deprived of its role as source of 
meaning - once meaning is explained in terms of conventional systems 
which may escape the grasp of the conscious subject - the self can 
no longer be identified with consciousness. It is 'dissolved' as its 
functions are taken up by a variety of interpersonal systems that 
operate through it... as it is displaced from its function as centre or 
source, the self comes to appear more and more as a construct, the 
result of systems of convention. The discourse of the culture sets 
limits to the self; the idea of personal identity appears in social 
contexts; the 'I' is not given but comes to exist (Culler 1975,28-9). 
Bartleby, as has been noted, prefers not to be a construct. He bases his 
rebellion in a simple linguistic formula, foreign to this system and 
therefore considered irrational ('At present I would prefer not to be a 
little reasonable', 81). In the end he prefers not to be, the alternative 
to being a construct is to be 'dissolved'. 
As narrator, the lawyer/author goes some way toward enlivening the 
'cadaver' (the impression he habitually receives of Bartleby), toward 
fashioning a person of the dead letter, rather grotesquely reviving the 
corpse of his chosen 'literary character'. Yet there is more to it than 
this; the deathly emptiness that perplexes the narrator with regard to 
Bartleby is merely one manifestation of a more extensive condition. The 
narrator, returning to his offices after hours, compares Wall Street to 
Petra. He is later to compare the prison in which Bartleby dies to 
Egyptian architecture (the description of the prison is very similar to 
that of the offices, with its lofty black walls and many small cells). 
These places remind him of dead civilizations; they have out-lived their 
inhabitants. They exist, like language itself in this peculiar environment, 
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as structures dislocated from the human. Despite the narrator's efforts to 
objectify him as a curiosity, his obsession with Bartleby suggests an 
affinity. He is also the vehicle for the transference of others' 
agreements, of others' dialogue, others' contracts. His occupation also 
demands his absence from the language he uses, except in so far as he can 
delegate to Bartleby - but Bartleby refuses the exchange. Bartleby's 
refusal prompts his move to self-expression in literature. His final 
statement, 'Ah Bartleby! Ah humanity! ', recentres the narrator as an 
authorative observer, but has the ring of overconfidence (we know he is 
not prone to 'dangerous indignation'); he is just as much a prisoner of 
Wall Street. In spite of the narrator's pose of sympathetic detachment 
from Bartleby's derangement, Wall Street is haunted by the living ghosts of 
many men. Bartleby's apparent insanity spreads'. He remains ultimately 
incoherent to the lawyer, who fails to penetrate the riddle of his final 
gesture. 
De-composition: The Text 
In Part I an integrative and speculative compulsion was noted to operate 
around the emergence of the irrational in a text. Melville's narrator 
would also appear to be working in this manner. He wants to produce a 
composition, to remedy a lack in literature created by the 'real' story of 
Bartleby. However, although Bartleby is presented as 'real' (the would-be 
author's aim is biographical) he provokes the narrator because of his 
'unreal' qualities. This utilitarian, pragmatic, Wall Street world does not 
easily allow for the incursion of the fantastic, and intimations of the 
supernatural clearly happen only within the perplexed mind of the narrator. 
There is little doubt in the minds of other characters that Bartleby is 
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anything more than deranged. He is not even accorded the romantic stature 
of madness, he does so little that could be construed as mad, outrageous 
or tragic - except choose to live in a place intended only for work Yet 
he is never quite fully accounted for. Bartleby hovers on the verge of 
the fantastic. 
'Bartleby' has been seen as an exceptionally modern works, It has been 
discussed as, amongst other clinical approaches, a study in schizophrenia9. 
Whatever the appropriate diagnosis of Bartleby's mental condition might be, 
it functions within the text as disruptive and obstructive of the attempt 
to assimilate, to narrate, to create consistency. The possibility that he 
worked in the 'Dead Letter' office is not forthcoming until the narrator 
attempts a conclusive diagnosis. The objective, incontrovertible and 
inexorable nature of Bartleby's disintegration is unrationalised. From the 
moment of Bartleby's appearance, and until his death, the actions and 
discourse of both the narrator and Bartleby are affected by illogicality 
and discontinuity, by incoherence. The integrity of the text, of the mind 
of the narrator, and of the protagonists as discrete entities begins to 
dissolve. The narrator's composition is abnegated by Bartleby's 
decomposition. 
Schizophrenia has recently been discussed in terms of entropy1', of 
psychic dissolution. Rosemary Jackson has spoken, from a different 
perspective, of the 'modern fantastic' as being characterized by 'a basic 
pull toward entropy' (1981,318). Entropy for Jackson signifies a 'degree 
zero' of undifferentiation, it involves the transgression of boundaries, 
changes of state, metamorphosis. She points out that such changes 'are 
without meaning and are progressively without the will or desire of the 
subject' (and she cites Kafka's Metamorphosis as an example). Bartleby 
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does not change into anything else, he simply dies; this death seems 
gratuitous, meaningless and futile. Yet some significance asks to be 
derived from the fact that Bartleby is presented as a phenomenon of Wall 
Street; he is obsessed with walls, he is constantly to be seen in a 'dead- 
wall reverie', and he dies in contemplation of the prison walls. Bartleby 
Is organic, human, living, the walls are inorganic, dead, and finally 
Bartleby too is dead, undifferentiated from the inorganic matter that 
encloses him. Perversly, at his death, it is noted by the narrator that 
his prison shows signs of organic growth, turf grows underfoot, grass 
grows in the clefts. In this sense the 'unreal' quality of the story of 
Bartleby is correspondent with Jackson's observation of the modern 
fantastic. Bartleby is the focus of a pull toward entropy, 
undifferentiation, dissolution, atomization (but here of a redemptive kind). 
The narrator is disturbed by the thought that he may succumb to Bartleby's 
derangement, by, perhaps, an 'unceasing fear of becoming an exceedingly 
unpleasant form of nothingness by a collapse of the self' (a description of 
the schizoid state in Sullivan 1962,318). It is the act of writing, the 
impetus of continuous narrative composition which prevents this, but barely 
so; its completion rests upon the hazarding of a 'vague report' concerning 
Bartleby's former employment. This invites speculation, but it sits 
awkwardly at the finish as a contrivance -a gamble on the adequacy of a 
psychological rationale which separates Bartleby from the narrator as an 
anomaly and excludes the fantastic from Bartleby's disintegration. The 
lawyers security in his world hangs by the thread of this rationale. 
Bartleby's refusal to be a social subject, and subsequent reluctance to be 
redeemed as a literary 'subject' foreshadows later presentations of 
'retreat' into psychosis. 
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DIS-INTEGRATION IN CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN'S THE YELLOW WALLPAPER 
Narrative and the Unauthorized Narrator 
The Yellow Wallpaper (1892) is the subjective account of the development 
of a condition of mental illness. A woman talks about an experience that 
begins as a therapeutic confinement; about her growing obsession with 
'deciphering' the pattern on the wallpaper in the room to which she is 
confined; and demonstrates by stages an increasing loss of psychic 
stability. 
The narrator begins to write on arrival at a 'colonial mansion' 
(Gilman 1981,9) that she and her husband have rented for the summer. 
Their stay is intended both as a holiday and a period of rest for the 
writer. Her husband John is a doctor, and believes that his wife is 
suffering from a 'temporary nervous depression' or a 'slight hysterical 
tendency' (10) which is aggravated by her own imagination. He has 
confidence that he is able to prescribe the cure'. He establishes her in a 
room to which she takes an immediate dislike, largely on account of the 
wallpaper. He condemns her revulsion as silly and irrational and merely a 
further indication of what he characterizes as a feminine nervous illness; 
he has her remain in the room on principle (she should not allow herself 
to 'give way to fancy' (15). He forbids her to meet and talk with people 
outside of the family. She should only rest and sleep. It appears that 
she does not leave the room throughout the narration. Social 
communication is not allowed. John is out most of the day, and apart from 
the occasional presence of her sister-in-law, who is charged with her 
-157- 
surveillance, she is alone. 
The narrator is also, she says, forbidden to write; the exercise of 
imagination, her 'habit of story-making' (15) is strongly discouraged ('I 
ought to use my will and good sense to check the tendency. So I try', 16). 
Despite these measures, she becomes increasingly dissociated from reality, 
'gives way to fancy' to the extent that fantasy is no longer 
distinguishable from what is 'real'; her account charts a steady 
psychological deterioration into what may be termed obsessional and 
hallucinatory states focussed upon the pattern in the wallpaper. It 
concludes with a demonstration of her complete 'madness' -a graphic 
indictment of her 'treatment'. John arrives to find her crawling around the 
room in circles. She describes how he faints in astonishment at this 
sight, and how she continues to crawl around silently, over and over his 
unconscious body. 
She is not narrating a history retrospectively from a present which 
is either complete or composed. The text is not based upon a literary 
autobiographical model. It takes, rather, the form of a diary. There is no 
gap in time across which to objectify her self, her experience, and her 
place within a series of events. There is no differentiated objective (and 
'rational') framing of a subjective (and 'irrational') narrative, but the 
text is in a sense ironically framed by the inderdiction of the rational 
voice (John's scientific 'no'). Story-telling here (for John, and hence 
initially his obedient wife) signifies not a mode of ordering, but a 
potential licence for disorder, for anarchic falsification. He believes that 
there may be a link between writing fiction and pathology (suggesting that 
'it is the writing which made [her] sick', 18). The topic of her discourse 
is her unaccountable suspicion (to John) of being more seriously ill than 
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John supposes. The subtext suggests a self increasingly operating on 
different levels; part of her exists in accord with the orderly imperatives 
of the external world and John's authority ('there are hedges and walls and 
gates that lock, and lots of separate little houses... '), part of her does 
not, is chaotic, rebellious and shadowy. The narrator, as story-maker 
nanqu4 sets out to commit her 'real' experience to paper, but in the 
process exposes 'John's wife' as a fiction. 
She is of less substance than Bartleby. She is simply a speaker. 
She reveals neither name nor history - beyond that which resides tacitly 
in her social role (as a doctor's wife, and a mother). Her language is 
discursive rather than descriptive. It is (to begin with) the exposition 
of an internal dialogue about her illness. Immediately, despite the 
firmness of tone, the narrative style provokes a frisson of uneasiness - 
it is somehow too private, too negligent of a certain literary decorum 
('Still I will proudly declare... ', 'Else, why should it be let... ', 9). The 
repeated 'I' creates, for the reader, an uncanny proximity due to the power 
of contrast between her status as stranger and the reader's as confidant 
or voyeur. The intimate, chatty tone allows for a randomness and a lack 
of narrative coherence which also requires an investment of faith (since 
no adequate reference to the world of the text has established the 
consistency of what she says with that world). The organization of 
experience, the ability to objectify herself in writing serves to create 
the impression of, and assumes the presence of a stable identity ('I must 
say what I feel and think in some way - it is such a relief', 21). 
However, her writing self emerges as the site of conflicting discourses. 
The inductive power of her state of consciousness is increased 
through the lack of any objective perspective, more so than would have 
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been the case if she had presented herself in the more conventional, 
retrospective 'memoir' form. This first-person narrative strategy invites 
the reader, implicitly, to register the mind's spiral into madness. First- 
person narration is that 'condition of discourse in which-the possibility 
of speaking the truth creates the possibility of misunderstanding, 
misperceiving and lying' (Martin 1986,142), but Gilman does not exploit 
the paranoid potential of the unreliable narrator. There is no temporal or 
spatial point beyond the narrator's experience from which to disentangle 
the 'real' from the 'unreal', fact from fancy, and the narration makes no 
attempt to invite such distinctions. The disintegration of the narrator's 
mind, her breakdown of identity, is obscured behind this 'I' (whether a 
reliable or unreliable perceiver) and the community established with the 
reader. 
As it progresses, the narrative suggests that what is designated by 
this 'I' was always in question, that her reiterated desire to write is 
symptomatic of the will to construct or preserve an identity. In her 
relation to others, those who surround, and she feels, control her, the 
narrator is in a position analogous to that of Bartleby. Her situation is 
one of subordination to another. Obedience is the condition of her status 
as an agent. Like Bartleby she is only to speak when she is spoken to. 
John's voice is invested with the power to speak for both of them. He 
knows what is good for her, he knows what she is thinking and feeling. 
She is where John says she is (he discourages self-consciousness, 'John 
says the very worse thing I can do is to think about my condition', 10). 
He authorizes what she experiences, and circumscribes her self. Her 
writing records his prescriptions. As in the case of Bartleby, self- 
expression in language is not her prerogative (John laughs at her attempts 
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at self-expression, and infantilizes her, dismissing them as the whims of a 
child, a silly woman, a 'blessed little goose', 15). 
Her writing increasingly expresses a problem, a 'private problem', 'I 
would not say it to a living soul, of course, but this is dead paper and a 
great relief to my mind' (10). Part of her acts and speaks in accordance 
with his version; 
So I take phosphates or phosphites - whichever It is, and tonics ... and 
am absolutely forbidden to 'work' until I am well again (10). 
Part of her thinks otherwise: 'Personally, I disagree... ' (10). This 
announcement, after her self-portrayal as passive and acquiescent, is 
equivalent to Bartleby's 'I would prefer not to'. The idea grows that the 
self expressed in such words is to be hidden ('I know John would think it 
absurd. But I must say what I feel and think... ', 21). The writing voice is 
deceitful, as distinct from the voice of 'John's wife', and sees writing as 
a method of 'relief', a mode of escape from the former. The writing of the 
text is an act of deceit, a transgression of authority (even, in its 
informal style, of literary conventions). It begins by presenting a self 
that is constrained to report or 'copy' John's word's, but provides an 
alternative scene of communication where the narrator is able to answer 
back, which she may not do when speaking without reinforcing the idea of 
herself as an irrational 'non-'person. The text becomes the site of a 
struggle, between the legitimate self (John's wife - as he sees her) and 
an illegitimate (irrational, 'deceitful') self. When the latter finally 
becomes dominant, taking over the narration to explain at the end of the 
story how she has defeated John and 'Jane', this is the first time the name 
appears and it seems to refer objectively, from an alienated position, to 
her 'self', a false and imprisoning identity. The narrator stages a 
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slippage of the narrative T. It is not, at this stage, the writer (who no 
longer consciously deceives) but the writing itself which is eventually 
exposed in this text as the locus of deceit. 
Narration and Dis-Integration 
The shifting position from which the narrator speaks is effected through a 
hallucinated scene of doubling. When she fails to real-ize her experience 
in John's eyes, she begins to see 'a woman stooping down and creeping 
about', 22) in the wallpaper. This hallucination seems to be connected to 
the experience of herself as deceitful. Both sides are aspects of a self 
caught between conflicting modes of self-representation. The suspicion 
grows that she 'can see a strange, provoking, formless sort of figure, that 
seems to skulk about behind that silly and conspicuous front design' (18). 
There is no doubt as to the reality status of her double (as, for example, 
is to be found in Hogg's Sinner). She herself first introduces it as an 
'as if'. However, since there is no position from which to objectify her 
perception, and since this changes, this text has the disturbing effect not 
of making what is unreal real (what might be termed the conventional 
'madness' of reading) but vice versa - it deceives the observer, the reader 
into missing (being unprepared for) the reality of this phenomenon. It is 
eventually as real to the narrator as she is to herself. 
This figure in the wallpaper does not remain a paranoid projection, a 
mirror image; it is constantly forming, shifting, reforming and its 
formlessness becomes plurality, 'It is always the same shape, only very 
numerous. And it is like a woman stooping down and creeping about behind 
that pattern' (22). This nameless entity may be one or many, there is no 
delimitation or differentiation, 'Sometimes I think there are a great many 
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women behind, and sometimes only one, and she crawls around fast' (30). 
These figures transgress the physical boundaries of her room, they are 
inside and outside; inside the room 'The faint figure behind seemed to 
shake the pattern, just as if she wanted to get out' (23), but she says 'I 
have watched her sometimes away off in the open country, creeping as fast 
as a cloud shadow in a high wind' (31). She sees other women roaming over 
the countryside, prolific and undifferentiated from the external natural 
world. Ultimately the narrator rips the paper off the walls to free the 
woman. The narration shifts suddenly from an objective view of the 
figurative woman in wallpaper, where the narrator is a discrete observer, 
to the subjective voice of the hallucinatory figure who has 'got out', 'I 
don't like to look out of the windows even - there are so many of those 
creeping women, and they creep so fast. I wonder if they all come out of 
that wall-paper as I did? ' (35). 
The loss of the fictional 'as if', which was out-lawed by John as 
potentially dangerous to a mind not sufficiently equipped with the 
capacity to maintain a differentiation between the real and the imagined 
(since such writing involves the repression of its metaphoric status), has 
ironically taken place in a place not subject to conscious textual control 
- her mind. John presented her with a possible rational, unified, 
'scheduled' ('I have a schedule prescription for each hour in the day', 12) 
version of herself, but the narrative enacts her refusal to be the subject 
of that prescription. Instead of a story her writing is the transcription 
of her mental processes, the site of a psychic metamorphosis into her 
'deceitful self', formerly denied realization. She is no longer deceptive 
because she is nobody. She is not 'John's wife', she no longer recognizes 
the social fiction or symbolic significance of their relationship ('Now why 
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should that man have fainted... ', 36). In relinquishing subjectivity she 
eludes entrapment in language (though, paradoxically, she continues to 
write) - existence as a function of language, of a 'false' discourse that 
is prescribed for her. As Lecercle suggests, 'the subject is nothing 
outside the order of language by which it has been formed' (1985,58). 
The wallpaper (like the 'deed paper' on which she writes, 10) then 
becomes an alternative scene of writing (representing figuratively the 
place where she is being written) which she must re-write 'deceptively', in 
a mode which she consciously disavows. It has a similar 'mortifying' 
effect upon the narrator to that which an endless contact with 'dead' 
letters and 'copying' is suggested to have had upon Bartleby. The pattern 
is repellent, yellowing, decaying, full of trapped and strangled heads and 
'eyes'. As beings marginalized by a dominant discourse, having no control 
over it (their communication even in protest is null and void - effects 
nothing) and subjugated within it, they may be said to be demonstrating 
the experience of language as an assault upon the self, upon self- 
determination and subjectivity. Its unproblematical function as a mode of 
self-realization has become inaccessible. 
The narrator persists in trying to discover a pattern within the 
paper, as if her sanity depends upon it. This obsession leads her to 
discover the figure which turns out to be a reflection of a self trying to 
escape, to emerge from behind its tracery ('I didn't realize for a long 
time what the thing was that showed behind, that dim sub-pattern, but now 
I am quite sure it is a woman', 26). This reading of the wallpaper is 
carried out, like her writing, in concealment. The wall-paper and the 
paper on which the narrator writes seem increasingly to have an implicit 
symbiotic existence in the narrator's mind. The pattern on the wallpaper 
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operates like the marks on the page, like words, like language itself in 
relation to the identity of the speaker concealed behind it. The words 
'this paper' (16) are ambiguous. The wallpaper displays a confusion of 
eyes, they go 'all up and down the line' (16), they are 'impertinent' (16). 
Her writing shows a profusion of 'I's, 'I's which are impertinent having no 
right to appear on the paper at all (since she has been forbidden to 
write, and since they do not refer to an equally stable entity), 'I's which 
are watching the struggle of the woman behind the wall-paper. 
Her 'haunting' by the wallpaper is prefigured in the narrator's mind 
with the kind of tale she might be setting out to write, and which might 
somehow naturally arise from the situation in which she finds herself. 
The work begins with a gesture by the narrator toward writing in a 
nineteenth century gothic manner. The action is to be set in a colonial 
mansion, it might even - perhaps must - be haunted, 'there is something 
queer about it' (9). The building has the gothic characteristics of 
dwarfing size ('it is very seldom that mere ordinary people like John and 
myself secure ancestral halls for the summer'), age, and emptiness. The 
scene is set for the introduction of the supernatural by her expressions 
of superstition. Less 'fanciful' than she, John nevertheless represents 
superstition, and this is manifest in her recognition of his determination 
not to confront anything disruptive of his ordered world. John personifies 
those limits that are to be transgressed, the 'real' world, reason operating 
through the exclusion of madness, without which a gothic reversal and 
disruption could not happen. He is introduced as a pragmatic scientist, 
whose intelligence is threatened by such things, 
John is practical in the extreme. He has no patience with faith, an 
intense horror of superstition, and he scoffs openly at any talk of 
things not to be felt and seen and put down in figures. John is a 
-165- 
physician... (9). 
However, the narrator has no intention of allowing her text to be trapped 
by an established artistic context2, her sense of dis-ease to be contained 
by a conventional literary interpretation. The occasion of the 
supernatural, as an agency external to herself and allowed to account for 
something which cannot - as far as she can see - be accounted for, would 
'reach the height of romantic felicity... would be asking too much of fate' 
(9). 
Instead of unseen things originating in the external world, or 
emanating from the fabric of the 'ancestral mansion', it is herself, that 
John scoffs at, 'You see he does not believe I am sick! ' (10). That which 
cannot be accounted for turns out to be located inside her. It is not 
only the house but also her self which has 'something queer about it'. Her 
sickness, she feels, is of a kind not to be felt or seen or measured 
scientifically (despite John's attempts). The narrator's writing may be 
seen initially as an attempt to 'put down in figures' something that seems 
unreal. The text itself then becomes uncanny, something is being 
uncovered that should remain hidden. It is haunted, as the narrator is 
haunted, by the unseen. Her sickness, whatever it is, is not described, is 
nameless, all that can be said is that it is not what John or science says 
it is ("Better in body perhaps-" I began, and stopped short, for he sat up 
straight and looked at me with such a stern, reproachful look that I could 
not say another word. "My darling", said he, "I beg of you... that you will 
never for one instant let that idea enter your mind! There is nothing so 
dangerous... ", 24). Madness is repressed in the narrator's mind, and in the 
narration ('the front pattern', 25) but 'gets out in spite of her', returns 
in the text like a 'bad dream'. When the narrator's mind turns to why she 
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is not 'getting well faster' (whether it is writing that made her sick, and 
why nobody believes that she is really sick) the prohibition not to speak 
about her suspicion that her mind is sick triggers a shift from her 
writing on the paper to writing about, and through, the wallpaper, 'I wish 
I could get well faster. But I must not think about that. This paper 
looks to me as if it knew what a vicious influence it had! There is a 
recurrent spot where the pattern lolls... ' (16). 
Her growing obsession with the paper is paranoid in the sense that 
she attempts to construct system, order, meaning from the wallpaper's 
mysterious convolutions, and experiences it as an invasive, hostile, 
persecutory force, 'I determine for the thousandth time that I will follow 
that pointless pattern to some sort of conclusion' (19). She remains for 
hours in contemplation of the wall 'trying to decide whether that front 
pattern and the back pattern really did move together or separately' (25). 
She Is convinced that it is a design, that it must be systematic, but 'on a 
pattern like this, by daylight, there is a lack of sequence, a defiance of 
law, that is a constant irritant to the normal mind' (25). She 
hypothesizes a general law of construction, 'the whole thing goes 
horizontally, too, at least it seems so, and I exhaust myself in trying to 
distinguish the order of its going in that direction' (20) but finds that 
order constantly collapses into chaos, 'it is dull enough to confuse the 
eye in following, pronounced enough to constantly irritate and provoke 
study, and when you follow the lame uncertain curves for a little distance 
they suddenly commit suicide-plunge off at outrageous angles, destroy 
themselves in unheard of contradictions' (13). The wallpaper takes on a 
fantastic quality, the nature of its construction is foreign, illogical, 
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unknown, 
I know a little of the principle of design, and I know this thing was 
not arranged on any laws of radiation, or alternation, or repetition, 
or symmetry, or anything else that I ever heard of (20). 
It becomes persecutory and uncanny, 'you think you have mastered it. but 
just as you get well underway in following, it turns a backsomersault and 
there you are. It slaps you in the face, knocks you down, and tramples 
upon you. It is like a bad dream' (25). It seems to be an organic thing, 
a pattern-in-process, 'budding and sprouting in endless convolutions' (25). 
The shift of the scene of reading from the text as it engages 
referentially with the 'real' world, to the enigma of the wallpaper - or 
the narrator's reading of the wallpaper, reproduces on another level the 
textual mechanism delineated in the previous section. As Conrad Shumaker 
has pointed out, 
once the narrator starts attempting to read the pattern of the 
wallpaper, the reader must become a kind of psychological detective 
in order to follow and appreciate the narrative. In a sense, he [she] 
too is viewing a tangled pattern with a woman behind it, and he must 
learn to revise his interpretation of the pattern as he goes along in 
order to make sense of it (1985,595). 
However, the wallpaper defies resolution. The process described here of 
constant revision, theoretical assimilation and recuperation is thwarted by 
the 'backsomersaults' effected by the narrator, whose relationship to the 
wallpaper goes through a series of erratic emotional and conceptual 
transformations. Further, the fixed point in this activity, the woman 
behind the tangle, the narrating mind, dislocates. The theoretical 
detective may then find that it is not pattern, or narrative, but 'mind' 
which becomes the object of investigation, the mind behind the bars, the 
'I's. 
In contrast to the nineteenth century texts where narrative and plot 
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are both investigation and the subjects of investigation (the 
sanity/madness of a character or narrating mind must be established 
through an encoded paranoid reading activity), this is a text where 
madness, though not rhetorically represented, is present. It is the mind 
itself, the seat of a madness which is no longer played off against 
'sanity', which becomes the complex object of interpretation. On this level 
the text signals a shift in the literary approach to madness related to 
the early twentieth century developments in discourse surrounding 
disturbed states of consciousness (where the 'normal' mind becomes the 
object of the Freudian gaze). 
This angle is of particular interest to feminist theorists. The text 
might be considered 'unreadable', outside of the context of the tale's 
'female meaning' (as Haney-Peritz, among others, has proposed as the 
condition of its comprehension, 1986). Occupying a marginal position in 
relation to society, culture and the symbolic order women are also 
situated on the borders of chaos, irrationality and darkness. Gilman's text 
makes this link between woman and madness". Feminist studies of this 
work have interpreted the text as a powerful metaphor for the positioning 
of woman, and the predicament of the woman writer in relation to male 
patriarchal discourse4. The narrator's paranoid search for system in the 
wallpaper has been seen in this context as an attempt to 'read' the plot 
of patriarchal subjection which has been woven around her, and around all 
women6; yet as MacPike has suggested, 'In relation to the 'principle of 
design' imposed by the masculine universe, both the wallpaper and her mind 
refuse to follow any logic other than their own... the wallpaper becomes at 
once the symbol of her confinement and of her freedom' (MacPike 1975, 
288). 
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Haney-Peritz concentrates upon exploring the significance of the work 
for feminist literary criticism, using a Lacanian interpretation to 
demonstrate what is happening to the mind of the female narrator in the 
text. She proposes that the walls within which the narrator is entrapped, 
the 'ancestral house' which is open to interpretation as a patriarchal 
monument 'must be thought of as in, and of, what Lacan has called the 
symbolic order, the order of Language' (1986,117). Within the confines of 
this study it is pertinent to note' that Gilman's narrative strategy, and 
her treatment of madness, involve uncovering the speaker as a subject of 
discourse, an effect of language, and deploying psychological breakdown as 
a form of protest. The dimensions of the linguistic alienation effect, in 
Lacanian theory, is not intrinsic to female experience. Feminist theory 
has however been valuable in uncovering the links between subjectivity and 
the mechanics of language, where women are recognized to be doubly 
alienated by a linguistic system thoroughly inhabited by patriarchy. 
In contrast to the texts so far discussed, madness, or the experience 
of madness, is here not objectively 'represented', but may be thought of as 
happening on the level of textuality. Madness in The Yellow Wallpaper 
emerges partly through the exposure of the non-sense in writing, the way 
in which fragmentation defeats systematizaton. Madness resides not so 
much in the event of hallucination but seeps through the space left by the 
changing place of the narrator, the collapse of differentiation. It might 
be said that the text (the mind of 'the narrator', the 'colonial mansion' of 
the symbolic order) is haunted by the 'ddlire' of language, as defined by 
Jean-Jacques Lecercle. The proliferation of 'I's in the text (in 'this 
paper'), 'eyes' in the wallpaper, and 'I's that come out of the wallpaper are 
a manifestation of the 'illegitimate ambiguity' of the word. This narrative 
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is structured around an example of what Lecercle has recognized as the 
'drifting language of madness' (1985,139), a psychopathological or 
schizophrenic disruption of signification, the 'dark side of meaning'. The 
text is itself both double and schizoid in the sense that a 'darker' 
subtext (the activity in the wallpaper) struggles for hegemony or 
possession (in the demonic sense) of the diary/letter pretext'; 
On the dark side, meaning proliferates, in short threads that can 
hardly manage to weave a coherent text: there is no totality, no 
guarantee, and the field is never closed-the system gives way to 
mere chance, or, in other words, to the semiotic processes of the 
unconscious (Lecercle 1985,71). 
The wallpaper (in its copious, prolific, self-propagating and fungoid form) 
adumbrates the pathological genesis of this dark side, that which is denied 
in the act of narration, in the creation of a fictional 'romantic felicity', 
it is analogous to what Lacan might call 'literary creation in psychosis' 
(Lacan 1977,189). What has been indicated as the paranoid search for 
structure and totality within its design by the narrator is a defense 
against its infectious, dementing quality ('the subject avoids being 
possessed by language by reflecting on it, finding its laws, commenting on 
the words') (ibid., 1977,78). 
The characteristics of the wallpaper in this (con)text may be seen as 
analogous to the phenomena of Schreber's Nervensprache or 'nerve-language' 
in his Memoirs of My Nervous Illness (as described and not as directly 
manifest in his work where sentences are always completed). The visual as 
opposed to auditory nature of the hallucination of the narrator in The 
Yellow Wallpaper may be traced to her confusion of the phonic and the 
graphic in the phoneme 'I/eye', where 'I' is associated with watching and 
being watched. Schreber explains how he is constantly subject to 
'compulsive thinking' which threatens his psychic stability and sense of 
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identity. This can be initiated by autonomous voices heard within his head 
or coming from outside. They are the proliferators of inanity and non- 
sense; 
From the beginning the system of not-finishing--a-sentence prevailed, 
that is to say the vibrations caused in my nerves and the words so 
produced contain not mainly finished thoughts, but unfinished ideas, or 
only fragments of ideas, which my nerves have to supplement to make 
up the sense. It is in the nature of nerves that if unconnected words 
or started phrases are thrown into them, they automatically attempt to 
complete them to finished thoughts satisfactory to the human mind 
(Schreber 1988,216). 
Schreber represents himself as mastering these onslaughts by refusing to 
complete the fragments of syntactic units. The response which they demand 
is not productive of sense but of more nonsense, which he then feels 
compelled to rationalize further. He counters nonsense with nonsense by 
repetition. Schreber excercises his intellectual capacity to 
differentiates, and thus (he believes) evades entrapment in Mire,, as 
Lacan comments with regard to Schreber: 
The subject in the grip of these mysteries does not doubt his 
ability, Created being though he be, to elude with his words the 
traps set by the alarming inanity of his Lord, or to maintain himself 
in the face of the destruction that he believes his God capable of 
launching against him, or anyone else, by virtue of a right to which 
he is entitled in the name of the Order of the world... [he] prevents 
his fall only by the support of his Word and by his faith in 
speech (Lacan 1977,204-6). 
Gilman's narrator persists in her attempt to discover pattern and sense in 
the perverse convolutions of the wallpaper, which nevertheless defies this 
search. Like Schreber's system of not-finishing-a-sentence the shapes in 
the wallpaper are described as 'silly and conspicuous' (18), 'pointless' 
(19); 'bloated curves and flourishes-a kind of 'debased Romanesque' with 
delirium tremens go waddling up and down in isolated columns of fatuity' 
(20). 
The narrator positions herself in relation to her visual hallucination 
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with a different form of reversal; being the victim of its perversity she 
sees the logic of its growth as a form of tyranny, this endows the pattern 
with design and significance; it is a set of bars intended to entrap a 
woman. The reading of the paper develops into a plot, the woman must not 
be allowed to escape. Eventually she identifies with this figure, it is 
herself at the centre of this cage, and she must find a way to escape: 
If that woman does get out, and tries to get away, I can tie herl... I 
don't like to look out of the windows even - there are so many 
women, and they creep so fast. I wonder if they all came out of the 
wallpaper as I did? (34-35). 
She herself completes the design, is at its centre. However, her escape 
proves to be not so much a release as a new form of entrapment, a 
different kind of subjection to the wallpaper. Her statement, 'I've pulled 
off most of the paper, so you can't put me back', though apparently an 
affirmation of mastery, displays the extent of her defeat. It may be 
impossible to discover the 'order of its going' in terms of the design, but 
there is no doubt that the whole thing goes around the room. The new 
self disintegrates as it emerges. The woman described becomes an effect 
of repetition like the pattern itself, crawling round and round the room 
with her body pressed against a running yellow 'smooch' on the wall, which 
she herself has perhaps created in trying to follow the pattern. She may 
be one - going very fast ('and though I can always see her, she may be 
able to creep faster than I can turnt', 31) - or many, either way the loss 
of her former sense of identity is complete. 
Like Schreber she responds to what seems to be a threatening anarchy 
of signs by mimicking their activity, by inhabiting them. Schreber however 
retains his belief in signification, in language, and rehabilitates his 
subjectivity within a phantasmagoric symbolic code, whereas this woman is 
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unable to do so, is 'entitled' to nothing, has lapsed into a 'pre-social', 
'pre-vocal' (she crawls like an infant) condition. The present disturbed 
state in which the crawling woman finds herself (as described, impossibly, 
by 'the diarist') might be called both anti-patriarchal (she crawls over 
John's body), and anti-narrative. 
Protest and Schizoid Textuality 
'Illegitimate ambiguity' in The Yellow Wallpaper resides not in the event 
of madness (as in the aporia inherent in the 'paranoid texts'), or in the 
mode of representing that event, but in its attempt at non-representation 
- its presentation. Gilman does not describe madness as object in this 
only superficially coherent narrative. Narrative strategy here exploits 
the potential of story-telling language as a vehicle of disorder and 
destabilization, rather than an ordering principle. The text both depicts 
and generates a loss of the capacity to decipher, to make sense from a 
system of signs. It is still essentially descriptive, but the fragmentary 
nature of the information given defies orientation outside of the thought 
processes of the narrating mind. 
What sense there is of systematic continuity is threatened and 
threatening. The narrator continues to write whilst John attempts to 
break into the room with an axe. The tense switches back in the last 
phrases of the text from present to past, but continuity has been 
radically disrupted. In between the last moment and the moment in which 
the narrator has again picked up the pen to write she has crawled around 
the room and over her husband several times (as she writes he is 
unconscious on the floor). In the duration of that hiatus writing was 
abandoned for a corporeal enactment of the denial of reason, an escape 
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from logic, a demonstration of what the text cannot say; John interrogates 
the narrator, 'For God's sake, what are you doing? ' and she writes, 'I kept 
on creeping dust the same, but I looked at him over my shoulder. 'I've got 
out at last', said I' (36). The single inversion here of 'I said' is 
suggestive of the speaking/writing 'I' as distanced, as artificial, as 
slightly problematical. The shift from her providing an objective account 
of the movements of the woman crawling in the wallpaper to an account of 
herself creeping around the walls, related from the peculiarly objective, 
split-off position of narrator, both enacts and describes something similar 
to a schizoid experience. The author has contrived that the narrator's 'I' 
should demonstrate its dissociation from its initial fairly stable position 
(outside of, and in control of the confusion in the wallpaper), without the 
total collapse of grammatical continuity or narrative coherence. Yet the 
represented breakdown of the subject in the end has the effect of 
rendering the figure writing as hallucinatory as the figure in the 
wallpaper, even whilst it is contained within an essentially stable 
narrative form. The text begins as an act of deception and becomes as 
deceptive as the wallpaper itself. It seems on the surface to 'form around 
the common centre' of the narrator's organizing mind and then to 'rush off' 
in a 'headlong plunge of distraction' (20) as this centre disintegrates. It 
is perhaps only (or eminently) recuperable, as has recently been attempted, 
in terms of the psycho-analysis of the female narrator, the examination of 
the modes of continuity between the structure and language of the 
narrative and the activity of the unconscious encoded within the 
hallucinatory wallpaper, yet, as Jeanette King and Pam Morris have 
suggested 'a self that is irremediably split and displaced has no intrinsic 
meaning to be read'. They see this resistence to recuperation as 
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advantageous to feminist literary and social politics: 
The desire to discover an immanent meaning restricts this polysemic 
potential. There is... everything to be gained from an espousal of 
openess -a rejection of any authoritative, essentialist theory of 
meaning, acknowledging instead the predominance of the signifiers 
over the signified... (King and Morris 1989,32). 
This exploration of breakdown, this 'illegitimate' text which represents 
itself as produced under prohibition - an 'authentic' subjective account of 
madness - in important ways foreshadows the fluidity, the breakdown of 
'realist' narrative method (already both subverted - as Rosemary Jackson 
suggests - and reinforced by the unsettling strategies of gothic fiction) 
in twentieth century texts. The disintegration of the structure of 
'character', of a rationally circumscribed subjectivity is dramatized, in the 
company of 'madness' as a metaphoric presence, in the work of such writers 
Virginia Woolf and Samuel Beckett. It is interesting to note that when 
discussing her sense of alienation from patriarchal discourse found in 
texts written by men Woolf later (in 1929) echoes the hallucinatory images 
in the wallpaper described by Gilman's female narrator: 
After reading a chapter or two a shadow seemed to lie across the 
page. It was a straight dark bar, a shadow shaped something like the 
letter T. One began dodging this way and that to catch a glimpse 
of the landscape behind it. Whether that was indeed a tree or a 
woman walking I was not quite sure. Back one was always hailed to 
this letter 'I'. One began to be tired of 'I'. Not but what this 'I' 
was a most respectable 'I'; honest and logical; hard as a nut, and 
polished for centuries by good teaching and good feeding., I respect 
and admire that 'I' from the bottom of my heart. But - here I turned 
a page or two, looking for something or other - the worst of it is 
that in the shadow of the letter 'I' all is shapeless as mist (Woolf 
1977,95). 
The modernist project is often spoken of in general as a vehicle of 
'psycho-pathological' literary manifestations'. The demonstrations of 
attempted liberation from en oppressive discourse of selfhood, in the 
writing of such authors as Gilman and Woolf, may be formulated negatively 
-176- 
as an intrinsically female literary 'madness': 
In the realm of culture... masculine values prevail and deflect the 
vision of the woman novelist, inserting a duality into the female 
narrative, turned Janus-like toward the responses of both self and 
other. This schizoid perspective can fracture the female text (Abel 
1989,162). 
It is however indicative of an identified 'modern writing', by men and 
women, which enlists perceptions of madness to similar ends. As Makiko 
Minow-Pinkney has pointed out: 
If feminine writing is an attempt to inscribe positions against or 
alternative to those of the dominant male order, then the possibility 
of such writing does not exclusively correspond to biological 
gender... the valorisation of the 'feminine' remains meaningful 
precisely as a strategy of reversal, as a challenge to conventional 
norms of writing (1987,16). 
The Yellow Wallpaper may be understood (within the context of the 
changing function of 'madness' in narrative) to demonstrate a hypothetical 
moment of transition; from the ambiguous location of madness in the 
behaviour of a specific character, and the paranoid thinking processes 
evoked by narrative strategies which create a tension in keeping it there, 
to what might be termed a schizoid textuality which defeats these through 
an awareness of the essential disjunction and alienation of the self as 
subject constituted in and through social, linguistic and literary 
convention. 
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AUTHENTIC DIS-CONTINUITY IN VIRGINIA WOOLF'S MRS. DALLOWA Y 
Narration and Authentic Dis-Continuity 
Virginia Woolf may be considered innovative in her considered attempt to 
synthesize particular insights into altered states of consciousness with 
literary method. Her treatment of such states in Mrs. Dalloway (1925) is 
accessible from several angles. It may be treated diachronically, as a 
phenomenon of the disintegrating, post-war 'modernist' cosmos. From 
another perspective, although counter-balanced by an awareness of 
psychosis as alienation and suffering, it may be characterized as combining 
the lyrical and the political, and further located in relation to the mid- 
twentieth century movement towards an approbation of 'controlled 
disintegration' and the disapprobation of the false stability ratified by 
the conventions of social, moral and psychological institutions. It is 
avant-garde in its affirmation of a schizoid, dispersed consciousness (a 
precursor of Laingian psychology). Woolf's fiction may also be approached 
synchronically (in terms of recent theoretical developments) as 
paradigmatic, demonstrating both positively and pessimistically the 
relations between language, femininity, subjectivity and psychosis. Again, 
it appears to be an antecedent of the modern debate which continues the 
project of dismembering binary thought and establishing an affirmative 
continuum between sanity and psychosis as the site of a protean, generic 
subjectivity. With regard to Mrs. Dalloway, each of these perspectives 
converge at the point where Woolf is understood to use exceptional psychic 
conditions strategically toward a form both of dramatized social and an 
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implicit literary criticism. Conversely, she may be said to employ social 
and literary criticism toward a positive presentation of such states. 
When setting out to examine this text it is perhaps necessary to 
take into account the web of ideas articulated by Woolf that are 
contextual to, and work through Mrs. Dalloway. Woolf was exceptionally 
self-conscious as an artist (in contrast to the writers so far discussed) 
and the corpus of her non-fictional writing may be positioned in 
intertextual relation to her fictional work. Woolf said in her diary of 
Mrs. Dalloway. 'I want to give life and death, sanity and insanity; I want 
to criticise the social system and to show it at work, at its most intense' 
(June 19th 1923, in Woolf 1978,82). The text shows this system at work 
upon and within the individual psyche, the juncture and locus of interplay 
of these delineations. She wished to create a study of 'the world seen by 
the sane and the insane side by side' (October 14th 1922, ibid., 77). This 
double vision does not mean that the opposition between the sane and the 
insane simply collapses in her fiction. Yet it does mean a little more 
than an exploration of insanity as the negative against which sanity is 
defined. 
Continuity, within Woolf's work, can refer both to the process which 
gives rise to the represented 'unity', undividedness, wholeness of the 
individual as a subject, and to the 'solidity' of the text as it presents an 
interface between individual and social 'realities', or public and private 
registers of experience. Psychosis, as the instance of individual mental 
distress is explored as a way into, and as expressive of, a more 
'essential' and poetic level of individual experience; as a kind of 
authentic discontinuity. 
In Mrs. Dalloway the sane objectify the insane as deluded, alienated 
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from reality, as other, but the text pre-empts objectification, or seeing 
from one side. The novel inhabits and transforms this dualism. The 
'social system' is present as a framework of binary codes within which 
individual identity is fixed and positioned (man/woman, sane/mad). The 
seeing from the 'other' side subtly challenges this system. 
Woolf's stance is dissident, she opposes the confinement of plot, 
linearity, system. In the essay 'Modern Fiction' (1925) she rejects an 
inhibitive and compulsive form of writing where, 'The writer seems 
constrained, not by his own free will but by some powerful and 
unscrupulous tyrant who has him in thrall, to provide plot... ' (Woolf 1984, 
149). She takes on that 'tyrant'; in many other, and connected ways, she 
begins to 'unravel' the plot created by what she characterizes in A Room 
of One's Own (1929) as an essentially masculine writing (the great male 
novelists, the great 'male sentence', 'the weight, the pace, the stride of a 
man's mind' (Woolf 1977,73)' 
Central to the text of Mrs. Dalloway is a treatment of madness that 
reflects a concern with both the social and literary construction of self- 
hood and with ways of perceiving reality. Woolf attempts to institute a 
difference between these, and, in a sense, to render one a 'corrective' of 
the other. Woolf tried to create a form of writing in reaction to a 
narrative that displaces the feminine as 'other', 
some of the finest works of our greatest living writers fall upon 
deaf ears. Do what she will a woman cannot find in them that 
fountain of perpetual life which the critics assure her is there... they 
celebrate male virtues, enforce male values and describe the world of 
men (Woolf 1977,97). 
This canonical writing was architectonic ('sentences built... into arcades 
and domes' ibid., 73), about order, but in danger of fossilizing, becoming 
'hardened and set' (ibid., 74). It was a labour of 'solidity', as she says in 
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'Modern Fiction', from which life escapes (Woolf 1984,149). The paranoid 
texts discussed earlier may be seen to engage in this 'labour of solidity' 
but introduce gaps, cracks and fissures which undermine the foundations of 
these structures. Woolf's idea was in a sense to string together such 
gaps, to produce a continuum out of the extraneous and uncharted: 'let us 
trace the pattern, however disconnected and incoherent in appearance, which 
each sight or incident scores upon the consciousness' (ibid., 150). She 
strives for the narrative representation of what she believes to be 'life 
itself', the representation not of an external but of an internal reality. 
The bodywork of plot, the specifications of coordinates of time and space 
must be taken apart, until there is 'no scaffolding: scarcely a brick to be 
seen' (January 26th 1920; Woolf 1978,42). 
The provocative narratives in Part I were seen as problematizing the 
readable, as exaggerating and exploiting conventions of reading the world 
and the text. Woolf also sets out to challenge convention, but as a result 
of a textual participation in disturbed psychological states rather than 
inducing a paranoid response in aligning these with madness. Interest for 
the modern writer lies, she says, 'in the dark places of psychology': 
The accent falls a little differently; the emphasis is upon something 
hitherto ignored; at once a different outline of form becomes 
necessary, difficult for us to grasp, incomprehensible to our 
predecessors (Woolf 1984,152). 
The delving into 'dark places' in her work includes a concern with 'madness' 
or disturbed states of consciousness, not essentially to provoke or 
disrupt, but questing for the extra- in the 'ordinary mind' ('Examine for a 
moment an ordinary mind... ', Woolf 1984,149) for so long subject to what 
she sees as a reductive and naive traditional literary treatment (and 
further, to a social and medical suppression). 
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Gilman's narrator finds an essential part of her experience silenced, 
and is finally driven to relinquish linguistic expression entirely at the 
end of The Yellow Wallpaper, though the story carries on being told. 
Woolf's idea is to create another kind of literary language that will 
express that 'other' that is suppressed in Gilman's story. The task is 
not a simple one, but confronts Woolf in all its complexity and apparent 
paradox. Her struggle with psychological intimacy resonates curiously with 
the confessions of Gilman's narrator: 
As I think, the diary writing has greatly helped my style; loosened 
the ligatures. (Entry for following day) What I was going to say was 
that I think writing must be formal. The art must be respected. This 
struck me reading some of my notes here, for if one lets the mind 
run loose it becomes egotistic; personal, which I detest. At the same 
time the irregular fire must be there; and perhaps to loose it one 
must begin by being chaotic, but not appear in public like that 
(Woolf 1978,96). 
She goes on to note that at this point she is 'driving' her way 'through 
the mad chapters of Mrs. V, and wonders whether the book would have been 
better without them. She is uncertain, but pursues her attempt to expose 
the pattern underneath, to 'trace the pattern, however disconnected and 
incoherent' (Woolf 1984,150). 
Social Coercion and the 'Authentic Self' 
Mrs. Dalloway involves the formulation of a nexus of conflicting principles, 
and an examination of the way in which these are deployed can reveal the 
extent to which the text is engaged in creating a persuasive context for 
the ultimately affirmative presentation of discomposed psychic states. 
Mrs. Dalloway follows a day in the life of Clarissa Dalloway, a 
middle-class housewife, as she organizes a party which is to take place in 
the evening. As the wife of Richard Dalloway her existence is that of a 
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society hostesss; systematized, restricted and structured. 
In all this there was a great deal of Dalloway... a great deal of 
public spirited, British Empire, tariff-reform, governing-class spirit, 
which had grown on her, as it tends to do. 
Personally, however, Clarissa resents such psychic regimentation, 
With twice his wits, she had to see things through his eyes - one of 
the tragedies of married life. With a mind of her own, she must 
always be quoting Richard (Woolf 1976,69). 
Clarissa is aware of leading, in a sense, a double life: partly the coherent 
existence of the solid Mrs. Dalloway, and partly the incoherent and fluid 
existence of a private Clarissa. Simultaneously the narration follows the 
experience of Septimus, a 'shell-shocked' soldier, through the hours leading 
up to his suicide. Not only has Septimus left this society behind in order 
to fight for 'his' country, he has found that it is impossible to return. 
It has lost significance for him ('it might be possible, Septimus thought, 
looking at England from the train window, as they left Newhaven; it might 
be possible that the world itself is without meaning', 79). 
This parallelism has lead critics to diagnose the text and characters 
in the text as 'schizophrenic'. Herbert Marder says, for example, 
as an account of dissociation, both mental and social, the novel is a 
book about splitting, and it demonstrates the split in its method of 
narration (Marder 1986,56). 
Barbara Hill Rigney draws upon the beliefs of R. D. Laing to diagnose both 
Clarissa and Septimus, 
Laing's definition of schizophrenia, explored in The Divided Self, 
applies quite clearly to Septimus and, to a degree, to Clarissa as 
well (Rigney 1978,47). 
Harvena Richter says that there is a contrast betwen the minds of Clarissa 
and Septimus, 
Septimus is schizophrenic ... Clarissa is divided in another way-the 
outgoing social self, oriented toward life, and the inner emotional 
self, concerned with failure and death (Richter 1982,309). 
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It would appear from this emphasis that the attempt to redeem or validate 
psychotic experience reinforces the exclusion of such experience by 
presenting it as alienation'. 
Phyllis Rose, on the other hand, has called Mrs. Dalloway 'the most 
schizophrenic of English novels' (Rose 1978,125), linking psychosis with 
drug-induced states. It is equivalent in that the novel tries to express 
an 'alternative, transcendent reality'. It is this use of the term which 
seems to be most appropriate to the text. It is not really a case study, 
it is not attempting to explain or more clearly understand madness as 
madness, but as censored psychic territory. The diagnosis of Clarissa and 
Septimus as representations of schizophrenics misses the dynamic of the 
text, which positions their 'schizoid' experience not simply as expressive 
of alienation or breakdown but as alternative and oppositional. 
Barbara Hill Rigney says that 'Woolf, like Laing, indicates that 
insanity, after all, may be the only escape from society's own state of 
schizophrenia called normality... ' (Rigney 1978,63). It is not so much 
escape perhaps as antidote. Neither is post-war London really a measure 
of normality (but perhaps Laing's polemical methodology has a little in 
common with Woolf's). The Great War is over, but not its effects ('the 
late age of the world's experience had bred in them all, all men and women, 
a well of tears' 10). Both Clarissa and Septimus have undergone assaults 
on their sense of the continuity and stability of their existence, and have 
been rendered more than usually vulnerable by their suffering. This 
heightened sensitivity and instability are seen against the rigidified 
attitudes and ideology persisting after the war4. The Dalloways live in 
Westminster, which as Jeremy Tambling has pointed out, is the 'seat of 
government, of public buildings, of the nation's religion and its monuments' 
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(Tambling 1989,141). The consciousnesses of Clarissa and Septimus are 
being forged in a state of existence where the pull toward chaos and the 
push toward control, system, and restraint are in radical conflict. 
Further to her Juxtaposition of male and female experience, apparent 
sanity and insanity, Woolf also contrasts the creation of order 
(government) with destruction (Septimus is an emissary from the front). 
Whereas Gilman's narrator plays out an alignment that she experiences as 
socially entrenched and persistent (male/sanity/order, 
female/insanity/destruction) and parodies their insidiousness with the 
breakdown of her narrator, Woolf moves the pieces around. She makes use 
of the widespread phenomenon of male psychosis after the war to 
destabilize the alignment of woman with the sub-rational, alienated 
consciousness. Feminist psychoanalytical readings of Mrs. Dalloway trace 
the ways in which Clarissa's suffering is founded in her femininity, in 
alienation, in the continuously thwarted attempt to forge a stable 
identity under patriarchy. Elizabeth Abel asserts that 'Woolf represents 
the war as a vast historical counterpart to male intervention in women's 
lives' (Abel 1989,41). Yet Septimus is also a victim of patriarchy, as so 
many other men were casualties of a ruthless martial ethosb. Septimus's 
shell-shocked psyche struggles to repress the mind-shattering images of 
war: as he stands in the street watching the stately and omnibus motor-car 
pass by having just back-fired like a 'pistol shot' -a 'violent explosion' 
- it was 'as if some horror had come almost to the surface and was about 
to burst into flames' (Woolf 1976,15). He feels that he has 'a brain made 
sensitive by eons of evolution. Scientifically speaking, the flesh was 
melted off the world. His body was macerated until only the nerve fibres 
were left' (62). 
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Septimus is insane, but Septimus's insanity is opposed to the 
inhibitive 'sanity' of his doctors. Dr. Holmes and Sir William Bradshaw 
perform a role in many ways comparable to that of John in Gilman's The 
Yellow Wallpaper. They tyrannize over the psyche, function as the 
legislative agents of patriarchy. Holmes is dismissive of Septimus's 
mental disturbance: 'headaches, sleeplessness, fears, dreams - nerve 
symptoms and nothing more he said-health is largely a matter in your own 
control' (82). Holmes likes good food, society, and old furniture and 
remains uncontaminated and unconvinced by the complexity of the disordered 
psyche. Sir William, an eminent Harley Street psychiatrist, bastion of high 
society and servant of the afflicted rich is a 'priest of science', 'a fine 
figurehead of ceremonies', laden with responsibility and privilege. He is 
known as a man of 'extraordinary distinction', 'lightning skill and almost 
infallible accuracy in diagnosis', and as Woolf sardonically writes of 
'sympathy, tact, understanding of the human soul' (85). Like Gilman's John, 
or Weir Mitchell, he decides that Septimus's 'complete physical and nervous 
breakdown' (85) is 'merely a question of rest... rest, rest, rest; a long rest 
in bed. There was a delightful home down in the country... ' (86). 
Like John, Sir William also has an instinctual aversion to the naming 
of madness: 'he never spoke of 'madness'; he called it not having a sense 
of proportion' (86). When people display exaggerated and unreasonable 
behaviour, he is ready with a practical solution that silences their 
experience and replaces it with another: 
Health we must have; and health is proportion; so that when a man 
comes into your room and says he is Christ (a common delusion), and 
has a message, as they mostly have, and threatens, as they often do, 
to kill himself, you invoke proportion; order rest in bed; rest in 
solitude; silence and rest; rest without friends, without books, 
without messages... (89). 
-186- 
For Bradshaw madness is stepping out of line, and the line is very 
straight, like the rows of soldiers seen by Clarissa's old friend Peter 
Walsh marching through London. Proportion involves behaviour like Lady 
Bexborough's, who opened a bazaar with a telegram informing her of her 
son's death in her hand (6). 
It is not only men who play a part in this web of oppressive and 
violatory forces threatening the autonomy of 'sentient' minds. Clarissa 
experiences an irrational and obsessive hatred of Miss Kilman, who she 
believes is taking her daughter from her. Miss Kilman, 'or the idea of 
her-had become one of those spectres with which one battles in the night; 
one of those spectres who stand astride us and suck up half our life 
blood, dominators and tyrants' (13). She is a woman who has (in Clarissa's 
eyes) 'failed' to be feminine, and represents a monstrous masculinity. She 
tries to persuade Clarissa's daughter Elizabeth to become a doctor, a 
member of parliament - to join the ranks of 'those people busy about their 
activities, hands putting stone to stone, minds eternally occupied not with 
trivial chatterings... but with thoughts of ships, of business, of law, of 
administration... ' (121). Miss Kilman represents for Clarissa an agent of 
conversion, of an authoritarian, vengeful Christian God. To Clarissa this 
is destructive. As she watches an old woman, alone in her room opposite, 
Clarissa thinks, 'There were something solemn in it - but love and religion 
would destroy that, whatever it was, the privacy of the soul. The odious 
Kilman would destroy it' (113). 
There are two kinds of religious consciousness in Mrs. Delloway. 
Miss Kilman represents one, a despotic and autocratic, doctrinal state 
religion. Clarissa and Septimus suggest another, a mysticism that derives 
from the 'unity' or truth of multiplicity, the interpenetration of all 
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things, the dissolution of the self into the other. As Septimus feels, 
'leaves were alive; trees were alive. And the leaves being connected by 
millions of fibres with his own body, there on the seat, fanned it up and 
down; when the branch stretched he, too, made that statement. The 
sparrows fluttering, rising, and falling ... the white and blue, barred with 
black branches. Sounds made harmonies... All taken together meant the birth 
of a new religion' (22). Unlike Schreber, Septimus does not in the end 
seem to internalize external oppressive ideological structures to produce a 
persecutory theological schema. His doctor does not become a vindictive 
God, Septimus rejects their coercive legislation. Bradshaw is a juncture, a 
node in a network of oppressive ideological structures, implicated in the 
prohibitive, distorting regime from which Septimus and Clarissa need to 
disentangle their consciousness. 
Sir William is the point at which the 'social system' is 'at work at 
its most intense', policing the experience of the individual, where private 
meets public. Big Ben too becomes an agent in this exercise. 
For having lived in Westminster - how many years now? over twenty, - 
one feels even in the midst of traffic, or waking at night, Clarissa 
was positive, a particular hush, or solemnity; an indescribable pause; 
a suspense... before Big Ben strikes. There! Out it boomed. First a 
warning, musical; then the hour, irrevocable. The leaden circles 
dissolved in the air (6). 
Doctors and clocks° are locked in a struggle to subjugate, 'correct' and 
convert the chaotic mind, the dissolving subjectivity into coordination and 
sychronization: 
Shredding and slicing, dividing and subdividing, the clocks of Harley 
Street nibbled at the June day, counselled submission, upheld 
authority, and pointed out in chorus the supreme advantages of a 
sense of proportion (91). 
Clarissa appears to rebel against this regulation attempting to preserve a 
chaotic, fluid subjectivity which exists simultaneously across past and 
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present, transgressing temporal boundaries. The text opens with her 
return to her girlhood world of Bourton and a self which preceded her 
negation or marginalization within the social system. She thus escapes 
being 'invisible; unseen; unknown-this being Mrs. Dalloway; not even 
Clarissa any more; this being Mrs. Richard Dalloway' (11). When her 
girlhood love, Peter Walsh, returned from India, visits her, the boundaries 
of her self as Mrs. Dalloway begin to dissolve ('Take me with you, Clarissa 
thought impulsively, as if he were starting directly upon some great 
voyage', 43). Possibilities are unshackled for an escape from her present 
identity, but Clarissa is dragged back into the other reality: 
The sound of Big Ben striking the half-hour struck out between them 
with extraordinary vigour, as if a young man, strong, indifferent, 
inconsiderate, were swinging dumb-bells this way and that (44) 
The clock strikes twelve as Septimus makes his way to see Bradshaw: 
It was precisely twelve o'clock; twelve by Big Ben... Twelve was the 
hour of their appointment. Probably, Rezia [Septimus's wife] thought, 
that was Sir William Bradshaw's house with the grey motor car in 
front of it. (The leaden circles dissolved in the air. ) (84). 
The clock strikes as Septimus kills himself. It strikes again as Clarissa 
empathizes with the suffering of Septimus (having heard the news from 
Mrs. Bradshaw at her party): 
She felt somehow very like him - the young man who had killed 
himself... The clock was striking. The leaden circles dissolved in the 
air. But she must go back. She must assemble (165). 
Doctor Holmes and Sir William Bradshaw are represented as agents complicit 
in a (characteristically masculine) conspiracy to dominate and control. 
Doctor Holmes, seen through Septimus's eyes, is a dictatorial image of 
violence. When Holmes visits the couple Septimus recoils: 
Human nature, in short, was on him - the repulsive brute, with the 
blood-red nostrils. Holmes was on him. Dr. Holmes came quite 
regularly every day. Once you stumble, Septimus wrote on the back of 
a postcard, human nature is on you. Holmes is on you. Their only 
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chance was to escape, without letting Holmes know (83). 
It is Holmes' arrival, his hounding him down, that drives Septimus to his 
last escape, his suicide. He throws himself out of a window, escapes 
Holmes's menacing surveillance by killing himself (132). 
Septimus is not the only victim of this despotic systematization of 
thought: 
Sir William not only prospered himself but made England prosper, 
secluded her lunatics, forbade childbirth, penalized despair, made it 
impossible for the unfit to propogate their views until they, too, 
shared his sense of proportion (89). 
The Goddess of proportion worshipped by the doctor has a sister: 
Conversion is her name and she feasts on the wills of the weakly, 
loving to impress, to impose, adoring her own features stamped on the 
face of the populace (89). 
This Goddess 'smites out of her way roughly the dissentient, or 
dissatisfied' (89). Sir Williams will 'propogate reforms, initiate 
institutions! But conversion, fastidious Goddess, loves blood better than 
brick, and feasts most subtly on the human will' (90). The Bradshaws feed 
on the submission of the defective and feminine. Lady Bradshaw herself is 
visibly submerged, there is 'the slow sinking, water-logged, of her will 
into his' (90). She is 'quick to minister to the craving which lit her 
husband's eye so oilily for dominion, for power' (90). 
Clarissa experiences a strong antipathy to Bradshaw when she 
encounters him at her party; 
A man absolutely at the head of his profession, very powerful-He had 
to decide questions of appalling difficulty. Yet - what she felt was, 
one wouldn't like Sir William to see one unhappy. No; not that man' 
(162). 
She feels that he is 'obscurely evil-capable of some indescribable outrage 
- forcing your soul-they make life intolerable, men like that' (164). 
Bradshaw preys upon the aberrant, with society and the law firmly behind 
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him. When Clarissa encounters Bradshaw the doctor is engaged in a 
discussion of how to deal with the fate of thousands: 
Some case Sir William was mentioning, lowering his voice. It had its 
bearing upon what he was saying about the deferred effects of shell- 
shock. There must be some provision in the Bill (162). 
Sir William is linked to government and the state apparatus. Clarissa's 
party is given for members of the 'governing classes'. The Prime Minister 
attends, 'this symbol of what they all stood for, English Society' (153). 
Against this scene of suppression and coercion the 'discontinuous' and 
liberated psychic existence of Septimus and Clarissa functions as both a 
more 'authentic' psychic experience and a defence. 
This society identifies itself by, and perpetuates its power through 
a system of signs and symbols. Clarissa had seen the wielding of an 'icon' 
effect a passage through 'the populace' for the government car. 'something 
white, magical, circular, in the footman's hand, a disc inscribed with a 
name, - the Queen's, the Prince of Wales's, the Prime Minister's? ' (17). The 
car causes great disturbance among the people lining the streets. It is 
pregnant with untold significance. It might almost contain Kilman's God: 
Passers-by, who, of course, stopped and stared, had just time to see 
a face of the very greatest importance against the dove-grey 
upholstery, before a male hand drew the blind and there was nothing 
to be seen except a square of dove-grey (14). 
This 'sign', interpreted as a spectre of authority in Mrs. Dalloway, induces 
a response in the watchers which is then magnified in Septimus's reaction. 
They become subject to an arcane power, mystified by screen of ideological 
messages. Speculation is rife, people are suspicious, adjust and 
coordinate, become 'rank and file': 
Rumours were at once in circulation... falling indeed with something of 
a cloud's sudden sobriety and stillness upon faces which a second 
before had been utterly disorderly. But now mystery had brushed 
them with her wing; they had heard the voice of authority; the spirit 
of religion was abroad with her eye bandaged tight and her lips 
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gaping wide. But nobody knew whose face had been seen (14-15). 
Septimus interprets the moment as apocalyptic, 'The world has raised its 
whip; where will it descend? ' (15); it has already descended on him, 
inviting him to his death. Faces are ruffled with 'the same dark breath of 
veneration' (16). People become still, quiet, and awestruck, chaos is 
reduced to order, movement to stasis. Something had happened 'in its 
fullness rather formidable' between the start and finish of a sentence 
spoken by women in a hat shop (18). The masculine response ('Tall men, 
men of robust physique, well-dressed men..., 18) to the car is the 
instinctive perception, 
that greatness was passing, and the pale light of the immortal 
presence fell upon them as it has fallen upon Clarissa Dalloway. As 
once they stood even straighter... and seemed ready to attend their 
Sovereign, if need be, to the cannon's mouth, as their ancestors had 
done before them (18). 
Army meets civilian as soldiers are seen marching through the streets, 
their faces laden with import: 
Boys in uniform, carrying guns, marched with their eyes ahead of 
them, marched, their arms stiff, and on their faces an expression like 
the letters of a legend written round the base of a statue praising 
duty, gratitude, fidelity, love of England (47). 
The political thrust of the text is realized through the connection of the 
oppression of femininity with the violation of the human occasioned by 
patriarchal warfare'. Access to meaning production is characterized as 
essentially masculine: 
Lady Bruton often suspended judgement upon men in deference to the 
mysterious accord in which they, but no woman, stood to the laws of 
the universe; knew how to put things; knew what was said; so that if 
Richard advised her, and Hugh wrote for her, she was sure of being 
somehow right (98). 
Mrs. Dalloway happens against an indistinct but compelling projected 
backdrop of the Great War. Physically and temporally war is removed from 
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the world of London society, psychically it is omnipresent - the struggle 
against dark forces of oppression has now to be internally waged. There 
is a paranoid quality to Woolf's method, to the suggestion of a pandemic 
presence of restrictive and coercive elements in the world of Clarissa 
Dalloway. Yet it may be understood as strategic, a loading of the dice in 
favour of communicating the value and fragility of a new register of 
experience. 
The language that destroys Septimus, that is inscribed on the faces 
of the soldiers as they march through London , that 'works legs and arms, 
uniformly' while 'life with its varieties, its irreticences, had been laid 
under a pavement of monuments and wreathes and drugged into a stiff yet 
staring corpse by discipline' (47) recalls the phrasing employed by Woolf 
in 'Modern Fiction' to reject more conventional literary concerns and modes 
of expression. It persists in the rhetoric of psychiatrists who try to 
tyrannize Septimus back into sanity. This relationship between 
regimentation and madness is later poignantly exposed when the soldiers 
are replaced by a group of mental patients that Septimus watches being 
herded past him through the streets; 
a maimed file of lunatics being exercised or displayed for the 
diversion of the populace (who laughed aloud) ambled and nodded and 
grinned past him, in the Tottenham Court Road, each half 
apologetically, yet triumphantly, inflicting his hopeless woe. And 
would he go mad? (81), 
In A Room of One's Own Woolf sees a dark shadow lying across a page, 
obliterating what lies behind it®: 
It was a straight, dark bar, a shadow shaped something like the letter 'I'. One began dodging this way and that to catch a glimpse 
of the landscape behind it. Whether that was indeed a tree or a 
woman walking I was not quite sure... in the shadow of the letter 'I' 
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all is shapeless as mist (Woolf 1977,95). 
In Mrs. Dalloway images of strength and violence, associated with Holmes 
and Bradshaw, with the straight, dark, shadow of Big Ben9 are each in a 
sense implicated in the obliteration of that landscape, in the grid 
obscuring the 'under-pattern' and encaging a primary, authentic and in 
essence feminine consciousness1O. ' 
Schizoid Discontinuity 
Septimus's suicidal plunge is psychotic, a casualty of 'discipline', dying 
impaled on railings. His 'schizoid jottings"' (Brown 1989,106) constitute 
his attempt to 'save the world', his world. He proposes a remedy, a 
personal alternative to the system that has written him out of 'sanity' and 
into 'madness'. In Three Guineas Woolf hints at her own remedy to the 
embattled condition of humanity. She expresses to her hypothetical male 
correspondent the desire to 'discuss with you the capacity of the human 
spirit to overflow boundaries and make unity out of multiplicity' (Woolf 
1938,260). She declines to elaborate upon her meaning, deeming it 
inappropriate to a political treatise: 
But that would be to dream - to dream the recurring dream that has 
haunted the human mind since the beginning of time; the dream of 
peace, the dream of freedom. But, with the sound of guns in your 
ears you have not asked us to dream. You have not asked us what 
peace is; you have asked us how to prevent war. Let us then leave it 
to the poets to tell us what the dream is (ibid., 260). 
As a poet she attempts the expression of this dream. Behind the world of 
post-War London she adumbrates another landscape, 'at midnight, when all 
boundaries are lost, the country reverts to its ancient shape' (1938,23). 
Here the restrictions and prohibitions that create madness out of 
mindscape are effaced. The text is not a collection of incoherent, absurd 
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or fantastic 'schizoid jottings', but it operates more as a montage of 
impressions than as sequential narrative. Woolf promotes a mode of 
reading which is a registering of a flow of images and signs which remain 
'myriad' and disconnected'2. The erratic deployment of Septimus's inspired 
and obscure commentaries further disrupts continuity. 
The chimes of Big Ben relentlessly marshall events, coordinate the 
London social machine, punctuate the narration, call the mind to attention. 
A network of doctors, legislators, governors and proponents of religious 
doctrine regulate and schematize meaning and life, distinguish between 
sanity and insanity, proportion and chaos. This level of reality is 
composed of the formalities and strain of social encounters, the rigours of 
government and reverberations of militant ideology; yet it is continuously 
dismantled, the narrative takes flight, 'Time flaps on the mast. There we 
stop; there we stand' (Woolf 1976,45), rooted in a ceaseless psychic 
present. The text moves into a different dimension, where 'visions 
ceaselessly float up, pace beside, put their faces in front of, the actual 
thing' (52). 
Septimus's chaotic imaginings flow beneath and across the attempts of 
doctors to interpret and control them and his wife Rezia's desire to recall 
him to the coordinates of their life - marriage, children, people, things 
(he is told to 'take an interest in things outside himself' 21). His 
delusions and suffering, his 'drowning' (62) in sound, light and memory, in 
an agonizing internal drama -a 'schizophrenic dispersal' (Minow-Pinkney 
1987,68) - is an exaggerated manifestation of a process of loss of self, 
of momentary disintegration, which affects others. Peter Walsh experiences 
'myriads of things merged in one thing', himself as 'this figure, made of 
sky and branches' (Woolf 1976,52), a release from being Peter Walsh 
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standing alone in Trafalgar Square: 
as if inside his brain, by another hand, strings were pulled, shutters 
moved, and he, having nothing to do with it, yet stood at the opening 
of endless avenues down which if he chose he might wander... He had 
escapedl was utterly free - as happens in the downfall of habit when 
the mind, like an unguarded flame, bows and bends and seems about to 
blow from its holding (48). 
Schizoid narrative articulation manifests itself in a discontinuity where 
the logic of progression has been displaced by the co-existence of 
moments, a semi-mystical eclecticism. Narrative voice shifts between minds 
and memories, noting external phenomena and recording subjective 
experience. This voice is strung out from Septimus to Peter Walsh, 
Clarissa, Lady Bruton, the man and woman in the street, the old woman 
singing at the entrance to the tube station ('a frail quivering sound, a 
voice bubbling up without direction, vigour, beginning or end' 73). The 
writing 'I' is dispersed'3. 
Bradshaw's rigid 'sense of proportion' is exchanged for the graceful 
flourish and roll of clouds over London, endlessly metamorphosing. 
Clarissa's daughter, Elizabeth, watches the sky whilst travelling on a bus: 
Signs were interchanged, when, as if to fulfill some scheme arranged 
already, now a summit dwindled, now a whole block of pyramidal size 
which had kept its station inalterably advanced into the midst or 
gravely led the procession to fresh anchorage. Fixed though they 
seemed at their posts, at rest in perfect unanimity, nothing could be 
fresher, freer, more sensitive superficially than the snow-white or 
gold-kindled surface; to change, to go, to dismantle the solemn 
assemblage was immediately possible; and in spite of the grave 
fixity, the accumulated robustness and solidity, now they struck light 
to the earth, now darkness (123). 
Suggestions of portentious regulation are replaced by a perception of 
protean surfaces, discontinuity, depthlessness, evading significance. 
Those characters that experience dissociation from a pressing social 
reality move beyond the boundaries that regulate 'ordinary' experience. 
Peter Walsh's visionary moments are triggered by his having lost contact 
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with his old self, with England, during his stay in India. Clarissa has 'a 
perpetual sense, as she watched the taxicabs, of being out, out, far out to 
sea and alone;... She knew nothing; no language, no history; she scarcely 
read a book now, except memoirs in bed... ' (10). For Septimus, 'even Holmes 
himself could not touch this last relic straying on the edge of the world, 
this outcast, who gazed back at the inhabited regions, who lay, like a 
drowned sailor, on the shore of the world' (83)14. 
The text experiments with a discourse of fluid subjectivity. As 
Minow-Pinkney has suggested: 
Woolf Is project... becornes a subtle and elegant infraction of the laws 
of writing, undermining its protocols from within, 'fluctuating' rather 
than drastically demolishing the fixed positionality of the subject in 
language (1990,160). 
In The Modernist Self Dennis Brown draws upon the work of Woolf and 
recent feminist criticism to see post-War Modernist literary 
experimentation as 'part of a revolutionary 'dcriture feminine" (Brown 
1989,179), but poses the question, 'Can we accept such heterogeneity of 
self-hood without imperilling our sanity? ' (ibid., 183). Heterogeneity is 
represented in Mrs. Dalloway, and in recent critical approaches to the text, 
as akin to 'madness', the disintegration of the self, loss of meaning, but 
is no closer to psychosis than the homogeneity presented in Mrs. Dalloway 
in the form of the drive for conformity and suppression. 'Schizoid' 
consciousness is not the other of reason but a language of flight. 
Madness is not the other of language but another language; not 'madness' 
then, but as emerges from the structure of this text, the key to a new 
freedom of expression, a new realism. The mind is kaleidoscopic, the text 
is an optical toy; through which, nevertheless, important vistas may be 
discerned. 
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In Kafka: A Minor Literature, Deleuze and Guattari create a new 
context, a different but related perspective, for the discussion of the 
treatment of madness in Woolf's writing. It is, however, congenial to the 
expressed aims of Woolf herself. In this work they produce a model for 
reading Kafka's texts which resists providing explanations and sees the 
literature instead as a process or a practice, as a 'machine of expression' 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1986,19). Kafka, and the other examples of writers 
of 'minor' literature, are predominantly male, but there is a sense In which 
to read Woolf's texts as a 'minor literature' (according to their use of 
the term) is to the point. Deleuze and Guattari use Joyce and Beckett as 
examples of Irish writers that 'live within the genial conditions of a 
minor literature', operating in a relation of 'deterritorialization' to a 
major language. In their attempt to delineate the attributes of a minor 
literature they argue: 
How many people today live in a language which is not their own? Or 
no longer, or not yet, even know their own and know poorly the 
language that they are forced to serve? This is the problem... of 
minorities, the problem of a minor literature, but also a problem for 
all of us: how to tear a minor literature away from its own language, 
allowing it to challenge the language and making it follow a sober 
revolutionary path? How to become a nomad and an immigrant and a 
gipsy in relation to one's own language? ' (ibid., 19). 
Woolf's own position, and that of recent feminist readings of Woolf and her 
literary fictional project may be understood to situate her as a female 
writer writing within the 'major' language of patriarchy and patriarchal 
literary tradition. Approaches such as that of Minow-Pinkney argue that 
Woolf's condition of double alienation both as woman and woman writer 
gives rise to her experimentation with a form of writing that is 
fundamentally subversive 'of the very definitions of narrative, writing, the 
subject - of a patriarchal social order' (Minow-Pinkney 1987,10); to which 
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end she enlists narrative strategies bearing a relation to psychotic 
patterns of consciousness. Both feminism and modernism, Pinkney argues, 
'have a common antagonist; they challenge the dominant, phallocentric mode 
of discourse and the masculine social order which it underpins' (ibid., 
187). This angle would seem to position Woolf's mode of writing as 
reactive, dependent for its effect upon an awareness of its oppositional 
placement within the domain of patriarchy but at the same time presaging 
an alternative female subjectivity which should defeat and supersede that 
constituted through the paternal order. Minow-Pinkney calls for 'the 
forging of a new kind of subjectivity' situating Woolf as martyr to the 
cause (she quotes Kristeva, who sees Woolf 'sinking wordlessly into the 
river-haunted by voices, ibid., 196). 
Minow-Pinkney's point of view is arguably essentialist (she takes on 
board Kristeva's theory of subjectivity as corrective of essentialist views 
of language, but in fact appears to carry it in a similar direction), 
reading Woolf's writing through the writer's femaleness and seeing it as 
an expression of jeopardy, of the marginalization of female consciousness 
into madness by the masculinity of language. She views Woolf as straining 
to 'give voice to the specificity of a female subject who is outside any 
principle of identity-to-self' (ibid., 83). Woolf's constitutive polemical 
control and focus in Mrs. Dalloway would, however, suggest that such a 
view is preemptive. 
Woolf's modes of writing are not inevitably linked to an essential 
femaleness, but operate strategically, benefitting from a textual interplay 
between marginalization and domination. 'Otherness' is essential to her 
project. Her method is one which exploits, even demands the oppositional 
impetus to give voice, power and credence to her literary experimentation 
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with exceptional states of consciousness. Deleuze and Guattari propose 
that the writer of a minor literature is foreign, the minor author must be 
'a sort of stranger within his own language' (1986,26). From this 
perspective, rather than being confined by its method to an enactment of 
the condition of a feminine consciousness and a mode of escape from 
'paternal government', schizoid narrative functions dynamically, contributing 
to the emergence of the text as revolutionary and innovative: 
A minor literature doesn't come from a minor language; it is rather 
that which a minority constructs within a major language... if the 
writer is in the margins or completely outside his or her fragile 
community, this situation allows the writer all the more the 
possibility to express another possible community and to forge the 
means for another consciousness and another sensibility (ibid.. 16- 
17). 
Sustaining elements of 'female consciousness', of psychosis, of alienation 
and marginalization in opposition to a masculine principle should not only 
be considered as an expression of crisis but, with regard to Woolf's 
deployment of these conditions, as construction - enabling the 
communication of an alternative dimension of experience. Woolf has 
described the female condition of existing within, and nevertheless feeling 
radically other to a society, not as a state of entrapment or oppression 
but as a position of vantage which - once adopted in full awareness - may 
be critically regenerative: 
If one is a woman one is often surprised by a sudden splitting off 
of consciousness, say in walking down Whitehall, when from being the 
natural inheritor of that civilization, she becomes, on the contrary, 
outside of it, alien and critical. Clearly the mind is always altering 
its focus, and bringing the world into different perspectives (93). 
Further, the presentation of the 'masculine' principle in Mrs. Dalloway 
should also be recognized as integral to the text, as construction - as 
stylized. Woolf's writing becomes perhaps so disconcertingly appropriate 
to discussion in terms of recent theoretical thought because it speaks the 
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same lyrical language of dissent, contrives the same implicit narrative, 
and rather than being the raw material (by virtue apodictically of her 
final end? ) upon which to work is as dialectically astute and creative as 
these later speculative schematizations' 4. 
How is it then that exceptional psychic experience is redeemed in 
Mrs. Dalloway from the entrapment in silence and psychosis represented in 
The Yellow Wallpaper? The 'dominant phallic position' is shifted from the 
mean to the brink. The conventional 'masculine' principle of reason, order, 
restraint, conformity is located at the opposite end of the spectrum to 
the 'feminine' principle of irrationality, chaos and liberation; both are 
equally perilous to the full life of the psyche. Space is thereby created 
for the emergence of an alternative mode of expression not assignable to 
the realms of psychosis, of a broadly revelatory rather than dysfunctional 
nature. The text generates an oppressive discourse against which schizoid 
consciousness is defined. Bradshaw's sanity puts Septimus's insanity into 
question ('this is madness, this sense..., 89). The text engages in a 
strategy of inversion, framing a locus that will tolerate or endorse the 
articulation of exceptional dimensions of experience. Mrs. Dalloway 
presents a historicized, paranoid, patriarchal world taut with the threat 
of collapse in which entropy is occurring on the level of individual 
experience. The text attempts to create a literary language for controlled 
disintegration, to express a 'decentred' self-hood within the context of a 
generalized epistemic breakdown. Rather than simply presenting a study of 
the psychosis and near-psychosis. of two characters, the text participates 
in an ongoing psychological validation of 'madness', where sanity and 
insanity become questionable categories. 
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DISSOLUTION IN SAMUEL BECKETT'S THE UNNAMABLE 
Narration and Dissolution 
Madness in the work of Samuel Beckett operates in a manner fundamentally 
distinct from that of the texts so far examined. Specific features of the 
schizoid state are combined with a dismantling of the mechanisms of 
narration to produce a radical use of madness that is coterminous with 
much modern psychological and literary theoretical thought. However, 
rather than connecting madness (or alternative states of consciousness) 
with experimental literary concerns in a mutually affirmative manner (as 
may be said of Woolf), Beckett forges a link between linguistic processes 
and an ineluctable, dysfunctional state of consciousness more in the 
manner of a lament than a validation. 
Raymond Federman saw Beckett (in 1975) as representative of a new 
kind of fiction, the creation of which entails each novelist dealing with 
textual problems involving the abnegation of concepts of 'plot' and 
'character'. The writer engages 'in his own individual manner, and with his 
own madness', with creating 'non-heroes' who move toward a generic 
condition of 'unnamability' and complete dissociation from any fixed reality 
(Federman 1981b, 310-11). The social reality that forms a background to 
the psychic experience of characters in Woolf's work is melted away in 
Watt (finished 1945, published in English in Paris in 1953) and The 
Unnamable (which appeared in French as L'innomable in 1953, and was first 
published in English in 1959). States analogous to a psychotic condition 
are, it seems, enlisted in an abrogation of the power of the fictional text 
to constitute an agent of representation. This analysis attempts to trace 
-202- 
the ways in which these states might induce a paralysis of narrative as a 
signifying procedure: if this were the basis of what takes place in Watt, 
with regard to the function of madness, The Unnamable may be understood 
to take it from there. 'Where now? ' (Beckett 1979,268), asks the 
Unnamable. While the text does not address itself to the question of what 
sanity might be, it remains (for the reader) an indicator of the 
Unnamable's condition. 
This 'condition' in some ways corresponds to predicaments being 
approached in current theoretical discourse. In literary criticism there 
has arisen an interest in referring to the works of Samuel Beckett in 
terms of schizophrenia. Studies such as Barnard's Samuel Beckett: A New 
Approach (1970), and Eileen Watts's analysis, 'Beckett's Unnamables: 
Schizophrenia, Rationalism and the Novel' (1988) have discussed the part 
played by schizophrenia in the personalities of his 'heroes'. Barnard 
suggests that most criticism of Beckett's work fails to deal adequately 
with the texts in ignoring the part played by schizophrenia (1970, xi), and 
proposes, for example, that The Unnamable is a text which probes into the 
root causes of schizophrenia through its presentation of a condition of 
Laingian 'ontological insecurity' (ibid., 66) or the inability to create a 
stable identity. Barnard's analysis tends toward a realist interpretation 
of the texts, as studies of insane people, diagnosing their conditions (for 
example, he says of the trilogy (of which Watt is not part) that 'the three 
novels are a study of alternating or multiple personality involving mania' 
ibid., 65). Watts asserts that the three novels in the trilogy, of which 
The Unnamable is the last, conflate Laing's notion of psychosis with an 
escalation of Cartesian doubt, and 'progressively deteriorate before the 
reader's eyes as the narratives' madness grows more acute' (1988,103). In 
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Fiction of the Modern Grotesque (1989) Bernard McElroy asserts that 
'whether by conscious design or by intuition, Beckett has built his novel 
entirely around the symptoms of schizophrenia' (ibid., 125). McElroy, like 
Barnard, feels that Beckett must be describing the schizoid state from 
experience ('the writer's interest in the illness dates back to his visit to 
Bethlem Royal Hospital and his acquaintance with Lucia Joyce', ibid., 197). 
To an extent this discussion follows this critical precedent in applying 
ideas about schizophrenic experience to what Beckett's texts describe. It 
will also approach those aspects of Beckett's work which are distinctive 
for their accessibility to such analysis in terms of what is enacted in the 
two chosen texts on the level, beyond representation, of narration. 
There is a continuity between Watt and The Unnamable residing in a 
more relentless dissolution of the structure of the text as 
fiction/narrative than is found in Watt. Its foundations are laid by a 
problematization of narrative voice, of 'plot' or temporality, and of 
internal connectedness and consistency (including, as Watts suggests, 'a 
lack of boundaries associated with writing: chapter, paragraph, and 
sentence boundaries' (1988,104). Whereas in the other texts dealt with 
there operates a tension between narrative, narrator and psychosis which 
influences style and structure, and at times moves in the direction of 
meta-fictional activity, Beckett's treatment of psychosis seems to be 
founded in, or to emerge out of, a tension between narration, narrative and 
'fictions' of subjectivity on a more complex and abstract level. 
The encroachment of delire upon the process of narration in Gilman's 
The Yellow Wallpaper figured in the narrator's psychological relation to 
the patterns in the wallpaper, although the narrative cohesion was itself 
not severely disrupted. In Beckett's texts the focus upon the narrator's 
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problematized relation to narrative, to the language of story-telling, is 
not represented figuratively. The language in the text itself more nearly 
approaches Lecercle's idea of the condition of delire. 
Delire is a special form of discourse: it is concerned with language, 
and it is naturally metalinguistic in the same way as literature; it 
implies a practice of language which is close to its theory (1985, 
155). 
The articulation of this linguistic and psychological predicament is 
applicable both in terms of the discursive movements within the two texts, 
and of the shift between them; like paranoia, Mire 'is logical, rigorous, 
internally coherent and based on inferences; it attempts a global 
interpretation' but if it fails 'the way out is to fall back on 
schizophrenic discourse, a form of tinkering, bricolage, contenting oneself 
with accounts of limited fields, with fragmentary constructions which do 
not aim at universal explanatory power' (ibid., 152). 
Watt 
The narrative in Watt follows the physical relocations of the central 
character, Watt, from his first materialization - apparently comatose - in 
the middle of a street and the object of public curiosity, to the house of 
somebody called Mr. Knott, where he appears to undertake domestic work. 
Another unspecified journey is then described during which time Watt finds 
himself institutionalized in what appears to be an asylum for the insane. 
This is roughly the sequence of events, although they are not relayed in a 
linear fashion. These changes of environment seem to correlate with an 
internal, mental transformation of Watt. This seems to proceed from a 
state of social and psychological alienation in the external world, to 
acute mental disorientation within the walls of Knotts's house, and further 
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to a condition of increasing disintegration, what have been called the 
clearly discernible effects of schizophrenia' (Di Pierro 1981,14), a 
condition in which his world becomes 'unspeakable' (Beckett 1963,82). 
The major part of the narrative describes what happens to Watt in 
the house of Mr. Knott, An apparently omniscient narrator is attempting 
to organize Watt's experience significantly. There has been, though, a 
noticeable reduction of continuity and coherence following the shift in the 
'centre of consciousness' occurring early in the text (from Mr. Hackett, an 
impartial observer of the first discovery of Watt in the street, to that of 
Watt himself). Further, it is already suggested that there is something 
strange about Watt, or something indefinite and extraordinary about Watt's 
experience: he is susceptible to aural hallucinations, hearing 'voices, 
singing, crying, stating, murmuring, things unintelligible, in his ear'. 
Watt is fairly familiar with this phenomenon, and so is not 'alarmed, 
unduly' (Beckett 1963,27), but the voices do interfere with his 
perceptions of 'real' events. Watt's eventual arrival at Knott's house is 
inauspicious, a scene of uncertainty and mystery bathed in an unreal lunar 
glow: 
The chimneys of Mr. Knott's house were visible at last, in the light, 
of the moon. 
The house was in darkness. 
Finding the door locked, Watt went to the back door. He could not 
very well 
ring, or knock, for the house was in darkness. 
Finding the back door locked also, Watt returned to the front door. 
Finding the front door locked still, Watt returned to the back door. 
Finding the back door now open... Watt was able to enter the house. 
Watt was surprised to find the back door, so lately locked, now open. 
Two explanations of this occurred to him. The first was this, that 
his science of the locked door, so seldom at fault, had been so on 
this occasion, and that the back door, when he had found it locked, 
had not been locked but open. And the second was this, that the back 
door... had subsequently been opened from within, or without... (34-5). 
The tone here describing the event is objective, but not without 
-206- 
intimations of the uncanny, suggestions of threat and enigma. The house 
seems to be deserted, but the door is found open under peculiar 
circumstances. This fact is, however, no more peculiar than Watt's 
behaviour, and Watt's logic. If he had not expected to discover the door 
unaccountably opened after first finding it shut, there is no clear reason 
for his going repetitively back and forth from front to back door. The 
use of the word 'science' here denotes an habitual and peculiarly intensive 
application of thought to what in other circumstances might be thought 
trivial. This hyper-rational procedure is in fact characteristic of Watt's 
mental behaviour as it is represented by the narrator. (There is a 
notable ludic or comic element in Watt's confusion which may be understood 
to be an aspect of a specific feature of schizophrenic discourse, the 
flattening of emotional affect, an issue to be discussed later on). It 
correlates with the increasing refusal of events to be easily recognized 
and understood. 
Once ensconced in Knott's house Watt is increasingly less able to 
reason with effect, to establish beyond doubt the physical coordinates of 
his experience. Knott's house proves to be the forum for Watt's complete 
loss of the ability to subdue external phenomena to a coherent reality. 
Watt's arrival in the house is greeted by a long monologue from a being 
called Arsene, who is about to leave. Arsene suggests that Watt has taken 
his place. Arsene himself might, however, be a hallucination. Watt 
meanwhile cannot work out whether it might be daytime or night-time. 
Arsene's narrative relates what has happened to him, and what he supposes 
is happening to Watt, there being some relation between them as 'men in 
our situation'. Arsene tells Watt of a significant moment in his life when 
the order of his world seemed to undergo a subtle but important change: 
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The change. In what did it consist? It is hard to say. Something 
slipped... It was a slip like that I felt, that Tuesday afternoon, 
millions of little things moving all together out of their place, into 
a new one near by, and furtively, as though it were forbidden. And I 
have little doubt that I was the only person living to discover them. 
To conclude from this that the incident was internal would, I think, 
be rash. For my - how shall I say? - my personal system was so 
distended at that period of which I speak that the distinction 
between what was inside it and what was outside it was not at all 
easy to draw. Everything that happened happened inside it, and at 
the same time everything that happened happened outside it. I trust 
I make myself plain. I did not, need I add, see the thing happen, nor 
hear it, but I perceived it (41-2). 
Arsene believes that 'what was changed was existence off the ladder', the 
reality beyond the series of questions and answers, the process of 
reasoning, by which 'with patience, it would be an easy matter to extract 
the next in order, and so descend, so mount, rung by rung, until the night 
was over' (43). That the change of state was real, Arsene is sure, but not 
sure in what sense, 
in my opinion it was not an illusion, as long as it lasted, that 
presence of what did not exist, that present without, that present 
within, that presence between, though I'll be buggered if I can 
understand how it could have been anything else (43). 
Everything experienced by Watt in Knott's house becomes similarly 
problematic and enigmatic: 
Watt now found himself in the midst of things which, if they 
consented to be named, did so as it were with reluctance. And the 
state in which Watt found himself resisted formulation in a way no 
state had ever done, in which Watt had ever found himself, and Watt 
had found himself in a great many states (78). 
A series of enigmatic events and objects of a hallucinatory nature become 
the focus of Watt's attention, and of his logical faculties. The incident 
of the piano tuners' visit ('Mr. Gall Senior and Mr. Gall Junior') to the 
house 'in a sense... resembled all the incidents of note proposed to Watt 
during his stay in Mr. Knott's house' (69). It is remarkable, but also 
typical, for its dubious quality of not having happened, very noticeably, 
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with no discernable concrete meaning, 'a thing that was nothing had 
happened with the utmost formal distinctness, and... continued to happen, in 
his mind, he supposed, though he did not know exactly what that meant, and 
though it seemed to be outside him, before him, about him, and so on' (73). 
It resembles other events 'in the vigour with which it developed a purely 
plastic content, and gradually lost, in the nice processes of its light, its 
sound, its impacts and its rhythm, all meaning, even the most literal' (69). 
The event 
ceased very soon to signify for Watt piano tuned, an obscure family 
and professional relation, an exchange of judgements more or less 
intelligible, and so on, if indeed it had ever signified such things, 
and became a mere example of light commenting bodies, and stillness 
motion, and silence sound, and comment comment (69-70). 
(This movement of disintegration of significance, of presence, will also 
prove to be prototypical of the fluctuations of narrative discourse in The 
Unnamable). Watt's confusion, his inability to distinguish between the 
nature of one event and another, to perceive things objectively, to place 
himself securely in relation to events in space and time gives rise to a 
compulsive thought process through which he tries to understand and 
reformulate events. The 'fragility of the outer meaning had a bad effect 
on Watt, for it caused him to seek for another' (70). Likewise with each 
occasion, Watt is 
obliged, because of his peculiar character, to enquire into what they 
meant, oh not into what they really meant, his character was not so 
peculiar as all that, but into what they might be induced to mean, 
with the help of a little patience, a little ingenuity (72). 
The narrative becomes more a description or representation of this process 
than of any series of 'actual' events. Watt's deliberations on Mr. Knott's 
eating habits and on what is supposed to happen to the uneaten food that 
he collects after Knott has left the table sustain a considerable portion 
-209- 
of narrative2. By so doing, Watt is also reasoning Knott (whom he is 
never certain of having seen, 'not that Watt was ever to have any direct 
dealings with Mr. Knott, for he was not') into existence as perhaps, the 
'author of a final solution' (91) who eventually 'chosen' from among the 
many elaborate alternatives that Watt could imagine. 
Watt's discourse approaches Lecercle's concept of delire here in that 
he believes his thought process is as far as possible in the circumstances 
'logical, rigorous, internally coherent'. It is also 'based on inferences; it 
attempts a global interpretation': without any knowledge of Knott Watt 
infers that such a being is at the hub of this intractable realm, and 
infers from this that there must therefore be an order behind it if only 
he can conceive of the nature of its operation, and in the process of 
such deliberation he is able once more to infer Knott's existence (like 
proofs for the existence of God). However, Watt does not succeed in 
convincing himself of the actuality of any system he construes, and at 
intervals the narrative collapses into, 
tinkering, bricolege contenting oneself with accounts of limited 
fields, with fragmentary constructions which do not aim at universal 
explanatory power (Lecercle 1985,152). 
The relations between 'such series as these, the series of dogs, the series 
of men, the series of pictures, to mention only these series... ' (135) never 
cohere into a unifiable structure. They are dealt with exhaustively within 
a very narrow focus. Watt considers, 
not only some of those solutions that had not apparently prevailed, 
but also some of those objections that were perhaps the cause of 
their not having done so, distributed as follows: 
Solution Number of Objections 
Ist .... .... .... .. 2 2nd .... .... .. 3 3rd .... .... .... .. 4 4th .... .... .... .. 5 
... Passing on then to the solution that seemed to have prevailed, Watt found it to be roughly this, that a suitable local dog-owner, that is 
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to say a needy man with a famished dog, should be sought out (94-95) 
Watt is not successful in his paranoid 'decoding' and re-formulation of 
experience. System and frame, which could be provided by 'Knott's house', 
disintegrate as Knott himself proves to be a central and significant 
absence, an indeterminable entity. Watt's reasoning dissolves into endless 
and monotonous fabrication and bricolage. What is made in his mind, 
though shifting and hallucinatory, has as much or as little meaning for 
him as anything he can suspect has actually happened outside of his head. 
However, the narrative continues to be articulated in the third 
person, functioning as an external perspective on what goes on in Watt's 
head. The question arises as to why the narrative, the signified of which 
is the story of what happens to Watt -a character who seems to be 
psychotic - does not appear to be impermeable to Watt's confusion. On the 
contrary, it is increasingly caught up in repeating the delirious tangle of 
Watt's thought processes. It ceases to be a 'narrative', not succeeding in 
operating in communicating a sequence of events, strung together on a 
thread of cause and effect. 
Something has taken place in the process of narrating, or has 
occurred at the level of a determining narrative instance'. This becomes 
clear at an advanced stage in the text. There is a shift from an 
apparently omniscient narrator to a narrator as character. Chapter III 
begins, 'It was about this time that Watt was transferred to another 
pavilion' (149). The narrator refers to himself as Sam and explains at 
length the nature of his encounters with Watt. It becomes evident that 
the narrative is a re-construction, from Watt's personal reconstruction, as 
relayed by Watt to Sam in an asylum. However, Watt's powers of narration 
are constantly dwindling. Watt's practice of supplying proliferating 
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hypothesis renders the act of transcription farcical. It becomes more a 
question of process, of narration then narrative. 
Watt's mental abnormality seems to be the missing link between the 
act of narrating and the construction of a stable narrative. Narrating as 
an organizational and referential activity is considered problematic by 
Sam, because there is no way of getting past Watt, and Sam is attempting a 
faithful rendition of Watt's tale. 
And if Watt had not known this, that Erskine's key was not a simple 
key, then I should never have known it either, nor the world. For all 
that I know on the subject of Mr. Knott, and of all that touched Mr. 
Knott, and on the subject of Watt, and of all that touched Watt, came 
from Watt, and from Watt alone. And if I do not appear to know very 
much on the subject of Mr. Knott and of Watt, and on the subject of 
all that touched them, it is because Watt did not know a great deal 
on these subjects... This does not mean that Watt may not have left 
out some of the things that happened, or that were, or that he may 
not have foisted in other things that never happened, or never were. 
Mention has already been made of the difficulties that Watt 
encountered in his efforts to distinguish between what happened and 
what did not happen, between what was and what was not, in Mr. 
Knott's house. And Watt made no secret of this (124). 
Sam faces difficulty in that Watt's notion of time has abandoned him, 'As 
it turned out, Watt was never to know how long he spent in Mr. Knott's 
house, how long on the ground floor, how long on the first floor, how long 
altogether. All he could say was that it seemed a long time' (134). Sam 
also professes himself quite unable to penetrate Watt's mental and verbal 
constructions to the truth of what took place: 
Watt considered, with reason, that he was successful, in this 
enterprise, when he could evolve, from the meticulous phantoms that 
beset him, a hypothesis proper to disperse them, as often as this 
might be found necessary. There was nothing, in this operation, at 
variance with Watt's habits of mind. For to explain had always been 
to exorcize, for Watt. And he considered that he was unsuccessful, 
when he failed to do so. And he considered that he was neither 
wholly successful, nor wholly unsuccessful, when the hypothesis 
evolved lost its virtue, after one or two aplications, and had to be 
replaced by another, which in due course ceased to be of the least 
assistance, and so on. And that is what happened in the majority of 
cases. Now to give examples of Watt's failures, and of Watt's 
successes, and of Watt's partial successes, in this connexion, is so 
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to speak impossible. For when he speaks, for example, of the Gall's 
father and son, does he speak of it in terms of the unique hypothesis 
that was required, to deal with it, and render it innocuous, or in 
terms of the latest, or in terms of some other kind of series?... one 
is sometimes tempted to wonder, with reference to two or even three 
incidents related by Watt as separate and distinct, if they are not 
in reality the same incident, variously interpreted (74). 
Watt is also, according to Sam, unable to control language in a manner 
that would facilitate narration. Watt speaks 'in short and isolated 
phrases, or fragments of phrases, separated by considerable periods of time 
from one another..,. ' (117). Sam seems to report all characters as speaking 
deliriously, because he cannot distinguish their words from Watt's manner 
of reportage: 
that there ever issued from the mouth of man, or ever shall again, 
except in moments of delirium, or during the service for the mass, a 
voice at once so rapid and so low, is hard to believe. Watt spoke 
also with scant regard for grammar, for syntax, for pronunciation, 
enunciation, and very likely, if the truth were known, for spelling 
too, as these are generally received. Proper names, however, both of 
places and of persons, such as Knott, Christ, Gomorrha, Cork, he 
articulated with great deliberation. 
Knott also talks like Watt; 
Mr. Knott often talked to himself too, with great variety and 
vehemence of intonation and gesticulation, but this so softly that it 
came, a wild dim chatter, meaningless to Watt's ailing ears (208). 
As Sam declares his difficulties with Watt's communications, Sam's 
discourse is itself rendered doubtful. 
Watt spoke as one speaking to dictation, or reciting, ' parrot-like, a 
text, by long repetition become familiar. Of this impetuous murmur 
much fell in vain on my imperfect hearing and understanding, and 
much by the rushing wind was carried away, and lost forever (154). 
Sam suspects that this is how he missed much 'of great interest touching I 
suspect the second stage of the second or closing period of Watt's stay in 
Mr, Knott's house' (163), but asserts elsewhere, 'Watt had little to say on 
the second or closing period of his stay in Mr, Knott's house', and 'in the 
course of the second or closing period of Watt's stay in Mr, Knott's house, 
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the information acquired by Watt, on that subject, was scant' (199). Watt's 
voice, like Knott's voice, has all the characteristics of a hallucinatory 
'inner voice', such as Watt is supposed to hear, 'stating, murmuring, things 
unintelligible' (27). The narrative voice becomes identifiable with a 
verbal hallucination, disembodied, delirious, invading Sam's disturbed 
consciousness. 
If, at some points, he has been unable to make anything of Watt's 
language, then it seems that Sam has substituted and supplemented Watt's 
narrative in an equally extravagant manner. Watt had 
wondered what Arsene had said, on the evening of his departure. For 
his declaration had entered Watt's ears only by fits, hardly at all. 
He had realized to be sure, that Arsene was speaking, and in a sense 
to him, but something had prevented him, perhaps his fatigue, from 
paying attention to what was being said and from enquiring into what 
was- being meant (77). 
Sam's account becomes indistinguishable from Watt's account, not because it 
is a facsimile, but because both are defective, insubstantial, and 
fragmentary. 
The sifting of the referent through the disrupted and parthenogenic 
percipience of two institutionalized characters enacts the dissolution of 
the relation between descriptive language and reality. The fact that the 
narrative fails to maintain a stable signified is the effect of a rupture 
of the relation between signified and signifier in the mental apparatus of 
Watt and Sam. Whereas, in the paranoid texts, there might be several 
narrators each providing a different perspective upon the same sequence of 
events - creating the challenge to re-accomplish a stable objective reality 
- there are in this text two narrators producing proliferating accounts of 
an unknown sequence of events - playing verbal havoc with both 
subjectivity and objectivity. In the same way as Watt perceives that the 
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pot is not a true pot, the narrative is not a 'true' narrative: 
It was just this hairbreadth departure from the nature of a true pot 
that so excruciated Watt. For if the approximation had been less 
close, then Watt would have been less anguished. For then he would 
not have said, This is a pot, and yet not a pot, no, but then he 
would have said, This is something of which I do not know the name 
(78). 
What seems to have happened is that 'little by little, a disturbance [has 
been turned] into words.., ' (114-5). Watt, as Hugh Culik proposes" seems to 
collapse 'into an institutionalized aphasic condition after losing faith in 
the ability of words to control reality' (1983,65). This condition is not 
only characteristic of Watt's speech, but, occasionally and unavoidably, of 
the text itself, both exhibiting, to borrow Barnard's terminology, 'perfectly 
sound examples of schizophrenic speech disorders' (1970,24). 
The presence of Watt and Sam might be said finally to be the 
elements that knit the text together, but just as Watt's recognition that 
the pot is not quite a pot leads him to the suspicion that he is not quite 
a self ('of himself he could no longer affirm anything that did not seem 
as false', Beckett 1963,79), there is a domino effect in the text that 
elimates both Watt, Sam, and every other character as a discrete, reliable 
centre of consciousness. Sam walks 'glued' to Watt (167), Watt becomes 
physically entangled with Sam, Watt is quite possibly a hallucination or 
alter-ego of Sam's. Everbody is possibly insane: 'Or was Erskine out of 
his mind? And he himself Watt, was he not perhaps slightly deranged? And 
Mr. Knott himself, was he quite right in his head? Were they not all 
three perhaps a little off the hooks? ' (120). This propagation of 
identities is an abstracted and passive affair, in contrast to instances of 
paranoid doubling and projection in the earlier texts. The words 'Watt' 
and 'Knott' are too linguistically homophonic and nonsense-like to perform 
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adequately as names (What is Watt? What is what? What is Knott? Watt is 
not. What is not? What is... the relationship between object and object, 
signifier and signified? Is Watt/what is, that which can pin down the 
chain of signifiers by being identical with his name? ), and they are 
without the reassuring familiarity of the name Sam. But perhaps Sam, when 
combined with the name 'Hackett' (the character that disappears after the 
discovery of Watt in the beginning), has an over-familiar ring. It seems 
that, as Federman said 'fiction, as exemplified in this novel, is made to 
become the product of a deranged mind' (1965,110), but the question is 
'whose? '. Narrative, as a signifying discourse, has in Watt been 
transformed. Syntagmatic cohesion has been disrupted, its logic parodied. 
The activity of narration sustains itself overall however, within a fragile 
semblance of coherence, in default of the mad narrators and narrative 
chaos. 
Just as Sam - the ostensible narrator - and Watt - the apparent 
protagonist - pace around the grounds of the asylum 'glued' together, the 
relation of the text to the psychotic states it describes becomes 
indissoluble. In contrast to the paranoid texts Sam's testimony does not 
function as a frame, objectifying Watt's experience, but very subtly begins 
to loosen and dissolve the narrative texture, exposing the delusionary 
component of the narration. Textual disorientation echoes Watt's 
experience. The narrator speculates about Watt speculating, about the 
refusal of words to have much to do with things and of external reality to 
conform to his endless hypothesizing. Watt's accelerating paralogical 
thought processes, and loss of capacity to stabilize anything (manifest in 
contradiction, repetition, inconsistency, compulsive thinking in the 
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Schreberesque sense) initiate textual decomposition, which is not 
dissipated by the imposition of narratorial control. Disruptive discourse 
at intervals becomes heavily patterned, for example: 
He moved, to and fro, from the door to the window, from the window 
to the door; from the window to the door, from the door to the 
window; from the fire to the bed, from the bed to the fire; from the 
bed to the fire, from the fire to the bed... (203) 
It articulates a paranoid mania for order at this level, but the whole 
falls apart, becoming an insistent bricolage of 'virtual' narrative. 
The world of the text is, in a sense, gothic and fantastic: the laws 
governing this world are uncertain, aporia hangs on every event and 
circumstance, the instability of phenomena is persecutory. However, 
because there is no working up of a recognition of any object or event as 
extraordinary in relation to any other, only in its own quintessentiality, 
the paranoid dynamic is disabled. This world becomes an arena for 
schizoid dissolution both on the level of what the text describes 
(narrative) and of the text as a process of narration. 
The Unnamable 
It is possible to trace, to a limited extent, the movement of Watt through 
space and time, to understand Watt both as a narrative of what happens to 
a character, and as a narrative of the difficult process of narrating that 
narrative. (Sam explains, for example, 'As Watt told the beginning of his 
story, not first, but second, so not fourth, but third, now he told its end. 
Two, one, four, three, that was the order in which Watt told his story... ' 
214). The Unnamable is not accessible to such reformulation. There is no 
sustained concession to plot, no action, no continuous narrative to piece 
together. It does not, like Watt, deal with a man's struggle with language, 
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but, as Maire Jaanus Kurrik suggests, 'The plot of The Unnamable is 
language's war against itself' (1979,227). 
Watt's world in Knott's house becomes 'unspeakable', or perhaps 
finally speakable only in terms of what might be called a schizoid 
discourse. 'Knott's house' is in a sense a figure for the situation of the 
Unnamable. 'That Mr. Knott might never cease, but ever almost cease. Such 
appeared the arrangement... ' Beckett 1963,203), and such appears to be the 
arrangement for the voice of the Unnamable. The text, as the title 
implies, focusses again upon the recalcitrance of language. There are no 
pots here to challenge subjective perception and stability. The subject, 
the percipient, is in a state of continuous dispersal. The Unnamable 'is 
not', and is not nameable, existing as an ongoing negation, or present only 
as that which cannot be spoken of, that which the text continues (to abuse 
by) not-speaking-of. 
The Unnaraable speaks of 'the madness of having to speak' (Beckett 
1979,297), when nothing and nobody is there to be be spoken. The 
dissociation of word from thing set in motion in Watt as an observable 
process crystallizes out here into a condition. The text functions as an 
expose of this condition. Language is demonstrated to be both autonomous 
and persecutory. It is devoid of a stable relation to mind or matter, and 
unable to bridge the gap between them. The subject disperses and a voice 
or voices continue to speak, in an eternal, torturous present: 'Ah if only 
this voice could stop, this meaningless voice which prevents you from 
being nothing and nowhere, just enough to keep alight this little yellow 
flame' (341). The image echoes that in Dante's Inferno (canto xxvi), where 
the character of Ulysses speaks from a cloven flame, condemned to the 
realm of the false counsellors. He tells his story: he voyaged in search 
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of experience, 'virtute e canoscenza', which culminates in a 'folle volo' -a 
mad flight to destruction. This realm of Hell is peopled with spirits 
imprisoned in flames (Dante 1939,321-327, I). Beckett is known to have 
been interested in The Divine Comedy (to which More Pricks Than Kicks, for 
example, bears witness). The voice of The Unnamable expresses, if nothing 
else, complete isolation and dissociation, frequently referring to his 
situation as a state of damnation; there is for The Unnamable, 'Nothing to 
do but stretch out comfortably on the rack, in the blissful knowledge you 
are nobody for all eternity. A pity I should have to give tongue at the 
same time' (311). 
The text traces not so much a struggle against the process of 
breakdown, like Watt, but a final dwindling: 'I have dwindled, I dwindle' 
(1979,304). The Unnamable is suspended in a species of pre-birth, or as 
Barnard says 'post-mortem' limbo, where the narrative coordinates that give 
a subject existence (syntagmatic logic, location in time and space) are 
ineffectually articulated. The process of narration in the text is subject 
to a constant form of erasure: the narrative instance is abortive, the 
narrator - the person whose utterance constitutes the narrative - is 
manifestly both incapable of utterance and a non-person, experiencing 
alienation from both selfhood and language. He is unable to find himself 
in the utterance of 'I'. 
The text begins 'Where now? Who now? When now? Unquestioning, I, say 
I. Unbelieving. Questions, hypotheses, call them that. Keep going... ' 
(1979,267). It is a quest for the significance and validity of such 
questions, untethered as they are and not issuing from any centre of 
meaning, any presence. The whole may be seen as an interrogative 
signifier, of which the signified is lost. First person and utterance are 
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severed: 
This voice that speaks ... I'll ask no more questions, there are no more 
questions, I know none any more. It issues from me, it clamours 
against my walls, it is not mine, I can't stop it, I can't prevent it, 
from tearing me, racking me, assailing me. It is not mine, I have 
none (281). 
Yet the struggle to identify who is occupying the space, from which the 
voice issues, paradoxically and compulsively continues. It is manifest in 
The Unnamable's attempts to substantiate his presence, in unsatisfactory 
forays into narrative descriptions of the situation of the speaker/hearer. 
Operating in the present tense the language communicates simultaneously 
the fluctuating and obscure perceptions of the Unnamable, but cannot 
express awareness of past or future ('I am incapable ... of measuring time' 
274, 'I resume, years later, meaning I suppose that I went silent, that I 
can go silent. And now this noise again. That is all rather obscure. I 
say years, though here there are no years' 283, 'when you have nothing left 
to say you talk of time, seconds of time, there are some people add them 
together to make a life, I can't, each one is the first, no, the second, or 
the third, I'm three seconds old, oh not every day of the week... ', 364). 
Likewise, though there are attempts at describing spatial dimensions, 
they are vague and without perception of a fixed external reality, 
everything is continually in motion, shifting, emptied of significance (as 
things for Watt 'became a mere example of light commenting bodies, and 
stillness motion, and silence sound, and comment comment', Beckett 1963, 
70). Images of characters (including those from other texts, Murphy, 
Molloy and Malone) revolve around each other. whilst the Unnamable likes to 
think, 'I occupy the centre, but nothing could be less certain' (Beckett 
1979,270). The Unnamable attempts unsuccessfully to position himself 
(the assumption of masculinity here is consistent with the Unnamable's 
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shifts into the pronoun 'he') in relation to external phenomena, 'my seat 
would appear to be somewhat elevated', 'I only see what appears close 
beside me'. Yet everything is 'murky', only half-perceived and 
indeterminate, two-dimensional. The only factors signalling consciousness 
are alternations of lights with dark, apparitions and disappearances. 
There is nothing there to measure or to reason with, no absent or present, 
no past or future, no inside and outside, self and other, only assertion 
and negation, 'alone, in the unthinkable unspeakable, where I have not 
ceased to be, where they will not let me be... ' (307). 
The physical existence of the Unnamable is, for him, a matter of 
debate, 'being incapable of seeing, moving, thinking, speaking... '; The 
Unnamable expresses alienation and disorientation with regard to his 
physical being. He is not sure whether he is in fact located inside 'a' 
head, the whole mindscape being the 'inside of my distant skull where once 
I wandered, now am fixed, lost for tininess, or straining against the walls, 
with my head, my hands... ' (277). He also speaks of being, 
in my head, which I am beginning to locate to my satisfaction, above 
and a little to the right' but sometimes convinces himself of being 
secured in this skull, 'I say to myself I am in a head, it's terror 
makes me say it, and the longing to be in safety, surrounded on all 
sides by massive bone (322). 
Positions and shapes are created, 'I know I am seated, my hands on my 
knees, because of the pressure against my rump' (279), 'my spine is not 
supported. I mention these details to make sure I am not lying on my 
back... ', 'were it not for the distant testimony of my palms, my soles, which 
I have not been able to quash, I would gladly give myself the shape, if 
not the consistency, of an egg' (279). None of these efforts are invested 
with conviction and each is negated by further attempts at self-location. 
The attempt to discover the being, the physical agent, behind the 
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voice(s) also gives rise to an activity of self-conscious fictionalization. 
The voice propogates a series of signifieds for the 'I', which first emerge 
couched in the third person, radically other than the speaker, and which 
then merge into the first person. An entity named Basil erupts into the 
discourse, 'usurping my name' (273). Basil is later renamed 'Mahood', 
Decidedly Basil is becoming important, I'll call him Mahood instead, I 
prefer that, I'm queer. It was he told me stories about me, lived in 
my stead, issued forth from me, came back to me, entered back into 
me, heaped stories on my head. I don't know how it was done (283). 
These names become autonomous physical agents, proliferating and 
disintegrating in fragmentary narratives (or are fictions borrowed from 
other narratives: Malone, Molloy, Murphy 268, Mercier-Camier 272) that 
usurp both the voice and the consciousness of the Unnamable. They become 
both the narrators and protagonists of their own stories. Mahood 'speaks 
through' the Unnamable in the third person (and the Unnamable speaks 
through Mahood in the first person). Mahood becomes involved in a series 
of stories, also referred to as lies. The story of his 'homecoming', of 
Mahood as a traveller with a past, with a future, with a family (but like 
a doomed and broken Ulysses), absorbs the Unnamable's attention at 
considerable length. The tale is grotesque, surreal, nonsensical. 
At the particular moment I am referring to, I mean when I took 
myself for Mahood, I must have been coming to the end of a world 
tour, perhaps not more than two or three centuries ago. My state of 
decay lends colour to this view, perhaps I had left my leg behind in 
the Pacific... In a word I was returning to the fold, admittedly 
reduced, and doubtless fated to be even more so, before I could be 
restored to my wife and parents, you know, my loved ones... I found 
myself in a kind of vast yard or campus, surrounded by high walls, 
its surface an amalgam of dirt and ashes, and this seemed sweet to 
me after the vast and heaving wastes I had traversed, if my 
information is correct... (291). 
The voice offers a meticulous account of the tediously slow arrival of the 
crippled figure, lasting many years, to where his large family await him in 
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a small building at the end of this enclosure. The Unnamable remarks of 
the creation of a family, 'That's one of Mahood's favourite tricks, to 
produce ostensibly independent testimony in support of my historical 
existence' (292). He wonders whether he 'is required' to admit 
that I am Mahood after all and these stories of a being whose 
identity he usurps, and whose voice he prevents from being heard, all 
lies from beginning to end... (285). 
Finally the Unnamable proposes the termination of Mahood's voice, but even 
this is doomed to futility in his predicament: 
The stories of Mahood are ended. He has realized they could not be 
about me, he has abandoned, it is I who win, who tried so hard to 
lose, in order to please him-sometimes I forget, that all is a 
question of voices. I say what I am told to say, in the hope that 
some day they will weary of talking at me. The trouble is I say it 
wrong, having no ear, no head, no memory (317). 
Having no sense of time passing, the Unnamable later wonders whether he 
has discussed Mahood at all: 
I must have talked about him, the same words recur and they are your 
memories. It is I invented him, him and so many others, and the 
places where they passed, the places where they stayed, in order to 
speak, since I had to speak, without speaking of me, I couldn't speak 
of me, I was never told I had to speak of me, I invented my 
memories... (364). 
Worm is another persona, usurping Mahood ('Worm, I nearly said Watt, Worm, 
what can I say of Worm, who hasn't the wit to make himself plain... ' 311) 
promising more authentic expression but barely existing, the least vocal of 
them all. 
The Unnamable has to use language, or be used by language, 'I have to 
speak, whatever that means. Having nothing to say, no words but the words 
of others, I have to speak. No one compels me to, there is no one, it's an 
accident, a fact' (288). He is immured, buried alive in alien utterance, 
I am walled around with their vociferations, none will ever know what 
I am, none will ever hear me say it, I won't say it, I can't say it, I 
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have no language but theirs (299). 
No matter how many persons there are, how many names they may have, they 
are all in the end pseudonyms; 'I knew it, there might be a hundred of us 
and still we'd lack the hundred and first, we'll always be short of me' 
(311). The voice of the Unnamable becomes involved in a reflexive 
discourse considering the linguistic and fictional possibilities of its own 
being: 
But enough of this cursed first person, it is really too red a 
herring, I'll get out of my depth if I'm not careful. But what is the 
subject? Mahood? No, not yet. Worm? Even less. Bah, any old pronoun 
will do, provided one sees through it. Matter of habit. To be 
adjusted later, Where was I? (315). 
The validity of such questions is itself questioned, 'How many of us are 
there altogether, finally? And who is holding forth at the moment? And to 
whom? And about what? These are futile teasers' (339). Distinctions 
between pronouns are eventually demolished: 
Someone speaks, someone hears, no need to go any further, it is not 
he, it's I, or another, or others, what does it matter, the case is 
clear, it is not he, he who I know I am, that's all I know, who I 
cannot say I am... (370). 
They are recognized as mere mendacious narrative devices, use in any case 
to create a series of madmen. The Unnamable 'succeeds in catching', 
without ceasing an instant to emit my he said, and he said to 
himself, and he asked, and he answered, a certain number of highly 
promising formulae and which indeed I promised myself to turn to 
good account at the first opportunity, that is to say as soon as I 
had finished with my troop of lunatics (282). 
The Unnamable proposes to abandon these ciphers, but cannot abandon the 
madness, the persecution by continual self-negation in every act of self- 
affirmation ('affirmations and negations invalidated as uttered, or sooner 
or later' 267), self-expression: 
Its of me now I must speak, even if I have to do it with their 
language, it will be a start, a step towards silence and the end of 
madness, the madness of having to speak and not being able to, except 
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of things that don't concern me, that don't count, that I don't 
believe, that they have crammed me full of to prevent me from saying 
who I am, where I am, and from doing what I have to do in the only 
way that can put an end to it... But I'll fix their gibberish for them. 
I never understood a word of it in any case, not a word of the 
stories it spews... it's entirely a matter of voices, no other metaphor 
is appropriate (297). 
Viewing Beckett's The Unnamable in terms of schizoid narration rests on 
the premise that the text involves the dismantling of some form of 
coherent narration. As the preceding passage suggests, this dismantling 
can be said to be initiated by a schizoid narrative instance, that is to 
say, the primary failure of continuity between the narrator and the 
narration, the 'speaker' and the utterance. In Philosophy through the 
Looking Glass Jean-Jacques Lecercle proposes; 
Poetry is a recording of experience, a new experience of language and 
of the world, whereas delirium is mere repetition, in which the 
subject is possessed by language (1985,120). 
As the the Unnamable reflects, 'It all boils down to a question of words... '; 
A parrot, that's what they're up against, a parrot. if they told me 
what I have to say, in order to meet with their approval, I'd be 
bound to say it, sooner or later (Beckett 1979,308). 
The Unnamable is not in this sense a poem, the Unnamable a poet, or the 
text a 'poetic' text. The narrator is not a living Ulysses, expressing a 
passion to 'gain experience of the world' ('l'ardore ch'i'ebbi a devinir del 
mondo esperto' xxvi, Dante 1939,97), but a destroyed Ulysses, sunk deep in 
hell, forever exiled from self ('the one they foisted on me, up there in 
their world', Beckett 1979,273) from experience, from canoscenza, 'Can it 
be that I am the prey of a genuine preoccupation, of a need to know as 
one might say? I don't know'. The world in which the Unnamable exists is 
not knowable, is not consistent or continuous; it is a condition of 
uncertainty, 'If one day a change were to take place, resulting from a 
principle of disorder already present, or on its way, what then? ' (270). 
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There is no guarantee from one moment to the next that the flow of words 
refers to anything beyond itself. The Unnamable is a linguistic 
performance enacting the event of linguistic performance as a non-event. 
The text demonstrates a schizoid perception of language as automatic 
- an 'uncanny' noise made by an automaton, a being composed of mechanical 
parts: 
Strange, these phrases that die for no reason, strange, what's strange 
about it, here all is strange, all is strange when you come to think 
of it, no, it's coming to think of it that is strange, am I to suppose 
I am inhabited (371). 
In psychiatry there is an argument whether, in a chicken-or-egg fashion, 
thought disorder gives rise to language disorder or vice-versa, as 
Rochester and Martin point out in Crazy Talk: A Study of the Discourse of 
Schizophrenic Speakers (1979)', but it can be said that with regard to The 
Unnamable, availing itself as it does of metafictional strategies, language 
is the creator and destroyer of both the continuity and differentiation 
between the self, the world, and reality. Federman decides in Journey to 
Chaos that, 'Beckett seems to suggest that fiction emerges from a state of 
insanity' (1965,97). Whether it involves a deployment of language in an 
examination of its function as the origin of a philosophical and linguistic 
predicament, or as a representation of an ontological problematic inherent 
in the act of fabrication7, the text realizes an experience which might be 
called schizoid in its focus on ensnarement and dissolution in the 
mechanics of language. There are disjunctions, separations, abscissions at 
every level: between mind and body, thought and language, body and 
language, subject and narrative, narrator and utterance. How, 
in such conditions', asks the Unnamable, 'can I write, to consider only 
the manual aspect of that bitter folly? I don't know. I could know. 
But I shall not know. Not this time. It is I who write, who cannot 
raise my hand from my knee (Beckett 1979,276). 
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A salient aspect of the stories told by the voices in The Unnamable 
relates to a further level of discontinuity that is again analogous to 
what can be described as a schizoid condition. The narratives describe 
isolation, horror, death and dying, mutilation, exhaustion, situations that 
must be understood to give rise to suffering. Yet the narration does not 
register any such appropriate response. The writing manifests a 
'flattening of affect'; the severance of word from thing is repeated in the 
disjuncture between self and experience. When Mahood relates his endless 
route home, and discovers that his relatives are, meanwhile, dying, he says. 
As for the screams of pain and wafts of decomposition, assuming I 
was capable of noticing them, they would have seemed to me quite in 
the natural order of things, such as I had come to know it... (295). 
He talks of the poison that had 'exterminated my entire kith and kin' as 
something 'I could readily admit, but only on condition that my personal 
behaviour had not to suffer by it' (296). A different tale gives rise to 
the announcement of emotional dereliction, originating in a loss of self 
and sense of absolute futility: 
They say I suffer like true thinking flesh, but I'm sorry, I feel 
nothing. Mahood I felt a little, now and then, but what good did 
that do them? No, they'd be better advised to try something else. I 
felt the cang, the flies, the sawdust under my stumps, the tarpaulin 
on my skull, when they were mentioned to me. But can that be called 
a life which vanishes when the subject is changed? ... They want me to 
have a mind where it is known once and for all that I have a pain in 
the neck, that flies are devouring me and that the heavens can do 
nothing to help (325). 
The Unnamable laments the fact that he does not seem to have a face, as 
if to have a face to register emotional affect would be the answer to his 
inability to feel, and thus he would be assured of his existence. He is 
'nothing but a shapeless heap, without a face capable of reflecting the 
niceties of a torment' (328): 
A face, how encouraging that would be. if it could be a face, every 
now and then, always the same, methodically varying its expressions, 
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doggedly demonstrating all a true face can do, without ever ceasing 
to be recognizable as such, passing from unmixed joy to the sullen 
fixity of marble, via the most characteristic shades of 
disenchantment, how pleasant that would be (333). 
In her case study of a schizophrenic woman Marion Milner describes the 
ongoing sensation experienced by her patient of having 'no face' as linked 
to loss of identity. She is told that the woman 'has not had a face for 
five years'. Having no face was part of 'having no boundary, so that she 
could feel herself spreading out to include everything, be everthing 
without any limits; but this, she feels, could also mean being nothing' 
(Milner 1969,127). The dissolution or 'dwindling' of the anguished 
speaking 'I' into many different voices, and then simply into language in 
The Unnamable is also described in terms of entropy, of a physical 
dispersal: 
No need of a mouth, the words are everywhere, inside me, outside me, 
well well, a minute ago I had no thickness, I hear them, no need to 
hear them, no need of a head, impossible to stop them, impossible to 
stop, I'm in words, made of words, others' words, what others, the 
place too, the air, the walls, the floor, the ceiling, all words, the 
whole world is here with me, I'm the air, the walls ... I'm all these 
words, all these strangers, this dust of words, with no ground for 
their settling, no sky for their dispersing (Beckett 1979,356). 
This results in a desire for imprisonment, for containment, for walls ('a 
cell would be plenty' 377), like the walls of the skull; but these walls are 
incomplete - perhaps he has no face, perhaps he has only a face, like 
Milner's patient, with nothing behind it, 'perhaps that's what I am, the 
thing that divides the world in two, on the one side the outside, on the 
other the inside... ' (352). 
The recognized counterpart of flattening of affect, of dissociation 
from sensation', is continuous weepingrl. Perhaps the most explicit and 
distinct information offered concerning the (non)entity known as the 
Unnamable is that he weeps, continuously. This is noted repeatedly at 
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intervals throughout the texts: 
The tears stream down my cheeks from my unblinking eyes. What makes 
nie weep so? From time to time. There is nothing saddening here. 
Perhaps it is liquefied brain. Past happiness in any case has clean 
gone from my memory, assuming it was ever there-Nothing ever 
troubles me. And yet I am troubled (269). 
'If only I were alive inside... ', he complains, and proposes, 'I know my eyes 
are open, because of the tears that pour from them unceasingly'. The 
sound of crying bears no relation to the body of the utterer: 
So after a long period of immaculate silence a feeble cry was heard, 
by me. I do not know if Malone heard it too. I was suprised, the 
word is not too strong. After so long a silence a little cry, stifled 
outright. What kind of creature uttered it and, if it is the same, 
still does from time to time? impossible to say. Not a human one in 
any case, there are no human creatures here, or if there are they 
have done with crying (271). 
The Unnamable convinces himself that he has the power to stop the 
tears, to be simply a talking machine, immune to the torment of 'not-being' 
('being Knott'), 'I'll dry these streaming sockets too, bung them up, there, 
it's done, no more tears, I'm a big talking ball, talking about things that 
do not exist, or that exist perhaps, impossible to know' (280). Yet he can 
never fully create this mechanistic consciousness. 
Schizoid Textuality 
In terms of loss of unitary identity, linguistic delire, and the lack of 
continuity between experience and sentiment, this 'fictional' text mimics 
focal mechanisms and diagnostic criteria of schizophrenia. Beckett's (anti) 
narrative technique has meant meanwhile that his work is has become an 
arena for contemporary theorizing about language within different 
discourses. Ihab Hassan, for example, asserted that Samuel Beckett was 'a 
supreme example of the postmodern artist, turning the malice of language 
against itself' (1982,210). In his essay 'Wittgenstein. Heidegger, the 
-229- 
Unnamable, and some Thoughts on the Status of the Voice in Fiction' Allen 
Thiher proposes that the 'schizo-text' comically blurs, 
the line of demarcation between fictive and nonfictive text in order 
to live out the madness that our various philosophical systems would 
ascribe to our daily lives. The schizo suspension of logic allows the 
Unnamable to live out his narrative project as an experiential 
critique of language theory (Bela 1983,89). 
Charles Glicksberg proposes that 'these divagations of a schizophrenically 
tormented consciousness' render Beckett 'the literary nihilist par 
excellence' (1975,235). The text may be seen, on this level, as a 
'fictional' interface of aspects of recent philosophical, literary and 
linguistic theory: as Iain Wright says, 'Beckett's texts seem to provide the 
ideal site for post-structuralist critical revelry' (1983,66). All this 
would seem to suggest, then, that 'the schizophrenic', or the schizoid 
condition (as a metaphor accommodating theoretical thought from different 
domains), can simultaneously be seen as a 'fictionalized', or theoretically 
fabricated model of the focal mechanisms and diagnostic criteria of certain 
kinds of 'post-modern' writing and thought. It is working on this basis 
that critics such as Allen Thiher talk about Beckett's 'view of language 
and self' as 'a schizo-comedy that takes desperate delight in its own 
impossibility', and says that in this sense, 
Beckett's work ushers in the era of the schizo-text, that is perhaps 
the post-modern text par excellence. Beckett's work gives full 
expression to the voice alienated from itself (Beja 1983,89). 
Beckett's work preludes 'the proliferation of post-modern works whose 
voices know not whence they speak or speak from that equivocal space 
called the text' (ibid., 89). However, not only do Beckett's textual 
strategies result in a text characterizable as schizoid, but he is at pains 
to frame the texts in terms of the distress involved in psychopathological 
experience. This fiction becomes pure suffering, the subject is impaled 
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upon a voice, the voice of the text and in nobody's head. There is a 
howling coming from beyond the philosophical 'dissertation' (Beckett 1979, 
288). Critical approaches to Beckett perhaps tend to demonstrate an 
apparently correspondent 'flattening of affect', a lack of interest, or in- 
difference to this malapropos tragic component. It seems that in this 
dramatic element of the fictional enactment of a psychotic condition 
Beckett has ironically preserved something more 'authentic', less 
fabricated, than those fictions woven through and around the text by 
modern philosophical 'symptomatology'. To an extent before the event, 
Beckett reveals the tragedy behind what is understood to be an 
uncompromising investigation of language and fiction, of what turn out to 
be the conceptual borders between literature and madness. 
Madness is no longer a marginal or 'gothic' concern, manifest and 
dealt with in a paranoid manner by fiction. Neither does it offer 
territory reclaimable as a richer, more authentic realm of consciousness. 
It is, in the work of Beckett, relentlessly assimilated into the fictional 
act on the basis that knowledge of self and world is never more than that. 
His texts allegorize contemporary psychological insights that take up the 
indeterminate quality of psychosis as an index to the obsolescence of the 
idea of normality. Disrupted subjective experience in earlier fictional 
treatments of madness represented the threatening 'other' of rational 
modes of understanding and describing 'reality'. It has by this time come 
to be understood as a story of every day, the definitive condition of the 
de-centred subjects and disinherited story-tellers - not always describable 
as 'fictionalists' - of a 'post-modern' and 'post-structuralist' world. It 
is, however, ominous in its refusal to excise distress or to maintain a 
divide between the academic and the infernal. 
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ANTINARRATIVE AND THE SCHIZOID TEXT: JEANNE HYVRARD'S MOTHER DEATH 
The following extract, to which reference will be made in the course of 
this discussion, is from a novel by Jeanne Hyvrard, entitled Mother Death 
(1988, from Mere la Mort 1976)'. 
I hadn't foreseen. The death of the I. The transparent blue of 
dreams opening onto the other thing. The other part. The river with 
time and space mingled together going toward the mouth. Barques 
crossing the rapids below the house. At the place where there's 
almost no water. She hasn't managed to smother me. I survived my 
own birth. The cave in the cliff finally surrenders its drawings. The 
burn of immobile suns and light. How much more time behind blurred 
windowpanes? What do they know about what I see through them? 
Nobody masons the stones that come undone one at a time anymore. 
The cornice has already fallen into the street. Or only the gargoyle. 
I don't know. Nobody will come and fix it because the balcony's too 
high for anyone to reach. Too bad. It's not I who's speaking. I've 
disappeared completely into the river's single-stringed discourses. 
You've put nets on the roof to catch the stones falling from the 
cliff. But so many have fallen that they've crossed the roof. The 
wallpaper you hung floats at the stern of my joyful body. The cracks 
in the walls grow larger and thick paint doesn't keep the branches 
from the ceiling anymore. The drawing becomes clearer. The lines 
become more distinct. Your plastering doesn't conceal the essential 
anymore. A tree with a thousand sectioned hands under the ceiling. 
A tree that grows in my body and crosses the caved-in roof. A tree 
in the wreckage of the dilapidated house. 
The postman brings letters but I don't go down to get them. I 
don't answer since they don't ask questions. Letters pile up on the 
stone steps going into the heart of the cliff. The answer's in the 
silence... But they can't stand the thick silence of the disappearance 
of names. They can't stand the absence of identity. They can't stand 
the disappearance of the 'I'... They speak in our place to be sure of 
silencing us. They gave my sickness a name. What was it again? 
They gave my sickness a name. But their diagnosis is wrong... (93-95) 
A Different Kind of Unnamability 
Whilst evoking some already familiar themes, this passage nevertheless 
suggests new problems, even from the standpoint of sheer readability, that 
need now to be addressed. There are two aspects to this text's 
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significance for the purposes of my argument; its narrative procedure is 
comparable in crucial ways to that of Beckett's The Unnamable, but it also 
connects with and carries forward issues that arose in the context of the 
discussions of Melville, Gilman and Woolf and from which The Unnamable 
represented a departure. I will first examine the ways in which the text 
connects with The Unnamable. 
Viewing Beckett in relation to Hyvrard, it becomes evident that two 
quite different uses may be, and have been made, of the understanding of 
madness as a symptom or trope of the hazardous reciprocal relation 
between language and subjectivity. 
Beckett's novels may be seen in the light of, or as a consummate 
expression of, the modernist suspicion that the words on the page are not 
the whole story and do not re-present an external reality; that they are 
never less 'the whole story' than when they appear coherent and controlled, 
insulated against 'the irrational'. Watt and The Unnamable inherit the 
discovery that 'reality' cannot be unproblematically represented when that 
reality can only be perceived through the disorder and complexity of 
subjective processes. 
The Unnamable moves into the realm of the postmodern in its apparent 
affiliation with notions of the decentred subject and the primacy of 
language. It demonstrates an understanding that fiction can only refer to 
the real via language, which has been subjected to the same scrutiny as 
the human mind. Language must now be considered a constituent of mind 
and has been found equally perplexed in its relationship to 'reality'. The 
subject is produced through language and is therefore itself a kind of 
fiction. In its most radical dimension The Unnamable seems to engage with 
the critique of the subject which is a central postmodern concern. For the 
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Unnamable, there is, somewhere, tremendous distress, psychic disorientation 
and confusion; but the voice is not sure of being the origin or subject of 
this tension, there is no-one there to be identified as 'mad'. 
The voice in Mother Death also seems to take up this topos of the 
de-centred self saying, 'It's not I who's speaking'; with, however, a 
slightly different emphasis. 
I escape them. I'm unnameable. I'm my own name. Not the one they 
inscribed in my flesh to appropriate me. Not the one they tattooed 
on my dutiful wife's forehead. My real name. The unnameable-The 
splitting of identity. I'm unnameable (Hyvrard 1988,7). 
There are evidently distinctions to be made between Hyvrard's 'unnameable' 
and that created by Beckett. The alienation of the 'I' in language is 
similar, but the essential motivation behind this articulation of the 
predicament of the subject is noticeably different. 
Hyvrard seems to be concerned with an intrinsic policing and ordering 
power in language, with the power of language to name and control. The 
speaker rebels against being named in a way that ties her to a societal 
function (that of the 'dutiful wife'), that initiates the internalization of 
social control, and that situates her as subject to the discourse of others 
('They speak in our place.... ', as above). In Mother Death it is 'they' who 
'can't stand the thick silence of the disappearance of names', 'they' who 
'can't stand the absence of identity'. For the speaker herself unnamability 
does not seem to be an impasse, but both a beginning and an end, a 
desirable condition. 
For Beckett there is no inherent orderliness in the relation of 
language to reality that is not vulnerable to disruption. In the moment 
at which it attempts to name the self language fails. Words continually 
negate what they confirm, destroy what they make, continually create and 
-234- 
dissolve the subject into silence. 
I resume, you must resume, never stirred from here, never stopped 
telling stories... it's such an old habit, I do it without heeding, or as 
if I were somewhere else, there I am far again, there I am the 
absentee again, it's his turn now, he who neither speaks nor listens, 
who has neither body nor soul, it's something else he has, he must 
have something, he must be somewhere, he is made of silence, there's 
a pretty analysis, he's in the silence, he's the one to be sought, the 
one to be, the one to be spoken of. the one to speak, but he can't 
speak, then I could stop, I'd be he, I'd be the silence, I'd be back in 
the silence, we'd be reunited, his story the story to be told, but he 
has no story, he hasn't been in story, it's not certain, he's in his 
own story, unimaginable, unspeakable (Beckett 1979,380). 
Subjectivity is a philosophical problem. Any question of meaning is 
rhetorical: 
And all these questions I ask myself. It is not in a spirit of 
curiosity. I cannot be silent. About myself I need know nothing. 
Here all is clear. No, all is not clear. But the discourse must go 
on. So one invents obscurities. Rhetoric (ibid., 269). 
The right question is an impossibility. Beckett is apparently aligned with 
Lacan in this respect, 'for there even to be a question... there must be 
language' (1977n, 172)2 and where 'language' has itself become the focus of 
ontological interrogation the premise of possible certainty seems to be 
invalidated. The Unnamable confines himself to 'fragmentary constructions 
which do not aim at universal explanatory power' (Lecercle 1985,152); the 
questions lack pertinence, precluded by the inevitability of finding no 
satisfactory answer. 
Yet, however fragmented, halting, disrupted the language of Beckett's 
Unnamable may be, there is still the ghost of polemic, circling around the 
lost centre. Unlike Beckett's Unnamable, Hyvrard's speaker is not convinced 
that 'the discourse must go on'. In Mother Death the text refuses this on 
several levels. It moves toward a consummation where any reflexive 
discursive considerations, presented as physical mutilation in the 
mechanics of linguistic logic ('they cut entire sentences in my flesh', 
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Hyvrard 1988,42), finally give way to a lyrically rendered moment of 
synthesis with libidinal and physical female flows. The movement is 
illustrated in the opening phrases of the passage above: 
I hadn't forseen. The death of the I. The transparent blue of 
dreams opening onto the other thing. The other part. The river with 
time and space mingled together going toward the mouth. 
This communicates a moment of release, a breaking out and away from the 
inherent regulatory logic of language. 'Mother Death' resides in the 
features of an untamed internal/external landscape: 
We advance in the river. She's recognized us. She nods. The water's 
up to your knees. I have water between my opened thighs. Don't be 
afraid... (110). 
A kind of desolate but vital dreamscape combines and recombines its 
elements, becoming the metamorphic ground of a mythic struggle. This 
struggle does not seem to be determined by the constant bifurcation or 
alternation of self between presence and absence, but is a figurative 
attempt to escape difference. 
Atavistic formulations are typical of the procedure of the text, 
which creates images of a continuum between body and environment, word 
and matter. A new, and primal, kind of language is being evolved, 
Roots, verbs, and substantives ... Roots that spread out until they yield 
all possibilties... A language elementary enough for nightmares and for 
joy. A language elementary enough that it can put an end to 
separance at last (54). 
'Separance' is a word used by Hyvrard, it seems, to infer an original unity 
which has been actively sundered and dispersed; this subverts the passive 
and given oppositional condition of difference. 
Lack of clarity is not, it appears a problem (as it is above for 
Beckett's Unnamable), but an objective. 'Clarity', as that activity which 
separates, names and subjugates, is revealed as fraudulent and coercive, 
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the instrument of sexual imperialism ('I become everything they want me to 
be. They appropriate me. I disappear' 19, 'They want to make us talk. 
The only means they have of inserting themselves between our words and 
ourselves' 48). 
Raymond Federman's Surfaction has been mentioned for its appraisal of 
Beckett as the representative of a new kind of fiction. alluding to a 
generic condition of 'unnamability' (1981b, 310-11). Federman's approach 
highlights a fundamental disparity between Hyvrard and Beckett. 
Surfiction can be understood as a manifesto for the schizoid 
fictional text. the 'writerly' text (to draw on Berthes' useful distinction) 
whose primary intention is not communication but the suggestion of its own 
impossibility. The 'surfictional' text denies any ground for consensus of 
meaning between reader and text. language is apparently autonomous and 
opaque, it provides no index to Truth, delusion is not differentiated from 
reality. The texts do not set out to 'baffle' the reader so much as to 
alert the reader. via an antinarrative process which is offered as 
ontologically authentic. to the new reality of ineluctable, existential 
'bafflement'. Federman wants to see the language of fiction approaching a 
form of Mire. curiously echoing the configurations in Gilman's wallpaper: 
It will circle around itself. create new and unexpected movements and 
figures in the unfolding of the narration, repeating itself, 
projecting itself backward and forward... the shape and order of 
fiction will not result from an imitation of the shape and order of 
life, but rather from the formal circumlocutions of language as it 
wells up from the unconscious (Federman 1981a, 11). 
The only questions raised by this fiction concern the enigma of itself as. 
a kind of discourse whose shape will be an interrogation, an endless 
interrogation of what it is doing while doing it, an endless 
denunciation of its fraudulence, of what it really is: an illusion (a 
fiction). just as life is an illusion (a fiction) (ibid., 11). 
Thus fiction is understood to be the mirror not of what has been known as 
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'life' but of the sur-real, reaching toward the expression of a modern 
philosophical and psychological aporia. Federman suggests that any 
creature ('word-being') produced by this kind of discourse will be 
made of fragments, disassociated fragments of himself... will be 
irrational, irresponsible, irrepressive, amoral... aware, in fact, only of 
his role as fictitious being. 
The writing from which such word-beings emerge will be 'deliberately 
illogical, irrational, unrealistic, non sequitur, and incoherent' (ibid., 13). 
Federman celebrates the irrational, the psychotic as enacted and described 
in fictional discourse as a literary revolution, producing something which 
is also 'more true-to-life' (ibid., 13). The movement is toward the 
deliberate abandonment of any more than illusory access to a knowable 
reality, and is recognized as the purposeful assumption of an unstable, 
delusional but 'authentic' position. 
As lyrical exponents of this manifesto The Unnamable and Mother 
Death operate very differently. The tragi-comic inflection of Beckett's 
speaker's awareness of his role as 'a fictitious being' accentuates the 
impression that the narrative is haunted by the 'decentered' self, 
returning insistently to the scene of its demise or displacement. In The 
Unnamable we see Federman's 'wallpaper' vision of literary practice shifted 
from the experimental to the persecutory in a manner which aligns it with 
the dynamics of Gilman's text. In Mother Death Hyvrard's subjective 'voice' 
is set up in opposition to an 'other' which is not simply language but 
users of language, who maintain power over her; they disempower her, and 
diagnose her as sick (see passage above). If she uses this language, 
abides by or plays with its conventions, she is complicit in her own 
disenfranchisement, not simply in an expose of the fraudulence of literary 
practice. Further, the abandonment of the notion of any stable reality 
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beyond language militates against the implication of a social, rather than 
philosophical impasse (already seen to be a premise of the text). 
The language in Mother Death can be said, in the manner outlined by 
Federman above, to 'create new and unexpected movements and figures in the 
unfolding of the narration, repeating itself, projecting itself backward and 
forward'. An operative principle in this text would seem to be one of 
repetition, even recitation. However, it cannot be said to 'circle around 
itself' in the focussed and contrapuntal manner this implies. It is 
sporadic and fluctuates; a variety of states, landscapes, impressions, 
motifs (a river, blood, a disintegrating edifice, a desert, memory) 
continually resurface, revolve and fold in upon each other, abandoning the 
field for a kind of anarchic jouissance. The text circulates tropes of 
fluidity (for example, in the repetition of 'the river's single-stringed 
discourse') and generates linguistic shifts which enact the fusion and 
symbiosis of all life and all states. The animate and inanimate cohere, 
internal and external interlock ('The wallpaper you hung floats at the 
stern of my joyful body', 'thick paint doesn't keep the branches from the 
ceiling anymore', cf. opening passage). 
The text is predominantly 'non sequitur', and incoherent. However, 
behind the constant disruption and displacement, a diachronic or narrative 
dimension is operative within the text, as opposed to the essentially 
synchronic, interrogative mode of The Unnamable. 
In The Unnamable there is no suggestion of amelioration or 
emancipation, only, as has been noted, of an interminable dwindling. 
Beckett's 'Unnamable' is persecuted by a 'they', or an 'other', which is most 
often identifiable as language, or words. There is no escape from this 
agonistic domain. The Unnamable perhaps regrets a former state where the 
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('his') fictional selves circulating in the text were erroneously engaged in 
giving an account of 'truths' and certainties that are now perceived to be 
nothing more than a fabrications. They were, 
invented to explain I forget what. Ah yes, all lies. God and man, 
nature and the light of day, the heart's outpourings and the means of 
understanding, all invented, basely, by me alone, with the help of no 
one, since there is no one, to put off the hour when I must speak of 
me. There will be no more about them. 
I, of whom I know nothing (Beckett 1979,278-9). 
But their usefulness is expired. He can see no other way to be except in 
language, in this racking half-life of unnamability. The subject is locked 
into the oppositional logic of speech/silence. 
Hyvrard's protagonist, however, strives toward silence as the other, 
and somehow original condition, before language (before separance). 
Silence is not the other of speech, is not always in potential and a 
phantom; it is a future and a past. While there is no clear narrative 
progression in Mother Death (it is, like The Unnamable, procedurally 
antinarrative) neither is the speaker encaged in an inexorable aporia. 
There is a history, indistinctly intoned or sporadically voiced: 
Mother death, the invaders came and said you were two. They've 
changed our history but haven't been able to kill our memory. The 
conquerors came and that's all we know. Women die locked up in their 
walls (Hyvrard 1988,60) 
This seems to detail an original moment of 'separance', or of a fall into 
difference, where, for example, life ('mother') became distinct from and 
opposed to death. Threads of an archetypal narrative can be run in the 
text. There is a subverted biblical account where what is omitted is the 
seminal nature of the Word, which becomes an agent of interference: 
Let's start again. In the beginning was chaos. Then the earth. The 
earth begets the sky and unites with him. But chaos means openness. 
They translate it as 'emptiness'... Already at that point, something's 
wrong. Already at that point, they separate mother from daughter. 
After having separated space from time. And sky from earth. The 
more time passes, the more they separate us. I was earth and sky 
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and time. They tore the sky from me. We were just one (ibid., 61-2) 
Linguistic configurations are developed in the text which also indicate 
that, on the level of some sort of mythic temporality, the speaker has 
changed/is changing state. This is not a constant alternation but a 
process of becoming 'other', becoming 'Mother Death'. She has been 'locked 
up' (2) and silenced, and is gradually metamorphosing into a condition in 
which the effects of this outrage will be reversed or negated, and conflict 
transcended: 
Help me relearn the language they tore from me. Help me relearn the 
language that has sedimented in the gulfs of my memory. Help me 
relearn the language in which words mean their opposites... They say 
they are going to cure me. They say I must get well. They've mixed 
words together and they don't know how to speak anymore. They've 
mixed words together and they confuse opposite and negation (2-3). 
The text does not proceed by 'affirmation and negation' (Beckett 1979, 
267), oscillating between speech and silence, life and death, 'I' and 'not I'. 
The voice of the protagonist seeks to subvert and exceed this dualism or 
'separance', to move on from the state where she lives 'in separance. 
Path of disaster. Crossroads of madness' (Hyvrard 1988,2). There is a 
kind of submerged narrative at work, moving from an entrapped and 
suffocated past (before the text begins) toward some kind of freedom, a 
new state of consciousness, as the protagonist moves deeper into silence 
or 'unnamability'. The antinarrative and 'antiseparance' maneouvres are 
participants, it seems, in the unfolding of an unarticulated narrative; the 
struggle in the text is a point on a trajectory. These manoeuvres are not 
indicators of an ineluctable condition. The Unnamable concludes with the 
words, 'I can't go on. I'll go on'. Mother Death concludes with the 
suggestion of engulfment in a polymorphoous and oneiric materiality; and 
words which suggest that they are the residue of a struggle completed 
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long ago: 
Tears are like light from the stars. Sometimes it reaches us even 
though its source may have disappeared a long time ago (ibid., 110). 
Mother Death demonstrates in its fabric the embrace of nullity; the 
speaker embraces and is embraced by it. Seen in relation to this text, 
Beckett's writing and Federman's lyrical theorizing of the surfictional, 
postmodern text are revealed to have in common the assumption of a 
gendered male subject as the focus of textual dissolution. In Mother 
Death the wordless silence into which the gendered female 'I' is pulled, 
toward which she moves (this ambiguity is intrinsic to Hyvrard's narrative 
procedure) is feminine, 'Mother Death'. 
Mother Death, the unnamable. I run toward you. The current carries 
me toward the abyss where I'll be reunited with you (70). 
The agent of persecution, from which this reclamation of lost female 
territory represents an escape, is language - revealed as male language. 
The Unnamable laments his loss of identity but cannot escape the tyranny 
of language. Hyvrard discloses, strategically appropriates and inhabits a 
disarticulated domain: 
Mother death, they look for the name of my illness..... If I find it, 
they'll let me leave. I'm both she and I. It's I who devour and 
destroy myself. Red acids. If I consent to being her. I survive. 
Conciousness being molded. A behaviour being learned. If I am she, I 
survive. Beginning of osmosis. The victim's consent to the 
executioner. I'm going to die. Symbiosis. Loss of identity (31). 
Exposing the narrator as a fictitious being, uncovering the artificiality of 
this activity would not, it seems, serve Hyvrard's project as an end in 
itself. There is a political impetus in the text which moves it closer in 
this sense to 'Bartleby', The Yellow Wallpaper and Mrs. Dalloway. Rendering 
the Inevitable and tragic deception of 'man' by 'language' in the form of 
an antinarrative process would defeat the attempt to reveal language as 
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the site not of an inevitable (and nescient), but of a specific and 
socially inscribed misrepresentation. 
Madness and Protest: Reclaiming Uncharted Territory 
In terms of the treatment of subjectivity in Mother Death then, Hyvrard 
both coincides with, and departs from The Unnamable. Hyvard raises gender 
as an issue. Similarly, in terms of narrative procedure, the text displays 
comparable but ultimately divergent characteristics. Though demonstrating 
an antinarrative process, it nevertheless seems to avoid entrapment in the 
kind of epic metalinguistic stasis that maims Beckett's Unnamable. 
Largely responsible for this is the implied reference to a reality 
beyond the text, via the inference of the social as against the purely 
linguistic production of the subject. This is combined with the generation 
of a kind of prototypical or mythical narrative substructure. Taken 
together these functions may be thought of as inserting the text into a 
political praxis. The manner in which these are linked will be more fully 
addressed in the concluding section of this chapter. They will first be 
treated separately, as components in the following narrative levels. 
In one sense Mother Death offers the narrative representation of a 
woman imprisoned in an asylum, diagnosed as 'mad'. Rather like The Yellow 
Wallpaper, the text then functions as the private and proscribed account of 
her experience. This is the level on which the text engages with the 
existence of the subject as a node in the network of social discourses (as 
is the case in 'Bartleby', The Yellow Wallpaper and Mrs. Dalloway). The 
woman is subject to the will of her oppressors to convert her, to force 
her acknowledgement that she is both 'woman' and 'mad', to secure 
acquiescence in their diagnosis: 
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They say I have a sickness. They give it a name. They say I'm 
unstable, precarious, lunatic. They say they want to cure me... They 
want to make a complete woman out of me. They don't know I see 
their coats of mail under the lace. They want to cure me of what, 
exactly? (16) 
She struggles to escape this predicament, the constant attempts to erase 
identity and impose restraint. 
In another sense, the text becomes a poetic exploration of a 
condition rather than a narrative account of it; the narrator takes on the 
iconic significance of 'woman', the excluded feminine 'other' in a world 
founded upon masculine logic (more explicitly than was the case in 
Gilman's tale). The narrator is confronting the schizoid or disjunctive 
nature of her being, and needs to transcend this. 
In a third sense, the poetic and narrative dimensions of the text are 
subsumed. within the submerged narrative which presents a 'maddenedwoman' 
(enfolIee, driven mad, 1) questing for a lost stratum of experience. The 
text will now be treated with a view to the use made of madness on these 
different levels. 
Through the presentation of the narrator as a psychiatric patient 
Hyvrard allows the text to slide into cultural commentary, tapping into an 
established metanarrative which represents a gradual process of psychic 
oppression and distortion. This process is thought to arise from the 
formation of modern society generally, and more particularly from the 
authority accorded to the psychiatric profession, who are thought to 
perpetuate such distortion. A major proponent of this scenario is R. D. 
Laing. The influence of his anti-psychiatric polemic cannot be 
underestimated in its effect upon later thought. Laing's emphasis upon the 
'ontological insecurity' which threatens every mind with 'schizophrenic' 
breakdown (Laing 1965Y has played a key part in revolutionizing attitudes 
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to madness. It accepts schizophrenia as a description of the individual's 
existence in the alienated state produced by Western civilization, but 
rejects it as diagnosis. This resistance is echoed in the initial extract 
from Mother Death, 'they gave my sickness a name. But their diagnosis is 
wrong'. (This Is the doctrine - psychosis as a kind of health or at least 
a therapeutic process - that Lionel Trilling suggested as early as 1972, 
had come to pervade the attitudes of 'a consequential part of the educated 
public'; Trilling 1972,171). Madness is also made use of strategically, 
toward cultural critique by Michel Foucault in Madness and Civilization. 
Foucault posits a metanarrative within which is theorized the 
colonization of experience classified as 'mad' by the language of reason, 
of science, of government, morality and responsibility. Foucault seems to 
valorize the experience categorised as madness as the sign of a liberated 
and purer condition, a state violated and silenced by the interested 
discourses of rationality. The doctor or psychoanalyst is seen as an 
intermediary between state and subject, a policing agent set in place to 
'decipher', translate or misrepresent the language of the mad. This figure 
originates in the need to enforce and protect the, 
massive structures of bourgeois society and its values: Family-Child 
relations, centered on the theme of paternal authority; Transgression- 
Punishment relations, centered on the theme of immediate justice; 
Madness-Disorder relations, centered on the theme of social and moral 
order (Foucault 1967,274) 
Hyvrard's Mother Death is on one level a dramatisation of this process (as 
are, to an extent the fates of the narrator in The Yellow Wallpaper, and 
of Septimus in Mrs. Dalloway). The madness of the narrator is presented 
as a journey into, and expression of, an authenticity written over by 
psychiatric discourses working to evade its threatening 'otherness'. The 
omnipotent 'they' violate the experience of 'maddenedwomen' by labelling 
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their protest 'sickness'. Embedded in the narrative is this enraged 
statement: 
So they made death out of us. They invented marriage counselors. 
Sex clinics. Sex educators. Psychoanalysts. Psychotherapists. 
Priests in ready-to-wear and haute couture... All these charlatans of 
our shared misery. These predators of our confinement. These fungi 
of our despair. And those women. Instead of screaming 'liars'. They 
screamed 'thank you'. Instead of screaming 'enough'. They screamed 
'I'm cured' (Hyvrard 1988,99). 
Further, the recurrent 'they' in Hyvrard's text is not strictly confined 
simply to medical practioners, but extends to encompass Foucault's 
generalized collation of scientific, rational, institutionalized discourses - 
the custodians of reason in any guise ('their' voices may talk of 
'historical necessity, rights of nations, diplomatic agreements', or of the 
factual and grammatical mistakes in her writing; ibid., 31 and 34). 
David Cooper, a disciple of Laing, Introduces Madness and Civilization 
observing that psychiatry is enlisted in the denial of 'our core- 
essentiality' (Foucault 1967, vii; this is in opposition to the ideas of the 
later Foucault). This is to be understood as an unmediated awareness of 
'self'. He speaks of the relegation of the 'wildly charismatic or 
inspirational area of our experience to the desperate region of pseudo- 
medical categorization' (ibid., viii), and advocates the goal of the 
'autonomous assertion of pure, spontaneous Self' (ibid., ix). Cooper's 
language is idealistic, semi-mystical (in a way that Foucault could be 
expected to reject). Yet both (like Woolf, like Laing) appear to have in 
mind an authentic self for which madness is both protest, escape, and free 
self-expression. 
The self that 'escapes' determination by social and medical discourse 
in Mother Death, however, does not seem to cohere into a 'core- 
essentiality', is not one and self-identical but plural, a protean 
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consciousness which is found in that which language excludes. It is 
presented as both preceeding and exceeding language, being continuous with 
matter and the natural world (earth and water, flesh and blood, pain and 
feeling, hunger and thirst, light and dark). Its voice is found only in 
silence and the scream ('They have language. They have words. - I have 
only a scream', Hyvrard 1988,19). Branches, roots -a violent, exuberant 
nature - constantly press against and shatter the walls and ceilings of 
'language', and the confines of the physical self. On this level, madness 
functions for Hyvrard and Foucault as a sign for the reclamation of lost 
psychic territory. A tension, or ambiguity remains, however; this lost 
territory only matters in the sense that it is both the hidden past and 
the buried center of the self, the self as protagonist in a narrative of 
oppression. Yet simultaneously, both attempt to dismantle the idea of the 
subject, of a core and constant selfhood. 
The second level upon which the text may be approached involves 
Hyvrard's departure from Foucault's story, and points to a context for this 
tension. As has been noted, the protagonists in the conflict are 
explicitly gendered, and this is not the case with regard to Foucault, 
Laing or Cooper. 'Language' in Mother Death seems to become the material 
of the asylum walls that enclose her. It is characterized as the site of a 
discourse of rationality which creates the subject as masculine, situating 
the feminine as 'other' and unspeakable (confusing 'opposite and negation', 
ibid., 3). As Hyvrard's 'unnameable' says: 
They listen to my sentences and criticise the confusion of first, 
second, and third persons. They speak of the search for identity. 
But language is itself colonized. The search for identity. A false 
problem. A Woman seeks her identity. A madwoman confuses first, 
second, and third persons (54). 
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In its interrogation of language and subjectivity Mother Death connects 
with an ongoing feminist critique of Western culture's subordination of 
women in and through language. Virginia Woolf, for example, suggested in 
1925 ('Modern Fiction') that 'For the moderns-the point of interest, lies 
very likely in the dark places of psychology. At once a different outline 
of form becomes necessary' (1984,152). Mrs. Dalloway explores some of 
the implications of gaining access to those dark places, of charting the 
ways in which they have hitherto been relegated to insignificance, and of 
understanding the ways in which their insignificance is gendered, socially 
and discursively linked to that of a female or 'feminised' realm of 
experience. Much later, in 'The Laugh of the Medusa' (first published in 
French in 1975) Helene Cixous casts new light upon Woolf's words, exhorting 
women to reclaim their creative territory, to emerge from the darkness and 
silence historically and linguistically imposed upon them, to find their 
voice: 
Your continent is dark. Dark is dangerous. You can't see anything in 
the dark, you're afraid. Don't move, you might fall. Most of all don't 
go into the forest. And so we have internalized this horror of the 
dark (Cixous 1990,318). 
Woman must; 
Write herself: must write about women and bring women to writing, 
from which they have been driven away as violently as from their 
bodies - for the same reasons (ibid., 316) 
How this may done should not be defined she says, should not be clear, but 
always elusive, 'in flight' from masculine logic. Cixous sees women's 
literary silence as linked to a cultural repression of the female, which 
situates woman in the domain of the unconscious, the irrational, the 
physical - unable to speak herself. She recognizes Western thought to be 
fundamentally dualist in structure, and is concerned to demonstrate the 
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hierarchical nature of its oppositions, central to which is that of 
man/woman. Around this are ordered such oppositions as order/disorder, 
nature/culture and conscious/unconscious4. In 'the Laugh of the Medusa' 
she attempts to unravel and counter these. 
I mean it when I speak of male writing. I maintain unequivocally that 
there is such a thing as marked writing; that, until now, far more 
extensively and repressively than is ever suspected or admitted, 
writing has been run by a libidinal and cultural - hence political, 
typically masculine - economy; that this is a locus where the 
repression of women has been perpetuated, over and over, more or less 
consciously, and in a manner that's frightening since it's often 
hidden or adorned with the mystifying charms of fiction; that this 
locus has grossly exaggerated all the signs of opposition (and not 
sexual difference), where woman has never her turn to speak (ibid., 
319). 
Cixous sees the way forward as lying in the hands of poets, as opposed to 
'novelists, allies of representationalism' (ibid., 320): 
Because poetry involves gaining strength through the unconscious and 
because the unconscious, that other limitless country, is the place 
where the repressed manage to survive: women (ibid., 320). 
As is the case with Hyvrard, the strategy and the aims seem to be fraught 
with contradiction. Cixous seems to be recommending that women both 
remain within, and emerge from, darkness, unnamability and the domain of 
the irrational. The retreat into poetry and away from representationalism 
may be said to reenact the 'ghettoisation' of women's words, in a sphere 
distinct from the very domain where the repression of woman is constantly 
maintained and may be most clearly seen in its effects. Such a move 
apparently reinforces woman's disinheritance from meaningful utterance. 
Another proponent of feminine writing who identifies a 'lost 
continent' of female experience is Luce Irigaray. In This Sex Which Is Not 
One she posits a forgotten language; 
One would have to dig down very deep indeed to discover beneath the 
traces of this civilization, of this history, the vestiges of a more 
archaic civilization that might give some clue to woman's sexuality. 
That extremely ancient civilization would undoubtedly have a 
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different alphabet, a different language... Woman's desire would not be 
expected to speak the same language as man's; woman's desire has 
doubtless been submerged by the logic that has dominated the West 
since the time of the Greek (Irigeray 1985,25) 1,. 
Again, it is not clear whether Irigaray sees this realm as reclaimable, and 
views this fiction as a metaphor for a condition which must be the basis 
for social change; or whether this is simply the lyrical evocation of a 
mythical state of being. 
Hyvrard might be seen as a pioneer in this lost territory, or as an 
'archaeologist's, creating a different (if residually romantic) context for 
the use of the topos of madness. Hyvrard demonstrates a radical potential 
for what Cixous calls the 'sowers of disorder' (Cixous 1990,325) in the 
schizoid text. Madness is valorized as astratagem for reclaiming the lost 
territory of woman's desire, for erasing imposed dissections and 
boundaries, for bringing about 'an upheaval of the old property crust' 
(ibid., 326) (as apparently figured in the trope of crumbling masonry in 
the opening passage from text). As the unidentified speaker in Mother 
Death asserts, she will seek to uncover the 'language before the invaders' 
(Hyvrard 1988,27): 
I'll twist language until it works straight. They set up barriers to 
appropriate us. They've kept the forms that guarantee their power. 
But we'll liberate language and the mad will get out. We'll open the 
asylum doors. We'll unlearn how to speak (ibid., 73) 
Let's recover the speech they tore from us and let's cry out our 
differences since that's the reason we're dying (ibid., 85). 
Irigaray avoids pathologizing the fluidity of female consciousness as the 
'other' of male unity and sanity, by attempting to fill the void with 
plenitude, turn the negative into the positive, to revaluate femininity 
within a new semiotic field, or from the other side of 'the looking glass'. 
This is similar to Hyvrard's project in Mother Death. They attempt to 
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counter and escape the abuse of 'reason' that is understood, in different 
ways, to have contributed to the subjection of women, by refusing 
patriarchal language - and by positing a lost, primary or primeval female 
language7 that critiques rationality without repeating its exclusion of 
madness. Yet, the question remains, as to whether such tactics do not 
amount to a confirmation of the cultural exclusion of women. 
Schizoid textuality and the topos of madness in Mother Death serve a 
dual function. As the polar and inverse response to subjugation in reason, 
they operate both as a form of protest and as a mode of liberation. As 
against Beckett's constrained voice, lamenting the inexorable logic of 
writing ('the discourse must go on') the voice in Mother Death may be said, 
like Cixous's female Voice in The Newly Born Woman, to be 'thrown forward' 
into the 'void': 
She goes forward, doesn't turn back to look at her tracks. Pays no 
attention to herself. Running breakneck. Contrary to the self- 
absorbed, masculine narcissism, of being seen, of seeing 
itself... (Cixous and Clement 1986,94) 
Although Beckett's Unnamable can be said to display a curious, inverted 
form of narcissism (being seen not to be seen, not seeing himself), the 
text is continually examining its tracks', enacting the 'endless 
interrogation of what it is doing while doing it' prescribed by Federman. 
It displays what Cixous might describe as the 'masculine anxiety and its 
obssessional relationship to workings they must control - knowing "how it 
runs" in order to "make it run"' (Cixous and Clement 1986,96). It seems 
to be this which Hyvrard's speaker attempts to transcend, trying to avoid 
twisting around to see where she has been, and choosing instead to 'fly' 
onward; 
She doesn't hold still, she overflows. An outpouring that can be 
agonizing, since she may fear, and make the other fear, endless 
aberration and madness in her release. Yet vertiginous, it can also 
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be intoxicating - as long as the personal, the permanence of identity 
is not fetishized -a 'where-am-I', a 'who-enjoys-there', a 'who-I- 
where-delight'; questions that drive reason, the principle of unity, 
mad, and that are not asked, that ask for no answer, that open up the 
space where woman is wandering, roaming... flying (ibid., 91). 
Mother Death then, attempts both an expression of protest and a gesture of 
flight or liberation. As an expression of protest It is inscribed within a 
variety of metanarrative scenarios; those of, for example, anti-psychiatry 
and Foucault's history of madness. It is also locatable within a feminist 
theoretical context; that of ecriture feminine and the search for a female 
language. 
The latter, as has been noted, occurs in the text as a component of a 
substructural or implicit narrative. This involves the positing of a shift 
of state from an essential, aboriginal level of conciousness or existence 
to a condition of colonization where the realm of the feminine has been 
'invaded', declared terra nullius. The story continues on a trajectory 
toward deliverance from this condition, involving a retreat from the socio- 
linguistic determination of subjectivity. This is imagined to be effected 
by fully inhabiting that marginalised state known as 'madness' which, it is 
inferred, conceals the threshold of this lost realm. Ultimately though, the 
strategic efficacy of such deliverance must remain in doubt. 
The ambiguity arising from the interchangeability of internal and 
external, historical and psychological, spatial and temporal modes of 
representing this narrative works to hinder its communication. This is 
requisite since any clarity of narrative exposition would pull the writing 
too close to the domain of the 'agents of sense' to be appropriate to the 
project of disorientation invited in 'The Laugh of the Medusa', and 
acknowledged in the creation of this text. However, this basic structural 
figure persists, and it is this problematic dimension of the text (the 
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story of original freedom, subsequent oppression and liberation) that I 
will now examine further. 
Madness and Liberation? Antinarrative and Metanarrative 
It has been noted that Mother Death may be situated in relation to a 
variety of different critical contexts. In its proximity to Beckett's The 
Unnamable it can be seen to negotiate both the theoretical critique of the 
subject and the literary project of evolving a radical form of writing or 
schizoid textuality; these concerns are characterisable as 'postmodernist'. 
It also bears an intertextual relation to earlier representations of 
madness in fiction which take the form both of protest against social 
misrepresentation and oppression, and of the quest for alternative modes 
of consciousness. Further, it inherits the legacy of influential 
theorisations of the place of madness in modern society founded in 
implicit metanarratives of the regressive distortions and appropriations of 
a more authentic and irrational psychic continuum by this society. 
Preeminently it correlates with recent feminist discourse, which is 
able to critique and appropriate each of the above (a similar strategy to 
that developed by Foucault') when the proposition is accepted that the 
whole of Western thought and intellectual enterprise is rooted in the 
subordination of woman in consequence of its founding hierarchical 
opposition man/woman. 
Before addressing this strategic formulation further, however, a query 
attends the political aspirations of Mother Death. In its dissentient and 
redemptive dimensions the text, as we have seen, incorporates a 
substructural narrative of female liberation, which turns upon the trope of 
madness. However, bearing in mind its political agenda (its avowed 
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participation in the reclamation of woman from silence) the efficiency of 
this configuration would seem questionable. Can madness be as useful for 
feminism as Mother Death suggests? 
There is the possibility that the positing of the disintegration of 
the self and loss of meaning and coherence in text and society is 
effective as a form of anarchism or inversion. It can be useful as a 
strategy for breaking down the outmoded, and gathering new perspectives. 
This, traditionally, has been the point of avant-garde writing. It is 
possible that the most powerful way of transforming meaning in language 
is to disperse, dissect, fragment that language so that its parts may be 
held up to scrutiny and the system weakened. 
Conversely, it could be said that what appears to be figuratively and 
poetically liberational is also ultimately futile (as the image of the 
crawling woman in The Yellow Wallpaper suggests). Such liberation becomes 
re-entrapment within silence, a self-defeating form of protest. The 
retreat from language may be seen as a form of essentialism that in the 
end re-enacts the patriarchal suppression of the feminine'°. That is to 
say, the fictional representation of woman as mad would seem to be to 
small advantage, perpetuating as it does the well-established equation 
between women and insanity, women and silence. It appears to be only 
rhetorically effective, as a fictional, provocative, hypothetical backlash. 
Yet this - as Christine Battersby observes - becomes problematic as 
doctrine: 
Women creators still have to struggle (both socially and inwardly) 
against dispersing into the kind of Otherness now endorsed as 
'feminine' by many of those who look to l'ecriture feminine (Battersby 
1989,145). 
The schizoid freeing of desire from the constraints enshrined within 
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language, though temporarily liberating is also liable to become 
negativity, fetishized apathy and unsatisfactory as an end in itself. The 
theoretical or hypothetical erosion of the lived boundary between sane and 
insane raises questions''. Fredric Jameson has warned, in this regard'3, 
that, 
the schizophrenic... is not only 'no-one' in the sense of having no 
personal identity; he or she also does nothing, since to have a 
project means to be able to commit oneself to a certain continuity 
over time. The schizophrenic is thus given over to an undiffer- 
entiated vision of the world in the present (Jameson 1983,120)13. 
What happens to those diagnosed as mad, unless they are capable of 
constructing a defence against being considered entirely subject and 
incapable, is that they lose control over their lives. This suggests that 
deploying language ideologically against the interests of the individual 
works in the favour of those perceived to be in control. If the 
speculative use of madness persists, it would be against the interests of 
those who have found in it a way of identifying and exploring what it is 
to be subject to that language. 
What is at stake here is the loss of what Jameson suggests is 
necessary to action, upon and within the world, 'continuity over time'. In 
its procedural proximity to postmodernist concerns, its apparent denial 
both of the integrity of the subject and its retreat from the operation of 
'reason' and narrative logic, Mother Death would seem to relinquish such 
continuity. Viewing Mother Death in the light of an exercise in dcriture 
feminine, an anarchic and at the same time quasi-essentialist enterprise, 
can mean dismissing it as an effective vehicle for change. As Lovibond 
says in her discussion of the possibility of feminism in the postmodern 
world: 
Subjectivity can be as fluid as you please, but this insight - once 
decoupled from the feminist ambition to reconstruct sensibility in 
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the interest of women - will no longer be of any specifically 
political interest (1990,178). 
Creating a space for a poetic/theoretical flight from a socially and 
discursively produced subjectivity as the site of oppression, and into 
madness or the dissolution of self, could be seen as premature retreat. 
Christine Battersby points out that, 
A feminist aesthetics cannot simply be an openness to Otherness; 
feminists have to concern themselves with what is involved in writing 
or creating as a female - as a subject positioned within the social 
and historical networks of power (1989,148). 
There must apparently be a point at which the focus upon the alienation of 
the self in language must be arrested. To reject language and discourse, 
before women have ever properly 'inhabited' it, or managed to employ it as 
a means of exerting control over their environment, is to reject the 
possibility of gaining the power to transform it. 
In its accommodation of postmodernist and radical feminist concerns 
to the fictional topos of madness (focussed in the figure of the 
maddenedwoman) Mother Death could be relinquishing any claim to political 
vitality and efficacy. However, I will return now to the basic narrative 
configuration evolved in the text. 
'Continuity over time' entails the positioning of the subject as 
protagonist within a narrative scenario, rather than dissolved within an 
antinarrative textuality. The fictional representation of the condition of 
woman, when politically motivated, might be expected to maintain the 
inscription of a history of oppression, and the projection of future 
liberation. 
In its suspended, mythic simplicity, and despite its apparent 
discontinuity, the essential narrative configuration in Mother Death 
generates connections with contemporary metanarrative scenarios of loss, 
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invasion and oppression. It resonates with those of anti- psychiatric 
thought, and the 'history' of madness. Yet these may not be considered 
necessarily emancipatory in that they theorize loss, do not appeal to 
rationality for legitimation, but themselves are concerned to validate the 
irrational, the antinarrative and the anarchic as continuous with more 
authentic modes of being; as Foucault writes, 'We must try to return, in 
history, to that zero point in the course of madness at which madness is 
an undifferentiated experience' (1967, xi). 
What seems necessary to a specifically political agenda is that it 
finds its legitimation within an emancipatory metanarrative, yet Mother 
Death apparently complies with the 'incredulity toward metanarratives' 
recognised by Lyotard as an index to the postmodern condition14. However, 
the antinarrative premise of postmodern thought is itself founded in 
narrative, a paradox common to Mother Death and thought about female 
language. Perhaps the most unexpected totalizing narrative with which it 
coincides is precisely that of postmodern thought (as articulated by 
Lyotard) which proposes the invalidation of knowledge and consciousness 
since the Enlightenment, and advocates the more authentic articulation of a 
'disorderly' and 'directionless' world, 'an experience compounded of pleasure 
and pain' (Lovibond 1990,164), Foucault's history of madness belongs, in 
the end, in this domain. He proposes a realm, 
which is neither the history of knowledge, nor history itself; which 
is controlled by neither the teleology of truth nor the rational 
sequence of causes, since causes have value and meaning only beyond 
the division [notionally equivalent to Hyvrard's moment of separation] 
(1967, xiii). 
Despite his putative historical framework Foucault opts ultimately for a 
synchronic and spatial overview of the position of madness in relation to 
the discourses of reason. 
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'Postmodernism' itself, then, can be said to have delegitimized 
metanarratives of liberation'P, even to have suggested that, as Lovibond 
argues, maintaining faith in such a thing constitutes a kind of delusion. 
Lyotard's historical thesis about grand narratives develops itself 'into a 
series of more or less explicit suggestions on the subject of postmodern 
mental health' (Lovibond 1990,397). In the postmodern quest for 
discursive novelty, 
any lingering conviction that thought has some overarching purpose, 
some destination where it could rest, must be viewed as a sign of 
imperfect adaption to postmodernity. The authentically postmodern 
consciousness is experimental, combative, 'severe' (ibid., 397). 
Clinging to outmoded political agendas, then, is a kind of madness. 
However, perhaps there is a way in which such madness may 
nevertheless be considered sustainable, and licensed by the postmodern 
immersion in paradox; a way in which the feminist premise of Mother Death 
need not finally conflict with postmodern incredulity. Paranoid textual 
functions have been discussed in terms of their basis in a plot-forming, 
connection-making preoccupation. They constitute an essentially, 
emphatically narrative procedure where thought has an 'overarching 
purpose', that of establishing the process of cause and effect which has 
brought about disorder, simultaneously reasserting/constructing that order 
(schizoid textuality, on the other hand, to be succinct, involves the 
dismantling and subversion of order). Paranoid texts also demonstrate the 
ease with which narration carries over into delusion, into constructions 
required to bear no relation to a reality or history as it is generally 
agreed to be. This kind of textuality remains unimpaired when 'reality' 
and 'history' are not generally agreed to be at all, in any rational 
sense I*. 
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Hyvrard's use of madness within the core narrative configuration is 
paranoid. In a postmodern world perhaps feminism can only allow itself to 
construct or hypothesize, rather than record or discover, a history (or 
'archaeology') within which a patriarchal conspiracy against, or persecution 
of women has been operating. In the case of Mother Death, at least, this 
becomes literally an insanely licensed narrative. It is able to attempt, 
unchallenged, a totalizing perspective. It does so in the recognition that, 
not only is truth relative, but this particular truth is being reiterated 
by a voice so liminal as to be beyond the reach of 'truth' or the 'severity' 
of postmodern critical modification. 
The linguistic machine employed to maintain male superiority is in 
control of woman's 'reality'. The submerged narrative in Mother Death 
elaborates this history. Hyvrard suggests that the only recourse of the 
oppressed is to refuse the real, and to take refuge in madness - the kind 
of madness that disrupts (takes issue with) the levels of reason and logic 
that constitute that linguistic system. This recourse to madness functions 
within - and not against - the framework of a feminist metanarrative, the 
'history' of women's oppression. Hyvrard's maddenedwoman is a protagonist 
in this story. 
Communicated through the chaotic thought processes of a woman 
diagnosed by the agents of rational discourse as mad, Hyvrard's story of 
loss of freedom maintains the power of a historic trauma without being 
susceptible to further deconstruction. It also maintains its paranoid 
generative power by sustaining the symbolic, oppositional components or 
ciphers in the story; 'they' invaded - on many different levels - and 
maintain their assault in each and every realm of experience. (Laing and 
Foucault might also be said to have employed such paranoid tactics"'. ) 
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This positing of conflict and disorder invokes the imperative that somehow 
the 'rent' in the order of the world must be repaired, the hierarchical 
inversion must be righted. Just as Schreber, in his madness, felt that his 
reason - even his body - had been usurped, 'feminised', Mother Death 
proposes that female consciousness and experience has been violated, 
colonised, 'masculinised', at some indistinct point in time; lost territory 
must be reclaimed. 
Cixous writes, in The Newly Born Womarr. 
We see that victory always comes down to the same thing: things get 
hierarchical. Organization by hierarchy makes all conceptual 
organization subject to man. Male privilege, shown in the opposition 
between activity and passivity, which he uses to sustain himself. 
traditionally, the question of sexual difference is treated by 
coupling it with the opposition: activity/passivity (Cixous and 
Clement 1990,64). 
This foundational proposition enables the feminist interpretative system to 
assimilate each of the intertexts present in the text. Despite radical 
feminism's distrust of rational discourse, and despite the concomitant 
disruptive schizoid textuality of Hyvrard's text, it nevertheless appears 
that, once shifted into the domain of paranoid procedures, binary logic can 
be tactically valuable. Cixous's very articulation of the condition of 
woman inhabits and displays the heightened binary reasoning characteristic 
of paranoid texts 17, reasoning which she wishes to attribute to masculine 
rationalist discourse but which is found provocatively reenacted on the 
level of the theory of woman's (passive) enslavement to man's (active) 
tyranny1e, The power of this configuration contextualises the definitive 
lapse into undifferentiation sanctioned in ecriture feminine. Though it is 
accomplished by inhabiting the disenfranchised space of madness, Mother 
Death still defends and maintains its capacity to strengthen the history of 
conflict and infer an emancipatory teleology (and arguably, this 
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distinguishes it from traditional avant-garde activity). 
Such paranoid speculation does not fetishize entrapment in psychosis 
but constitutes a political stratagem. Feminism now seems to be in a 
position where it must struggle against being subsumed in the generalized 
intellectual 'institutionalization' of a postmodern 'schizoid' consciousness 
as Jameson describes it above. It needs to sustain the polemical power of 
the refusal of reason only where that reason has become the coercive tool 
of a patriarchal society, not as a generalized political 'dysfunctionalism'. 
The paranoid metanarrative is in this case of value as a textual element. 
Paranoid logic may be used strategically toward provoking the 
(re-)construction of a hitherto unrecognized pandemic plot perpetrated by 
a persecutory 'they' which represents a complex force at work in society. 
It also implies a historical agenda that contextualizes the use of madness 
as reaction. Thus it appropriates the compelling power of fictional 
narrative, where the 'reality' of woman's oppression is precisely what 
conventional reason produces and conceals; and what the contemporary 
questioning of the possibility of meaning and history undermines. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
POSTMODERNISM: USING MADNESS IN CONTEXT 
The hypothetical 'postmodern' condition has proved too close to theories of 
'madness' for this proximity to remain unexploited. The link between 
diagnostic language and literary representations of 'postmodern' experience 
is in the pervasive idea of the 'fiction' of self-hood, of world- 
representation' or 'textualisation', and the reification of language as the 
'substance' of reality. This connection enables the strategic manouevres 
initiated by antipsychiatric thought to be brought into both poetic and 
political play. Psychosis and its diagnostic language have supplied 
writers with material for testing the sanity of individual and social 
experience in an era where the cultural guidelines on these matters have 
dropped away. Ihab Hassan has identified what he sees as the emergence 
of a uniquely postmodern entity, 'Homo significans, gnostic creatures 
constituting themselves, and determinedly their universe, by symbols of 
their own making' (Hassan 1987,95). His observation is borne out in that 
schizophrenia has become for recent thought a convenient, dominant and 
potent metaphor or signifier for a uniquely destabilized state of 
existence. Hassan himself submits that schizophrenia is a term. which 
points to the postmodern 'tendency of indetermanence' (1987,94). A mode 
of critique has emerged which takes as its principle focus not the 
literary object but the predicament of the self in contemporary Western 
culture. Across fiction and criticism, the implicit approbation of 
'insanity' as a key to apprehending modes of existence in a postmodern 
world is sustained. Madness has been enlisted in the construction of a 
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postmodern 'self' and 'world' to be found represented both in fiction, and 
in the critical discourse which engages in constructing a cultural context 
for those fictional productions. 
Self and Psychosis in Postmodern Fiction 
Certain texts characterisable as 'postmodernist' can be examined for their 
representation of some form of psychotic subjectivity. The work of Thomas 
Pynchon, John Barth, Donald Barthelme, Doris Lessing and Kurt Vonnegut2 is 
open to such analysis. Their uses of madness move between the ideas that 
'the modern world is mad, there is no state of sanity' and 'the modern 
world is mad, the only sane individual is the madman'. The former 
paradigm treats the 'self' as no more than an 'effect' or ephemeral 
creation of that mad world, in the latter the self regains significance as 
something that exists prior to that world in which its essence is 
oppressed (when it struggles to express this 'core-being' it is treated as 
psychotic/driven to madness by that world). 
Pynchon's narratives often apparently speak from the view-point of a 
not easily identified 'insane' consciousness, and are perhaps close to 
Beckett's in their interrogation of sanity as an impossibility. Pynchon's 
work is persistently concerned with paranoia. V (1963), Gravity's Rainbow 
(1975) and The Crying of Lot 49 (1966) are all peopled with figures which 
display psychically disturbed characteristics and whose perceptions appear 
to be of a paranoid, delusional kind3. Characters Inconclusively read 
signs, are convinced of national, technological and cosmic conspiracies 
closing in on them4. 
Gravity's Rainbow recreates a war-time world. It is'written in a 
multiplicity of registers, and produces a proliferation of signifiers which 
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bear no determined relation to signifieds. It effects a frenetic, 
nightmarish montage. All of this happens under the trajectory of a single 
rocket across the sky, passing unseen, in silence but followed by a sonic 
shriek (the text opens with 'A screaming comes across the sky... '). The 
rocket is interpreted by the characters as part of a conspiracy to 
annihilate humanity, operated by an unidentifiable 'They'. 
Pynchon exposes his concept of paranoia in the text to an extent that 
it is suspect, and becomes a thematic topos. This perversely suggests 
that he is aiming beyond the presentation of the figure of modern man in 
a God-forsaken, superstitious condition, obsessed with cosmic conspiracy. 
The paranoia dominating the consciousness of characters in the texts, who 
seem to exist within a mysteriously and threateningly systematized 
universe, would seem to be the pretext for an elaboration of a deeper 
concern. This emerges out of the disjunctive mode of writing in the text, 
the ultimate sense of meaninglessness and disintegration experienced by 
the figures and the continuous disintegration of the sign in the text. 
This manifestation of the ongoing breakdown of order into disorder can be 
identified with Pynchon's recurring motif of 'entropy', the inherent measure 
of disorder constantly working to undermine structure, system and 
stability. In Gravity's Rainbow Pynchon opposes paranoia with 'anti- 
paranoia' (1975,434), a schizoid condition, 'where nothing is connected 
with anything, a condition none of us can bear for long',. The apocalyptic 
function of the rocket, of the rainbow of Gravity, is less related to a 
fear of death or destruction, than to a terror of and defeat by 
unmeaning'. In terms of textuality, the paranoid reading of the world as 
a provocatively elusive and cryptic text dissolves into the delire or the 
scream identified by Lecercle as operating behind language and 
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signification (as the scream follows the rocket). 
An apparent comment upon the alienated and psychotic qualities of 
contemporary existence occurs in Barthelme's City Life (1970). Barthelme's 
writing displays a disrupted and disruptive, hallucinatory form similar to 
that of Hyvrard. The short story, 'Brain Damage', 1s a series of visions, 
accompanied by noises and voices, expressive of a radical schism between 
self and world, self and body, word and thing. It presents a universalized, 
traumatized consciousness'. There is an insistent sense of warning, of 
impending doom, of being perched precariously on the brink of annihilation 
as the piece concludes, 'Skiing along on the soft surface of brain damage, 
never to sink, because we don't understand the danger- ' (149). The text 
is interspersed with signs suggesting a listening, silent, distressed 
audience (single words in large black typscript, pictures of gaping, 
dislocated heads, a woman covering her face with her hands). It is 
punctuated by the cry 'WHAT RECOURSE? ', Beckettian in its use of 'TO WHAT 
END? ' and 'IN WHOSE NAME?. The proximity of the prose to Beckett's is also 
evident in the confusion between voices and the impression of bricolage, 
as noted in Watte. 
In contrast to Pynchon and Barthelme, Doris Lessing's Briefing for a 
Descent Into Hell (1971) is concerned not with a generalized state of 
consciousness but with the fate of the individual consciousness which has 
abandoned the 'false consciousness' of others. The text is subtitled, in a 
manner reminiscent of Woolf's statement about modern fiction, 'Categ-ory. 
Inner-space fiction/ For there is never anywhere to go but in'. The novel 
charts the experience of Charles Watkins, an academic who is going through 
what might be thought of as a mental breakdown, but is presented in the 
text as an 'intrapsychic' or psychadelic journey. This takes place mainly, 
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but not explicitly, in the context of a mental hospital. The flow of his 
account of this experience is broken up by passages of dialogue, and 
letters between characters (hospital staff, friends, relatives) who have 
had some contact with the 'patient'. Their comments construct, obliquely, a 
'case' for Watkin's illness in several ways; as the logical - rather than 
illogical - response to a contingent social reality, and as closer than 
first appears to the 'normal', but submerged, experience and suffering of 
other people. 
Watkin's narrative bears an interesting similarity to that of Poe's 
Arthur Gordon Pym. The account is given in terms of a sea-voyage, into 
unexplored geographical regions and of strange, even supernatural 
experiences",. However. the narration does not provoke an interrogative 
urgency as to the reality status of events. They are 'psychotic' 
manifestions, framed by the location of the protagonist which, as is the 
case with Beckett's Watt, is a clinical environment''. The text relates a 
cosmic crisis and journey of Schreberesque dimensions, although it is more 
lyrically and imaginatively communicated. It reverberates with 
'discoveries' similar in nature to any by Septimus, The Unnamable, or 
Schreber ". The protagonist hears voices which criticise, from a cosmic 
perspective, the irrationalities and enormity of mankind's behaviour. 
Madness here speaks truth and prophecy, whilst doctors attempt to drug and 
shock the mind back into 'sanity'. The book stands in strong intertextual 
relationship to antipsychiatric ideology (a dimension of the book explored 
in Keitel 1989,90-106). It reverses (as in Mrs. Dalloway) the status of 
the 'insane' and the 'sane', asserting that the dominant Idea of normality 
is itself insanely impoverished 12. 
Although it does share certain generic characteristics with these 
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fictional texts, Mother Death marks a departure from the conventions they 
adhere to. It is a hybrid text, crossing the conventional generic 
boundaries between fiction and theory. However, the current acceptance of 
the indeterminacy of genre and category has also broadened the scope of 
criticism. Play with the inversion and negation of the 'mad/sane' divide, 
and the awareness of the social implications of its deployment, is not 
confined to fictional experiments. They have an extensive counterpart in 
critical and theoretical concerns. 
The Culture of Psychosis: Critical Representations 
This development illustrates the imaginational force of the idea of 
'schizophrenia', to the point of its taking on an emblematic or iconic role 
in recent critical thought. The term - by its very nature - invites the 
abandonment of conventional categorical precision. In his preface to The 
Divided Self Laing remarks upon 'our present pervasive madness' (1965,13), 
indicating the premise underlying his work, which displaces insanity onto 
the 'sane' world and posits the schizoid condition as simply a response, an 
adaption to living in that world. Features of this antipsychiatric thought 
appear to have had a sustained influence upon later critical attitudes to, 
and uses of, madness. These include the adoption of Laing's scientifically 
and politically dubious but rhetorically potent strategy of generalizing 
(as did Freud before him) about a homogenous 'culture', 'world', or 
'civilization', and about the self which finds itself either struggling to 
obtain integrity and stability within it or succumbing to schizoid 
fragmentation. They include the premise that schizophrenia is not insanity 
but a more 'authentic' way of being13. 
In this separation of the notion of madness from any particular 
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psychological or clinical context, borrowing it as a culturally descriptive, 
or prescriptive term (Laing himself alternates between these uses of 
schizophrenia), critics demonstrate their debt to conventional anti- 
psychiatry. It is commonly remarked that literary criticism has become 
more concerned with characterizing the 'post-modern', and the features of 
the typical post-modern text, than with interpretations of specific texts. 
Notions of psychopathology have been enlisted in the identification of 
these features of the 'post-modern'. 
For example, Charles Newman (1985) gloomily discerns 'a dim pathology 
of the contemporary, which amounts to Art is everywhere and Life is vague' 
(5). Language, he suggests, has become our persecutor rather than our 
servant: 'We have become acutely aware of language not as a mediating 
tool, but as an independent agency in its own right, a force which is not 
an adjunct of perception, but a competitor' (ibid., 30). There is no 
turning back: 'We have educated ourselves thoroughly in the psycho- 
pathology of contemporary art' (ibid., 98). Terry Eagleton is circumspect: 
'There is perhaps, a degree of consensus that the typical post-modernist 
artefact is playful, self-ironizing and even schizoid... ' (1987). Brian 
McHale in Postmodernist Fiction chooses to differentiate postmodern from 
other modern fiction by proposing a movement from uncertainty to entropy, 
'Intractable epistemological uncertainty becomes at a certain point 
ontological plurality or instability: push epistemological questions far 
enough and they 'tip over' into ontological questions' (1987,11) (just, 
perhaps, as paranoia tips over in Pynchon, into anti-paranoia). McHale, 
with some irony, reverses the 'experimental' label of postmodernist fiction 
to render it homogenous and rule-bound: 'It is no longer official reality 
which is coercive, but official unreality, and postmodernist fiction, 
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instead of resisting this coercive unreality, acquiesces in it, or even 
celebrates it' (1987,222). McHale categorizes many postmodern texts as 
'schizoid texts' (ibid., 190-194), using the term to comment upon the fact 
that these works are divided, mixing visual with verbal messages, playing 
with the physical appearance of the page, or arranging 'two or more 
texts... in parallel, to be read simultaneously'. By doing so, he suggests, 
these texts reflect a psychopathological ontology, 'they bring worlds of 
discourse, visual and verbal into collision', eclipsing the projected 
fictional world (ibid., 192)14. 
The focus, in McHale's Postmodernist Fiction, upon ontological 
insecurity as a mode of explaining present literary preoccupations links 
these ideas, however obscurely, to popularized mid-century accounts of the 
nature of consciousness. Laing described the manner in which each 'normal' 
individual is prone to gradations of schizophrenic experience; 
The individual in the ordinary circumstances of living may feel more 
unreal than real; in a literal sense, more dead than alive; precariously 
differentiated from the rest of the world, so that his identity and 
autonomy are always in question (1965,42). 
Postmodern fiction is talked about as promoting the reality of unreality, a 
'schizoid' thematic, beyond as McHale says, a poetics of ontological issues. 
The literature which permanently places 'worlds under erasure' - which 
puts, as McHale observes, existence and event into question - works 
relentlessly upon an audience predisposed to doubt. 
Critical commentators on 'post-modern culture', whose subject is 
frequently though incidentally fiction, display a preoccupation with ideas 
related to psychopathology. The vocabulary, at its most vivid and 
imaginative is often profoundly 'dystopic', suggesting disease, depravity, 
psychic violation and automization. Their style is experimental, excessive 
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- 'sur-' and 'hyper-' - repeating the surrealist 'manifesto' strategy and 
its attempt to assume the position of the revolutionary 'voice' of 
contemporary culture. Much of this writing is politically inspired, 
describing a consumerist, late-capitalist society alienating, or rather - as 
Fredric Jameson would say - fragmenting the self and destroying the 
possibility of value or meaning as constituting the means of stability for 
that self' b. 
Kroker and Cook, for example, are enthusiastically both ecstatic and 
apocalyptic. They proclaim their project as 'hyper-theory', an exercise or 
performance in 'panic reading', and announce: 
The postmodern mood can alternate so quickly between hermeticism and 
schizophrenia, between the celebration of artifice and nostalgic 
appeals for the recovery of nature, because the self is now like what 
the quantum physicists call a 'world strip', across which run 
indifferent rivulets of experience. Neither fully mediated nor fully 
localized, the self is an empty sign: colonized from within by 
technologies for the body immune; seduced from without by all of the 
fashion tattoos; and energized by a novel psychological condition - 
the schizoid state of postmodern selves... (1988, vii). 
Baudrillard diagnoses the contemporary modern, technologically tyrannized 
condition as universal psychosis and crisis: 
If paranoia was the pathology of organization, of the structuration 
of a rigid and jealous world; then with communication and information, 
with the immanent promiscuity of all these networks, with their 
continual connections, we are now in a new form of schizophrenia. No 
more hysteria, no more projective paranoia, properly speaking, but 
this state of terror proper to the schizophrenic... What characterizes 
him is less the loss of the real, the light years of estrangement 
from the real, the pathos of distance and radical separation... but, 
very much to the contrary, the absolute proximity, the total 
instantaneity of things, the feeling of no defense, no retreat (Foster 
1983,126). 
Where Baudrillard, like Pynchon, identifies in the schizoid self pain, fear, 
an exquisite vulnerability, Deleuze and Guattari offer this state of 
consciousness as revolutionary, and as combative. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia can be understood as a manifesto for a 'schizoid' 
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existence; 'We are all schizos' (1984,67), it informs us. Deleuze and 
Guattari proclaim, 'schizophrenization must cure us of the cure' . As 
commentators upon the 'post-modern condition', Deleuze and Guattari posit 
an environment within which only the 'schizo' can function freely: 
We live today in the age of partial objects, bricks that have been 
shattered to bits, and leftovers. We no longer believe in the myth 
of the existence of fragments that, like pieces of an antique statue, 
are merely waiting for the last one to be turned up, so that they 
may all be glued back together to create a unity that is precisely 
the same as the original unity (ibid., 42). 
While creating the context for their performance of 'schizoanalysis', they 
evolve an appropriate method of presentation, characterized in terms of 'a 
great disjunctive synthesis' (ibid., 39). Their adherence to post- 
structuralist thinking is evident in their lauding of a kind of writing 
that ceaselessly composes and decomposes the chains into signs that 
have nothing that impels them to become signifying. The one vocation 
of the sign is to produce desire, engineering it in every 
direction... These chains are the locus of continual detachments - 
schizzes (ibid., 40). 
Proust is chosen to illustrate 'a schizoid work par excellence' (ibid., 42), 
since the text is made up of 'asymmetrical sections', 'gaps between things 
that are contiguous'. This is the form of writing to which their own 
aspires; it is eclectic, random, exuberantly anti-systematic. Lecercle sums 
up their (anti-)methodology; 
Theory is no longer superior to fiction: the teller of tales tells us 
as much about the abstruse question of meaning as the professed 
philosopher, and his texts are as useful for the understanding of 
schizophrenia as the reports of the psychiatrist (1985,93). 
Interestingly, however, all this happens within a strong conceptual 
framework of oppositions; Oedipus/anti-Oedipus, paranoia/schizophrenia, 
fascism/revolt, a tactic recognisable from the work of Hyvrard. 
The similarity is again evident in the ideas of Fredric Jameson, who 
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draws upon Deleuze and Guattari to support his description of contemporary 
culture as 'schizophrenic'. He comments that their use of schizophrenia 
furnishes a 'relatively new literary classification of no little practical 
interest' (1988,124). This is because he sees modern literature as 
attempting to regain awareness of an authentic; lost, schizoid 'primordial 
flux' (ibid., 126) which was the experience of the self before 'civilization' 
(when still in a state of savagery), and before the havoc wreaked by the 
modern, Western, capitalist existence. The strategic, paranoid myth-making 
remarked in Hyvrard is noticeable again here. Jameson uses the term 
'schizoid' to designate the, 
druglike dissolution of the bonds of time and logic, the succession 
of one experiential moment after another without the organization and 
perspective imposed by various kinds of abstract orders of meaning - 
whether individual or social - which we associate with ordinary daily 
life (ibid., 124). 
He here attributes political value to schizoid textuality. Jameson wants 
to deal with what he sees as a 'basic feature of postmodernism', namely 
its peculiar way with time 'which one could call "textuality" or "6criture" 
but which I have found it useful to discuss in terms of current theories 
of schizophrenia' (1983,118)17. He distinguishes the postmodern from the 
modernist in terms of their relation to psychopathology: 
Concepts such as anxiety and alienation (the experiences to which 
they correspond, as in the The Scream) are no longer appropriate in 
the world of the post-modern... This shift in the dynamics of cultural 
pathology can be characterized as one in which the alienation of the 
subject is displaced in the fragmentation of the subject (1984,63). 
This fragmentation is welcomed, once more, as liberation; 
As for expressions and feelings or emotions, the liberation, in 
contemporary society, from the older anomie of the centred subject 
may also mean, not merely a liberation from anxiety, but a liberation 
from every other kind of feeling as well, since there is no longer a 
self present to do the feeling. This is not to say that the cultural 
products of the post-modern era are utterly devoid of feeling, but 
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rather that such feelings - which it may be better and more accurate 
to call 'intensities' - are now free floating and impersonal (1984, 
64). 
This schizoid 'waning of affect' is also characterized by Jameson 'in the 
narrower context of literary criticism, as the waning of the great high- 
modernist thematics of time and temporality' (1984,64). Schizophrenia, as 
the modern label given to many kinds of madness by psychiatric discourse, 
affords Jameson a conceptual and theoretical vehicle for playing his part 
in the quest for a more authentic way of being, in the culture of the 
liberated self. He wants to show, he explains, 
the way in which what I have been calling schizophrenic disjunction 
or dcriture, when it becomes generalized as a cultural style, ceases 
to entertain a necessary relationship to the morbid content we 
associate with terms like schizophrenia, and becomes available for 
more joyous intensities, for precisely that euphoria which we saw 
displacing the older effects of anxiety and alienation (1984,74). 
Jameson takes schizophrenia a step further away than Laing from its 
'morbid', pathological connotations, undermining its psychiatric deployment 
by rendering it poetically desirable. 
Across the extent of this work however, there does seem to be an 
inherent contradiction in Jameson's treatment of schizophrenia; it is not 
finally clear whether it is the result of postmodern society's 
fragmentation of the individual (rendering him critical of the operational 
modes of that society) or the rediscovery of a lost way of being (and 
therefore politically quietist, even romantic). Like Laing before him, it is 
questionable whether 'schizophrenia' is being used descriptively or 
prescriptively in Jameson's work; if it is the latter then this raises 
questions about the usefulness of such cultural critique (that is to say, 
of his 'identification of crisis' in contemporary culture). It functions 
rather as the recommendation of psychological crisis, as a form of cultural 
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adaption. As in the case of Mother Death, the political value of such 
rhetoric is at issue. 
Writers of fiction who represent an approximate version of the 
experience of loss of self, discontinuity, fragmentation, 'madness' (Beckett, 
Pynchon, and Barthelme), would seem to engage with the pathos of the 
postmodern condition rather than with its potential for fearless 
liberation'E', and (though often categorized as postmodern) do not seem to 
provide'the 'joyous intensities' and 'euphoria' proclaimed by Jameson. 
Though still striving for liberation from a blindly entrapped existence, 
they doggedly remind us of the terror of this mode of liberation. Critical 
representations of this condition, however, seem on the whole to affirm the 
value of endowing it with psychopathological attributes. 
Critical interest in psychopathology has presented two facets. It is 
used metaphorically to celebrate a revolutionary (or anarchic) liberation 
of the self. It is also used, connecting the linguistic bias in 
examinations of psychosis with that of post structuralismn''0, to construct a 
universal, ontological state of 'split-off-ness' from certainty, reality, or 
meaning (each may be found in Kroker and Cook, in Deleuze and Guattari, 
and in Jameson). These uses involve the promotion of flux, surface, a- 
temporality, de-centering, dis-continuity, dis-function, indeterminacy, de- 
construction and dissolution. In the case of Jameson, Deleuze and Guattari 
amongst others, the reign of the signifier, eternally severed from any 
signified, leads to the construction of a modern myth - another grand 
narrative - the ontology of the 'schizoid'. It could be said that the 
emancipation of the self, the exploration of and experimentation with the 
inexplicable, irrational dimensions of the psyche carried out by earlier 
fictionists has been subsumed within a body of radical theory which 
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conceives the ineluctability of psychopathology, and celebrates it as a new 
truth. 
Before addressing further the merits of this extension of the use of 
madness (as a metaphor for contemporary existence) from fiction to related 
discourses, I will return to what have been the main concerns of this 
thesis. 
IN CONCLUSION: USING MADNESS CRITICALLY 
Since the end of the nineteenth century a discourse has been generated 
around exceptional states of consciousness that is now generally available 
to describe patterns in fiction. This thesis identifies two kinds of 
fictional process that present, describe, and - in terms of narrative 
strategy - participate in two essential forms of literary 'madness'. 
'Paranoid' and 'schizoid' texts have been seen as polarized, and 
characteristic of different historical periods. These modes are not always 
separable. They operate at the limits of literary procedure. They 
encompass both the impulse toward systematization and coherence and the 
processes of disintegration and chaos. Their interaction constitutes a 
part of the textual dynamic in many of the texts discussed, beginning with 
that of Daniel Paul Schreber. 
To be brief, paranoid textuality resides in, three basic 
characteristics of the text: the primary adoption of a coherent, 
explanatory, interpretative and logical narrative style; the application of 
this narrative discourse to the irrational, insane, supernatural or 
unknowable; and a resulting exaggerated, 'hyper-logical' process that is 
both enacted and provoked in the effort to achieve story, explanation, 
solution and synthesis. This reasoning becomes compulsive because it is 
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always incomplete, and ultimately brings about a transition from a logic 
based upon cause and effect as it may be agreed to operate in the 'real' 
(natural) world, to a process of reasoning which becomes delusional (for 
example, encompasses the supernatural) in relation to the predominant 
narrative mode. The question remains of whether texts can be called 
paranoid that are only exaggerating reading, writing, self-making 
processes. Is the narrative use of language by nature paranoid when it is 
striving for solidity against the intrinsic resistance of language to the 
unproblematic representation of reality? The earlier texts draw attention 
to this problem in an uncomfortable and provocative way. 
In later experimental literature this focus becomes first radical and 
then almost mandatory. 'Schizoid textuality' is understood, relative to the 
paranoid dynamic, as resistant to coherence, interpretation and ultimately 
to being described as 'narrative' (if 'narrative' is understood to denote 
sequence and continuity). It breaks down the provocative oppositions 
brought into play in the paranoid text (or deploys them tactically and 
covertly), dissolves differentiation, and promotes mechanisms of dis- 
integration. 
In the fictional texts discussed the 'use' that literature makes of 
'madness' has changed; or intensified. It has undergone a paradigm shift. 
It is no longer to be represented or excluded by a narrative discourse 
which sets itself beyond disturbed states of consciousness, or which plays 
with the challenge offered it by the enigma of madness (as in the 
'marginalized' gothic fiction which displayed a preoccupation with the 
marginality of madness). Indeed, it would seem that such play is no longer 
possible, or possible only on a very abstracted and sophisticated level, 
since the boundary between reason and madness has been eroded. Instead, 
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prose fiction has experimented increasingly with the effects of speaking 
from the position of madness (Woolf, for example), or attempted to 'write' 
the irrational (Beckett). Writers like Poe and Hogg, in their defiance of 
plot, narrative, syntagm, logos, began a specifically literary excursion 
beyond the confining parameters of sense. As the mechanics of language 
and the discursive production of false and shifting subjectivities become 
implicated in the understanding of what it is to be psychologically 
unstable, fiction continues to invoke 'abnormal' or 'insane' consciousness in 
its imaginative enterprise: yet the 'ab-' and the 'in-' no longer really 
apply. And neither can literature perhaps be said to be 'using' madness; 
it will not sustain the implied differentiation. 
Recently, diagnostic language has been employed, in a literary- 
theoretical context, to blur the boundaries between fiction and reality: 
concern with the nature of language and the relation of the psyche to 
language has made way for the questioning of 'reality' and literary 
realism, and for the extension of the study of fiction to cultural and 
philosophical commentary. The apparent diminution in the immediate 
dramatic intensity of the term 'madness', which was derived from its power 
to distinguish the ordinary from the extraordinary is, famously, approached 
in a challengingly broad cultural perspective by Michel Foucault"'. 
Foucault concludes that the modern, Western world's experience of 
madness has become universally mediated and controlled by the figure of 
the physician, psychiatrist or psychoanalyst. Effectively, this figure 
commands 'the whole experience of madness' (1967,269), and has been 
invested with 'quasi-divine status' (ibid., 277). The figure of the 
physician operates from within the socius, rather than from above, and 
replaces the patriarchal Christian God as regulator of the limits of 
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reason, knowledge, the constitution of the 'self' and the boundaries of the 
moral and social order. Whilst mapping out a credible scenario within 
which the transformation of 'civilized' society's treatment of madness may 
be charted, Foucault does not offer a definition of that madness. His 
rhetorical use of the term implies an unspoken or unspeakable essential 
stgnified, a reinstatement of the 'pre-scientific' otherness of insanity. 
However, the use of madness in modern fiction is, perhaps, a site 
where exploration of conditions of mind may go beyond convention and be 
freer of clinical designation of the shapes consciousness takes. Recent 
studies, such as Modernism and the European Unconscious, take up the view 
that uses of madness in twentieth-century fiction can provide an index to 
wider cultural developments, seeing modernism, for example, as 'a revulsion 
against the limits set by the rationalism and scientism of the last half 
of the nineteenth century', and demonstrating a 
desire to open up uninvestigated areas of the mind - the whole mind, 
in its unconscious and irrational aspects, as disclosed by the new 
forms of depth psychology at the turn of the century (Collier and 
Davies 1990, xiii). 
It is decided here that this search in fiction for the deepest sources of 
the modern psyche 'provides the richest insight into the epistemological 
configurations and historical origins of our own age' (xiii). 
Criticism of this kind recognizes a shift from the nineteenth-century 
positivist to the twentieth-century intellectual relativist world-view2'. 
How, then, might the fictional treatment of madness fit into this panoramic 
narrative scenario? When reason, rationality and objectivity begin to lose 
their metaphysical confirmation, then madness and the irrational come free 
of their moorings and start to look dangerously invasive. As a 
consequence of the breakdown of the dualist paradigm, 'madness' can no 
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longer mean in a positive sense, as the opposite of reason. It can not 
simply be 'other' and always mysteriously beyond the conscious self. 
Instead, it describes the perception of and response to the encroachment 
of chaos upon the citadel of 'the self'; it could operate metaphorically as 
the sign for the threatened stability and unity of the self, for the 
condition of that menaced self. Madness as part of a process (rather than 
as a stable signified) underpins the narrative dynamic of the nineteenth- 
century fiction examined in this study. Characters in these texts do 
manifest certain modes of behaviour that are presented as 'mad', but 
madness also operates structurally in a manner which exceeds the bounds 
of a fictional 'case study'. These works have, as a characteristic feature, 
recourse to the positivist claims of science as a source of transcendent 
signification, but the ambiguity that arises through the conflict of 
scientific and metaphysical codes tends to be obstructive of narrative 
resolution2 . 
In a twentieth-century relativist universe the objective narrative 
presentation of madness becomes increasingly problematic. This analysis of 
the presentation of madness, as regards the modern texts, was particularly 
concerned to examine the functions of the shift of attention from its 
social significance toward the analysis of meaning production itself-2'. 
This is nowhere more evident than in the direction taken by modern 
discourse on the subject of exceptional states of consciousness. It is, as 
is demonstrable in the work of Freud and Jacques Lacan (further discussed 
in the appendix), culturally and linguistically informed. 'Madness' is 
relative to continually re-negotiated cultural and linguistic norms. 
Ultimately it seems to become, in fiction and theory, a metaphor for the 
entrapment of the shifting 'de-centred' self within this ineluctable 
-279- 
condition of relativity. 
Foucault would argue that the divide between sanity and insanity in 
society discussed as no longer operative is in fact so, but in a new way. 
It has been continued by the discourse of psychology; 
You tell me that all this is finished today or is coming to an end; 
that the madman's speech is no longer on the other side of the 
divide; that it is no longer null and void; on the contrary it puts us 
on the alert; that we now look for meaning in it... we have even gone 
so far as to come across this speech of madness in what we 
articulate ourselves, in that slight stumbling by which we lose track 
of what we are saying. But all this attention to the speech of 
madness does not prove that the old division is no longer operative. 
You have only to think of the whole framework of knowledge through 
which we decipher that speech, and of the whole network of 
institutions which permit someone -a doctor or a psychoanalyst - to 
listen to it, and which at the same time permit the patient to bring 
along his poor words or, in desperation, to with-hold them. You have 
only to think of all this to become suspicious that the division, far 
from being effaced, is working differently, along other lines... (Young 
1981,53). 
Yet both the fiction and the theory concerned with madness remains 
separate from clinical or medical interpretative specialisms. These 
specialisms, however, have not remained exempt from the interpretative 
operations of literature. Those institutions that find it necessary to 
maintain the divide between sanity and insanity have been placed under 
scrutiny by literary interrogations of the self. The privilege of fiction 
is that it can explore the implications of such knowedge, and yet cannot 
be positioned as 'patient'. Schreber's narrative (not fiction in any 
orthodox sense) did become a patient; it has undergone discursive control 
or reconstruction on successive occasions since the time of his submission 
of it in court in his defense (just as, perhaps, Foucault suggests the 
human subject is constituted and acted upon by social institutions). 
Consequently, the insights that might be gained from it have been obscured 
(as Morton Shatzman says in Soul Murder, and as Foucault might say), 
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primarily by Freud's definition of it as a 'case history', anomalously 
'written by himself' and 'brought before the public in print' (Freud 1979, 
138). Schreber's text did not 'bring along its poor words', or 'with-hold' 
them. As Freud himself said, 'paranoiacs cannot be compelled to overcome 
their internal resistances... they say only what they choose to say' (though 
Freud nevertheless undertook to render Schreber's words an oblique 
facsimile of what he chose to say). Schreber, like the Ancient Mariner, 
wanted to tell his story, as a story, to others, so that they 'may have 
some understanding of the necessity which forces (him) to various oddities 
of behaviour, even if they do not fully understand these apparent oddities. 
This is the purpose of the manuscript' (1988,1). His priority was 
communication, the establishment of community with others, the laying bare 
of his suffering so that he would not be considered monstrous, or silenced 
by reason, in the manner that Foucault believes is necessarily the fate of 
the insane. It could be said that Schreber internalized the discursive 
silencing of madness, and brought to bear contemporary social 'policing 
processes' within his own subjectivity, in his efforts to imbue his 
experiences with some coherence and to make them make sense Yet he no 
more wished to erase and medically 'flatten out' his perceptions than later 
fictionists. 
There is a sense, however, in which the discourses that surround 
fiction have suggested that not only fiction, but the whole of modern 
literature and culture was somehow to be 'diagnosed', and in opposition to 
those institutions whose business it has been to diagnose individuals. It 
could be that there is some danger in this eliding of issues, and I want, 
with regard to this tendency, to distance my own critical endeavour from 
such broad applications. I believe that terminology that has been derived 
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from psychology and psychiatry is useful when applied to specific literary 
explorations of exceptional states of consciousness and their evocation 
through experimental narrative strategies, but less so when it exceeds 
these parameters. We are ultimately able to see The Private Memoirs and 
Confessions of a Justified Sinner, The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym, 'The 
Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde', 'Bartleby the Scrivener', The 
Yellow Wallpaper, Mrs. Dalloway, Watt, The Unnamable, Mother Death and many 
more such texts not as case histories but as texts which give readers 
imaginative access to alternative states of consciousness, to the ways in 
which we read and write the world and our experience (to the 'dark places 
of psychology' upon which they shed a little light). This being so, 
perhaps it is best to maintain, for the time being at least, if not the 
divide between sanity and insanity, the boundary between fiction as a 
ritualized space of experience and those discourses which analyse, 
describe, prescribe culture, society and modes of subjectivity, and which 
are still exempt from the fictional 'as if'. 
To release madness, even hypothetically, into the society we inhabit 
and the individual mind - because we have undermined any capacity we may 
have had for limiting its dominion - is liable to leave us exquisitely 
vulnerable, persecuted by 'reality' in a newly Gothic world intent upon 
hunting down the 'self', and replacing it with nothing but its ghost, a 
collection of 'schizoid intensities'. That is not to say that such 
theoretical commentary should not be enlisted in our understanding and 
interpretation of artistic texts, to the enrichment of both, but simply to 
suggest that outside of the province of fiction the intellectual 
approbation of schizophrenia and disapprobation of our attempts to relieve 
suffering are, perhaps, unwise. Scientific studies of the psyche may in 
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some way tyrannize over our psychological freedom, they may have a hidden 
political agenda, they may contribute to a frequently unwholesome 
severance between madness and reason. But until we create new ways of 
trying to understand ourselves, that allow for for the amelioration of the 
condition of those who are manifestly (or even hypothetically) in states of 
social and psychological crisis or distress, it would seem premature to 
invalidate or destroy such an ostensible healing praxis in the name of the 
conceptual authenticity of a pure, un-reconstructed self-hood, or to 
proclaim the prevalence of relativity and the demise of 'truth'. The 
fictional treatment of madness, of whatever kind, is, and perhaps always 
has been, one of those ways. 
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Appendix 
SCHREBER'S MEMOIRS REMODELED: FREUD, LACAN AND LAING 
Freud and Narrative 
Freud may be considered the first to have read Schreber's Memoirs as a 
'paranoid' fictional text, beyond his reading it as a text written by a 
paranoiac'. Madness is still the focus and provocation of narrative 
(re)construction. His systematic reclamation of the psychological truth 
(the story of the development of Schreber's psychosis) as a hidden 
narrative or subtext beneath Schreber's own account of his experience 
points to his identifying a gap, an enigma in the account which must be 
explained by further speculative activity. This speculation takes the form 
both of the interpretation and distortion of Schreber's account in a mode 
equivalent to that in which Schreber's interpretation (and his psychosis) 
was seen by Freud as a distortion of the 'true' story. In a section 
entitled 'Attempts at Interpretation' in his case study of 1911, Freud 
systematically rewrites Schreber's story, following up clues, replacing 
Schreber's terminology with his own, Schreber's 'characters' with his own, 
translating 'the paranoic mode of expression into the normal one' (Freud 
1979,168). The major part of this essay is an elaboration upon Schreber's 
version, which he summarizes in this way: 
We shall, therefore, I think, raise no further objections to the 
hypothesis that the exciting cause of the illness was the appearance 
in him of feminine (that is, a passive homosexual) wishful phantasy, 
which took as its object the figure of his doctor. An intense 
resistance to this phantasy arose on the part of Schreber's 
personality, and the ensuing defensive struggle, which might perhaps 
just as well have assumed some other shape, took on, for reasons 
unknown to us, that of a delusion of persecution. The person he 
longed for now became his persecutor, and the content of his wishful 
phantasy became the content of his persecution. It may be presumed 
that the same schematic outline will turn out to be applicable to 
other cases of delusions of persecution (ibid., 182). 
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Schreber's 'fictional' representation of his madness, and the madness 
inherent in his fictional representation, may in a sense be seen to be 
repeated in Freud's 'discovery' of the repression of homosexual tendencies 
as the origin of Schreber's psychosis. As Freud concedes, this can 
ultimately be no more than a hypothetical scenario gaining credence from 
its internal coherence and from its continuity with what is said, and what 
is not said in, but may be deduced from Schreber's text. Freud is candid 
about the apparent suppositional and unautheticated nature of his 
methodology. He finds proof of Schreber's repressed homosexuality in 
Schreber's admission that, in his wife's absence, he suffered a fresh 
nervous collapse conquent upon nocturnal erotic fantasies of submitting to 
sex as a woman; this coincidence is alluded to for the substantiation of 
his theory, and in turn his theory confers meaning and coherence upon 
Schreber's experience, as he concludes - 'this hypothesis harmonizes with a 
noteworthy detail of the case history, which remains otherwise 
inexplicable' (Freud 1979.180). It is, in a way, a delusional synthesis, as 
he says, 
it remains for the future to decide whether there is more delusion in 
my theory than I should like to admit, or whether there is more truth 
in Schreber's delusion than other people are as yet prepared to 
believe (Ibid., 218). 
It is effected by the removal of the supernatural (God) from Schreber's 
schema, its replacement by the natural (first Schreber's doctor, Flechsig, 
and then his father) and the refraining of the plot in terms of a 
psychological biography able to claim scientific status (only) through its 
continuity with the real world (Freud will be satisfied if he can 'succeed 
in tracing back ... the nucleus of the delusional structure with some degree 
of certainty to familiar human motives' (ibid., 171) and the rigour of its 
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internal logic (again as it coheres with Freud's account of the Oedipal 
narrative). 
Very simply, the Freudian approach to psychosis - as regards Freud's 
treatment of Schreber's writing - is founded in a narrative or 
compositional process. Schreber's psychosis is evidenced in the clearly 
'delusional' character of his narrative, Schreber's 'cure' remains in 
potential in the analyst's reformation and realignment of that account with 
the real-2. Yet, as Freud states, 'I had developed my theory of paranoia 
before I became acquainted with the contents of Schreber's book' (Freud 
1979,218). Recalling the strategies of the fictional 'editors' or 
presenters in the gothic texts, Freud then provokes the speculative 
response to his own account rendering it too a 'paranoid' text; 'I cannot 
conclude the present work, which is once again only a fragment of a larger 
whole' (ibid., 219), 
I feel confident that every reader with a knowledge of psychoanalysis 
will have learned from the material which I presented more than was 
explicitly stated by me, and that he will have found no difficulty in 
drawing the threads closer and reaching conclusions at which I no 
more than hinted (ibid., 220). 
Jean-Jacques Lecercle has said that, perhaps, 
the only difference between Schreber and a novelist is one of social 
position, not one of mastery or control over one's text: doubt is 
caste on Schreber's mastery over the myths he composes by the fact 
that he was certified as insane. so that the open character of his 
text (the inconsistencies, the gaps, the threads left dangling) can be 
interpreted as symptoms of ddlire, not as a rhetorical ploy, a way of 
opening a space for the reader's participation in the process, 
while carefully monitoring his reading (1985,123). 
Freud's own performance suggests that, without much difficulty, he might 
be added in to this equation. Freud's approach to insanity is curiously 
ambivalent in that it involves the application of a method clearly aligned 
with attitudes found in the earlier literature to a system of thought so 
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radical as to challenge those attitudes at their foundations. His 
invitation to the perpetuation of speculation with the end in view of 
establishing truth through continuity bears comparison to Poe's thesis in 
Eureka. The proximity between Poe's texts and Freud's has been 
comprehensively explored in Clive Bloom's study Reading Poe Reading Freud. 
Bloom proposes that; 
Considered as narratives of analysis, (narratives that express 
themselves in the form of 'games'), both Freud and Poe's texts 
traverse a landscape neither of science nor fiction; a world belonging 
neither to the psyche nor the text. Poe and Freud propose opposite 
functions for their discourses in which Freud uses the discourse of 
fiction to find truth and Poe exploits the discourse of truth to 
create fiction. However, considered as types of narrative the two 
discourses are curiously able to intermesh... (1988,4). 
Further. it is perhaps less than coincidence that their analytic method may 
take the form of the effort to 'bring to light' something that should 
remain hidden -a crime, or a criminal". through the (retrogressive) 
construction of plot. As Freud explained in his address to members of 
the legal profession in 1906; 
The task of the therapist-is the same as that of the examining 
magistrate. We have to uncover the hidden psychical material; and in 
order to do this we have invented a number of detective 
devices... (1959.108). 
When his attention is focussed upon the fictional presentation of madness 
Freud's approach is very similar. In his reading of Hoffman's The Sandman 
as illustrative of the 'uncanny' in 1919, he ventures to refer the 
disturbing quality of the text 'to the castration complex of childhood' 
(1985b, 233). He chooses this explanation over another, which he sets up 
in order to deny. That is the idea of 'intellectual uncertainty', which 
renders the uncanny 'something one does not know one's way about in' 
(ibid., 341). Freud builds upon the identification made by Nathaniel (the 
central 'mad' protagonist) between the memory of a man encountered in his 
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childhood (already connected in the child's mind with the threatening 
fantasy figure of the sandman who removes and eats children's eyes) and a 
strange figure who intrudes into his adult life selling glasses. Before 
his analysis, as in the case of Schreber, Freud offers a summary of the 
story which actually remodels it into a chronological narrative locating 
the origin of Nathaniel's disturbance in the childhood castration complex 
and tracing its evolution through his life as at emerges at critical points 
in his relationships with women this mother, his fiance, the mechanical 
doll Olympia). He decides that intellectual uncertainty will not account 
for the uncanny effect of the story because we are certain that Coppola is 
Coppelius ('the story makes it quite clear that Coppola the optician really 
is the lawyer Coppelius and also, therefore, the Sand-Man' (1985b, 352) as 
the story concludes. Freud proposes that 'we know now that we are not 
supposed to be looking on at the products of a madman's imagination, 
behind which we. with the superiority of rational minds, are able to detect 
the sober truth' (ibid., 352). 
We know no such thing, we can only speculate; and Hoffman has 
engineered this ambiguity in his disorientating and provocative narrative 
technique. Freud's rare use - and dismissal - of the word 'madman' here, 
in a literary context, and as part of the effort to erase uncertainty is 
interesting. He suggests that a naive reading of Nathaniel as 'mad' 
provokes the intellectual doubt that would be the obvious but mistaken 
cause of the 'uncanny' impression the story creates. The question arises 
as to what Freud could mean by 'madman', and under what special 
circumstances 'madness' would arouse uncertainty in the psychoanalyst. Is 
his Oedipal interpretation of Nathaniel's delusions not also detection of 
the sober truth? Or is it simply that this truth is not 'sober'? Hoffman 
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invites the understanding that we are 'looking on at the products of a 
madman's imagination', whether it is that of Nathaniel or of the narrator. 
Freud's failure to engage with the self-reflexive dimension of Hoffman's 
text has already been shrewdly exposed in Neil Hertz's analysis, 'Freud and 
the Sandman' (Herari 1980). The text is not linear, and loops about upon 
itself. Nathaniel. like Schreber, is himself an author. He writes 'poems, 
fantasies, visions, novels, tales' (Hoffman 1982,117) which prefigure the 
shapes his madness takes. He is called by Clara (his fiance) the creator 
of a 'mad, senseless, insane story' (ibid., 106). The 'reader' is directly 
addressed. drawing attention to the manipulative quality of the fictional 
creation. The maker of the deceptive doll, Olympia, asserts that 'the whole 
thing is an allegory, an extended metaphor', which suggests that Hoffman is 
playing with the intellectually seductive and deceptive power of fictional 
narratives, which generate the need to discover symbol and significance. 
Most of the text is related by different characters in the epistolary mode. 
These figures also undertake to discuss Nathaniel's madness (his fears are 
'phantoms of his own ego', ibid., 97). The narration of the frenzied finale 
is usurped by a strange intrusive 'author' figure, who, whilst telling the 
tale from Nathaniel's point-of-view ('Nathaniel awoke as if from a dreadful 
oppressive dream... ' (ibid., 122) is also prepared to offer the objective 
description of Nathaniel as a 'raging madman' (ibid., 124), whose view-point 
is evidently suspect. 
Freud's denial of 'intellectual uncertainty' is also a denial of the 
paranoid (or 'uncanny') power of the text to which his totalizing 
speculation is a direct response. His denial hinges upon the consistency 
of the reality status of events described, something that he himself 
establishes (and where there can be no reality beyond events treacherously 
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related in fiction. Freud's version of that 'reality' is delusional on his 
terms because it does not conform to any 'real' sequence of events). 
Apparently it is imperative that this process take places, otherwise we 
may catch ourselves 'looking on at the products of a madman's imagination' 
without having been aware of his insanity. Fascinating though such 
products may be, they are also somehow 'unclean', that is to say 'taboo's 
even to the mind-doctor himself; madness itself is 'uncanny', something 'we 
do not know our way about in' - although ironically but predictably Freud 
intimates that it is long since he has 'experienced or heard of anything 
which has given him an uncanny impression' (1985b, 340). 
Freud's contribution to modern conceptions of selfhood lies in the 
theorization of a self never fully present to itself, internally divided 
between the conscious and unconscious, never completely 'sane' - if this 
means wholly rational. Evidence of the presence and operation of the 
unconscious in the psychic economy may emerge in terms of textuality; 
where coherence and control fails and slips of the tongue mark the 
potential of the unconscious to disrupt the domain of the conscious. or 
where a lack of rational coherence indicates the condensation and 
displacement of repressed material in the psyche of the patient. Yet his 
'detective' treatment of Schreber's and Hoffman's texts indicates that 
fundamental to his enterprise as a writer is the impulse to discover a way 
of reinstating continuity and unity, and that the essence of the 'cure' has 
to do with the location of an originating trauma and the further creation 
of (and, from his own perspective, conscious acceptance of) dynamic 
connections which once fully composed will actually exclude the possibility 
of 'madness' - psychic anarchy or dis-order. As Chabot observes: 
Beyond its concern with the discontinuities of any life, with the 
disjunction between conscious and unconscious, between primary and 
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secondary thought processes, psychoanalysis also posits the radical 
continuity of that life (Chabot 1982,64). 
Lacan and Language 
Jacques Lacan's later treatment of Schreber's text in his essay 'On a 
Question Preliminary to any Possible Treatment of Psychosis' (first 
published in 1959) marks a new perspective upon madness developing 
alongside more recent theoretical disciplines (and moving away from the 
initial biological or physiological basis of Freudian thought), notably 
those of linguistics and the derivative thought of structuralism and post- 
structuralism. Lacan earlier asked, in 'The Agency of the Letter in the 
Unconscious' (1957), 
how could a psychoanalyst of today not realize that speech is the key 
to that truth, when his whole experience must find in speech alone 
its instrument, its context, its material, and even the background 
noise of its uncertainties (Lacan 1977a, 147). 
He decides that what is of importance in Freud's analysis of the Memoirs 
is the nature of the 'revealed' relation 'between the signifier and the 
subject' (1977b, 183). As Freud had already, apparently. formulated his 
theory of paranoia and used Schreber's paranoia to underwrite his story of 
the social dimension of the formation of the individual psyche, Lacan had 
already, apparently <'thirty years ago', ibid., 184), formulated a theory of 
paranoia and - drawing upon linguistic and structuralist findings - uses 
the condition to demonstrate his theory of the linguistic construction of 
consciousness ('it is only after the linguistic analysis of the phenomenon 
of language that one can legitimately establish the relation that it 
constitutes in the subject' (ibid., 187). 
Freud wanted to offer, through his analysis of psychopathology, not 
only a way of identifying the roots of disturbance in the individual 
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psyche but of explaining the structures of Western civilization; psycho- 
analysis is able to 'throw light on the origins of our great cultural 
institutions - on religion, morality, justice and philosophy... ' (1913, cf. 
Freud 1953,185). Where Freud's methodology (if not his theory) based 
itself upon the search for truth and origin, Lacan's is based upon the 
impossibility of that origin and upon the radical discontinuity of the self, 
which is ultimately founded upon the discontinuity between signifier and 
signified. In 'The Future of an Illusion' (1927) Freud argues for the 
substitution of the delusional religious God with 'Our God, A6yog' - the 
God of logic or reason - because 'in the long run nothing can withstand 
reason and experience, and the contradiction which religion offers to both 
is all too palpable' (Freud 1985a, 239). The God of logic has the task of 
re-stabilizing the world, and assuring the stability of individual identity 
within that world: 
You have to defend the religious illusion with all your might. If it 
becomes discredited - and indeed the threat to it is great enough - 
then your world collapses. There is nothing left for you but to 
despair of everything, of civilization and the future of mankind. 
From that bondage I am, we are. free... We believe that it is possible 
for scientific work to gain some knowledge about the reality of the 
world... (Freud 1985a, 239)'. 
This rule of reason is the very point at which Lacan, through his emphasis 
upon the unstable and constitutive rather than stable and descriptive role 
of language, departs from Freud - although he too is turning to a 
contemporary, apparently more rigourous 'scientific' endeavour to reframe 
psychoanalysis as an epistemological enterprise (language has 'attained the 
status of an object of scientific investigation', Lacan 1977a, 148). 
Lacan says that 'it is the business of reason to recognize the drama 
of madness,.. because it is in man's relation to the signifier that this 
drama is situated' (1977b, 214). Structuralism teaches that signification 
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occurs only through the temporal and spatial deferral of meaning along a 
chain of signs - composed of signifier and signified - which bear no 
direct relation to one another or to 'reality'. Lacan names this semantic 
field the Symbolic and situates the creation of consciousness at the 
moment of entry into the Symbolic, which he maps on to the Freudian 
moment of enforced differentiation of the child from mother, world and 
ultimately self through the imposition of the incest taboo. The Symbolic 
is a network of discourses which construct the self as a subject along the 
chain of signifiers presided over by the 'Law of the Father'. That self 
(as 'signified') is subject to the endless deferral of meaning and thus 
never complete or identical with the self (as 'signifier') and 
always/already schismatic. Malcolm Bowie outlines the extent of Lacan's 
affiliation to modern theories of language; 
Like any other form of discourse, 'theory' for Lacan is a chain, a 
skein, a stave, a weave of interconnected meaning-producing elements; 
it is born by hybridization; it inhabits time, it is perpetually in 
process. Wit, irony and ambiguity are immanent in it. The analyst 
who tries to jump clear of his own language as he uses it - or tries 
to build within that language a permanent conceptual home - is a 
charlatan or a fool. And Lacan's attempts to teach by example in 
this area, to be the knowing non-fool among psychoanalytic theorists, 
make his whole project seem remote from the Freudian ideas to which 
he repeatedly declares himself loyal (Bowie 1991,12). 
Bowie points out that Lacan goes so for as to make one of his recurrent 
purposes as a writer the amplification of theories 'to the point where 
they become deranged, to supercharge them with meaning in such a way that 
they no longer have uses or aplications'. It is, he notes, as if Lacan is 
'prepared to ask the question 'how useful is all this? ' only when the 
theory in question has owned up to its own madness' (ibid., 35). 
Where Freud makes the substitution of Schreber's father for 
Schreber's 'God', Lacan's terminology may be said to substitute Freud's 
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father with 'the Name-of-the-Father', something no longer bearing any 
direct connection to a real or biological father (and hence no longer part 
of a socially or 'scientifically' defined narrative) but becoming the 
principle of signification itself. Without wishing to present here a full 
transcript of Lacan's 'diagnosis' of Schreber's predicament (which would be 
an unsatisfactorily reductive activity as Lacan's mode of expression always 
seeks to remain open and exceed any meaning imposed upon it), it is 
sufficient to note that Lacan shifts the study of psychosis into a new 
frame. As in Freud's case, this frame does not confine Lacan to an 
insulated clinical sphere of activity, but through the focus upon 
signification allows the expansion of his theories into a study of the 
whole of Western culture, and ultimately encourages a hyperbolic mode of 
expression suggestive of cosmological intentions"'. Lacan interprets 
Freud's work on his own terms: 
the slightest alteration in the relation between man and the 
signifier... changes the whole course of history by modifying the 
moorings that anchor his being. 
It is precisely in this that Freudianism, however misunderstood 
it has been, and however confused its consequences have been, to 
anyone capable of perceiving the changes we have lived through in 
our own lives, is seen to have founded an intangible but radical 
revolution. There is no point in collecting witnesses to the fact: 
everything involving not just the human sciences, but the destiny of 
man, politics, metaphysics, literature, the arts, advertising, 
propoganda, and through these even economics, everything has been 
affected (1977a, 175). 
Lacan characterizes both Schreber's experience and, beyond that, the 
experience of every individual as essentially 'paranoid' - in that the 
subject is always found to be alienated from itself in languages. 
Schreber's experience is psychotic because of 'the failure of the paternal 
metaphor' (1977b, 215): 
For the psychosis to be triggered off, the Name-of-the-Father, 
verworfen. foreclosed, that is to say, never having attained the place 
of the Other, must be called into symbolic opposition to the subject. 
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It is the lack of the Name-of-the Father in that place which, by 
the hole that it opens up in the signified, sets off the cascade of 
reshapings of the signifier from which the increasing disaster of the 
imaginary proceeds, to the point at which the level is reached at 
which signifier and signified are stabilized in a delusional metaphor 
(ibid., 217). 
Moving out of the warp and weft of Lacan's discourse here, and back to 
Freud, it is interesting to note that Lacan's 'elaboration' upon Freud's 
work might, ironically, have been thought by Freud to be psychotic and to 
bear a strong relation to his own concept of schizophrenia. As Freud 
wrote in 1915: 
If we ask ourselves what it is that gives the character of 
strangeness to the substitutive formations and the symptoms of 
schizophrenia, we eventually come to realize that it is the 
predominance of what has to do with words over what has to do with 
things (1957,200). 
This suggestion made by Freud, combined with Lacan's procedures and focus 
upon the splitting of the subject in language, may be said to inform 
recent theoretical characterizations of psychosis in terms of 
'schizophrenia"-. As John Forrester suggests, schizophrenic psychosis was 
not amenable to psychoanalysis (or analytical reconstruction) and its 
interpretative enterprise because, 
the schizophrenic possesses a superfluity of words, a system of 
language that has been cut loose from any linkage with the 
unconscious thoughts controlled and directed be the activity of the 
ego... the schizophrenic loses the system of objects to which the word 
presentations attach. In either case, what appears on the surface of 
language, on that surface that consciousness perceives, is a salad of 
sterile fruits, cut off from the tree of thought (1980,56). 
Further Linguistic Approaches 
Twentieth century psychiatry has provided a further perspective on 
insanity in studying schizophrenia through the analysis of linguistic usage 
by patients, or 'discourse analysis" 1. Where hysteria, neurosis and 
-295- 
paranoia were the main focus of Freud's attention, and where such 
pathological manifestations now seem representative of that era, it could 
be said that (outside of the work of Lacan) schizophrenia is the figurative 
psychopathology of the twentieth century. Many studies have been made of 
schizophrenics which confine themselves to the breakdown of syntactic and 
grammatical structures in schizophrenic speech and writing. These attempt 
to discover ways of diagnosing the condition, to categorize its symptoms 
and to render it a meaningful term by differentiating schizophrenia from 
other states. Such studies do not generally derive from structuralist 
theory but rely upon basic notions of cohesion, association and 
communication. Rochester and Martin, in Crazy Talk, observe that the term 
was coined 'in part, to describe discourse failures', noting Eugen Bleuler's 
reported experience of 'being a confused listener in the presence of 
incoherent speakers' (1979,2). They base their study upon the fact that 
'a failure to form "texts" - to produce stretches of language that seem 
coherent to the listener - has long been regarded as an essential 
characteristic of the schizophrenic speaker' (ibid., 73). A debate was 
begun that tried to decide whether the schizophrenic was first of all 
thought-disordered and therefore language disordered, or whether the 
reverse was the case. Nevertheless the widespread prevalence among 
patients of an inability to achieve coherence led to an acceptance of this 
as a basis upon which to start. Rochester and Martin use the rules of 
normal usage of the English language to distinguish departures from these 
rules in schizophrenics. Typical. of the debate about schizophrenia are 
these suggestions taken from The British Journal of Psychiatry. 
The performance of both highly creative and schizophrenic individuals 
is characterized by looser associations than that of low creative 
individuals (Dykes and McGhie 1976,54). 
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With regard to word association literature, it is clear that 
schizophrenics emit remote and unusual associations, as do creatives. 
Some aspects of the schizophrenic seem to demonstrate a preference 
for the complex and the asymetrical (Hasenfus and Magaro 1976,346). 
The schizophrenic patients, especially those who were thought- 
disordered, used fewer cohesive ties than other subjects, with the 
result that the links between phrases and clauses were often weak 
and tenuous. Secondly, the thought-disordered group showed marked 
abnormalities in their reference networks. Sometimes they would 
present new information but then fail to follow it up, so that the 
listener was left wondering what had become of the loose ends; and 
sometimes they would assume information they had not in fact given, 
or make ambiguous references to an earlier text, so that the listener 
was unable to trace the referent. What was happening, it seemed, was 
a failure to structure discourse in a way which th listener could 
understand and follow. The central problem, in other words, was not 
so much cognitive as social: failure or inability to take the role of 
the other (Rutter 1985,400)'2. 
Providing a summary of such experiments a list has been compiled of those 
headings under which schizophrenic discourse may be categorized, including 
'looseness of association', 'gaps in communication' and 'lack of information', 
'private meaning', 'vagueness of ideas', 'abrupt shifts in time', 'repetition' 
and the 'reiteration of ideas without direction', known as 'perseveration' 
(Reilly 1975,242). 
The significance for literature of these approaches to insanity lies 
in the fact that, after Freud, the key to the enigma of psychotic behaviour 
was located in language in this way, both by psychoanalysis and by 
psychiatry. Whether schizophrenia existed before it was named is a moot 
point; this concentration upon linguistics invites speculation as to 
whether it is not the creation of twentieth century scientific concerns, 
and of whether, and why it is apparently a characteristically twentieth 
century phenomenon in this guise. Such questions can generate a 
multiplicity of hypotheses, but this brief cultural contextualization of 
twentieth century fictional treatments of madness is intended, within the 
confines of this study, merely to underline the contiguity of the literary 
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shift in the narrative presentation of madness with conceptual 
developments in its diagnosis and treatment in the ideational arena from 
which it emerges'y. 
Laing and Anti-Psychiatry 
R. D. Laing is renowned for his vehement rejection of the idea that 
schizophrenia is an illness that modern science can cure. He argued that 
schizophrenia is the creation of modern society; that is to say that it is 
society that drives the individual to schizophrenic behaviour, and that 
until that society is transformed schizophrenia will not be 'curable'. 
Neither will it be an illness, but a reaction to current pressures upon the 
individual or a protective response. As Edgar Z. Friedenberg concludes, 
Laing brings the study of madness firmly into the arena of social 
criticism, concluding that 'mental illness is generated by hostile and 
dishonest manipulation of individuals who cannot escape the role of victim' 
(1974,19). Laing's The Divided Self, first published in 1960, was written 
with the purpose of making 'madness, and the process of going mad 
comprehensible... in plain English, in existential terms' (Laing 1965,9), has 
proved to be a seminal text for recent cultural criticism, philosophy, 
theory and fiction'". Though setting himself up in opposition to the 
'exclusively intrapersonal' (ibid., 42) - rather than interpersonal - bias 
of Freud, Laing might be said to have built gradually upon Freud's 
intimations of the profound psychic discontent of the civilized toward a 
far more polemical and critical position. For Laing, every schizophrenic 
individual in Western society represents a generic condition of man 'cut 
off from his own mind, cut off equally from his own body -a half-crazed 
creature in a mad world' tibid., 43). Laing's 'existential' picture of the 
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schizoid individual involves the idea of a being 
the totality of whose experience is split in two main ways: in the 
first place, there is a rent in his relation with his world and, in 
the second, there is a disruption of his relation with himself (ibid., 
18). 
The emphasis, however, is not upon the patient's own dysfunctional 
relationship to an objective reality, but upon the falsification of the self 
produced by the subject's existence within a particular social 
configuration. Such a person is not able 'to experience himself "together 
with" others or "at home in" the world, but, on the contrary, he 
experiences himself in despairing aloneness and isolation" 15. 
Morton Schatzman has produced an in-depth study of Schreber's text 
pursuing the Laingian approach to madness. Schatzman's study, Soul Murder: 
Persecution in the Family (1973) shifts the focus from Schreber's psychosis 
to Schreber's biography, his family relationships and social environment. 
Basically, Schatzman attributes the cause of Schreber's disturbance (the 
'murder of his soul') to his treatment by his own culturally influential 
and highly disciplinarian father. He points out that Freud (and the same 
is true of Lacan) ignored the evidence available of Schreber's childhood 
persecution at the hands of his father. Dr. Daniel Gottlieb Moritz 
Schreber published extensively on the themes of the correct way to train 
('suppress', as Schatzman decides) children, on the correct social behaviour 
as the healthiest and most 'God-fearing' way to live. Schatzman's book is 
about 'politics: the micro-politics of child-rearing and family life and 
their relation to the macro-politics of larger human groups' (1973,10). 
Schreber's father is seen not only in his biological role but as an agent 
and node in a network of discursive structures which subject and control 
the individual: 
Given Dr. Schreber's views about the parts fathers do and must play 
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in families, it is likely he held God-like power in his family. Family 
members, who connected his presence with God's, were probably 
presenting the family power system in cosmic terms. And the father, 
seen by them as God, and enacting the role of God, taught them with 
his 'divine' authority that God is Father. Dr. Schreber urged parents 
to urge, encourage, and induce children to be devoted to God... If a 
child's father is his God, and he learns everything which transcends 
his power rests upon God's, then his father's power over him 
increases even more. I propose (as Freud did) that the author of the 
Memoirs transfigured the father of his childhood into the God of 
his 'nervous illness' (ibid., 16). 
Through his research Schatzman aims to prove that many of Schreber's 
experiences only thinly veil actual emotions and experiences undergone at 
the hands of his maniacally repressive father. Schreber, Schatzman points 
out, 'was born into a conspiracy against hire' (ibid., 143). That social 
conspiracy turns out to be far more insidious and threatening than 
anything Schreber could dream up to disguise or explain it. He was 
enmeshed in an a ubiquitous, authoritarian webwork of power and values 
which, as Schatzman discovers, are always in place in any fascist, 
patriarchal state in whose interest it is to perpetuate (perpetrate) a 
system of power relations which are psychically interiorized by the 
individual, and within which the majority are oppressed. Chillingly 
Schatzuran warns, 'Remember Hitler and his peers were raised when Dr. 
Schreber's books, preaching household totalitarianism, were popular' (ibid., 
151). He attempts to place Freud's theory within what he thinks is its 
'relevant ideological setting'. Freud, because he was caught within it, was 
blind to it, 'the authoritarian, patriarchal nineteenth century family was 
one of the conditions in which psychoanalysis developed and which it has 
sometimes semmed to embody' (ibid., 114). 
Schatzman then, adopts Laing's'b position against psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis as practices which - if only by remaining uncritical - 
support the social structures which cause that which they attempt to cure. 
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The 'origin' of madness must be looked for not in the patient's psyche but 
in the world in which he exists and functions: 
It has been a thesis of this book that people considered paranoid 
experience as persecution what people around there experience 
differently. Feelings of persecution are no less prevalent in Western 
Society than anywhere else, as far as I know. Therefore you would be 
mistaken to think what I have been saying applies only to the Nazis, 
Soviet Russia ... and not to Us (ibid., 157). 
The alternative theoretical and ideological approaches to madness 
which I have outlined here find their counterpart or dramatization to some 
extent in kinds of fiction which seem increasingly to explore exceptional 
psychic states from the position of the 'mad'. The biographical-narrative, 
linguistic and social emphases of these studies connect with different 





1. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, in Ficgraphia Literaria (1817), for example, expresses the 
Romantic preoccupation with the operation of the imaginative faculties when liberated 
from the tyranny of reason: 
The thought suggested itsell,,, that a series of poems might be composed of two 
sorts, In the one, the incidents and agents were to be, in part at least, 
supernatural; and the the excellence aimed at was to consist in the interesting 
of the affections by the dramatic truth of such emotions, as would naturally 
accompany such situations, supposing them real, And real in this sense they have 
been to every human being who, from whatever source of delusion, has at any time 
believed himself under supernatural agency (1973,5). 
2, In their Declaration of January 27th, 1925 (the manifesto of le Bureau da 
Recherches Sarrhalists) leading Surrealists express their crede by saying that 
Surrealism is 'a means of total liberation of the mind and of all that resaables ft', 
They wish to 'show the fragility of thought, and on what shifting foundations, what 
caverns we have built our trembling houses', Surrealism, they assert, 'is not a poetic 
form, It is a cry of the mind turning back upon itself, and it is determined to break 
apart its fetters,,, ' (quoted in the collection of extracts from manifestos by Maurice 
Nadeau in The History of Surrealism, 1973,240), 
3, As demonstrated by Roger Smith in Trial by Medicine; Insanity and Responsibility in 
Victorian Trials (1981), He sees the increasing legal interest in'madness as 
contributing to the developing scientific and professional status of the study of 
madness, From the end of the eighteenth century criminal trials began to make use of 
new medical evidence as to the sanity of the accused, Smith proposes that this 
cultural development culminated in two 1845 Acts which demanded the building of county 
asylums and marked the growth of psychiatry as a new medical specialism (1981,3), 
Madness, as a principle of chaos, began to function as a challenge to the positivistic 
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scientific enterprise, and to the organizational capability of 'civilized society', 
Smith observes that, 
The asylum movement exemplified a new pattern of social control, A neu group 
with professional expectations, under a central administration, directed 
specialist institutions for inmates whose lived experience was of routine, 
discipline and work,,, Treatment of the insane, perhaps the most abject 
embodiments of suffering, became a potent symbol of society's ability to regulate 
its affairs (1981,4-S). 
4, For a fuller discussion of the difficult place of insanity in current legal 
procedure see Jennifer Radden's discussion of M'Naghten's Rule and legal tradition 
(1985,121-138). 
5, See Seymour Chatman's Story and Discours, (1978,253-62), This is a useful term 
here; it is appropriate to an approach which needs to keep some distance between the 
idea of the empirical reader and the reader or addressee evok, d by the discourse of the 
narrator. As Chatman points out, the narratee may be understood to be either 
'intradiegetic' (within the frame of the story) or 'extradiegetic' (external to the 
story) (1978,254), 
6, For a fuller discussion of clinical procedures in this regard see R, P, Bentall, 
Reconstructing Schizophrenia (1990,43-45), 
7, The Schreber case is of added significance because it punctuates a chronological 
view of the literary treatment of madness and marks changes in modern patterns of 
thought (including but not confined to psychology). The occasion of the case, the 
writing of the text, the later rewriting of the text by Freud, the recent rewriting of 
Freud and Schreber by Jacques Lacan (1959, cf, 1977b), Morton Schatzpan (1973) and 
Gilles Deleuze (1972, cf, 19e4) all now contribute to the text's centrality in the 
ongoing 'rational' discourse about the nature of madness, Though appropriated by 
psychiatric discourse Schreber's text was initially intended by him to be widely 
published, The work is the author's account of what he believes to be the facts of his 
insanity, transcribed into a form judged by him to bridge the gap between a 'sane' 
-303- 
reader, and an 'insane' writer, It is a statement of subjective experience, Most 
importantly - as I hope to show - it suggests correlations between writing about 
madness (the fictional mode), the writing of madness (the memoirs of a madman), and the 
madness of writing, 
8. See also appendix above, This has been added with the intention of providing a 
point of reference for part II, where such material would hinder the elaboration of the 
central argument, Some influential twentieth century approaches to psychosis are 
outlined here, in so for is they bear relevance to the main thrust of the project or 
refer directly to the Schreber case, The main ideas treated are those of Sigmund 
Freud, Jacques Lacan and R, D, Laing, 
9, Trilling comments upon the modern view (tracing its rise through the theories of 
Freud and Laing, and an increase in cases of psychosis) that 'insanity is a state of 
human existence which is to be esteemed for its commanding authenticity' and points out 
that 'the doctrine that madness is health, that madness is liberation and authenticity, 
receives a happy welcome from a consequential part of the educated public' (1972,168), 
10, Jameson discusses 'schizophrenic disjunction' as aa 'generalized cultural style' 
(1984,74), 
11. Brooke-Rose introduces A Rhetoric of the Unreal with a comment upon a pervasive 
loss of reality; the sense that empirical reality is not as secure as it used to be is 
now pervasive at all levels of society, Certainly what used to be called empirical 
reality, or the world, seems to have become more and more unreal, and what has long 
been regarded as unreal is more and more turned to or studied as the only 'true' or 
'another and equally valid' reality, Witness, for example, Foucault on madness (1961), 
Laing on schizophrenia as a breakthrough (1967),,, Shoshanna Felman (1978)' (1981,4), 
12, She adds that madness 'usually occupies a position of t. rclusion it is outside of 
the culture, But madness that is a common place occupies a position of inclusion and 
becomes inside of a culture', and to the extent that 'our entire era,,. has become 
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subsumed within the space of sadness' (and consequently contributes to this trend with 
Yriting and Madness, approaching fictional works through the lens of 'madness' as it 
has been theorized in philosophy and psychoanalysis), She focusses upon what she sees 
as the modern 'rise' of madness and the demise of 'literature' from the perspective of 
current philosophical, post-structuralist and psychoanalytical thought, She concludes, 
from this position, that 'while it was through literature that madness became the order 
of the day, now it seems that literature itself has been dropped from the agenda, 
While madness has finally been recognized as a burning contemporary question, it is as 
though the question of literature has become anachronistic and irrelevant' (Felnan 
1985,15), She counters this trend by theorizing an intrinsic link between the nature 
of literature and the nature of madness, This link, she concludes, lies in their 
equivalent 'resistance to interpretation' (ibid  254), She closes her analysis by 
tackling the significance of the term 'madness' as she has used it: 
What is the rhetorical status of the term 'madness' in my own critical and 
theoretical discourse? Is madness used here in its literal sense or is it simply 
a metaphor? 
The texts studied in this book do not permit a simple, unambiguous answer 
to that question, Whether they discuss psychosis, neurosis, or simply the 
stereotypical, stylistic usage of the term 'madness', the texts about madness 
baffle our preconceived notions about the rhetorical status of the madness they 
both express and put in question... I would like to open up the following 
question: might it not be possible to define the very specificity of literature 
as that which suspends the answer to the question of knowing whether the madness 
literature speaks of is literal or figurative? The specific property of the thing 
called literature is such, in other words, that the rhetorical status of its 
madness can no longer be determined (ibid,, 253). 
Felman's question, acknowledging that different kinds of madness may be represented in 
fiction, supposes that there is a possible literal sense in which the term maybe used, 
In so far as there is, my discussion proceeds on the basis that it must be rooted in 
the meaning attached to the term within a given historical or cultural context; it is 
context-bound, and as such may not be, other than in the most abstract sense, 
interpreted 'to the letter', The opposition called into play by Shoshana Felman is 
itself made operative within the discourses with which Felman wishes to engage in her 
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use of fictional texts, She is interested in 'the question that literature, from its 
unique position, invites us to ask and that, from its unique position it addresses to 
psychiatry, psychoanalysis, biology and linguistics' (Felnan 1985,254), Madness is 
she uses it, is defined by and against these discourses, Ultimately Felman's question 
must be situated, within the scope of this thesis, as symptomatic of current 
theoretical trends in the 'uses' of madness, 
13. As N, Takei da Silva observes in hodernlsa and Virginia Voo1t, 
Modern, and above all Modernist, fiction which made use of or, more often, was 
inspired by, psychoanalysis may indeed be considered the spiritual descendent of 
Gothicism in that it was motivated by the same concern with man's inner life as 
the latter, which was the very reason for using, or being affected by, 
psychoanalysis, and that both reacted against the prevailing mode of external 
realism, which they considered to be stifling and ignoring this side of human 
reality. This awareness, or concern, thus may be said to be the essential factor 
that interrelate; Modernism, the Gothic Novel (which may be considered the 
earliest manifestation of Romanticism), and Freudian psychology (1990,39-40), 
Although I chose to avoid having this study turn upon the theories of psychoanalysis, 
my subject has - in line with this perception - resulted in a selection of works in the 
gothic and modernist, rather than realist tradition, 
PART I 
Introduction! Madness and Gothic Fiction 
1. This general perspective on Gothic literature is also taken up by Eugenia C, 
Delamotte, in her study of Gothic fiction, She suggests that, 
Gothic terror has its primary source in an anxiety about boundaries and,,, Gothic 
romance offers a symbolic language congenial to the expression of psychological, 
epistemological, religious, and social anxieties that resolve themselves most 
fundamentally into a concern about the boundaries of the self (1990,14). 
2, Critics of Freud's interpetation include Hunter and Macalpine in the introduction 
to their English translation of Schreber's Heuairs (1955, cf, Schreber 1988), Morton 
Schatzman in Spul Harder (/ß73), Jacques Lacan, 'On a question preliminary to any 
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possible treatment of psychosis' (1959, cf, 1977b), C. Barry Chabot, Freud on Schreber; 
Psychoanalytic Theory and the Critical Act (1982), Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus 
(1972, cf, 1983), Alice Jardine in 6ynesis (1985), commentators and critics of the 
'post-modern', critics concerned with the Gothic genre and the psychoanalytical 
interpretation of paranoia include E, K, Sedgewick (1985), 
3, See appendix for a fuller discussion of Freud's reading of Schreber's /Mecoirs, 
1DP. Schreber's Meaofrs of My Nervous Illness! A Model 
1, Page references to Schreber's text will follow the original pagination, as provided 
alonside the test in the 1988 reprint of the 1955 first translated edition, In this 
chapter, as in each chapter which takes a single text as its focus, the author's name 
and the date of publication of that text will not be unnecessarily repeated where there 
is a string of references to the same text, References will be to the edition of that 
text detailed in the bibliography, Original dates of publication are mentioned in the 
introduction, within each chapter, and also supplied in the bibliography, These notes 
will not be used for full bibliographical references, since this thesis follows the 
Author-Date system as directed in the NHRA Style Rook (which advises, 'a combination of 
conventional notes and the Author-Date system is unnecessarily cumbersome for the 
reader and should not be contemplated'). 
2. God is to be regarded in a discussion of the Mesoirs as a concept in inverted 
commas because, as Schreber points out (Schreber 1988,20), his idea of God differs 
considerably from that of the Christian tradition, except in so far as God is the 
creator of the universe and the supreme being, 
3, For a slightly different perspective upon a similar phenomena see Shoshanna 
Felman's discussion of Nerval's AurOlia, Nerval set out in this work to give account 
of his own experience of madness, Her starting point in the discussion is Foucault's 
attempt to 'say madness' and she compares this with a 'madman's' literary, essentially 
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luth#tic enterprise, Felman points out that Nerval represents himself both as 'ill' 
and as extraordinarily healthy, the privileged possessor of a massive amount of 
knowledge; 
It is through this uneasiness of feeling double, through this very division of 
the self, that the speaker here affirms the (impossible) necessity of overcoming, 
by the very practice of his discourse, the linguistic separation between health 
and illness, between reason and madness, The use of the pronoun I consequently 
becomes very complex in the narrative of AurOlia in a process of constant 
splitting, the I stands for two distinct characters: the hero - and the narrator, 
The hero is a 'madman'; the narrator, a man who has recovered his 'reason' 
(Felman 1985,66-7). 
4. This defense became a legal one when the psychiatrist Dr, Weber, Superintendant of 
the asylum in which Schreber is confined, decided to submit his work to a court 
summoned to deliberate upon whether Schreber should be released from the asylum and 
readmitted to society: 
In line with the patient's originally rich gifts, his mental productivity and his 
wide education, the manifestations of his pathologically altered mind are not, as 
so frequently in other cases, poor and monotonous and their connections easily 
surveyed: on the contrary they present a structure of ideas so fantastically 
elaborated and developed and to far removed from the usual trends of thought, 
that it is hardly possible to sketch them briefly without rendering their inner 
structure incomprehensible and impairing understanding of their specific meaning, 
For this reason,,, I consider it useful to give to the Country Court the patient's 
'Memoirs' complete for their consideration,,, in the belief that the Judge will 
readily obtain a clear picture of the author's mental state without any furthur 
comment (Schreber 1988,394). 
5, Schreber is using a conventional strategy that the fictionists in this study will 
be shown to use, in a similarly exaggerated manner, in dealing with subject matter that 
more than usually threatens the internal 'truth status' of their fictional texts - the 
supernatural, 
6. With regard to the issues discussed in the pages to follow, plainly Freudian and 
Lacanian approaches would have more to say on the matter, My intention here is 
confined to the consideration of the iechanics of Schreber's own view of the man/woman 
relation, 
7. This opposition is often considered (to have been made) the key one in rational 
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modes of thought, 
Some writers have claimed that this is the primordial opposition on which all 
others are based and that,,, the aim of logocentrism, though it could not admit 
it, has always been to found phallogocentrism, to assure a rationale for a 
masculine order,,, Whether or not it is the paradigm of metaphysical oppositions, 
man/woman is certainly a distinction whose hierarchical structure is marked in an 
endless number of ways, from the genetic account in the Bible,,, (Culler 1983, 
165), 
This kind of thinking extends to other means of defining a stable world for Schreber, 
It is even the key to moral questions, Here the dominant structuring principle is the 
strong/weak opposition, 
In the whole domain of the created world, no one considers it immoral when - as 
long as it does not contravene the Order of the World - the stronger conquers the 
weaker, a people of higher culture expel from their abode one of lower 
culture,,. In any case the whole idea of morality can arise only within the Order 
of the World, that is to say within the natural bond which holds God and mankind 
together; wherever the Order of the World is broken, power alone counts, and the 
right of the stronger is decisive, In my case moral obliquity lay in God placing 
Himself outside the Order of the World by which he himself must be guided 
(Schreber 1988,60). 
8, It is not, perhaps, hososexuality which triggers the onset of paranoia (as Freud 
suggested), but sexuality is nevertheless a determining factor in Schreber's delusional 
construct, The experience of sensuality in Schreber is discovered in, and confined to, 
his own body (it is narcissistic), Freud perceives this as deviant (or considers that 
Schreber's superego must condemn it as such) because it does not fit into an 
institutionalized heterosexual structure. It seems that in Schreber's world - the one 
in which he functions as Judge Schreber, a man of authority and intellect - no space is 
made for sensuality, narcissism, or sensitivity except within the idea of the feminine 
(being 'passive', 'castrated', 'powerless'), Evidence has been amassed to the effect 
that Schreber's famous father drummed such ideas into his son's head with some severity 
and some rather cruel implements (see Morton Schatznan's challenging biographical 
investigation, as discussed above in the appendix), In his essay on Schreber Freud 
professes admiration for Schreber's father, speaking of his 'promoting the harmonious 
upbringing of the young', his 'great reputation' and suitability for being turned into 
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a God 'in the affectionate memory of a son' (Freud 1979,51), and thus becoming the 
prototypical object of homosexual desire, Schatzman's study renders all such comments 
rather ironic (if anything his desire might be more aptly described as masochistic, or 
transexual rather than homosexual). His pathologically authoritarian father's main aim 
was to subdue the will of his children absolutely and completely to his own (admittedly 
a God-like attribute), and to discover how many different methods of physical 
repression and abuse could he could use to subdue their bodies to automata, Many of of 
the somatic delusions suffered by Schreber have convincingly been linked by Schatzpan 
to actual diagrams drawn by Schreber senior of modes of restraining children's movement 
and growth. Schreber's text may be seen as 'uncanny' according to a definition used by 
Freud that what should have remained hidden, what is w7heialich, is being brought to 
light. Schreber's father set himself up as a kind of supernatural omnipotence in his 
son's life, aligning himself with God as a patriarchal law-giver, Schreber's whole 
delusional system is at once revelatory of this relationship and an expression of 
'irrational fear', concealing the fact that it is a forbidden fear of something 'real', 
9, For example; 
My breast gives the impression of a pretty well-developed female boson; this 
phenomena can be seen by anybody who wants to observe me with his own eyes, I am 
therefore in a position to offer oblective evidence by observation of my body,,, I 
venture to arrest flatly that anybody who sees me standing in front of a 
mirror,,,! believe I have thus furnished proof which must arouse serious doubt 
among serious men as to whether what has so far been attributed to hallucinations 
and delusions is not after all reality, and therefore my whole belief in their 
miraculous nature and my explanation of the phenomena on my person and on my body 
not also founded on truth,,, (Schreber 1988,280). 
10, For further discussion of the implications of this term in connection with 
paranoia and wider psychological, sociological, methodological and metaphysical issues 
see the work of Y, Fried and J, Agassi in Paranoia; A study in Diagnosis (1976), 
11, The body and sexuality have been used as metaphors for a variety of symbolic 
forces in recent theories about narrative, 'to make the body the centre of the symbolic 
field is to say it is] an image of the force which ultimately subjugates other 
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meanings' (Culler 1975,227), and it is in this sense that Schreber's activity may be 
understood as recuperative, Weber comments in his introduction to the work with regard 
to the construction of his text, 
if it is thus in the nature of miracles [the action of or upon nerves) to destroy 
the body's integrity - be it Schreber's body or an inorganic one - then this 
integrity can be re-established through the text that renames all Munden to 
Minder and reduces the latter to their cause, a text that ultimately consists in 
their re-absorption in Schreber's body, For this reason, the body consistutes 
the ultimate goal of the heaoirs' composition and publication,,, this scientific 
work has no other goal than to proffer its author's body,,, as an object of 
viewing' (Schreber 1988, xlviii). 
12, He also reads the text as uncanny according to a sense of the word that he himself 
takes on board in his essay dealing with that subject, He sees that through careful 
interpretation of the text 'things hidden' are brought to light, That is, the 
exciting cause of his illness,,, an outburst of homosexual libido' (1979,177), 
13, For a further treatment of Freud's response to Schreber's text see the appendix 
above, 'Freud and Narrative', This positions Freud's constructions in relation to the 
immediate narratological concerns of this thesis, whilst avoiding entanglement with the 
psychoanalytical merits of his approach. 
2. Plotting Damnation! James Hogg's Private He. oirs and Confessions of a Justified 
Sinner 
1, It is a curious anomaly that nineteenth century thought about the nature of madness 
often recognized it in terms of indecorous, amoral and anti-social behaviour, and that 
despite this it was still expected that madness conform in some measure to 'the 
limitations imposed on man by society', This is witnessed by Or, Weber's (Schreber's 
psychiatrist) comments upon the deaoirs as containing an 'abundance of indiscretions 
relating to himself and others', and 'the unembarassed detailing of the most doubtful 
and aesthetically impossible situations and events, the use of the most offensive 
vulgar words, etc, ' (Schreber 1988,402). 
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2, An interesting comparison may be found in Schreber's idea of the 'writing-down- 
system', 'Books or other notes are kept in which for years have been 'ritten-dovn all 
my thoughts, all my phrases, all my necessaries, all the articles in my possession or 
around me, all persons with whom I come into contact, etc' (emphasis Schreber's, 122), 
3, John Herdman provides a fuller discussion of the historical links between 
Christianity and Protestantism, and the literary 'double' in The Double in Nineteenth 
Century fiction ('The Psychological and Theological background'; 1990,1-11), He aims 
to create an understanding 'of the complex history of moral duality in the Western 
Christian tradition, and of the elements of dualism as a metaphysical position within 
orthodox, and even more markedly within heterodox Christianity' (1990,4), 
4, The analysis by Eve Kosofsky Sedgewick of The Private Henoirs and Confessions of a 
Justified Sinner (1985,92-117), whilst not focussing upon Hogg's narrative strategy, 
takes the paranoiac content, the thought processes of characters and the paranoid 
nature of relationships between them, toward a view of this novel as an exploration of 
'social and gender constitution as a whole' (ibid,, 115), Starting from the Freudian 
reading of the Schreber case (paranoia as the result of repressed homosexuality), but 
rejecting the hierarchical evaluation which situates homosexuality as deviance or 
'illness', Sedgewick forwards a reading of the 'paranoid' text which might be 
constructively applied not only to Hogg but to many other works, including those of Poe 
(6ordon Pve), and Stevenson ('The Strange Case of Or, Jekyll and Mr, Hyde') which 
display a simiar focus upon male experience (remaining significantly immune to female 
interception) within patriarchal social structures, Robert Wringhim's paranoia is 
founded in, she suggests, social pressures brought to bear; 
The internal sociophobic pressures on young Robert have the effect, not in the 
first place of repressing a pre-existent genital desire within his toward men, 
but of making him an excruciatingly responsive creature and instrument of class, 
economic and gender struggles that long antedate his birth, As he pushes 
blindly, with the absurdly and pathetically few resources he has, toward the 
male homosocial mastery that alone and delusively seem to promise him a social 
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standing, the psychologized homophobic struggle inside his seems to hollow out an 
internal space that too exactly matches the world around his (1985.114). 
Caught between the conflicted external relationships with other men and the class 
structure, and the delusional internal relationships (taking the form of the demonic 
double and 'God's' schema), Robert becomes 'a mere murderous potential, violent 
against. women and men alike, and capable of being seized and used by and in the 
service of any social force' (ibid,, 114). This political dimension of the paranoid 
text has not been, but must potentially be, connected to the factors focussed upon in 
this analysis, The 'release' of madness engineered by the narrative process, if 
combined with Sedgewick's cultural analysis, would further develop a perspective upon 
such texts that render their contrapuntal schema and almost viral invasion of areas of 
cultural anxiety and uncertainty a potential anarchic power-house. On this level the 
internal configuration that evolves in Wringhim's mind as a nightmarish mirror of 
external structures, is refracted back - via the surfaces of the text - onto that 
external Plane. Thus such texts are not only explorations but assaults, excercising a 
peculiarly effective power of epistemological distortion. or defamiliarization of a 
possibly liberational kind (in this way they connect with the contemporary writing 
discussed in the general conclusion). 
3-Plotting the Unearthly! Edgar Allan Poe's The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of 
Nantuch-et 
1, This is the 1975 reprint of the first American publication of 1838, with a minimum 
of amendment, The 'original' title page appears in this edition on page 42, 
2, The journey of the soul figured forth in the image of the sailor in a ship is 
almost archetypal, as for example in the anglo-saxon poem The Seafarer ( The Exeter 
Book, c, 975), This epic poem tells the story of an outcast on the high seas suffering 
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extreme physical and mental distress, even to the point of hallucination, 
3. Beaver points out that Poe had been, shortly before writing Gordon Pys, engaged in 
reviewing many pamphlets and articles dealing in travel and exploration (in addition to 
reviewing The Life and Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe, Poe 1975,10), He was 
also apparently preoccupied by a theory developed by a mariner, John Cleves Symmes, and 
published in manifesto form in 1818, that supposed the Poles to be holes, Symmes's 
theory was followed up, in the course of the next few decades, by further writings, 
explorations, and published records of these voyages (Poe 1975.11-14), 8, R, Pollin 
also suggests that a major source for the text was the 'very popular genre of 
chronicles or tales of mariners, purporting to be the crude and often unedited, first- 
hand accounts of storms and shipwrecks, fires, mutinies, and famine', which were 
'invariably based upon verifiable occurrences first reported in journals and 
broadsides': these narratives were produced in collections and individually 'as cheap 
pamphlets in England from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries and in 
nineteenth century America' (Poe 1981,19). 
4, As Wolfgang Iser suggests, during the process of reading 
We are situated inside the literary text. The relation between text and reader 
is therefore quite different from that between object and observer: instead of a 
subject-object relationship, there is a moving viewpoint which travels along 
inside that which it has to apprehend,,, every moment of reading is a dialectic of 
protension and retention, conveying a future horizon yet to be occupied, along 
with a past (and continually fading) horizon already filled, the wandering 
viewpoint carves its passage through both at the same time and leaves them to 
merge together in its wake, There is no escaping this process... (1978,110-112). 
S. Curiously, Harold Beaver suspects Poe's interest in the fact that Synmes's 
'Symzonia', his hypothetical land at the Antartic Pole, was peopled with a perfectly 
rational race, 
6. The text is divided in this way: Preface, 43-45, preliminary tale, 47-56 
(comprising chapter 1), main narrative, 57-239, 'editor's' note, 240-242, 
7, In his analysis of the Schreber case Freud identifies this mechanism as 'paranoid 
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projection', observing that is it 'the most striking characteristic of symptom- 
formation', He describes it in these terms: 
An internal perception is suppressed, and, instead, its content, after undergoing 
certain kind of distortion, enters consciousness in the form of an external 
perception (1979,204), 
He later ammends this by adding that 'what was abolished internally returns from 
without' (ibid,, 210), He points out however, that this paranoiac function is really 
only an exaggeration of the normal 'attitude towards the external world', 
10, Pym's arrival on the island of Tsalal in the Southern-most regions of the globe 
initiates another sequence of black imagery, The complexion of the native people 'was 
a jet black' (Poe 1975,189), They are 'clothed in the skins of an unknown black 
animal', their weapons consist of 'clubs of a dark and apparently very heavy wood', the 
bottoms of the canoes 'were full of black stones' (190), The bay into which they sail 
has a 'black sandy bottom' (193), The huts are made of black animal skins, The 
adventurers notice 'several animals,,, covered with a black wool' (196), Drawing 
fleetingly upon an intertextual burden of signification (recalling the obsessional 
narration of Coleridge's Ancient Mariner) Fyn sees a 'black albatross' (196), 
11, J. W. Robertson says; 
Evidently Pym had become entangled in such a maze of unescapable disasters that 
Poe was not able to invent a dens ex nachina which could snatch him from his 
impending doom (1969,174), 
12, Critical responses to these texts are to be further discussed in the conclusion to 
Part I, 
4. Plottins the Diabolical! Robert Louis Stevenson's 'The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll 
and Mr. Hyde' 
1. It seems relevant to discuss Jekyll's predicament in philosophical and linguistic 
terms considering that it is essentially the single meaning of a word, and its 
incompatibility with the complexity of his experience that is at stake here, Good can 
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only be wholly present in the complete absence of its negation, bad. In terms of 
current theoretical thought this follows logocentrism, where 'situated on the margin of 
the first term. the second term designates an undesirable, dispensible deviation' 
(Culler 1975,160), A deconstructive reading demonstrates that each is at the centre - 
a trace of - the other, Jekyll's discovery is most significantly a 'potent control'; 
it enables him to 'dissolve the bonds of obligation' (Stevenson 1979,83), to break 
apart the interdependency of this opposition, to enable a word to Sean purely and 
metaphysically without the movement of diffirance, Both sides of himself must be 
enabled to operate freely and independently, apparently unmodified by the intervention 
of the other, 
2, This may be read with reference to note 4 of the previous section, regarding 
Wolfgang Iser's suggestion of the 'moving viewpoint', Any distinction that seems to be 
drawn between narrator and reader here should be understood as qualified on this basis, 
Conclusions Provocative Narratives and the Paranoid Text 
1, Or as Rowe rather cryptically suggests in his analysis of Gordon Pyv' language may 
still appear to be a limitation for Poe that 'veils' a signified behind and within the 
ambiguous drift of signifiers leading to the end of the journey, But it is not a 
'veiled' but a 'shrouded' figure baring the winding sheet of finitude that is at once 
disclosed and repressed in the supplementary movement of psychic signification' (Rowe 
1977,119), 
2, Poe's Eureka (written in 1828, ten years before Gordon Pye) is offered, as he terms 
it, as a 'Book of Truths', lt is concerned with 'the Physical, Metaphysical and 
Mathematical - Land] the Material and Spiritual Universe: - t,,, ] its Essence, its 
Origin, its Creation, its Present Condition and its Destiny', Poe introduces this 
saying he will be so rash 'as to challenge the conclusions, and thus, in effect, to 
question the sagacity, of many of the greatest and most justly reverenced of men' (Poe 
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1965,185), In this text Poe attacks the methodology of contemporary scientists and 
philosophers (the 'diggers and pedlers of minute facts', - in a similar way Schreber 
defends himself from 'tumbling with both feet into the camp of naked materialism'), 
Eureka proposes a process for achieving a knowledge of the truth about 6od, the 
Universe, and man's position in relation to these concepts, a process which conflicts 
with 'pedestrian' empirical modes of thought, The text is teleological, attempting to 
communicate his belief that 'each soul is, in part, its own God - its own creator; - in 
a word, that God - the material and spiritual God - now exists solely in the diffused 
Matter and Spirit of the Universe' (ibid., 313), The process of attaining truth is 
focussed upon consistency; 'a perfect consistency can be nothing but an absolute truth' 
(ibid,, 196), 
'speculate' - 'theorize' - these are the terns,,, I repeat, speculate - theorize - 
and their theories are merely corrected - reduced - sifted - cleared, little by 
little, of their chaff of inconsistency - until at length there stands apparent an 
unencumbered Consistency -a consistency which the most stolid admit - because it 
is a consistency - to be an absolute and unquestionable Truth (ibid., 196). 
Poe is advocating an intuitively based, systematic thought process, The goal of his 
system is to become consistent, and therein lies truth, Consistency, however, is an 
ongoing process - an infinite condition, its does not, he says, require a 'finishing 
stroke' (ibid., 203), a closure, an answer, Only by 'foreclosing closure' can the 
system be complete. Poe discusses the propensity of theologians 'and others' to be 
always searching for a 'First Cause': 'A First Cause, And what is a First Cause? An 
ultimate termination of causes, And what is an ultimate termination of causes? Finity 
- the Finite' (ibid,, 202), Man's inability to think beyond the finite leaves him as a 
creature alienated from God, and without Godliness; with a limited intellect and 
without hope of ever comprehending his existence and creation, Poe is establishing a 
rationale for what is essentially a paranoid thought process, a form of 'compulsive 
thinking'; 
He who has a right to say that he thinks at all, feels himself called upon, not 
to entertain a conception, but simply to direct his mental vision toward some 
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given point, in the intellectual firmament, where lies a nebula never to be 
resolved, To solve it, indeed, he sakes no effort; for with a rapid instinct he 
comprehends, not only the impossibility, but, as regards all human purposes, the 
inessentiality, of its solution, He perceives that the Deity has not designed it 
to be solved, He sees, at once, that it lies out of the brain of man, and even 
how, if not exactly why, it lies out of it (Poe 1965,204), 
3, Edgar Allan Poe, 'A Few Words on Secret Writing' (July, 1841), 'Secret Writing' 
(August, 1841), 'Secret Writing' (October, 1841), 'Secret Writing' (December, 1841) in 
Poe 1965,114-132,133-137,138-140,140-149, 
4, As Harold Beaver records in his notes to the 1979 edition of 6ordon Pyre, these 
writers include Jules Verne, Charles Dike, and H. P, Lovecraft (Le Sphinx des 61aces, 
1864, A Strange Discovery, 1899, and At the Mountains of Madness, 1936; Poe 1979, 
269), 
S. In her discussion of contemporary literary treatment of madness Evelyn Keitel 
concludes by viewing the relationship between psychosis and creativity in a general 
sense, Her emphasis is firmly upon the reader's emotional response to texts, and she 
has recourse to Freud's theories of creativity and the unconscious. Her comments upon 
the production of anxiety as a structuring principle of the text are useful here; 
The communicatory situation between text and reader in the literary type of 
psychopathography extrapolates 'anxiety' into the reader's response,,, A sense of 
an enveloping oppression felt during the reading, a sensation of being trapped in 
the text, is furthur enhanced by the virtual dimension of the literary type of 
psychopathography. This virtual dimension comprises proliferations of phantasier 
relating to the subject, which are expansive factors, as well as intertextual 
references to the conventions of the mediating texts,,, the intertextual 
references are ambivalent inasmuch as they - at least initially - counteract a 
strongly negative, because suspended, openness by evoking stabilizing reading 
experiences. The reader's expectation of stabilization, however is thwarted, and 
the disappointment of his expectations reinforces his sense of an enveloping 
oppression to an even greater degree (Keitel 1989,118). 
6, For an analysis of the manner in which Schreber's text has functioned as a paranoid 




Introduction, - Madness and Modern Fiction 
1, 'We generally distinguish, within the literary Gothic, two tendencies: that of the 
supernatural explained (the 'uncanny'),,, and that of the supernatural accepted (the 
'marvellous')' (Todorov 1975,42-3), 
2, This term is used to indicate not the absence of logic, but a thought process which 
imitates the operation of logic, whilst failing in its usual enterprise - to be 
recognizably 'reasonable' and to achieve 'truth', 
3, See appendix for further exploration of Freud's, and subsequently Lacan's 
positioning of madness in relation to the self, 
4.1 will not be dealing here with texts which give in account of schizophrenic 
experience from a balanced, retrospective position, Narratives that tell the story of 
a person's experience of madness in order to question a society's institutionalized 
methods of dealing with it (for example, confinement within an asylum) almost 
constitute what might be considered a genre apart, and deserve special treatment as 
such, For example, such works as Hannah Green's I Never Promised You a Rost Garden 
(1964), Janet Frame's faces in the later (1961) or Peter Sayer's Ti,, Coaforts of 
Madness (1988) would come within this category, These are works whose style might be 
considered conventional, though they deal with unconventional material, The term 
'schizoid' will be applied to texts that might be termed experimental and in which the 
'madness' described more fundamentally affects its presentation, 
I. De-composition Herman Melville's 'Bartleby the Scrivener' 
1, Instead of dismissing Bartleby upon his refusal to work he discovers a need for 
further confrontation, 'I felt strangely goaded on to encounter him in new opposition' 
(Melville 1967,72), At one point this self-inflicted state of constant struggle 
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reminds him of a murder case. which seems to indicate that Bartleby increasingly 
represents a persecutory factor in his life, 
Bartleby and I were alone, I remembered the tragedy of the unfortunate Adams and 
the still more unfortunate Colt in the solitary office of the latter; and how 
poor Colt, being dreadfully incensed by Adams, and imprudently permitting himself 
to get wildly excited, was at unawares hurried to this fatal act,,, (ibid,, 87). 
Bartleby, he decides, cannot help his deranged condition, 'his eccentricities are 
involuntary' (ibid., 72), but such sympathy does not prevent him from sensing an 
impulse in himself, conversely, to kill Bartleby, Despite the danger of Bartleby 
reducing him to a pathological condition he does not want him to go, He finds a 
justification for this that belies his rational tone, He has a mission to perform with 
regard to Bartleby, 'Bartleby was billeted upon me for some mysterious purpose of an 
allwise Providence, which it was not for a mere mortal like me to fathom (ibid,, 89), 
This development has been commented upon as overtly pathological, For example M, 
Kaplan and R, Kloss point out that, 
He converts the ignominy of defeat into the exalted idea of a divine purpose, 
The humiliation of defeat, which he cannot erase at the risk of murderous 
violence, he dispels with a delusion of grandeur. Such a retreat from reality is 
shocking and gives the full measure of how costly his inhibition has 
become,,, (His) is the contentment of an all-but psychotic delusion (1973,75), 
2, An analysis of this literary text has been published within a psychoanalytic 
context, The connection between the narrator and Bartleby is interpreted by 
Christopher Bollas as a form of allogamous or interdependent psychotic manifestation; 
Like the narrator, we discover Bartleby as he exists inside the narrator. 
Indeed, Meville's story is primarily concerned with how Sartleby sponsors 
affective states in the narrator who feels compassionate, nurturant, helpless, 
resourceless,., This phenomenology of affect and defense is a phantom reflection 
of the silent scrivener, an affect language not spoken to the narrator, but 
thrown into and then lived out by him. 
Bollas goes on to develop the idea of a split self along clinical lines; 
it seems to me, after some reflection, that Bartleby embodies an absence in the 
self of this blithely cheerful narrator, a psychic double who represents the 
dramatic and aggravating presence of a repudiated true self: the internal other 
in the personality that is a collage of psychically, familially, and culturally 
disowned instincts and ego states that are never realized in the active life of 
the subject, Never actualized because they are sequestered through repression or 
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splitting from being lived out, they are known to the executant self by the 
energy and style of the defenses organized against this true self (Bolles 1914, 
409), 
The fact that Melville couples then together, isolated from the outside world and 
within a confined space, is productive of readings which describe them as linked in a 
kind of psychological double act, Kaplan and Kloss argue that 'There could hardly be 
imagined an interlocking of disorders greater than that which exists between the 
narrator and his scrivener' (1973,68). 
3, This is the term employed by Schreber when he realizes that 'God' wants to deprive 
him both of his masculinity and his reason, 'Premises' is a word that may also be 
linked here - metaphorically - in another sense with regard to his 'unmanning', The 
lawyer is an adherent of the 'doctrine of assumptions' (Melville 1967,86), Bartleby 
invalidates his assumptions in the same way as he has challenged laws of ownership by 
inhabiting the lawyer's offices, The lawyer gains some insight into the precariousness 
of his situation, 'that assumption was simply my own, and none of Bartleby's. The 
great point was, not whether I had assumed that he would quit me, but whether he would 
prefer so to do' (ibid., 189), 
4, Melville uses a similar paranoid doubling motif to that in Hogg's Sinner, There are 
suggestions that Bartleby may have no existence outside the narrator's imagination. 
The impression is produced that the narrator never quite sees Bartleby as a discrete 
entity, Bartelby, it is implicitly suggested, may be, if not a double (in the manner 
of Jekyll and Hyde) at least a form of psychological counterpart to the narrator, Like 
Gil-Martin in Hogg's story, Bartleby simply, at first, mirrors and magnifies the 
lawyer's image of himself, Bartelby is 'a safe man'; 
His steadiness, his freedom from all dissipation, his incessant industry,,, his 
great stillness, his unalterableness of demeanour under all circumstances, One 
prime thing was - he was always there - first in the morning, continually through 
the day, and last at night. I had a singular confidence in his honesty, I felt 
my most precious papers safe in his hands (Melville 1967,74-5). 
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In fact the narrator decides, 'I never feel so private as when I know the is) here', 
The scrivener, appears to be a complementary entity, a willed substitution for the 
other eccentric employees that render the lawyer's office a little less than secure, 
Bartleby comes to provide a preternatural challenge to the lawyer, he imagines 
that he can call him up at will to satisfy his whim, but hopes that Bartleby will 
revolt: 
I burned to be rebelled against again,,. Like a very ghost, agreeably to the laws 
of magical invocation, at the third summons, he appeared at the entrance of his 
hermitage (ibid,, 74). 
Bartleby does then rebel, Rather like Hyde however, once evoked he will not leave, but 
starts to persecute the narrator with his presence, clinging to the lawyer like an 
'intolerable incubus' (ibid,, 90), 
5, Stone indicates the relative and deceptive qualities of law when he suggests that 
When we turn our minds to considering the nature of law and its devices, we find 
our first reactions taking the form, not of logical discoveries, but of certain 
assumptions which are of impressionistic, rather than logical, provenance, Chief 
among these is that the assumption that the law itself is logical, so that... the 
process of applying its directives to concrete situations will be one of logical 
reasoning (1964,44), 
6. According to the Longsan Modern English Dictionary, 
7, Shortly before the publication of this story, in 1852, Charles Dickens's BJeak 
House appeared, also dealing with the Court of Chancery, Chancery here again 
represents 'dead letters', Language become writing - an endless flow of documents - is 
dislocated from the speaker, beyond the self, inhuman and persecutory, The language of 
the law is presented as out of control, as tyrannical, as self-perpetuating, The 
narrator in this case (outside of 'Esther's Narrative') maintains a detached status, an 
omniscient position, Here, however, the voice assumes an objective perspective upon 
the pernicious effects of the legal process, the 'madness' of Chancery is framed, and 
controlled, by the narrator's security , just as the origins of this madness are 
localized within the Chancery building, Dicken's court of Chancery 'has its decaying 
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houses and its blighted lands in every shire,,, its worn-out lunatic in every madhouse, 
and its dead in every churchyard' (1983,3). 
8, It is again worthwhile comparing Bartleby with B1iak Hogs, here in order to 
underline Melville's more 'modern' and challenging treatment of madness. Dickens 
localizes the disturbing and deadening elements in 'Chancery' - the court is their 
source - though its effects may disseminate through people and across country, The 
case central to the story, and being dealt with in Chancery - Jarndyce and Jarndyce - 
is responsible for a temporary lapse of control in an ordered world, 
Shirking and sharking, in all their many varieties, have been sown broadcast by 
the ill-fated cause; and even those who have contemplated its history from the 
outermost circle of such evil, have been insensibly tempted into a loose way of 
letting bad things alone to take their own bad course, and a loose belief that if 
the world go wrong, it was, in some offhand manner, never meant to go right 
(Dickens 1983,5), 
The mad Miss Flite and the dead Lady Deadlock are victims of the place. Chancery, and 
all that it represents as a socially constructed phenomenon, is seen as localized 
rather than as an ineluctable symptom of modern life, In 'Bartleby', however, the list 
of alternative occupations suggested by the lawyer to Bartleby, and refused, indicates 
that work in Chancery is simply one facet of a ubiquitous futility and meaninglessness 
(Melville 1967,93-4), 
9, For example, see Felheim 1961 
10, See for example the synopsis of theories of schizophrenia in the International 
Encyclopaedia of Psychiatry, 
If a man deviates from the dynamic steady state, he becomes less efficient and 
produces entropy at a higher rate. As entropy production increases, can's 
efficiency diminishes correspondingly, since any increase in the production of 
entropy results in less energy being available for the performance of work,,, 
2. Dis-integration in Charlotte Perkins Gilman's The Ye11ov yallpa 
1. Both the narrator's husband and brother are associated by the narrator with Weir 
Mitchell, to whom John threatens to send her (Gilman 1981,18); Mitchell was a 
-323- 
physician who actually treated the author towards the end of the nineteenth century, 
His 'rest cure' was widely employed in the treatment of (nervously or psychologically) 
sick women, He treated both their physical and mental well-being by forced inactivity, 
over-feeding and a kind of psycho-therapeutic procedure which involved their 'moral re- 
education' (cf, Bassuk 1986,142), 
2, Writing would thus become just another way in which she loses herself, as Wallace 
Martin points out (suggesting that this is the informing pattern behind all modern 
fictional texts); 
The idea of choosing a model to imitate conceals an insidious paradox, Freedom 
of choice is an expression of individuality; but the fact that we imitate another 
actually robs us of our self-identity, Our goals and desires are not really our 
own, but those of the Other - the role model. If we succeed in attaining them, 
we will probably find that they do not give us the satisfaction we imagined 
(1986,41). 
This observation is particularly pertinent with regard to the predicament of the woman 
writer, and Gilman's narrator is writing as a mode or gesture of escape from authority, 
from circumscription in an alien discourse, From another perspective, that model most 
closely associated with this text would be the female gothic (e. g Jane Eyre), from 
which the narrator must remain distinct in order to sustain her sense of self-identity, 
3. There is evidence, for example, that the narrator could be construed as collapsing 
into a post-partum depression (we know she has recently had a baby, Gilman 1981,14), 
Kristeva's theory of the 'abject' provides for a possible rich interpretation of the 
degeneration of the narrator into psychosis: cross-culturally the natural functions of 
the female body have been considered unclean an uncivilized, The fleshy (fungoid), 
decaying and cadaverous quality of the narrator's hallucination and her breakdown can 
be seen as linked to the operation of the abject and its part in the 
creation/destruction of a stable subjectivity, 
Abjection is the underside of the symbolic, It is what the symbolic must reject, 
cover and contain,,. It is an insistence on the subjects necessary relation to 
death (the subject as defined within the physical space of the body], to 
animality, and to materiality, being the subject's recognition and refusal of its 
corporeality... The abject is undecidably inside and outside the body,., dead and 
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alive (like the corpse), autonomous and engulfing (like infection and pollution), 
It is what disturbs identity, system and order, disrupting the social boundaries 
demanded by the symbolic. It respects no definite positions, or rules, 
boundaries, or socially imposed limits... It is, in other words, an avowal of the 
death drive, a movement of undoing identity,,. Like the abject, maternity is the 
splitting, fusing, merging, and fragmenting of a series of bodily processes 
beyond the will or control of the subject. The roman-mother finds that it is not 
her identity or value as a owman which maternity affirms, but her position as a 
hinge between nature and culture, Pregnancy betrays any tenuous identity the may 
achieve as a subject and a woman (Fletcher 1990,90 and 96). 
Mary Jacobus (1986) has also examined the text in the forts of a post-structuralist 
feminist critique of psychoanalytic presentations of hysteria and previous feminist 
criticisms of the story, 
4, See for example Janice Haney-Peritz's analysis, or Annette Kolodny's study which 
suggests that Gilman's story should not have been 'relegated to the backwaters of our 
literary landscape' because it could have contributed to the evolution of a fiction 
which combined female experience and female authorship, and revealed and confronted a 
situation where 'women too easily became isolated islands of symbolic significance, 
available only to, and decipherable only by, one another' (Showalter 1986,54), 
5, E, g, Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar's analysis of the text; the wallpaper 
represents 'the oppressive structures of society,,, ' (1979,90ff), 
6, I will be returning to the issue of femininity and language at a later stage in an 
analysis of Jeanne Hyvrard's Nother Death (the final chapter of part II), 
7, Chambers dictionary definition: 'An ostensible motive or reason, put forward as an 
excuse or to conceal the true one,,, outward show,,, praetexare, -te. xtua to weave in 
front, border', This word is appropriate here because it manifests the connotations of 
deceit, concealment and falsity, inherent in the 'normal', systematized use of 
language, of the narrative process (as represented by John and by the initial 
strategies of the narrator) that are exposed when the subject experiences a loss of 
control over language, In addition, its significance as 'weave' and 'border' indicates 
the metaphorical dimension in the design of the wallpaper - which becomes the barrier 
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through which the figure in the wallpaper must escape, 
8, As Lecercle points out; 
He carefully distinguishes the normal speech of human communication from the 
nerve speech,,, Nerve speech is compared to inner disocurse, and to dreams, it is 
silent, escaping the mastery of the speaking subject, and sometimes his 
consciousness, It is the language of possession, used by divine nerves to meddle 
with the human soul, It is language working on its own account, beyond or before 
consciousness (1985,125), 
9,. For example, Georg Lukacs' discussion of modernist writing: 
The disintegration of personality is matched by a disintegration of the outer 
world,,, the problem, central to all modernist literature (is] 
psychopathology,,, Distortion becomes the normal condition of human existence; the 
proper study, the formative principle of art and literature,,, (1990,64) 
Or again, Meyers's synopsis: 
Modern European Literature often concerns the abnormal and the pathological. It 
is characterized by a macabre sensibility, an attraction to decay and 
nothingness,,, defined by a mood of dissolution and disintegration, of paralysing 
anxiety and metaphysical despair, Disease both expresses and emphasizes the 
dominant themes of the modern age: hyper-sensitivity, self-doubt, loneliness, 
alienation, loss of identity (1985,12), 
And Brown's analysis in The Ilodernist Self in Twentieth-Century English Literature 
The decade 1914-1924 represents the historic node of English Literary Modernism, 
It also evidences a virtual paradigm shift in the presentation of self-experience 
- by consciously 'artistic' writers in particular,,, the war writers provided 
vivid socio-psychological evidence that, in extresls, the familiar Western egoic 
self was, quite literally, a sham (1989,74). 
3. Authentic Dis-continuity in Virginia Woolf Is Mrs. Dallovar 
1, The problem of the identity of the writer as a female 'self', silenced or oppressed 
by patriarchal language, feeds into the approach of much recent criticism-of Woolf's 
work, Woolf found herself (as she explains in 4 Room of One's Own) alienated and 
marginalized both as a female reader and writer, This position has been interpreted as 
contiguous with madness, in, for example, Gilbert and Gubar's The A+adwoaan in the 
Attic, and in their recent work No Man's Land, where they observe Woolf Is expression of 
the multiple bind in which the twentieth-century writer feels herself to be 
caught,,, to become a woman writer may be, she fears, to become an invisible star 
in male sunshine - to be, in other words, marginalized, dispossessed, 
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alienated,,, to become a Jealous neurotic or a madwoman (1988,74), 
Freud and Lacan have been drawn upon in recent analysis (for example Elizabeth Abel's 
study, Virginia Voolf and the Fictions of Psychoanalysis, 1989), Most notably Woolf's 
texts are being read in the light of the psychoanalytical and linguistic theories of 
Julia Kristeva, as in the work of Makiko Minow-Pinkney (or of Jean Wyatt in her essay 
'Avoiding Self-Definition: In Defense of Women's Right to Merge (Julia Kristeva and 
Mrs, Galloway)' (1986), This kind of analysis offers many valuable insights into 
Woolf's writing, but is, I think, ultimately limited in its achievement by claiming the 
writing for the theory, disregarding the conscious process of theorization in the 
writing itself, It leaves the text trapped in an impasse where its polemical process 
is suppressed and it remains martyred to a 'female' condition from which the only 
possible redemption remains the establishment of a psychological utopia, 
2. This aspect of Woolf's writing is that which is of most concern to recent 
criticism, which deals with the access to the 'psychotic' in her work, In this sense 
she may be taken to foreshadow the kind of thought developed by feminists today such as 
Helene Cixous, who identify Western thought and discourse as being founded in the 
hierarchical binary opposition presence/absence organized around the phallus as 
Signifier, and, as Minow-Pinkney points out, advocate 'a feminine writing as the space 
where the repressed term,,, speaks, as voicing this muted Other' (1987,17), (See also 
discussion of Hyvrard's Mother Death, in the final chapter of part II), The paranoid 
texts have in common an obsession with regaining or maintaining the centrality of the 
phallus as Signifier, actively foregrounding the repression of the other term, the mad, 
the feminine, the irrational, the incoherent, an anxiety founded in the process of 
signification, Woolf sets out to elude this tyranny of phallocentric anxiety, Pinkney 
proposes, using Kristeva's idea of the semiotic, that Woolf succeeds in creating a kind 
of androgynous, heterogenous writing, a writing that is - to borrow from Schreber - 
'unmanned', At least with regard to Mrs. Dalloway, however, it may only be appropriate 
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to assert that she creates the conditions for the reception of such articulation, 
3. As, for example, hawthorn's approach would seem to suggest,, 
In Mrs, Galloway madness is seen both as a symbol and a result of alienation, 
Because madness does cut the individual off from other people, it is to be 
expected that many of the characteristics resulting from mental disorder may 
resemble those which result from a society which denies its members full human 
contact ,,, Septimus, in other words, has a very low level of ontological 
security,,, Septimus form of madness is simply loneliness intensified beyond the 
point of human endurance (1975,34-38), 
4. Tambling observes that the London of Mrs, Calloway suggests the very 'invention of 
tradition' is in progress, 
The phrase,,, underlines the important investment throughout Europe, in the last 
thirty years of the nineteenth century and up to 1914, the period of unification, 
imperialism and nationalism, in uniforms, regalia, monarchy, national anthems, 
processions and attempts in public buildings to create a sense of a weighty, 
considerable past, of an extensive history, The London described in Mrs, Galloway 
is the imperial centre,,, (1989,140), 
5, As Elaine Showalter observes, 
this parade of emotionally incapacitated men was in itself a shocking contrast to 
the heroic visions and masculinist fantasies that had preceded it, The public 
image of the Great War was one of strong unreflective masculinity,,, The great war 
was a crisis of masculinity and a trial of the Victorian masculine ideal (1981, 
171) 
She demonstrates the repression of disturbed subjective experience by such strictures 
as 'duty', 'honour' and 'patriotism', and traces the ways in which this war-time 
rhetoric led to male madness, though it was 'only an exaggeration of the male sex-role 
expectations, the self-control and emotional disguise of civilian life' (ibid,, 171), 
Showalter has pointed out the significance of its being named 'shell-shock' to distance 
it from the feminizing connotations of madness (ibid,, 172), 
6, The text was originally entitled The Hours, In her essay 'The Canonical Hours in 
Mrs, Dalloaa y' Harvena Richter ignores the imagery of violence associated with the 
regular chiming of London clocks throughout the book, to note Woolf's appreciation of 
rhythmn and cycles; she shows how time in Mri, Da! loway relates to the scheme of 
religious life, She proposes that the text observes 'the importance of time as a medium 
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in which selfhood and its psychological progressions are formed' (1982,240), The 
association of the clocks, if there is one, with monastic life would seem to emphasize 
rather restriction and discipline - subjugation to an authoritative God not beloved of 
Woolf (as evidenced in Miss Kilaan), 
7. In Three 6ulneas Woolf again aligns patriarchy, contemporary fascism and the male 
ego with war and destruction, Three 6ufneat is written in the form of a letter 
answering another sent by a man who asks how war could be prevented, Woolf writes, 'We 
can best help you to prevent war not by repeating your words and following your methods 
but by finding new words and creating new methods,,, ' (1938,260), She observes that 
The nature of manhood and the nature of womanhood are frequently defined both by 
Italian and German dictators, Both repeatedly insist that it is the nature of 
man and indeed the essence of manhood to fight (ibid., 326), 
8, In Three 6, vineas another more menacing erect figure emerges only partially 
obscuring a waste land, She proposes a picture of primary and absolute authority, a 
monolithic masculine ego; 
It is the figure of a man; some say, others deny, that he is Man himself, the 
quintessence of virility, the perfect type of which all the others are imperfect 
adumbrations, He is a man certainly, His eyes are glazed; his eyes glare, His 
body, which is braced in an unnatural position, is tightly cased in a uniform, 
Upon the breast of that uniform are sewn several medals and other mystic symbols. 
His hand is upon a sword, He is called in German and Italian Führer or Duct; in 
our own language Tyrant or Dictator. And behind him lie ruined houses and dead 
bodies (Woolf 1938,258). 
9, Jeremy Tambling makes some interesting points on the role of Big Ben in English 
society, pointing out that Woolf did not yet know 'the emotional power of its chimes 
heard on the wireless in the Second World War' which 'acted as a focus for the nation', 
He suggests that 'the novel startlingly anticipates this deployment of the clock for 
ideological ends' - and further as a powerful symbol in the age of the British 
Broadcasting Company, He proposes that: 
Time's expression is not to much the existentialist enemy in this novel, as a 
part of the language of state-power which is felt to be threatening and minatory, 
and which clothes itself in its architecture and statues (1989,139). 
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10, Drawing upon the work of post-structuralist and neo-Freudian feminist theorists 
Minow-Pinkney aptly develops this dimension in terms of the construction of language 
around the phallus as Signifier, 'the symbolic order, representation itself [is] made 
possible by the repression of "woman"' (1987,17), Woolf's attitude is comprehended by 
Minow-Pinkney in these terms: 'Though the masculine ego has constituted civilization as 
rational, at the same time it leads humanity to the destruction of world war by its 
rapacious aggression' (1987,64), In 'Seen from a Foreign Land' she comments on 
Woolf's later censure of World War II: 
Woolf's lament over the mass destructiveness of the Second World War was tempered 
by a resigned aloofness; for her it was a iarrmade mess, She hopes for the 
emergence of a new 'I', plunging into the semiotic (1990,176). 
11, For example: 
Diagrams, designs, little men and women brandishing sticks for arms, with wings - 
were they? - on their backs; circles traced round shillings and sixpences - the 
suns and stars; zigzagging precipices with mountaneers ascending roped together, 
exactly like knives and forks; sea pieces with little faces laughing out of what 
might perhaps be waves: the map of the world, Burn them! he cried, Now for his 
writings; how the dead sing behind the rhododendron bushes; odes to Time; 
conversations with Shakespeare; ,,, messages from the 
dead; do not cut down the 
trees; tell the prime minister, Universal love: the meaning of the world,,, 
(Woolf 1976,131) 
12, Minow-Pinkney says of Woolf's concern with the signifier, symbol, and meaning: 
The extent to which Woolf is playing with the conventions of novelistic 
interpretation is revealed as the aeroplane flies over London forming letters of 
smoke, presumably as an advertisement,,,, For this 'key' to all mythologies is 
doubtless the transcendental signifier or solution to the hermeneutic riddle of 
the novel, Woolf tantalizes us with its possibility only to withdraw at once, 
As narrator, she refuses an 'authoritarian' relation to her own novel (1987,59). 
She rejects 'the thetic self and master-codes' (ibid,, 59), The 'thetic' state may be 
taken to approximate to the paranoid state, the self subject to the tyranny of meaning 
production, the spectator watching the plane, speculating on its mission, decoding the 
immanent and transcendent significance manifest at every moment in the Word, 
13, Or suspended in what Minow-Pinkney calls a 'schizophrenic fragmentation' 
comparable to a Kristevan 'semiotic sea' of an authentic pre-rational state: 
Such devices serve to 'fluctuate' the unified, fixed positionality, to create 
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effects of non-linearity and multi-dimensionality. Woolf thereby seeks to 
adumbrate the realm anterior to the logical, integrating subjectivity (1987, 
161). 
14. For example, having accepted that 'the repression of the feminine is the very 
condition of the human subject's speech' (and despite having gone on to acknowledge and 
adopt Kristeva's anti-essentialist stance which distinguishes the feminine from the 
seriiotic or pre-Oedipal phase), Minow-Pinkney says of Rhoda in the Yives that she 
suffers 'a dispersal of pathological proportions', marks out a 'locus of feminine 
space' and represents an 'infinitely decentred' discourse (1987,183), Woolf's 
writing, and her treatment of psychotic states, have come to be seen as an avant-garde 
manifestation of the concerns of current 'feminist' theory (Kristeva may not strictly 
function under this aegis). Dennis Brown observes that the 
fragmenting self becomes very much a deconstruction of male presumption and the 
new discourse of selfhood appears as a 'feminized' or 'androgynous' style 
expressive of fluidity. versatility and holistic wholeness (1989,179). 
'Male presumption' and "feminine space' are as much Woolf's polemical tools (as 
opposed to the authentic psychic material found lyrically expressed in the text) as 
they are of these recent critics. 
4. Dissolution in Samuel Beckett's the Unna, atJj 
1, Watt was so busy doing this, moving his hat to and fro behind him, that he 
neither saw, not heard, the door open and a gentlemen come in. So his suprise 
was extreme,,, 
And when Arsene has finished talking, 
the man standing sideways in the kitchen doorway looking at him became two men 
standing sideways in two kitchen doorways looking at him,,, (Beckett 1963,40) 
2, Watt is supposed to give the left-over food to the dog, but there is no dog, so 
Watt sets about reasoning one into existence (not without nonsensical interruptions 
from his voices): 'By what means then, were the dog and the food to be brought 
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together,,, Watt now passed on to the manner in which this problem had been solved' 
(Beckett 1963,90), 
3, Defined by Genette as, 'the producing narrative action and, by extension, the whole 
of the real or fictional situation in which that action takes place' (1980,27), the 
generating instance of narrative discourse' (1980,213). 
4, Hugh Culik offers an interesting perspective on the significance of the piano- 
tuners, the Galls, in this context,, 
These figures precipitate Watt's collapse by discovering that a set of internal 
external correspondences is random, They are piano tuners and find Mr, Knott's 
piano in such disrepair that it must be abandoned,,, The voice of the piano cannot 
be restored because its internal strings do not connect with the keys,,, the 
random relation between the piano's inner strings and outer keys suggests the 
tenuous relation language builds between the self and the world (1983,61). 
Culik notes that Beckett may be alluding to name of Franz Joseph Gall - who with John 
Kaspar Spurheim wrote an article called 'Cerveau' (1819) in the Dictionnairs des 
Sciences Hedicale5 this was the 'first reported localization of speech' in the brain, 
Gall was the founder of phrenology, instituting the beginnings of aphasiology, Culik's 
essay traces Beckett's apparently very accurate use of scientific disciplines 
especially of neurology and psychology, 
5. As is argued in God, The Quest, The Hero, by Laura Barge (1988). 
6. This argument is further discussed in the appendix, under the heading 'Further 
Linguistic Approaches', 
7, As Brian McHale argues, ' The Unnaeable foregrounds the fundamental ontological 
discontinuity between the fictional and the real,,, ' (1987,13), 
8, As J. D, Arana records, 'next to a hypersensitive emotional disposition, a feeling 
of indifference or an emotional bluntness may coexist' (1978,134), 
9, Milner writes of her analysee, Susan 
was still living entirely in her head, and she still had no feelings,,, 
Frequently in these sessions she would sit with tears streaming down her face as 
she cried, 'Give me back my feelings', but all the time insisting that the tears 
came only from her head (1988,26). 
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10, For example: 
But the eye, let's leave him his eye too, it's to see with, this great wild black 
and white eye, moist, its to weep with,,, tears gush from it practically without 
ceasing, why is not known, nothing is known, whether it's with rage, or whether 
it's with grief, the fact is there, perhaps it's the voice that makes it weep, 
with rage, or some other passion, or at having to see, from time to time, some 
sight or other (331). 
Then there is the way of flowing of my tears which flow all over my face, and 
even down along the kneck, in a way it seems to me they could not do if the face 
were bowed (279), 
I feel my tears coursing over my chest, my sides, and all down my back, Ah yes, 
I am truly bathed in tears, They gather in my beard (279), 
Labyrinthine torment that can't be grasped, or limited, or felt, or suffered, no, 
not even suffered,,, Next instalment quick, No cries, above all no cries, be 
urbane, a credit to the art and code of dying, while the others cackle, I can 
hear them from here, like the crackling of thorns, no, I forgot, it's impossible, 
it's myself I hear, howling behind my dissertation (Beckett 1979,288). 
5. Antinarrative and the Schizoid Text, Jean Hyvrard's Nothgop Deith 
Hyvrard has been characterized by Laurie Edson as 'one of the strongest feminist 
voices to emerge in France in recent years' (Hyvrard 1988,111), Twelve years elapsed, 
however, before this text was made available in translation; years in which French 
feminist thought continued to evolve and contribute significantly to the main trends of 
current feminist criticism. Such thought, identifiable as a major influence in 
Hyvrard's text, is seen as relevant to this thesis (where other 'feminisms' are not 
here taken on board) in that it links in to the project via its particular emphasis 
upon textuality, Hyvrard's work can be said to be rooted in what has been labelled 
'second wave feminism'. 
Bearing in mind that the fallout from 'French' feminist critical theory is 
constrained by no national boundary, it is nevertheless the case that this other 
key strand of the 'second wave' originated in France, Deriving from Simone de 
Beauvoir's perception of woman as 'the Other' to man,,, sexuality (together with 
class and race) is identified as a binary opposition (man/woman, black/white) 
which registers 'difference' between groups of people - differences which are 
manipulated socially and culturally in ways which cause one group to dominate or 
oppress another, French feminist theoreticians in particular, in seeking to 
break down conventional, male-constructed stereotypes of sexual difference, have 
focused on language as at once the domain in which such stereotypes are 
structured, and evidence of the liberating sexual difference which may be 
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described in a specifically 'women's language' (Seiden and Viddowson 1993,222). 
"other Death offers a narrative (or antinarrative) which explores the oppression and 
liberation of woman through language, 
2, See also appendix, 'Jacques Lacan and Language', for further comment upon Lacan's 
theorisation of the signifying mechanisms of language, 
3. For a fuller discussion of Laing's work in this regard see appendix, 'R, D. Laing 
and Anti-Psychiatry', The impact of such thought is also readdressed in the 
conclusion, in the context of its influence upon late twentieth century fiction and 
criticism. 
4, This is further explored in rho Newly Born iVoaan, For example: 
Man 
Woman 
Always the same metaphor: we follow it, it carries us, beneath all its 
figures, wherever dicourse is organized, If we read or speak, the same thread or 
double braid is leading us throughout literature, philosophy, criticism, 
centuries of representation and reflection. 
Thought has always worked through opposition,,. 
Through dual, hierarchical oppositions, Supertor/Inferior, Myths, legends, 
books, Everywhere (where) ordering intervenes, where a law organizes what is 
thinkable by oppositions (dual, irreconcilable; or subletable, dialectical), And 
all these pairs of oppositions are couples, Does that mean something? Is the 
fact that Logocentrism subjects thought - all concepts, codes and values - to the 
binary system, related to the couple sin/woman? (Cixous and Cl&a, nt 1986,64), 
5, In this work Irigaray, like Hyvrard, transgresses - or eliminates - boundaries; 
between theory and fiction, sanity and madness, 'The Looking Glass, from the Other 
Side' (the first chapter) is, like Mother Depth, a textual performance that exposes the 
sense-making function of language as in league with masculine power structures (law, 
property, division, deferentiation, control); 
So he cokes (back) in. It's tea tide. She,,, She? She who? 0015 she? She (is) 
an other,,, looking for a light. i/here's a light? Upstairs, in the bedrooe, the 
surveyor, the tall one, points out cheerfully, Pleased at last to cone across a 
specific, unquestionable, verifiable fact, Pleased that he can prove it 
(hieself) using afb, or 1f1, that is, an element that repeats itself, one 
that stays the same and yet produces a displacecent in the sum, pleased that its 
a matter of series, of a sequence, In short of a story, Night as well say it's 
true, That he,,, ? That she? gas? hasn't? She (Iri9arey 1985,12). 
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irigaray suggests that narrative logic is an expression of male sexuality, She 
counters the 'Male' desire to impose order (contiguous with the unity of the phallus) 
with the notion of female sexual plurality; 
The one of form, of the individual, of the (male) sex organ, of the proper name, 
of the proper meaning,,, supplants, while separating and dividing, that contact of 
at least two lips (lips) which keeps woman in touch with herself, but without any 
possibility of distinguishing what is touching from what is touched, 
Whence the mystery that woman represents in a culture claiming to count 
everything, to number everything by units, to inventory everything as 
individualities, She is neither one nor two, Rigorously speaking, she cannot he 
identified as one person, or as two, She resists all adequate definition, 
further, she has no 'proper' name, And her sexual organ, which is not one organ, 
is counted as none, The negative, the underside, the reverse of the 
only visible and morphologically designatable organ (ibid,, 26). 
6, As Foucault says in his preface to iladness and Civilization, 'I have not tried to 
write the history of that language (the monologue conducted by science about madness], 
but rather the archaeology of that silence [that of madness]' (1967, xiii), 
7, Cixous also speaks of this language or 'Voice' in terms of the lost nother(tongue): 
The Voice sings from a time before law, before the Symbolic took one's breath 
away and reappropriated it into language under its authority of separation,,, In 
woman there is always, more or less, something of 'the mother' repairing and 
feeding, resisting separation, a force that does not let itself be cut off but 
that runs codes ragged,,. Text, my body: traversed by lilting flows,,. Voice: milk 
that could go on forever. Found again. The lost mother/bitter-lost (Cixous and 
Clement 1986,93), 
8, Such reflexivity is evidenced for example, in what almost amounts to the refrain 
of: 
It all boils down to a question of words, I must not forget this, I have 
forgotten it, But I must have said this before, since I say it now, I have to 
speak in a certain way,,, (Beckett 1979,308). 
9. He suggests that what has been happening to madness in Western culture since the 
medieval era, and more profoundly since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when 
attempts at the rational explanation of madness began (the birth of the asylum, the 
initiation of modern psychiatric theory) has been crucial to the production of the 
modern, oppressed 'subject', He also uses this 'silence of madness', as David Carroll 
observes, to claim for his work 'the power to situate all previous historical and 
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philosophical methodologies and systems and denounce their reductive strategies of 
analysis and exclusion' (Carroll 1987,108); evidently a useful precedent for the 
feminist project of reclamation under discussion here , Foucault's own critical 
perspective is positioned, Carroll says, in such a way as to be so marginal, so 
disrespectful to tradition, that it cannot be situated, in its turn, by anything - by 
any history, ideology, or language - by anything that is, but itself and the 
'disruptive discourses with which it identifies itself" (ibid,, 108), 
10, Phillip Martin has traced the literary history of the representation of had women 
in prose and poetry, and connected them with the ongoing 'scientific' discourse about 
the nature of women carried forward by patriarchy, Martin observes, referring to the 
growth of psychiatric and medical thought from the eighteenth century onward; 
if this body of discourse could be taken as a reservoir of its society's beliefs 
and practices, then we would be left in no doubt that it had a deeply established 
belief in the special proneness of woman to insanity, which went so far as to see 
it as a condition constantly attending her biological and social state (Martin 
1987,28), 
Martin suggests that, traditionally, 'woman and madness share the same territory,,, they 
may be said to enter a concentric relationship around a central point occupied by a 
fundamentally male normality' (ibid,, 42), 
11, The abiding preoccupation with anti-psychiatric thought is also evidenced in 
Deleuze and Guattari's later Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia where they 
recommend a 'schizoid ideal' and the taking on of 'the utter innocence of madness' 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1984,17), The requirement is passivity, acquiescence in an 
esoteric, self-constructed myth of eternal split-off-nm from a sense of being real in 
a real world, 
12, Jameson's ideas are further dicussed in the conclusion, He is concerned to 
develop a political view of the relation between capitalism and the postmodern 
condition, He uses the idea of the schizophrenic as descriptive of the plight of the 
subject thoroughly inhabited and fragmented by the cultural processes of late 
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capitalism, 
13, This contrasts with his later use of the idea of schizophrenia discussed in the 
conclusion of this thesis, 
14, As Hekman argues in 6ender and Knowledge, 
Feminism, because it challenges the modernist, Enlightenment epistemology, is an 
intellectual ally of postmodernism,,, the feminist critique extends the postmodern 
critique of rationalism by revealing its gendered character (1990,2 and 6) 
15, The Fostrodern Condition has become, according to Fraser and Nicholson, the 'locus 
clessicus for contemporary debates' with regard to the relation between postmodernism 
and feminism, Lyotard's delegitimised metanarratives include 'Hegel's dialectic of 
spirit coming to know itself', and 'Marx's drama of the forward march of human 
productive capacities via class conflict culminating in proletarian revolution', These 
are themselves legitimated in the 'Enlightenment story of the gradual but steady 
progress of reason and freedom' (Fraser and Nicholson 1990,22); in which presumably 
Lyotard would also implicate feminism, since; 
For Lyotard, the illegitimate genres include large-scale historical narrative and 
social-theoretical analyses of pervasive relations of dominance and subordination 
(ibid., 25) 
16, As Mark Philp says of Foucault, 
His philosophy is rooted in story-telling and in action, His histories,,, art 
fictions which seek to forge connections, establish relationships and transgress 
the established order and unity of discourse (1990,79), 
He goes on to suggest that Foucault's strategy may be 
considered coercive, in that it is concerned with producing effects rather than 
with rational argument and persuasion. But this misses the fact that if we are 
disturbed by what he says it is because his fictions are recognised as familiar, 
It is as if they bring to awarness our inchoate experience of life in the modern 
State (ibid,, 80), 
17. Schreber appropriated this mechanism with some success, his fictional 
interpretative system allowing him, is he thought, to bring about the reinstitution of 
his masculinity with his reason (see chapter 1): 
The scales of victory are coming down on my side more and more, the struggle 
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against me continues to lose its hostile character (Schreber 1988,214). 
18, Commenting upon Hegel's version of historical 'progress' she seems to see it both 
as a legitimation of male oppression, of oppression perpetrated by  en in many forms, 
and equally as an adequate description of history. 
That is what masters do: they have their slaves made to order. Line for line, 
they assemble the machine and keep the alternator supplied so that it reproduces 
all the oppositions that make economy and thought run (1987,71). 
19, Freud realized this to be the case with Schreber's H,. oirs (see page 26 of this 
thesis), He saw that if the paranoid system admitted of no psychoanalytical 
intervention, neither did the interpretation of it need to take into account the 'real 
person' living through 'real events'; thus, ironically, Freud was able to allow the 
Memoirs to form the foundational construction which generated (or supplemented) his own 
influential thought system (Morton Schatznan's Laingian critique takes Freud's 
interpretation to task over this, in Soul Murder; 1973), This is further discussed 
under the heading 'Freud and Narrative' in the appendix to this thesis. Schatzman's 
analysis is also discussed here under 'R, 0, Laing and Anti-psychiatry'. 
i, Bradbury and Ro see this questioning as fundamental to modernist experiment: 
Before modernism there was a period of linguistic innocence when it was believed 
that language could conform to reality or nature like a second skin,,, the snake 
in this Eden was the discovery of the arbitrary nature of the sign; in Saussure's 
fatal vision of separation the worlds of discourse and things split apart, a 
process already imaginatively anticipated by the novels of James, Proust, Woolf 
and Joyce (1987,41). 
I would not go so far as to posit a linguistic Eden (indeed it appears, as I hope to 
have shown, that the sign was suspected of being arbitrary and was explored as such in 
prose narrative before the advent of 'modernism'), Yet the acceptance of the arbitrary 
nature of the sign must be considered as implicated in, if not fundamental to 
characteristic features of later fictional uses of madness, 
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2. Vonnegut introduces his work: 'This Is a novel somewhat in the telegraphic 
schizophrenic manner of tales.,, ' 1970, title page), This apparently anti-war, 'space- 
opera' text is Schreberesque in the proliferation of aural and visual hallucinatory 
experience, and post-modern in its disruption of temporal and spatial orientation and 
narrative process, 
3. Scott Sanders attributes the paranoid core of Pynchon's fiction to the condition of 
the Puritan mind in the modern world, and finds it 'rooted in a theology from which God 
has withdrawn' (1986,140): 'paranoia is the last retreat of the Puritan 
imagination,,, Thomas Pynchon, whose novels confront us with every degree of paranoia 
from the private to the cosmic, offers the most thoroughgoing example within literature 
of this mentality' (ibid., 149). God, as he points out, is the original conspiracy 
theory, Pynchon writes in 6ravit. v's R'inbow that 'Paranoia,,, is the onset, the leading 
edge, of the discovery that everything is connected, everything in the Creation.,, ' 
(1975,703). Sanders's analysis of Pynchon suggests a strong resemblance between the 
structures inherent in Hogg's Confessions and those in 6ravity's Rainbov, His 
schematic listing of the religious features of the work serves briefly to elucidate 
this link. Sanders explains that he is attempting to demonstrate that, 'the mental 
structures implicit in Pynchon's fiction reproduce dominant features of Calvinist and 
Puritan doctrine -a kinship of which he takes note in 6rarit, v's Rainbow, The 
analogues which have emerged in my argument might be schematically listed as follows', 
I will partly reproduce Sanders's arrangement here, as it is of some help in 'plotting' 
the links between a post-modern work and an early nineteenth century Gothic narrative., 
Pvnchon Puritanism 
paranoia faith 
cosmic conspiracy God's plan 
Gravity God's will 
membership in the firm election 
exclusion from conspiracy preterition 
remote control grace 
binary vision theism/atheism 
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decadence of history depravity of man 
paranoid self-reference personal salvation 
the Zero Last Judgement (Sanders 1986,154) 
This paranoid Meaning-mechanism at work in Gravity's Ralnbov displays similarities to 
those of Wringhim in Hogg's Confessions, Where Puritan religion was the system at work 
behind the scenes in this text, Sanders points to the basis of Pynchon's paranoia in 
the mystifying network of power relations governing the individual in a technocratic, 
totally administered, automated late twentieth century Western society (itself arguably 
a paranoid conception), However, as I will propose, Pynchon offers a world too 
unstable even to sustain a paranoid delusion, 
4, Oedipa Maas in The Crying of Lot 4. for example, constantly experiences herself as 
the passive and confused victim of some kind of delusional, omniscient and omnipotent 
system, which she must continually struggle to understand: 
The ordered swirl of houses and streets, from this high angle, sprang at her now 
with the same unexpected astonishing clarity as the circuit card had, Though she 
new even less about radios than about Southern Californians, there were to both 
outward patterns a hieroglyphic sense of concealed meaning, of an intent to 
communicate. There'd seemed no limit to what the printed circuit could have told 
her (if she had tried to find out); so in her first minute of San Narciso, a 
revelation also trembled Just past the threshold of her understanding (1966,15). 
Oedipa searches for ways of integrating the chaotic events of her life into a 
mysteriously organized and connected series: 
Things then did not delay in turning curious, If one object behind her discovery 
of what she was to label the Tristero System or often only the Tristero (as if it 
might be something's secret title) were to bring to an end her encapsulation in 
her tower, then that night's infidelity with Metzger would logically be the 
starting point for it; logically, That's what would cone to haunt her most, 
perhaps: the way it fitted, logically, together, As if (as she'd guessed that 
first minute in San Narciso) there were revelation in progress all around her 
(1966,29). 
S. Outside the 'System' at the heart of which is the rocket, is an anarchic area 
called the 'Zone', In his analysis of the text Tony Tanner describes the functions of 
these states; 'as figures move between System and Zone, to they oscillate between 
paranoia and anti-paranoia, shifting from a seething blank of unmeaning to the sinister 
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apparent legibility of an unconsoling labyrinthine pattern or plot' (1982,81), 
6, Sanders (see above) states that: 
The rainbow of Gravity is the trajectory of matter, from order to disorder, a 
process remorseless and irreversible... Gravity becomes the paranoid God, wreaking 
destruction upon an entire cosmos imagined, in Puritan terms, as innately 
depraved, There are no possibilities for grace in this metaphysic: it is 
Calvinist theology conceived in the mode of perdition rather than salvation 
(1986,150-151). 
Yet 'anti-paranoia' is a condition which denies this theology, Damnation is not, as 
Sanders proposes, the equivalent of a state of unmeaning or non-being for the 
individual, The psychomachia that torments Wringhin in the Confessions renders 
Wringhim of total significance to himself and to the cosmos, Were he to be damned he 
would join Gil Martin (the Devil figure that tempts him) 'raging with despair at his 
fallen and decayed majesty' (Hogg 1969,239), not dispersed into oblivion, The 
immanent destruction of the earth is represented by Pynchon as a terrifyingly 
reassuring possibility for the paranoid who needs to believe in process, parabola, 
system, beginning and end, causality, reason, the evidence of self through positing its 
potential destruction, the truth of the world by positing its unavoidable demolition; 
but this is not the whole story: 'If there is something comforting - religious, if you 
want - about paranoia, there is also anti-paranoia' (Pynchon 1975,434), The 
destruction or damnation that Sanders equates with paranoia is an essential part of the 
delusional system (as in Schreber), The destruction that Pynchon finally envisions 
entails the more terrible dissolution of this delusional system itself, the failure of 
those binary possibilities, 
7, The fragile, precious 'inner self' is violated by some kind of totalitarian 
pressure; 'The humanist position is not to plug in flowers - to let them alone, 
Humanists believe in letting everything alone to be what it is, insofar as possible. 
The new electric awareness, however, requires that flowers be plugged in,,. ' (1970, 
136), The text possesses a vivid visionary quality, gripped at once by a sensation of 
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crisis and a lack of affect. Feelings are not appropriately connected to potentially 
traumatic instances, The impression that something momentous has happened may be 
presented in a flat, surreal, anecodotal fashion, 'A great waiter died,,, the body was 
poached', Or again; 
A dream: I am looking at a ship, an ocean-going vessel,,, it is caked with rust, 
And it is not in the rater, the whole immense bulk of it sits on dry land, 
Furthermore it is loaded with high explosives which  ay go off at any moment, My 
task is to push the ship through a narrow mountain pass whose cliffs rush forward 
threateningly (Barthelme 1970,139). 
The narrator hears disconnectedly the voice of a nun saying 'it is not that we don't 
believe that your renunciation of the world is real, We believe it is real' (ibid., 
147), The suggestion of crisis begins to take on epiphanic form (similar to the manner 
in which Joyce's Gabriel in 'The Dead' perceives the prevalence of snow all over 
Ireland): 
Oh there's brain damage in the east, and brain damage in the west, and upstairs 
there's brain damage and downstairs there's brain damage, and in my lady's 
parlour - brain damage, Brain damage is widespread,,. And you can hide under the 
bed but brain damage is under the bed, and you can hide in the universities but 
they are the very seat and soul of brain damage,,, Brain damage caused by art, I 
could describe it better if I weren't afflicted with it (ibid., 148), 
8, As Couturier and Durand have observed, the asylum in which Beckett locates his 
characters takes shape inexplicitly in Barthelme's work as a cumulative effect of the 
bedlam he invokes: 
The absence of cross-references in these fragments makes it impossible to decide 
whether or not it is the same speaker who is uttering all these 'l't and 'we's, 
These fragments could be the rational utterances made on various occasions by a 
sane person, or a collage of statements made by a group of speakers, or the 
irrational utterances made at some particular time by a madman, The last 
interpretation seems the most logical, since the fiction is apparently about 
madness,.. as we read through Barthelme's stories, novels and visual collages, we 
have the uncanny feeling that someone is showing us around a lunatic asylum 
(1982,1$). 
9, Instead of heading toward the unknown lands at the pole, however, Watkins is 
concerned with moving between the Northern and Southern equatorial currents, 'around 
and around and around,,, ' (Lessing 1971,19), The mode of narration mimics the 
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movement of the voyage, it is not linear and sequential but fragmentary and more 
clearly reflecting a flow of psychic images; as Watkins explains to 'Doctor Y' in the 
initial exchange between them, 'I'n not going. I'm being taken, The current' (ibid,, 
19), At first Watkins provides a succession of geographical reference points, but 
loses sight of these as he becomes concerned with expressing an unfamiliar reality: 
We were four days out from shore, the current swinging us along fair and easy, 
the wind coming from the North on to our right cheeks, when Charles, who was on 
lookout, called us forward and there it ras. Or, there they were, Now if you 
ask how it is we knew, then you are without feeling for the sympathies of our 
imaginations in waiting for just this moment. And that must mean that you 
yourselves have not yet learned that in waiting for Them lies all your hope, No, 
it is not true that we had imagined it in just such a form, We had not said or 
thought, ever: They will be shaped like birds or be forms of light walking on the 
waves,,, (Lessing 1971,21). 
10, The narrative mode is also comparable, As Keitel observes of Watkin's style, it 
'impedes the reader's efforts to build consistency' due to its use of 'a language 
similar to that of dreams, a lack of contextualization, and frequent, unmotivated 
alternation between tenses' (1989,97), The alternating, split narrative structure 
(the 'insane', subjective narrative being framed by a series of documents creating an 
objective 'sane' perspective upon the central protagonist) recalls Hogg's narrative 
strategy, However, the effect produced is one of inverting the implied hierarchy, The 
narrative of Watkin's experience ceases about half-way through the book, and is 
replaced by the collation of letters from family and acquaintances, apparently 
accumulated by Watkin's doctor in an attempt to help him reconstruct his past and his 
personality, Their arrangement, however, is non-sequential and erratic, the 
information they provide about Watkins, his character and relationships, is 
disorientating and unhelpful, It is impossible for the reader to build the connections 
between these, in relation to Watkin's own account, that would allow for the 
reconstruction of Watkin's personality; the conditions are not established that permit 
even the possibility of the 'psychotic' account being interpreted through, or becoming 
integrated into a 'reality' validated beyond the psychic, subjective reality presented 
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in the patient's account, 
The scientific voice is undifferentiated from and over-ridden by the intense, 
detailed, and disorientated account given by the 'patient' of his psychotic experience, 
It is 'readable' in the sense that it is written cogently, 'unreadable' in the sense 
that it defies recuperation, It is open to the objection that it is 'lacking' in 
authenticity, because, like Gilman's text, it can continue to be coherently told whilst 
the protagonist undergoes psychotic experience, but this coherence is more apparent 
than actual, 
11, For example; 
On the surface of the little Earth, a little green film, and part and parcel with 
this film, being fed by it, the crust of microbes, mankind, mad, moonmad, 
lunatick, To celestial eyes seen like a broth of microbes under a 
microscope,,, these mad microbes say 1, I1I1I, 1, for saying 1, I, 1,1 is their 
madness this is where they have been struck lunatic, made moonmad, round the 
bend, crazy,,, some sort of divorce there has been somewhere along the long path 
of this race of man between the 'I' and the 'We', some sort of a terrible falling 
away, and I (who am not I. but part of a whole composed of other human beings as 
they are of me) hovering here,,, feel as if I am spinning back (though it may be 
forwards, who knows? yes spinning back into vortex of terror, like a birth in 
reverse,,, (Lessing 1971,103). 
12. This point is strengthened by the anonymous appendix, 'AFTERWORD, OR END-PAPER: A 
Small, Relevant Reminiscence' (a short statement under this heading, succeeding the 
last letter a the end of the book). This piece deals with the narrative instance of 
the text, The 'author', or editor (responsible for the collation of Watkins memoirs 
and the other documents) turns out to have known somebody (Watkins? ) and to have baud 
a story (becoming a rejected film script) upon the experience of that friend, This 
narrator tells of how the script was sent to two doctors, in order that the 
protagonist's illness could be identified for the purpose of producing the film (the 
script was rejected because the producers could not understand what was supposed to be 
wrong with him). The two doctors both gave very authoritative diagnoses of the man, 
each in total disagreement with the other. This anecdote is, it seems, provided to 
indicate to what extent the most respected Harley Street doctor has not come close to 
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'the truth' about psychotic experience, 
13, Thomas Szasz objected to Laing's work as promoting a 'cult of authenticity', 
As in psychiatry the core concept, the sacred symbol, is 'schizophrenia', so in 
anti-psychiatry it is 'authenticity', In the former view, what the schizophrenic 
has less of than other people is the ability to 'test reality'; in the latter 
view, what the schizophrenic has more of than other people is 'authenticity' 
(1976,57). 
14, Some time after the bulk of this project was completed McHale published a book 
entitled Constructing Postc, odernis, (1992), which continues his application of the 
terminology of psychopathology to postmodernist texts, Most significantly, with regard 
to the concerns of this thesis, he develops a theory of paranoid reading in the light 
of works by Umberto Eco and Thomas Pynchon (McHale 1992,165-185), He suggests that 
the typical postmodernist reader has been trained in the institutionalised art of 
paranoid reading, 
15, I will not be tracing the evolution of this kind of thought as it emerges from 
marxist theory, firstly because I am concerned here only with recognizing the 
intellectual popularity of insanity in a broad sense, and secondly because, where 
comments upon contemporary culture invoke insanity it seems that any political agenda 
has been largely submerged (history stops at late-capitalism as it 'implodes' into 
insanity, or anarchy), 
16. The primary cure being the falsifying of subjectivity as it is constructed by the 
myths of psychoanalysis and the capitalist system, Deleuze and Guattari combine ideas 
from Freud and Marx to redefine the postmodern 'subject' as a 'desiring machine', They 
identify two kinds of desire: the paranoid and the schizophrenic, They equate paranoia 
with authority and fascism, the schizophrenic with revolution, Wire, liberation, 
These are warring factions not only in the body politic but in the mind; there is no 
inside/outside, but a continuum between these zones, Freudian psychoanalysis is 
identified with paranoia, It is a 'mastering' discourse, always reducing the 
productions of the analysand to one plot, the story of Oedipus and the Phallus. Any 
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form of interpretation, for Deleuze and Guattari, is bad because it rewrites and 
imposes limitations, Psychoanalysis is particularly pernicious in that it is founded 
upon interpretation, It artificially 'constructs' a 'centred' subject, it entraps the 
decentred subject (the fragmented self in flux, that 'consumes and consummates each of 
the states through which it passes, and is born of each of them anew', made of part 
objects and itself part of other machines of desire, Deleuze and 6uattari 1984,40) in 
a rigidified text, They take the case of Schreber as an illustration, discussing the 
'flattening out of Judge Schreber's delireum' (ibid,, 86) by Freud's post-mortem 
rewriting: 'lt should be noted that Judge Schreber's destiny was not merely that of 
being sodomized, while still alive, by the rays from heaven, but also that of being 
posthumously oedipalized by Freud' (ibid,, 87), By this critical process they in fact 
transform (re-interpret? ) Schreber the paranoiac into Schreber the schizophrenic, not 
as diagnosis of pyschosis but in celebration of his authenticity, They implicitly re- 
contextualize Schreber's experience within the anti-psychiatric discourse originally 
promoted by R, 0, Laing, They idealize Schreber as both victim and revolutionary, 
17. Jameson builds here upon Lacan's description of schizophrenia as the breakdown of 
the relationship between signifiers: 
Schizophrenic experience is an experience of isolated, disconnected, 
discontinuous material signifiers which fail to link up into a coherent sequence, 
The schizophrenic thus does not know personal identity in our sense, since our 
feeling of identity depends upon our sense of the persistence of the 'I' and the 
'me' over time (Jameson 1983,119), 
He asserts that the experience of the postmodern self is analogous to that of the 
schizophrenic in the complete loss of any sense of continuity, historicity, and 
reality, He observes that Beckett's narratives are 'of this order'; 
most notably Watt, where a primacy of the present sentence in time ruthlessly 
disintegrates the narrative fabric that attempts to reform around it (Jameson 
1984,73), 
In this essay he states that he will, 
take up in turn the following constitutive features of the post-modern: a new 
depthlessness, which finds its prolongation both in contemporary 'theory' and a 
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whole new culture of the image or the siaulacrum; a consequent weakening of 
historicity, both in our relationship to public history and in the new forms of 
our private temporality, whose 'schizophrenic' structure (following Lacan) will 
determine new types of syntax or syntagmatic relationships in the more temporal 
arts (1984,58), 
18, Where the theory of this condition has already eliminated the subject as a 
presence or unity, fiction provides a mode of experiencing the process of this 
elimination, Postmodern fiction is dramatic and performative (in a way that some 
theoretical texts, for example that of Anti-Oedipus aspire to being), It puts on a 
'play' which requires the audience, the reader searching for meaning, to submit to the 
text, to be mastered by the text instead of mastering the text, In his discussion of 
the theory of the text Barthes discusses the way in which this theory should accept 
processes of word-play, 'white writing' ('which thwarts and deceives connotations'), 
irrational variations of person and tense, 'the continuous subversion of the relation 
between writing and reading; and in doing so reintroduces the subject as 'a cloven 
subject, ceaselessly displaced - and undone - by the presence-absence of his 
unconscious' (Barthes 1981,44-45), This theory he gives the status of a science, and 
posits a text which - as for Jameson - is the site of release; 'it is a science of 
'jouissance', any 'textual' text (one that has entered into the field of 'signifiance') 
tends ultimately to provoke or to live the loss of consciousness (the annulment) that 
the subject assumes fully in erotic enjoyment,,, ' (ibid., 45), 'Signifiance', Barthes 
explains, is 'that radical work (which leaves nothing intact) through which the subject 
explores how language works him and undoes him as soon as he stops observing it and 
enters it, 'Signifiance', unlike signification, cannot be reduced to communication, to 
representation, to expression: it puts the (writing or reading) subject into the text, 
not as a projection,,, but as a 'loss',,, Whence its identification with 'jouissance': it 
is through the concept of 'signifiance' that the text becomes erotic' (ibid,, 38), 
'Signifiance' then involves the dissipation of the subject into Lecercle's 'madness 
that inhabits language' (1985,74), theoretically, 'a creature at the mercy of the 
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monarchical Signifier' (Barthes 1981,59,67), 
Barthes theory of 'white writing' correlates with Jameson's observation of 
schizophrenia as a 'basic feature' of the postmodernism artifact,, 
Schizophrenic experience is an experience of isolated, disconnected, 
discontinuous material signifiers which fail to link up into a coherent sequence, 
The schizophrenic thus does not know personal identity in our sense, since 
feeling of identity depends on our sense of the persistence of the 'I' and the 
'me' over time (Jameson 1983,119). 
Working with grafts of theories of psychosis and language, both Barthes and Jameson 
theorize a hypothetical, liberational species of (fictional) text which serves in turn 
to illustrate theories of textuality and subjectivity, 
19, As Peter Dews says: 
Post-structuralisms can be understood as the point at which the 'logic of 
disintegration' penetrates into the thought which attempts to comprehend it, 
resulting into a plurality of inconsistent logics, The results of this defensive 
mimetic adaption can be seen not only in the internal incoherences of different 
post-structuralist positions, but also in their complementary onesidedness (1937, 
231-2), 
Psychosis (or an intellectual paradigm of it) is open to being used, outside of 
fiction, in the creation of a 'sovereign form of discourse' (108), as a weapon 'against 
the postulates of consciousness, reason, transcendence, continuity, totality, 
dialectics, subjectivity, authorship, etc', testifying by its mere existence to the 
'reductive, coercive effects of the systems of thought organized according to these 
concepts' (ibid,, 109), 
20, In the Middle Ages and until the Renaissance, man's dispute with madness was 
a dramatic debate in which he confronted the secret powers of the world' the 
experience of madness was clouded by images of the Fall and the Will of God, 
of the Beast and the Metamorphosis, and of all the marvellous secrets of 
Knowledge, In our era, the experience of sadness remains silent in the 
composure of a knowledge which, knowing too much about madness, forgets it 
(Foucault 1967, xiv), 
21. This shift has been analysed in terms of Nietzsche's announcement of the death of 
God (in 1882), The death of God; 
is but a metaphor for man's loss of belief in an absolute, transcendent source of 
significance for the phenomena of his immediate reality and for the self, The transcendent deity supported the dualist opposition between the self and an 
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objectified - hence 'external' - reality, since it sustained an opposition of 
spirit and matter, Heaven and Earth, and mind and body; its disappearance meant 
the collapse of these oppositions (Craige 1982,16), 
God may be assumed to have been dwindling since before Nietzsche proclaimed his demise, 
but Craige traces the exacerbation of the crisis of signification, of the growing 
incapacity to separate 'self' from 'other', to delineate with assurance the contours of 
reality, through the contributions of Darwin's Origin of the Species, Einstein's theory 
of relativity, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, Bergson's relativity of perception, 
Saussure's theory of the sign, and Derrida's 'deconstructionist' elaboration upon the 
work of Saussure. Freud would be included in this pantheon because, as Catherine 
Belsey says, he is thought of as having brought about a Copernican revolution in 
challenging the Cartesian basis of liberal humanism, the concept of personality 
determined by conscious subjectivity, the transcendent mind of the unique individual' 
(Belsey 1980,130), 
22, Stevenson's 'The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr, Hyde', for example, quite 
clearly aligns Jekyll's murderous counterpart with religiously conceived evil (or even 
possession), but links the division to the effects of a chemical drug, At the time it 
was written the author could not have been aware of the more sophisticated language we 
now have to describe it. The story alternates, on the one hand characterizing the 
split as coterminous with the opposition between good and evil in man which moves the 
events into a supernatural domain, and on the other as residing in his supposed (after 
Darwin) primitive and civilized selves, which shifts them back into the realm of 
contemporary science, It nevertheless deals with ideas that have contributed to modern 
clinical discourse, It was already possible to isaglne a self split in a form 
accessible to science (psychology later developed a technical vocabulary which as R. D. 
Laing says 'split man up verbally' (Laing 1965,19), 
23, 
The recognition of the absence of a transcendent deity is the recognition that 
the meaning tan has found in the world has been the meaning he imposed upon it, 
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by creating abstractions, whether theological, philosophical, social or 
psychological, And the abstractions by which he has separated himself from the 
immediate depended upon his abstract notions of a God that he imagined as giving 
significance to his universe; when that God dissappears, the abstractions become 
meaningless and hollow. 
When these abstractions become visible as systems by which man understands 
the world, they become objects of interest in themselves: and since language 
serves as the model for all cultural systems, language becomes a major object of 
interest in the twentieth century (Craige 1982,22), 
Appendix 
1, The following discussion of Freud's reading of Schreber should be considered as on 
adjunct to the conclusion of part I, 'Provocative Narratives and the Paranoid Text', 
2. The 'cure' then, involves the point at which Schreber's text becomes gothic, in 
accord with Todorov's theory (see above, 22ff, ), In these terms, Freud's 'resolution' 
of the moment of hesitation as suggested by Todorov, renders the text 'uncanny', rather 
than 'marvellous'. Yet, as is the case with the other texts examined, this moment is 
never really completed, Freud's theory of the nature and development of paranoia must 
first be elaborated: until that system is complete, Schreber's text is not 'whole- 
some', is not 'cured', and madness has not been excised from the activity of writer or 
reader, 
3. This principle was also noted to be at work in Hogg's Sinner (see above, 63 and 
74), and is present in Stevenson's 'Strange Case', This core narrative convention, 
shown here as common to contemporary science, legal practice and gothic fiction, may be 
thought of as expressing an evolving paranoid dynamic within the Enlightenment faith in 
reason, based in the shared goal of total knowledge, and shared fear of defeat, This 
is only one facet of Freud's presentation of psychoanalysis, the 'nineteenth-century' 
as opposed to the more sceptical and relativist 'twentieth-century' basis of his 
thought; the tension between them is evident in his essay 'The Future of a Illusion' 
discussed above (291), As Con Davis and Schleifer have pointed out. Freud suggests 
that psychoanalysis is 'the fulfillment of the Enlightenment dream of reason so that 
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even the darkest powers with which psychoanalysis traffics can come to be governed by 
consciousness and knowledge' (1991,30). 
4. The psychiatrist, Michael Shepherd has drawn the analogy between psychoanalysis and 
detective fiction in Sherlock Holees and the Cu. of Dr. Freud, calling Freud the 
archetypal detective and prototypical mental healer (1985,27). 
5. A similar urgency features in the approach of the narrator to Bartleby in 
Melville's 'Bartlebv the Scrivener', Though written in 1853, it could be considered an 
early precedent of Freud's psychoanalytic procedure, as regards the presentation of an 
individual (rather than an event, for example) as an enigma to be solved by the 
narrator/analyst. 
6, Thus Freud's own response to madness in fiction, and in Schreber's hesoirs, relates 
to both Todorov's and Punter's view of the gothic text as identifiable through the 
presence of 'taboo'. Both Schreber's deioirs and Hoffman's 'The Sandman' become gothic 
through the reading-effect. arising from their treatment of madness, that is observable 
in Freud's interpretations. 
7. The scope of Freud's thinking here seems to reveal further the telling proximity of 
his thought processes to those of Schreber, suggesting the paranoid basis of 
psychoanalysis as Freud presents it, in its Herculean task of suturing the rent left by 
the destruction of the 'religious illusion'. 
8. Here again. Lacan seems to be closer to both Freud and Schreber than at first 
appears. This is also an instance of the way in which the focus upon language, the 
'textualisation' of self and world, comes to legitimise the breadth of commentary 
exhibited by the writers discussed in the general conclusion, 
9. This situates TAe UnnamaOle as a foreshadowing of Lacan's proposition in its 
expression of the profound anxiety generated in the activity of speaking/writing, 
10. The theories of Fredric Jameson, for example (discussed above in both in the final 
chapter and the general conclusion). 
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11, This discussion elaborates upon the issues that are raised in the introduction to 
part II, and carried through into the examination of fictional texts, in particular 
those of Beckett and Hyvrard, It also has some bearing upon Woolf's presentation of 
Septimus's madness in terms of fragmented and discontinuous thought processes (see 
above, 'Authentic Dis-continuity in Woolf's Mrs, Oallova ), 
12, This might seem an adequate description of Hyvrard's avant-garde writing, 
revealing the level on which it is, perhaps, consciously crafted to communicate or 
represent the psychotic state of mind of the protagonist in a manner recognisable to 
contemporary readers, However, in this case Hyvrard suggests not a 'failure' or an 
'inability', so much as a refusal to take the role of the other, 
13, These psychiatric theories have, in the context of this study, most bearing upon 
Beckett's The Unnamable, (Beckett is himself known to have carried out some research 
in this area: cf, Barnard 1970). 
14, As discussed in the general conclusion above, with regard to the work of Foucault, 
Jameson. Deleuze and Guattari; also in the fictional domain, Doris Listing's Sriefiflp 
for a Descent into Hell and Hyvrard's Mother Death (which is discussed at length in the 
final chapter above). 
15, Laing's representation of schizoid existence may be said, in this sense, to find 
its fictional expression in earlier texts examined: that of Melville's 'Bartleby the 
Scrivener'; and those of Gilman and Woolf - texts which seem to express or interpret 
such a vision from a feminist position, Most significantly for this thesis, however, 
is its marked influence upon the later writers mentioned in note 14 above, 
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